ROUNDTREE v. SANTIAGO et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 6/3/2021. (pr,N.M)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DERRICK ROUNDTREE,

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Plaintiff
v.
OFFICER D. SANTIAGO,
et al.,
Defendants

Civ. No. 20-20744(RMB-MJS)
OPINION

BUMB, DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Derrick Roundtree, a prisoner confined at Bayside
State Prison in Leesburg, New Jersey, brings this civil rights
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff
did not pay the filing fee and his application to proceed in forma
pauperis

under

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(a)

(“IFP

application”)

is

incomplete because he did not submit a certified copy of his inmate
trust account statement. Before this action may proceed, Plaintiff
must either pay the $350 filing fee and $50 administrative fee, or
file a properly completed IFP application. 1 Pursuant to Brown v.

1

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) provides:
A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or
appeal a judgment in a civil action or
proceeding without prepayment of fees or
security therefor, in addition to filing the
affidavit filed under paragraph (1), shall
submit a certified copy of the trust fund
account
statement
(or
institutional
equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the

Sage, courts have “the discretion to consider the merits of a case
and

evaluate

an

IFP

application

in

either

order

or

even

simultaneously.” 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 1303 (2020). The Court will exercise its discretion to
consider the merits of the complaint.
When a prisoner is permitted to proceed without prepayment of
the filing fee or when the prisoner pays the filing fee for a civil
action and seeks redress from a governmental entity, officer or
employee of a governmental entity, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B);
1915A(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1) require courts to review the
complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are (1) frivolous
or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
will dismiss permit certain claims to proceed upon Plaintiff’s
payment of the filing fee or grant of permission to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismiss the remainder of the claims without
prejudice.

complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from
the appropriate official of each prison at
which the prisoner is or was confined.
2

I.

Sua Sponte Dismissal
Courts must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro

se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Thus, “a pro se complaint,
however

inartfully

standards

than

pleaded,

formal

must

pleadings

be

held

to

drafted

by

‘less

stringent

lawyers.’”

Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Court personnel reviewing pro
se pleadings are charged with the responsibility of deciphering
why the submission was filed, what the litigant is seeking, and
what claims she may be making.” See Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the
U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Jonathan D.
Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness
in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern
District of New York, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 305, 308 (2002)).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
3

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556.) Legal conclusions, together with threadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, do not suffice to state a
claim. Id.
Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
Id. If a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a district
court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice but must permit
the amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103,
108 (3d Cir. 2002).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

The Complaint

The named defendants in the complaint are employees of South
Woods State Prison, including Officer D. Santiago, Officer Stade,
Officer Murphy, Officer Echevaria, Officer Volov, Officer Craney,
John Does #1-3 and Jane Does #1-3. Plaintiff alleges the following
facts in his complaint, accepted as true for purposes of this
screening opinion. In 2016, Plaintiff was incarcerated at South
Woods State Prison. (Compl., ¶ 19, Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed a
grievance against Officer S. Waters for using threatening and
4

abusive language against him. (Compl., ¶ 20, Dkt. No. 1.) He spoke
to Sergeant Saul about the incident, but Saul did nothing. (Id.,
¶ 21.) Several days later, Plaintiff had words with Officer Waters,
who directed him to “lock in.” (Id., ¶ 22.) Several officers soon
arrived at Plaintiff’s cell and told him to put his hands in the
port to be handcuffed. (Id., ¶ 23.) Believing this was how officers
typically assaulted inmates, Plaintiff refused to put his hands in
the port until Lieutenant Taylor was called. (Id.) Lieutenant
Taylor arrived and told Plaintiff nobody would hurt him, and
Plaintiff put his hands in the port. (Id., ¶ 24.) An officer,
identified in the complaint as Jane Doe No. 1, began spraying mace
through the port. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit,
where he indicated that he was okay. (Id.) A call came over the
radio directing that Plaintiff be taken to E.C.U. for observation.
(Id., ¶ 25.) In the E.C.U., Plaintiff was served with a misconduct,
which he alleges contained false charges. (Id., ¶ 26.) After a
disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty and sanctioned.
(Id., ¶ 27.) He was transferred to New Jersey State Prison to serve
his sanction in the administrative segregation unit, and was
transferred back to South Woods State Prison on November 27, 2018.
(Id., ¶¶ 28, 29.)
On December 29, 2018, Defendant Santiago approached Plaintiff
and said Officer Murphy told him that Plaintiff was a tough guy
5

who liked to put his hands on women. (Compl., ¶ 30, Dkt. No. 1.)
Plaintiff responded loudly because he wanted to attract attention,
fearing that Santiago was going to assault him. (Id., ¶ 31.)
Sergeant Session responded to the area and told Plaintiff to return
to his unit and let him know if he had any more trouble with
Santiago. (Id., ¶ 32.)
On January 1, 2019, Santiago approached Plaintiff in the
medication line and tried to initiate an argument, but Officer
Slusarczyk told Plaintiff to ignore it, and Plaintiff complied.
(Id., ¶ 33.) As Plaintiff was leaving, Officers Santiago and Murphy
punched him and Officers Volov, Echevarria, Stade and Craney joined
in the assault. (Id.,

¶¶ 35-38.) The officers punched, kicked,

sprayed mace, hit Plaintiff with a metal baton, spat on him and
used racial slurs. (Id.)
Plaintiff was sent to the medical unit where x-rays were
ordered. (Id., ¶ 38.) He was subsequently hospitalized at Cooper
Medical Center, where he remained for five days. (Id.)

Plaintiff

suffered impairment of sight in his left eye and multiple abrasions
and contusions. (Id., ¶ 40.) Upon returning to South Woods State
Prison, Lieutenant John Doe took Plaintiff’s knee brace away from
him. (Id., ¶ 41.) According to Plaintiff, Defendants issued false
misconducts against him to cover up for their unprovoked assault.
(Id., ¶ 42.) After a disciplinary hearing held on January 14, 2019,
6

Plaintiff was found guilty of the charges, and was transferred to
the administrative segregation unit. (Compl., ¶¶ 43, 44, Dkt. No.
1.)
Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary sanction using the prison
grievance

procedure,

and

his

appeal

was

denied

(Id.,

¶

45.)

Plaintiff then appealed the disciplinary decision to the New Jersey
Appellate Division, but his appeal remained pending when he filed
the instant complaint. (Id., ¶¶ 46-48.) On September 15, 2019,
Plaintiff was advised that no charges would be filed as a result
of the Department of Corrections Special Investigation Division’s
(“SID”) investigation of the matter. (Id., ¶ 49.) Plaintiff told
the SID investigators that something had been done to the cameras
to prevent review of the incident. (Id., ¶ 51.)
Plaintiff raises claims of excessive force and retaliation
for exercise of his constitutional rights, as well as violation of
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. For relief, Plaintiff
seeks monetary damages, declaratory judgment, and any other relief
deemed just and proper. (Id., Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9.)
B.

Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

A plaintiff may assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides, in relevant part:
7

Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress....
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and that the constitutional deprivation
was caused by a person acting under color of state law. West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1998); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560,
563 (3d Cir. 2011).
1.

Statute of Limitations

“A section 1983 claim is characterized as a personal-injury
claim and thus is governed by the applicable state's statute of
limitations for personal-injury claims.” Dique v. New Jersey State
Police,

603

F.3d

181,

185

(3d

Cir.

2010)

(citing

Cito

v.

Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep't, 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989)).
“[A] section 1983 claim arising in New Jersey has a two-year
statute of limitations.” Id. at 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:14–2 (West 2004)). Federal law governs when the
Section 1983 claim accrues; a claim accrues and the two-year
statute of limitations begins to run when a wrongful act causes
8

damages. Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 388 (2007) (quotation omitted)).
The two-year statute of limitations expired in 2018 on the
excessive

force,

First

Amendment

retaliation

and

Fourteenth

Amendment due process claims arising out of the incidents in 2016
that are alleged in the amended complaint. According to the prison
mailbox rule, 2 Plaintiff filed his original complaint on December
27, 2020, two years after the statute of limitations expired on
any claims arising in 2016. Plaintiff does not allege any basis
for equitable tolling of the limitations period. The Court will,
therefore, dismiss the claims without prejudice as barred by the
statute of limitations, subject to amendment if Plaintiff has a
basis for equitable tolling.
2.

Eighth Amendment Claims
a.

Excessive Force Claims

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive
physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, the core judicial inquiry is … whether force was applied
in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
Under the prison mailbox rule … a pleading is deemed filed at
the time a prisoner executes it and delivers it to prison
authorities for mailing. Moody v. Conroy, 680 F. App'x 140, 144
(3d Cir. 2017) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988);
Pabon v. Superintendent S.C.I. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d
Cir. 2011)).
9
2

maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
that he suffered an unprovoked beating by the named defendants,
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims may proceed
against the following defendants, Officer D. Santiago, Officer
Stade, Officer Murphy, Officer Echevaria, Officer Volov, Officer
Craney. Plaintiff did not specify whether any of the John and Jane
Doe Defendants were involved in the alleged assault on him in 2019.
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against the
Doe Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
b.

Inadequate Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff alleges that after his hospitalization in January
2019, his knee brace was confiscated by Lieutenant John Doe upon
his return to South Woods State Prison. (Compl., ¶ 41, Dkt. No.
1.)

“Only

‘deliberate

‘unnecessary
indifference

and
to

wanton
the

infliction

serious

of

medical

pain’

or

needs”

of

prisoners are sufficiently egregious to rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting White v. Napoleon, 897 F2d 103, 108-09 (3d
Cir.

1990)).

Deliberate

indifference

may

be

shown

“where

‘knowledge of the need for medical care [is accompanied by the]
... intentional refusal to provide that care,’” Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst.
10

Inmates v. Lanzaro, (“MCCI”) 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)
(quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th
Cir. 1985)) (alterations in original)).
The Court infers that Plaintiff was prescribed a knee brace
when he was treated at Cooper Hospital. Therefore, Plaintiff has
adequately alleged a serious medical need. See MCCI, 834 F.2d at
347 (“a serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's
attention.’”)

However,

Plaintiff

does

not

provide

enough

information for the Court to analyze this claim against Lieutenant
“John

Doe.”

For

instance,

Plaintiff

failed

to

allege

that

confiscation of his knee brace violated the doctor’s orders, failed
to allege why the knee brace was confiscated, and failed to allege
whether the brace was returned to Plaintiff or whether the prison
medical staff determined the knee brace was no longer necessary
because they provided alternative treatment for Plaintiff’s knee
injury. If Plaintiff can provide additional relevant facts, he may
reallege this claim in an amended complaint.
3.

First Amendment Retaliation Claims

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim for engaging
in constitutionally protected conduct, a plaintiff must allege
that “(1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he
11

suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and
(3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or
motivating factor in the decision to discipline him.” Watson v.
Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn,
241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Plaintiff

alleges

he

suffered

severe

injury

because

he

“exercised his First Amendment right to free speech.” (Compl., ¶
53, Dkt. No. 1.) The Court construes the amended complaint as
alleging that the named defendants physically assaulted Plaintiff
in retaliation for the grievance he filed against Officer Waters
in 2016. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege facts suggesting that
his constitutionally protected conduct of filing a grievance was
a motivating factor in the physical assault on him. Plaintiff
alleged that he submitted a grievance against Officer Waters in
2016, but he alleges the named defendants physically assaulted him
in retaliation nearly three years later, in 2019. “[T]he timing of
the alleged retaliatory action must be ‘unusually suggestive’ of
retaliatory motive before a causal link will be inferred.” Watson,
834 F.3d at 424. “[W]here the temporal proximity is not so close
as to be ‘unduly suggestive,’ the appropriate test is ‘timing plus
other

evidence.’”

Id.

at

424

(quoting

Farrell

v.

Planters

Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281 (3d Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff’s
allegation that Defendants Santiago and Murphy accused him of being
12

a tough guy who liked putting his hands on women, just before they
assaulted him, does not create a reasonable inference that they
assaulted Plaintiff because he filed a grievance against Officer
Waters in 2016.
Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ “bogus
misconducts” against him were made in retaliation for his initial
grievance, and to “cover for their brutal assaults against the
Plaintiff.” (Compl., ¶¶ 42, Dkt. No. 1.) However, Plaintiff failed
to provide specific details describing the charges made against
him, including who made the charges and how they were false. The
Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims
against

Officer

D.

Officer

Echevaria,

Santiago,
Officer

Officer
Volov,

Stade,

Officer

Officer

Murphy,

Craney,

without

prejudice because he failed to allege a connection between the
initial

grievance

against

S.

Waters

and

the

assault

against

Plaintiff in 2019. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged how any
John or Jane Doe defendant was involved in the retaliation claims,
thus, the retaliation claims against the Doe Defendants will also
be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is permitted to file an
amended complaint if he can allege additional facts in support of
a First Amendment retaliation claim.
4.
Plaintiff

Fourteenth Amendment Claim
raises

a

claim

under
13

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

without providing any specific explanation of the claim. The Court
liberally construes the amended complaint as raising a Due Process
claim(s) in connection with Plaintiff’s 2019 disciplinary hearing,
which resulted in a finding of guilt and sanctions including
administrative segregation. “[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official

defendant,

through

the

official's

own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676 (2009). Plaintiff did not specify what each defendant
did to deprive him of due process. (Compl., ¶¶ 42–45, Dkt. No. 1.)
Although Plaintiff alleges the disciplinary charges against him
were false, he also alleges that he was found guilty after a
disciplinary hearing, and his appeal remains pending before the
New Jersey Appellate Division. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 645 (1997) (if the nature of a plaintiff’s challenge to the
procedures

employed

in

a

prison

disciplinary

hearing

would

necessarily invalidate the decision of the hearing officer, the
claim is not cognizable under Section 1983 until the hearing
officer’s

decision

Therefore,

the

claim(s)

without

Court

is

vacated
will

prejudice.

or

dismiss
If

the

otherwise
the

invalidated).

Fourteenth

Court

has

not

Amendment
construed

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim as Plaintiff intended it,
Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that alleges what each
defendant did to violate his rights protected by the Fourteenth
14

Amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims arising
from the alleged assault against Plaintiff in January 2019 by the
named defendants may proceed after he pays the filing fee or is
granted IFP status. The Court will dismiss the remainder of the
Section 1983 claims in the amended complaint without prejudice.

An appropriate order follows.

DATE:

June 3, 2021
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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