LIN-HENDEL et al v. DUPUIS et al

Filing 59

OPINION AND ORDER denying Plaintiffs' request to vacate foreclosure, sheriff's sale, and eviction and for a six-month leave; Counsel for the Chubb Defendants are directed to serve a copy of this letter by e-mail to plaintiffs at the addresses provided in their letter 58 ; Plaintiffs are directed to provide the Court with updated contact information for future correspondences and receipt of filings. Signed by Judge Edward S. Kiel on 8/30/2024. (tf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DR. RUDOLF H. HENDEL and
DR. CATHERINE GEI-INN LINHENDEL,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 23–cv–03956–ESK–EAP

OPINION AND ORDER

v.
K.R. DUPUIS, et al.,
Defendants.
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on plaintiffs Rudolf H.
Hendel, Ph. D. and Catherine Lin-Hendel, Ph. D.’s letter concerning pending
motions to dismiss (ECF No. 58); and the Court finding:
1.
Plaintiffs filed an emergent petition seeking to “[s]tay … the
unlawful looting of [their] home through the fraudulently obtained 1/04/2023
Sheriff’s Sale,” which included references to state-court and bankruptcy
proceedings. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs later filed a “Civil Rights Violations and
RICO Crimes COMPLAINT,” styled more traditionally as a complaint, alleging
assault of property rights, bad faith, fraud, slander, and defamation also related
to a foreclosure, sheriff’s sale, and related proceedings. (ECF No. 11.)
2.
Following reassignment of this case to me (ECF No. 25), I permitted
defendants to file motions to dismiss (ECF No. 27). Eight motions to dismiss,
all currently pending, followed. (ECF Nos. 29, 30, 37, 38, 41, 42, 47, 48.) I
noted in an August 8, 2024 text order that plaintiffs had failed to file any
opposition to the motions. (ECF No. 51.) I later learned that defendants
Chubb Insurance Company of New Jersey and Great Northern Insurance
Company (Chubb Defendants) failed to provide plaintiffs with notice of their
motion to dismiss until after the motion date. (ECF Nos. 52, 56.) I provided
plaintiffs leave to file an opposition to Chubb Defendants’ motion to dismiss and
directed plaintiffs to confer with counsel for other defendants for leave to file
belated oppositions to the other pending motions. (ECF Nos. 55, 57.) The
pending letter followed. (ECF No. 58.).
3.
Plaintiffs represent that Lin-Hendel has suffered multiple serious
health issues in recent months and is still recovering. (Id. p. 3.) Plaintiffs’

application for a hardship stay of their eviction was unsuccessful and they were
evicted from the subject property on August 22, 2024. (Id. pp. 2, 3.) A
consequence of their eviction is that they no longer have access to their legal
materials still located in the property and thus cannot use them to defend
against the pending motions to dismiss. (Id. p. 5.) They request “that this
Court vacate all the criminally fraudulent Foreclosure, Sheriff’s Sale and
Eviction, and grant Plaintiffs a 6-months leave to continue to prosecute this
Complaint.” (Id. p. 7.)
4.
“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents district courts from
mistakenly relying on their original jurisdiction to engage in appellate review
of state-court orders.” Merritts v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 774 (3d Cir. 2023).
The doctrine applies when the federal plaintiff lost in a state-court judicial
proceeding, the state-court judgment was rendered prior to the filing of the
federal action, the federal plaintiff seeks review and rejection of the state-court
judgment, and the federal plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the statecourt judgment. Id.
5.
District Judge Zahid N. Quraishi entered an order in response to
plaintiffs’ original emergent petition directing plaintiffs to show cause “why
their claim should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine” insofar as they appeared to seek
relief from a state-court foreclosure order. (ECF No. 10 p. 2.) Plaintiffs
responded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable when the
preceding judgment is procured by fraud. (ECF No. 13 p. 6.) Judge Quraishi
did not enter a subsequent order before this matter was reassigned to me.
6.
A review of the pending motions to dismiss indicates that the
applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will be a matter to be decided by
ongoing motion practice. Without prejudging those motions, I find that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine counsels against my granting of plaintiffs’
freestanding request to vacate the foreclosure and subsequent sheriff’s sale and
eviction. See Otto v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F. App’x 161, 163 (3d Cir.
2017) (“To the extent that Otto’s complaint can be read to include a request for
the District Court to overturn or negate the state court judgment of foreclosure,
we agree that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the suit.”).
7.
I further deny plaintiffs’ request for a six-month stay of the case. I
acknowledge the hardships plaintiffs have and continue to face but note that
their oppositions to dismissal—with the exception of the Chubb Defendants’
motion—were due prior to their eviction. If plaintiffs wish to file belated
oppositions to the pending motions to dismiss, they are again directed to confer
with defendants’ counsel on a briefing schedule. (ECF No. 55.) If the parties
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cannot agree to extensions and a related briefing schedule, plaintiffs may seek
extensions from the Court by filing a written request and proposed briefing
schedule. (Id.)
Accordingly,
IT IS on this 30th day of August 2024

ORDERED that:

1.
Plaintiffs’ request to vacate foreclosure, sheriff’s sale, and eviction
and for a six-month leave is DENIED.
2.
Counsel for the Chubb Defendants are directed to serve a copy of this
letter by e-mail to plaintiffs at the addresses provided in their letter. (ECF No.
58.)
3.
Plaintiffs are directed to provide the Court with updated contact
information for future correspondences and receipt of filings.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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