GAULT v. RIGOLI et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/24/2024. (dmr) Modified on 9/24/2024 (dmr, ).

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
KEON JAHAAD GAULT,

Civ. No. 23-22946 (RMB-MJS)

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

v.
SGT. RIGOLI, et al.,
Defendants.

IT APPEARING THAT:
1. On or about December 7, 2023, Plaintiff Keon Jahaad Gault, a pretrial
detainee confined in Cumberland County Jail in Bridgeton, New Jersey, filed a pro se
civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.)
2. Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Dkt. Nos. 1-1 and 1-2.) Plaintiff's IFP application establishes
his financial eligibility to proceed without prepayment of the $350 filing fee and will
be granted.
3. Because Plaintiff is granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to
screen his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

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granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122
(3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
4. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
5. The defendants to the complaint are Sgt. R. Rigoli, Officer R. Hasenpat,
Cumberland County Department of Corrections, and John Doe Officers 1-10.
(Compl., Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 4(b-d)). The Court construes the § 1983 claims against
Cumberland County Department of Corrections as Monell claims against Cumberland
County. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Cumberland Cnty. Freeholders, Civ. No. 21-19953(RMB-SAK),
2022 WL 861864, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2022) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“A county may be liable under Section 1983 for failing to train
its employees, resulting in a constitutional injury to the plaintiff.”))
6. Plaintiff alleges that on October 12, 2023, three housing units at Cumberland
County Jail were merged into the D-pod, due to understaffing. Sergeant Rigoli was
in charge of the merger. The unit, when full, housed 52 detainees. On October 17,
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2023, there were approximately 42 detainees in the D-pod, including Plaintiff. When
another detainee, John Devault, threatened to break the phones in the D-pod, Plaintiff
confronted him, and Devault attacked Plaintiff.
7. Officer R. Hasenpat was the housing officer on the scene when Devault
attacked Plaintiff, and he delayed calling a code to bring other officers into the unit.
Officer Hasenpat called for the inmates to lock into their respective cells, but he could
not control the unit. When Officer Hasenpat finally called a code for help, Plaintiff
was “severely injured as [he] was pushed away from the assault.”
8. Sergeant Rigoli and other officers responded to the code. The jail was
understaffed. None of the officers were able to de-escalate the situation, and the
detainees were becoming rowdy. Sergeant Rigoli entered the D-pod “barking out
commands” and directed Plaintiff to face the wall and remain still. Simultaneously,
another officer was handcuffing John Devault, but he broke away and attacked
Plaintiff. No officers shielded Plaintiff before Devault snuck up on him and struck him
in the head and face several times. Devault was arrested, and Plaintiff was taken to
the hospital where he required ten stitches and suffered a black eye. Plaintiff now
suffers chronic headaches. 11.

Liberally, construing the complaint, Plaintiff also

alleges that understaffing in the D-pod caused his injury. Plaintiff asserts Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims against the defendants for failure to protect him from
assault by another detainee and failure to intervene in the assault.
9. “‘To state a claim for damages against a prison official for failure to protect
from inmate violence, an inmate must plead facts that show (1) he was incarcerated
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under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was
deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and (3) the
official's deliberate indifference caused him harm.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 375
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (Bistrian abrogated
on other grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020)). To establish deliberate
indifference, the plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that “the prison officialdefendant [] actually [] kn[ew] or [was] aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety.”
Id. (quoting Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 25 (2001)). A plaintiff may establish
deliberate indifference through circumstantial evidence. Id. On the other hand,
“[p]rison officials may escape liability for deliberate indifference” if they show “‘for
example, … that they … actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety”
but “they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not
averted.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2012).
10. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that suggest Officer Hasenput displayed
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety when he attempted to control the D-pod by
ordering the inmates to lock into their respective cells before calling for additional
officers to assist him. The Court will dismiss the failure to protect claim against Officer
Hasenpat without prejudice. If Plaintiff can allege additional facts that establish
Officer Hasenpat’s decision not to call for immediate assistance was unreasonable
under the circumstances that existed, he may bring this claim in an amended
complaint.

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11. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that Sergeant Rigoli, who
responded to the call for help in the D-pod and attempted to restore order by calling
out commands to the inmates, was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety. There
are no facts in the complaint suggesting Sergeant Rigoli knew, or that it should have
been obvious, that John Devault would break away from the officer who was
handcuffing him and assault Plaintiff before he could be restrained. The Court will
dismiss this failure to protect claim without prejudice.
12. Plaintiff alleges that none of the defendants shielded him when John
Devault broke away from being handcuffed and assaulted him. To establish a failure
to intervene claim for “inmate on inmate attacks,” a plaintiff must allege facts showing
“the officer had ‘a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene’ and ‘simply
refused to do so.’” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 371 (quoting Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641,
650–51 (3d Cir. 2002)). The facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to suggest
the defendant officers were in a position to react quickly enough to intervene when
Devault unexpectedly broke away and snuck up on Plaintiff to assault him. The Court
will dismiss the failure to intervene claims against the defendants officers without
prejudice.
13. Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff alleges Monell claims against
Cumberland County based on the lack of a de-escalation policy at Cumberland County
Jail, failure to train officers in de-escalation of inmate fights, and that a custom of
understaffing caused the failure to protect Plaintiff’s safety.

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14.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against

Cumberland County for understaffing will be dismissed without prejudice for failing
to allege any facts suggesting that the County was deliberately indifferent to the
likelihood that the alleged understaffing at Cumberland County Jail would result in
the failure to protect inmates from inmate violence. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cook Cnty.
Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 306 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding “[t]he theory that
understaffing may have also caused [the plaintiff’s] death … is too remote to support
a verdict against the Sheriff.”)
15. Plaintiff alleges there is no policy in Cumberland County Jail for how staff
should respond to conflicts between detainees. The de facto policy is to “wing it.”
More specifically, Plaintiff alleges the jail lacked a “response team,” and if a response
team policy had been in effect, he would not have been injured. However, Plaintiff
also alleges the defendant Corrections Officers delayed calling a code for more officers
to respond. This implies Cumberland County Jail had a response team, but the team
was not called immediately. Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim
that the County knew the response team policy was somehow deficient, and the
deficiency in the policy itself caused Plaintiff’s constitutional injury. The Court will
dismiss the Monell policy claim against Cumberland County without prejudice.
16. Plaintiff also asserts a failure to train claim against Cumberland County,
suggesting there was no officer training on conflict de-escalation at Cumberland
County Jail. It is not clear from the complaint how Plaintiff became aware of the
failure to train Cumberland County Jail officers on de-escalation. If Plaintiff does not
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have evidentiary support for this claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3), upon
threat of sanctions, requires him to “specifically identify” that his factual contentions
“will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery.” The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s failure to train claim
against Cumberland County without prejudice for Plaintiff to plead additional facts
concerning his knowledge of Cumberland County Jail’s training program and
implementation.
17. In conclusion, this Court will grant Plaintiff's IFP application and dismiss
the complaint without prejudice.

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended

complaint.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: September 24, 2024
Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge

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