SAUZO v. THOMPSON
Filing
7
OPINION. Signed by Judge Edward S. Kiel on 10/22/2024. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CARLOS SAUZO,
Case No. 24–cv–04545–ESK
Petitioner,
v.
OPINION
WARDEN THOMPSON,
Respondent.
KIEL, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on petitioner Carlos Sauzo’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition) arguing that
the Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) failed to award him good time credits pursuant
to the First Step Act (Act).
(ECF No. 1.) Respondent Warden Thompson
opposes the Petition. (ECF No. 6.)
For the following reasons, I will deny the
Petition.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner is originally from the Dominican Republic.
(ECF No. 6–7 p. 1.)
He pleaded guilty to heroin trafficking in the Suffolk Superior Court in
Massachusetts on July 23, 2013 under the name Miguel Antonio Rivera.
No. 6–2 p. 4.)
(ECF
He was sentenced to three-and-a-half years and one day.
(Id.)
On November 4, 2016, petitioner received a 120-month sentence for conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute heroin in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas.
(ECF No. 6–4 p. 2.) Petitioner’s judgment
of conviction includes the aliases Felix Manuel Negron, Miguel Rivera, Felix
Antonio Negron, Jr., Carlos Emilio Saurzo-Martinez, Carlos Suaso-Martinez,
Miguel Antonio Rivera, Felix Negron, and Miguel Antonio Rivera, Jr.
United
States v. Sauzo, No. 5:14–cr–00071 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2016) (ECF No. 464 p. 1.)
His projected release date from Bureau custody is December 16, 2024.
(ECF
No. 6–4 p. 2.)
On March 24, 2015, the Department of Homeland Security (Department)
issued a final order of removal (Removal Order) to petitioner pursuant to the
Immigration and Nationality Act based on his aggravated felony conviction.
(ECF No. 6–7 p. 1); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
The Removal Order is issued
to “Carlos Suazo Martinez, aka Miguel Antonio Rivera and Felix Negron.”
(ECF No. 6–7 p. 1).
Petitioner filed his Petition on April 4, 2024 while confined in Fort Dix
Federal Correctional Institution (Fort Dix). (ECF No. 1.) He argues that the
Bureau erroneously determined that he was ineligible to earn good time credits
due to defects in the Removal Order.
(Id. p. 2.)
He argues that the Removal
Order is invalid because it was signed by a “field officer” instead of an Article
III or immigration judge and because it was issued before he was sentenced in
the Western District of Texas.
(Id. p. 6.)
Respondent opposes the Petition, arguing that it should be dismissed
because petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
p. 10.)
(ECF No. 6
Alternatively, respondent argues that the Petition is meritless because
the Act excludes prisoners with final removal orders from earning good time
credits.
II.
(Id. p. 13.)
Petitioner did not file a reply.
LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28, Section 2243 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a
writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or
issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why
the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the
application that the applicant or person detained is not
entitled thereto.
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A habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a federal prisoner to
challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 498–99 (1973); see also Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004).
A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than more formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
construed liberally.
A pro se habeas petition must be
See Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir.
2002).
III. DISCUSSION
“Although there is no statutory exhaustion requirement attached to
§ 2241,” the Third Circuit has “consistently applied an exhaustion requirement
to claims brought under § 2241.”
2000).
Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir.
“Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will
generally preclude federal habeas review.” Rodriguez v. Sage, No. 1:22–cv–
2053, 2023 WL 2309781, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2023) (citing Moscato v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761 (3d Cir. 1996)).
Exhaustion is required
because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual record and
apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to grant
the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the
opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.”
Moscato, 98 F.3d at 761–62.
However, “a prisoner need not exhaust
administrative remedies where the issue presented involves only statutory
construction … .”
Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2012).
I
need not decide whether petitioner was required to exhaust his claims because
they are subject to dismissal on the merits.
Under the Act, federal prisoners who meet certain criteria are entitled to
earn a maximum of 365 days of good conduct credits to be applied towards early
supervised release.
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4).
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The statute explicitly states that
a prisoner “is ineligible to apply time credits [to reduce his sentence] if the
prisoner is the subject of a final order of removal under any provision of the
immigration laws.”
Removal Order.
18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(E)(i).
Petitioner has a final
(ECF No. 6–7 p. 1) Therefore, the plain text of the Act
prohibits him from earning time credits.
The Court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to § 2241 to decide petitioner’s
challenge to the validity of his Removal Order.
“[T]he Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 … authorizes noncitizens to
obtain direct ‘review of a final order of removal’ in a court of appeals.”
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 579 (2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)).
“[A] ‘final order of removal’ is a final order ‘concluding that the alien is
deportable or ordering deportation.’”
Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)).
Additionally, the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 10943, 119 Stat. 231 (2005),
“clarified that final orders of removal may not be reviewed in district courts,
even via habeas corpus … .” Id. at 580.
“[A] petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals … shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial
review of an order of removal” and “includes all matters on which the validity
of the final order is contingent.”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); Nasrallah, 590 U.S. at
582 (internal quotation marks omitted).
I find that the plain text of the Act prohibits petitioner from earning good
time credits and that I do not have jurisdiction pursuant to § 2241 to consider
petitioner’s challenge to the validity of the Removal Order.
deny the Petition.
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Therefore, I will
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I will deny the Petition.
An appropriate
Order accompanies this Opinion.
/s/ Edward S. Kiel
EDWARD S. KIEL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 22, 2024
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