SWEENEY v. SENECA LABORATORIES, et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 5/24/2016. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

GERALD B. SWEENEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action No. 93-3479 (ES) (JAD)

SENECA LABORATORIES, INC., et
al.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Gerald B. Sweeney’s motion to revive a judgment to
recover money damages that were previously awarded against Defendants Seneca Laboratories,
Inc. and Edward S. Walter.1 (D.E. No. 29). The motion is unopposed. The Court decides the
motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons
outlined below, the motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

On November 28, 1995, the Honorable William G. Bassler, United States District Judge
for the District of New Jersey, entered judgment against Defendants, as debtors, in the amount of
$35,814.32 (the “November 28, 1995 Judgment”). (D.E. No. 29-2, Judgement Order). Defendants
subsequently appealed the November 28, 1995 Judgment, and on July 31, 1996, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed Judge Bassler. (D.E. No. 29-3, Certification of Judgment).

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Plaintiff states that Walter is the President of Seneca Laboratories, Inc. (D.E. No. 29-8; see also D.E. No.
24-1).

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On November 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed his first motion to revive judgment, asserting that
the November 28, 1995 Judgment has not been satisfied. (D.E. No. 23). On April 12, 2016, this
Court issued an Opinion denying that motion without prejudice, concluding that “Plaintiff has
failed to establish that there are no outstanding impediments” to judicial enforcement of the
judgment. (See D.E. No. 27, Opinion at 3). Specifically, the Court noted Plaintiff’s reference to
Defendant Walter’s bankruptcy proceeding and the potential for that proceeding to “serve as an
automatic stay against the November 28, 1995 Judgement.” (Id. at 2-3). Because the absence of
impediments to judicial enforcement—such as a stay or a pending bankruptcy proceeding—is a
necessary prerequisite to granting a motion to revive a judgment, see Adamar of New Jersey, Inc.
v. Mason, 942 A.2d 878, 879 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2008), the Court was unable to determine
whether revival was proper without Plaintiff clarifying whether enforcement of the November 28,
1995 Judgment would be free of impediments, (see Opinion at 2-3). Accordingly, the Court
permitted Plaintiff to refile his motion to address the deficiencies identified in the Opinion. (Id. at
3). Plaintiff filed the instant motion on April 15, 2016. (D.E. No. 29).
II.

DISCUSSION

“A judgment in this Court is accorded the same status as a judgment in the New Jersey
state courts.” Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Alliance Shippers, Inc., No. 93-1327, 2015 WL 1759581,
at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2015). Indeed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1962,
[e]very judgment rendered by a district court within a State shall be a lien on the
property located in such State in the same manner, to the same extent and under the
same conditions as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in such State, and
shall cease to be a lien in the same manner and time. . . . .
Under New Jersey law, “execution on a judgment may issue, without revival of the
judgment, at any time within 20 years after its entry.” Consolidated Rail Corp., 2015 WL
1759581, at *1 (citing N.J.S.A. § 2A:17-3). Although N.J.S.A. § 2A:17-3 bars enforcement of a
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judgment that falls outside that twenty-year period, another statute—N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-5—
provides a mechanism for a judgment holder to revive or extend the judgment for an additional
twenty years. See Adamar, 942 A.2d at 880. Under N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-5, “[a] judgment in any
court of record in this state may be revived by proper proceedings . . . within 20 years next after
the date thereof, but not thereafter.” In order to revive a judgment, a party must satisfy the
“Kronstadt elements”:
(1) the judgment is valid and subsisting; (2) it remains unpaid in full; (3) there is
no outstanding impediment to its judicial enforcement, e.g., a stay, a pending
bankruptcy proceeding, an outstanding injunctive order, or the like; and (4) the
action to revive was commenced within twenty years after the date the judgment
was entered.
Adamar, 942 A.2d at 879 (citing Kronstadt v. Kronstadt, 570 A.2d 485, 486-88 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App.
Div. 1990)). As noted, satisfying the Kronstadt elements extends the twenty-year term for New
Jersey judgments for an additional twenty-year term. Id. at 882.
Here, as an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s November 11, 2015 filing of the
motion to revive judgment is a “proper proceeding[]” and “within 20 years” of the November 28,
1995 Judgment. See N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-5; Adamar, 942 A.2d at 879.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the first two Kronstadt elements. As to the first,
Plaintiff asserts that the November 28, 1995 “Judgment remains of record and in effect, has not
been vacated, and has not been satisfied.” (D.E. No. 29-1, Certification in Support of Motion to
Reopen Case and to Renew and Revive Judgment (“Pl. Cert.”) ¶ 10; see also D.E. No. 29-6,
Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Support of Motion (“Pl. Ltr. Br.”) at 1-2). Nothing suggests otherwise.
In fact, the validity of the November 28, 1995 Judgment is bolstered by its affirmance on appeal
to the Third Circuit. (See D.E. No. 29-3, Certification of Judgment).

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As to the second Kronstadt element, Plaintiff certifies that “[n]o payments have been made
by Walter or Seneca or any other person against the Judgment; and the full amount of the
Judgment—$35,814.32 plus accrued post-judgment interest—remains unpaid.” (Pl. Cert. ¶ 11;
see also Pl. Ltr. Br. at 3). Again, nothing suggests otherwise. Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that he
was not identified as a creditor in Defendant Walter’s bankruptcy proceeding and that the
November 28, 1995 Judgment was not listed in that proceeding; accordingly, says Plaintiff, his
“claims against Walter were not discharged.” (Pl. Cert. ¶ 7; Pl. Ltr. Br. at 3; see also D.E. No. 295 (listing creditors in Defendant Walter’s bankruptcy case)).
Finally, under the third Kronstadt element, Plaintiff certifies that “[t]here is no impediment
to enforcing the Judgment.” (Pl. Cert. ¶ 9). Specifically, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Walter’s
bankruptcy proceeding was filed in 2003 and terminated in 2008 upon distribution of all assets.
(Id. ¶ 6). Plaintiff attaches both the docket sheet and list of creditors involved in that bankruptcy
proceeding, which respectively establish that Walter’s bankruptcy did, in fact, terminate in 2008
and that Plaintiff was not a creditor in that proceeding. (D.E. Nos. 29-4, 29-5). Therefore, the
Court finds that there are no impediments to enforcing the November 28, 1995 Judgment.
In sum, Plaintiff has satisfied the Kronstadt elements for reviving the November 28, 1995
Judgment under N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-5.

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III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has met the requirements for
reviving the November 28, 1995 Judgment under N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-5. Accordingly, this case must
be reopened and the November 28, 1995 Judgment must be revived for a new twenty-year term,
see Adamar, 942 A.2d at 882, running from the date of the Order accompanying this Memorandum
Opinion.
s/ Esther Salas
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

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