-CCC BAYSHORE FORD TRUCK, et al v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Filing 618

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 5/29/14. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BAYSHORE FORD TRUCK SALES, INC., a
Delaware corporation; MOTOR CITY
TRUCKS, INC., a Delaware corporation;
COLONY FORD TRUCK CENTER, INC., a
Rhode Island corporation, individually and on
Behalf of all others similarly situated,

Civil Action No. 99-0741 (JLL)

OPINION

Plaintiffs,
V.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant.

LINARES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiffs Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc.,
Motor City Trucks, Inc., and Colony Ford Truck Center, Inc., individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated, (collectively “Plaintiffs”)’s motion for reviewing, vacating, or staying
the Clerk of the Court’s opinion and order granting in part and denying in part Defendant Ford
Motor Company (“Defendant” or “Ford”)’s motion to tax costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(d). [CM!ECF No. 613.] The Court has considered the submissions made in support
of and in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion, and decides this matter without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.
I.

BACKGROUND

As the Court writes only for the parties, it will set forth only those facts it deems relevant
to deciding Plaintiffs’ motion.

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On December 8, 2005, this Court granted summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claim in favor of Plaintiffs. The Court subsequently held a trial as to eleven bellwether
Plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages between May 29 and June 26, 2012. The jury returned a
verdict awarding damages to each of the eleven bellwether Plaintiffs on June 26, 2012.
On September 25, 2012, Defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter o flaw which
this Court denied on November 21, 2012.
Defendant filed a timely appeal on November 29, 2012. On August 26, 2013, the Third
Circuit reversed this Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, with instructions
to enter judgment on Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim in Defendant’s favor. On September 9,
2013, Plaintiffs informed the Court that they filed a Third Circuit petition for a panel rehearing
and for a rehearing en banc. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 (d)( 1), the Third
Circuit’s mandate to this Court was stayed “until disposition of [Plaintiffs’] petition” for a panel
rehearing and for a rehearing en banc. Plaintiffs notified the Court that the Third Circuit rejected
their petition in its entirety on September 25, 2013. Plaintiffs then filed a petition for Writ of
Certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court denied their petition
on March 31, 2014. Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 134 S. Ct. 1762 (2014).
Having seen no reason for further delay in satisfying the Third Circuit’s mandate, this
Court entered judgment on Plaintiffs breach of contract claim in Defendant’s favor on
September 27, 2013. Plaintiffs filed separate motions under Rules 59 and 60 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the judgment and for relief from the judgment. This Court
denied Plaintiffs’ motions. (Docket #604.) Plaintiffs appealed this Courts decision to the Third
Circuit. (Docket #605, 606.) That appeal is pending.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that “[u]nless a federal statute, these
rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs

—

other than attorney’s fees

—

should be

allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). In the Third Circuit there is a “strong
presumption” that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party. Reger v. Nemours Found.
Inc., 599 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard P€B Litig., 221 F.3d 449,
462 (3d Cir. 2000)). “Only if the losing party can introduce evidence, and the district court can
articulate reasons within the bounds of its equitable power, should costs be reduced or denied to
the prevailing party.” In re Paoli, 221 F.3d at 468. “{T]he losing party bears the burden of
making the showing that an award is inequitable under the circumstances.” Id. at 462-63.
III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ motion asks this Court to: (1) stay Defendant’s application for costs; (2)
exercise its discretion to deny the taxation of the costs of the supersedeas bond Defendant posted
when it appealed this Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs to the Third
Circuit; and (3) allocate the costs recoverable by Defendant equally among Plaintiffs. This Court
denies all three of Plaintiffs’ requests.
A. Defendant’s Application for Costs is Not Premature.
Plaintiffs ask this Court to stay Defendant’s application for costs because “[amy taxation
of costs at this juncture is

.

.

.

premature...” (Plaintiffs’ Br., 11.) In support, Plaintiffs point out

that it is within this Court’s discretion to defer the taxation of costs while an appeal on the merits
is pending. (Id. (citing 1993 Amendments to Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d).) Plaintiffs argue that, because their appeal of this Court’s dismissal of their motions to
alter judgment and for relief from judgment is pending in the Third Circuit, it would be
premature to tax costs. This Court disagrees.

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Plaintiffs acknowledge that Defendant is the prevailing party. As such, the crux of their
argument that taxation of costs is premature is that they filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari
with the Supreme Court of the United States. That petition has now been denied. Thoug
h
Plaintiffs have appealed this Court’s denial of their separate motions under Rules 59 and 60 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the judgment and for relief from the
judgment, the initial appeal of the judgment on the merits of the case is over. Plaintiffs’
remaining appeal challenges only the application of the Third Circuit’s mandate to the differe
nt
plaintiffs in this case. Because there is no appeal on the merits pending, Defendant’s application
for costs is not premature.
B. Plaintiffs have Failed to Show Sufficient Evidence to Convince this Court that It Should
Exercise Its Discretion to Deny Ford’s Supersedeas Bond Costs.
This Court agrees with the Clerk of the Court’s determination that the circumstances of
this case do not warrant denying the taxation of the costs associated with Defend
ant’s
supersedeas bond. Plaintiffs do not deny that this cost is taxable under the Local Rules. Instead,
they argue that the Court should “exercise its discretion to disallow the costs of obtaining
the
unnecessary supersedeas bond” because Defendant voluntarily elected to secure the bond and
because “[hjad Ford asked the eleven Bellwether Plaintiffs to agree to waive the supersedeas
bond awaiting appeal, Plaintiffs would likely have given their consent.” (Plaintiffs’ Br.,
14-15.)
This argument is without merit. First, Plaintiffs’ characterization of Ford’s decision
to post the
supersedeas bond is misleading. Second, Plaintiffs consented to Ford’s decision to
post the bond.
By initially asking this Court to approve its supersedeas bond, Defendant was comply
ing
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) and Federal Rule of Appellate Proced
ure 8(a)(l)(B).
The purpose of the bond was to stay execution of judgment against it while its
appeal to the
Third Circuit was pending. Plaintiffs did not object to Defendant’s method of staying
execution

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of judgment against them. Thus, it is misleading for Plaintiffs to now call the posting of the
supersedeas bond as “voluntary” in order to avoid paying the cost.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ argument that they would have consented to waiving the bond
is
disingenuous. Plaintiffs never objected to the bond or suggested that they would be
willing to
waive it. In fact, Plaintiffs’ counsel “consented to the form and substance of the order and,
per
Ford’s representation, only after several rounds of negotiations.” (Docket #625 at 25.)
Plaintiffs’
counsel signed the Court Order approving Ford’s appeal bond, representing that
Plaintiffs
“hereby consent to the form and entry of this Order.” (Docket #53 7.) Thus, Plaintiffs have
failed
to show sufficient evidence to convince this Court that it should exercise its discret
ion to deny
Defendant’s supersedeas bond costs.
C. Ford’s Costs Should Be Imposed Jointly and Severally On Plaintiffs.
The default position in the Third Circuit is that taxable costs in a multi-party
case are
imposed jointly and severally on the losing parties. In re Paoli, 221 F.3d at 469.
To overcome
this default rule, “the burden [rests] on the losing parties to introduce evidence
and persuade the
court that costs should be apportioned[.]” Id. Plaintiffs have failed to produce suffici
ent evidence
to persuade this Court to deviate from the default rule.
Plaintiffs argue that this Court should set aside the Third Circuit’s default
rule and
apportion costs among the Plaintiffs because “Ford incurred costs during variou
s stages of the
litigation,” including before and after the bellwether plaintiffs were identif
ied. (Plaintiffs’ Br. at
17.) Thus, Plaintiffs argue, it would be unfair for a small number of the plainti
ffs to bear the
burden of paying all of the costs.
This argument is unpersuasive, particularly when considering that it would
also be unfair
to have Defendant, the prevailing party, collect costs from 74 different
plaintiffs individually.

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Plaintiffs also have not shown that it would be difficult for them to coordinate a way of dividing
the costs among themselves. As such, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to persuade this Court
to forgo imposing the default rule.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs motion for reviewing, vacating, or staying the
Clerk of the Court’s opinion [CM/ECF No. 613) is denied.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Linares
States District Judge

Dated: Mayç, 2014

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