ALVES, et al v. FERGUSON, et al

Filing 301

LETTER OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 2/20/2018. (JB)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CHAMBERS OF

MARTIN LUTHER KING COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT ST.
NEWARK, NJ 07101
973-645-5903

SUSAN D. WIGENTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

February 20, 2018

Mr. Joseph Aruanno, #363
Special Treatment Unit
P.O. Box 905
Avenel, NJ 07001
Plaintiff
Gurbir S. Grewal, Esq.
Michael Vomacka, Esq.
Victoria Ply, Esq.
Office of the New Jersey Attorney General
25 Market Street
P.O. Box 112
Trenton, NJ 08625
Attorneys for Defendants

LETTER OPINION FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Re:

Alves, et al. v. Ferguson, et al.
Civil Action No. 01-789 (SDW)(MCA)
Hasher, et al. v. Corzine, et al.
Civil Action No. 07-1212 (SDW)(SCM)

Litigants:
Before this Court are Plaintiff Joseph Aruanno’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction and Motion for Appointment of a Special Master. This Court having
considered the parties’ submissions and having reached its decision without oral argument
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, and for the reasons discussed below, denies
Plaintiff’s motions.

DISCUSSION
A.
Plaintiff has an extensive history of litigation before this Court. On March 12, 2007,
Plaintiff and others filed a prisoner rights complaint in this Court, Hasher v. Corzine, Civil Action
No. 07-1212 (“Hasher”). On June 4, 2008, that case was consolidated under Alves v. Ferguson,
Civil Action No. 01-789 (“Alves”), and Hasher was closed. (Hasher Dkt. No. 61.) Alves is a
consolidated class action “focused exclusively on the adequacy of the mental health treatment
provided to the residents of the State of New Jersey’s Special Treatment Unit (‘STU’)” where
Plaintiff is confined. (Alves Dkt. No. 242.) A class action settlement in Alves was approved on
December 4, 2012, and affirmed by the Third Circuit on March 20, 2014. (Alves Dkt. Nos. 220,
221, 234.) On April 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen/reinstate in Alves. (Alves Dkt.
No. 236.) This Court granted that motion on May 19, 2014, treating it as a request to reinstate
claims filed in Hasher that were not part of the Alves settlement. (Alves Dkt. Nos. 242, 243.) Alves
was closed on May 27, 2014.
In 2015/2016, Plaintiff filed additional motions to reopen/reinstate. 1 (Alves Dkt. No. 256,
274.) On November 8, 2016, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motions, finding that all his claims had
been resolved by the Alves settlement and Plaintiff had failed to offer a cognizable basis under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) 2 to reopen. (Alves Dkt. No. 278.) Plaintiff appealed and
this Court’s Order was affirmed on April 21, 2017. (Alves Dkt. Nos. 280, 287, 288.) 3
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and Motion for Appointment of a Special Master on August 16, 2017. (Alves Dkt. No.
290.) Personnel changes in the Office of the Attorney General for the State of New Jersey delayed
the Government’s opposition until January 25, 2018. (Alves Dkt. Nos. 297, 298.)
B.
When considering whether to grant a preliminary injunction, courts must consider whether
the party seeking the injunction has shown: “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she
will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even
greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.” Bimbo
Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Miller v. Mitchell, 598
F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Establishing a risk of
irreparable harm is not enough. A plaintiff has the burden of proving a clear showing of immediate

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Plaintiff also moved for, and this Court denied, the appointment of a legal guardian.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides, in relevant part, that upon a showing of “(1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief” a “court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
3
Plaintiff has also filed an “Application/Petition” to re-open/reinstate this matter. (Alves Dkt. No. 294.) Not only is
any request to reopen untimely under Rule 60(b), Plaintiff’s application merely reiterates the arguments addressed in
this Court’s November 8, 2016 Letter Opinion denying Plaintiff’s prior motions to re-open. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1) (requiring that a motion to reopen be filed within one year after entry of judgment).
2

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irreparable injury.” ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal
citations omitted). 4
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff’s
motion contains only conclusory and vague allegations of alleged harm and does not show how
the conditions of which he complains fail to meet the “minimally adequate” treatment required in
civil commitment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Although Plaintiff generally
argues that his constitutional rights are being violated by his confinement, he does not address
how the alleged harm he suffers has violated any constitutional or statutory provisions.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown he will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is denied.
Plaintiff only claims that he “suffers irreparable injury on a daily basis” but such a conclusory
allegation is insufficient. Therefore, this Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary
injunction.
C.
The appointment of a special master is limited to situations in which “exceptional
condition[s]” require it. Prudential Ins. Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 991 F.2d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir.
1993); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b) (permitting appointment of a special master only “upon a
showing that some exceptional condition requires it”). Here, Plaintiff does not present any
“exceptional condition” requiring the appointment of a special master, or indicate why a special
master is necessary in this matter. Therefore, this Court will deny Plaintiff’s request for the
appointment of a special master.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of a Special Master is
also DENIED. As the Alves matter is closed, Plaintiff is further ordered to cease filing motions in
that matter (Docket Number 01-789). Any further claims regarding the conditions of Plaintiff’s
confinement must be filed in a separate action.
An appropriate Order will follow.

___/s/ Susan D. Wigenton_____
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.

Orig: Clerk
cc:
Parties
Steven C. Mannion, U.S.M.J.
4

With respect to civil actions regarding prison conditions, “[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn,
extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least
intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). The Supreme Court has instructed courts
to play a “very limited role” in the administration of detention facilities. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584
(1984); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).

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