FREEMAN, et al v. MCGREEVEY, et al
Filing
144
ORDER denying 143 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Katharine S. Hayden on 7/14/11. (rg, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
:
ROBERT FREEMAN, ET AL.,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
Civil Action No. 03-3140 (KSH)
:
v.
:
:
JAMES E. MCGREEVEY, ET AL.,
:
OPINION & ORDER
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Defendants.
:
____________________________________:
This matter having come before the Court by way of motion of the Garden State Wine
Grower=s Association to reconsider the Order dated, filed, and entered on June 15, 2011, denying
its request to intervene in this case;
and the Court having considered the June 15, 2011 Order, the record of proceedings, and
the parties= submissions;1
and the Court deciding this motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78
and Local Civ. R. 78.1 as the submission clearly sets forth the positions and the factual basis for
the arguments;
and a motion for reconsideration being governed by Local Civ. R. 7.1(i);
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In support of its motion, the movant argues that: (1) the Court overlooked the
observations of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Mountain Top Condominium Ass=n.
v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 369 (3d Cir. 1995), that courts should Abe
reluctant@ to deny a request to intervene as untimely; (2) it moved to intervene only on the issue
of remedy within ten days of the issuance of the mandate; (3) no party will be prejudiced by its
intervention and the Court made no findings of prejudice; and (4) its participation as amicus
curiae will not sufficiently protect its interests because this status does not permit it to participate
in settlement discussions or appeal. (Mot. for Recons., Jun. 24, 2011, ECF No. 143)
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and Local Civ. R. 7.1(i) providing for the reconsideration of an order if the motion for the
same is filed within 14 days after entry of the disputed order;
and the docket reflecting that the Order was entered on June 15, 2011, and the motion for
reconsideration was filed on June 24, 2011, and therefore the motion is timely;
and the Court noting that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is Ato correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence,@ Harsco Corp. v.
Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985); see also P. Shoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant
Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001); Yurecko v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 279
F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (D.N.J. 2003);
and a court may grant a properly filed motion for reconsideration for one of three reasons:
A(1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred, (2) evidence not previously
available has become available, or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice,@ Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. & Publ=g Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1216,
1220 (D.N.J. 1993) (citing Weyerhaeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (D.
Md. 1991)); Carmichael v. Everson, Civ. No. 03-4787, 2004 WL 1587894, at *1 (D.N.J. May 21,
2004);
and Local Civ. R. 7.1(i) requiring that the moving party set forth Aconcisely the matters or
controlling decision which counsel believes the Court has overlooked,@ G-69 v. Degnan, 748 F.
Supp. 274, 275 (D.N.J. 1990) (citing former version of the rule);
and a motion for reconsideration being improper when it is used Ato ask the Court to
rethink what it had already thought through C rightly or wrongly,@ Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza
Corp., Civ. No. 91-5286, 1993 WL 90412, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 1993) (citing Oritani Sav. &
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Loan Ass=n v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 744 F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990), rev=d on other
grounds, 989 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1993));
and because reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy,
motions to reconsider or reargue are granted Avery sparingly,@ Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp.
621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986); accord Damiano v. Sony Music Entm=t, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623, 634
(D.N.J. 1997);
and the movant not arguing that there has been an intervening change in the law or that
facts have been overlooked;
and the Court finding that the caselaw the movant asserts the Court overlooked does not
warrant reconsideration;
and the Court further finding that allowing the June 15, 2011 Order to stand will not
result in a manifest injustice;
and for the reasons set forth herein;2
2
The Court finds no basis to reconsider the June 15, 2011 Order. First, the Court
followed the analysis set forth in Mountain Top. The Court considered the conjunctive
requirements of Rule 24 that must be satisfied for a party to intervene, Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at
366, concluded that the movant did not satisfy the timeliness element, and accordingly found no
need to consider the other elements. (Order 2, Jun. 15, 2011, ECF No. 141.) As to the
timeliness element, the Court considered, as suggested by Mountain Top, when the movant
should have known its interests may be implicated by the decisions in this case. (See Order 2.)
The movant failed to persuade the Court that it had good reason to assume that the state=s interest
completely paralleled the interests of in-state wine producers. The movant had sufficient
information to conclude that its interests may not be represented by the parties long before the
Court of Appeals issued its mandate. (Id.) Indeed, the Court of Appeals decision did not make
the movant=s entry suddenly appropriate, but rather confirms that no party represented the
movant=s interests even before the decision was rendered. Cf. Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d
146, 160 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that A[n]either defendant nor intervenors attempts to save the
provisions of the ABC Law allowing in-state wineries to make direct sales to consumers and
retailers@). Moreover, the in-state wholesalers were cognizant of this case and its impact on their
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interests and sought intervention years earlier on the same facts available to the movant. (See
Mots. to Intervene, Sept. 13, 2005, Sept. 16, 2005, ECF Nos. 35, 37, 38, 40.) Although the
movant argues that the Court should Abe reluctant@ to deny intervention based upon untimeliness,
Mountain Top also directs courts to consider Aall the circumstances.@ Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at
379 (quoting In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 695 F.2d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1982)); accord NACCP
v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). Having done so, the Court finds that the record shows
the movant had sufficient information to take steps to participate long before the conclusion of
the pretrial proceedings and appellate review but failed to act. See NAACP, 413 U.S. at 367
(affirming denial of intervention where movants failed to protect their interests in a timely
fashion when there was a Astrong likelihood@ of how the parties would act and it was thus
incumbent upon them Ato take immediate affirmative steps to protect their interests@).
Second, the movant fails to persuade the Court that allowing the movant to be heard as
amicus curiae created a manifest injustice or an error of law. The movant contends that amicus
status inadequately protects the interests of in-state wine growers. The posture of this case on
remand, however, undercuts that argument. The Court of Appeals found that the statutory
scheme at issue to be unconstitutional and provided only two options for a proper remedy on
remand. Freeman, 629 F.3d at 164. To remain consistent with that mandate, the chosen
remedy must place in-state wine growers and out-of-state wine growers on equal footing through
one of these two options. See id. at 158B160. As a result, the future briefs in this case, whether
from a party or an amicus, must argue the merits and/or weaknesses of each option. Because the
Court will weigh those arguments whether they come from a party or an amicus, the interests that
movant seeks to protect can be adequately represented in its amicus submission.
Third, and relatedly, the alleged inability to participate in an appeal is belied by
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 1979), where the Court
of Appeals observed that proposed intervenors are not prejudiced even when they are denied
intervention because they have been granted amicus status and thereby had an opportunity to
present their views.
Fourth, the movant=s complaint that the Court did not address prejudice does not warrant
reconsideration. As the Court of Appeals has stated Athe stage of the proceeding is inherently
tied to the question of the prejudice the delay in intervention may cause to the parties already
involved.@ Mountain Top, 72 F.3d at 370. Notably, the movant never stated why the existing
parties would not be prejudiced by its intervention. (See Garden State Wine Grower=s Ass=n Br.
16B17, Mar. 25, 2011, ECF No. 140.) Although no party objected to the request to intervene,
this does not mean that they would not be prejudiced by the tardy motion. If the movant were
permitted to intervene, it arguably may attempt to seek discovery or otherwise attempt to dictate
the pace of the proceedings. The movant=s late action could delay the Court=s and the parties=
efforts to promptly address remedy. The Court can ensure this does not occur by allowing the
parties to proceed on the record established through the pretrial process and simultaneously
preventing late-comers from disrupting an expeditious proceeding. Thus, while intervention
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could prejudice the parties, denying intervention does not prejudice the movant as the Court has
provided an avenue for it to voice its concerns. Therefore, the absence of prejudice to the
movant in this case and potential prejudice to the overall proceedings by its last minute request to
participate supports the decision to deny intervention.
For these reasons, the movant has failed to show that the Court has overlooked
controlling law, facts, or evidence or that a failure to reconsider the Order will result in a
manifest injustice. Therefore, the movant has failed to satisfy the requirements for
reconsideration and the motion for reconsideration is denied.
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and for good cause shown;
IT IS on this 14th day of July, 2011
ORDERED that the Garden State Wine Grower=s Association=s motion for
reconsideration of portions of the Order dated June 15, 2011 denying its motion to intervene
[Docket Entry No. 143] is denied.
/s/ KATHARINE S. HAYDEN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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