WILSON v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES (C.M.S.) et al

Filing 69

OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 6/15/10. (gh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT D I S T R IC T OF NEW JERSEY

E U G E N E R. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. C O R R E C T I O N A L MEDICAL SERVICES, et a l., Defendants.

C iv il Action Number: 2:07-5826

O P IN IO N H O N . WILLIAM J. MARTINI

O P IN IO N 1 I. INTRODUCTION In this civil rights action asserting both federal and state theories of liability, the p la in tif f , a state prisoner, alleges that he was seriously injured by improper medical care (in c lu d in g the alleged lack thereof). Defendants Correctional Medical Services ("CMS"), N ira n ja n a Shah, M.D., Jeane Betha, C.M.A., and Rosenleine Prophete's, R.N. ("Medical D e f e n d a n ts " ) have brought a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his a d m in is tra tiv e remedies.

For the convenience of the reader of this document in electronic format, hyperlinks to the Court's record and to authority cited herein may be inserted. No endorsement of any p ro v id e r of electronic or other resources is intended by the Court's practice of using h yp e r l i n k s .

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After initial briefing on the exhaustion issue, the Court issued an opinion. In that o p in io n , the Court explained that Plaintiff's Inmate Request Forms or IRFs indicate that P la in tif f took no administrative appeals from his initial administrative grievances and that th is would indicate that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by s ta tu te . Rather than terminate this action at that time, the Court, in an abundance of caution, d ire c te d the Department of Corrections ("DOC") to do a "complete, and diligent search of th e ir records for all other [Inmate Request Forms] which may be relevant to this action, and to supply the Court and Plaintiff with a copy of all such IRFs ... in conjunction with a c e rtif ic a tio n or declaration explaining what was found. " Plaintiff was given an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff requested an extension in which to respond, which was granted, and then P la in tif f responded. For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT the Medical Defendants' M o tio n to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 15), as to all Defendants on exhaustion grounds, the remaining m o tio n s to dismiss, (Doc. No. 59 & Doc. No. 67), are DISMISSED as moot, the state law c la im s are dismissed without prejudice, and this action is TERMINATED. I. F A C T S , PROCEDURAL POSTURE, AND THE CONTENTIONS OF THE P A R T IE S T h e parties are referred to the Court's prior opinion and order of March 17, 2010. S in c e that time, the parties have filed as exhibits additional IRFs filed by Wilson. None of th e filings, put forward by either party, indicate that Plaintiff took an administrative appeal o f any his IRFs which were filed during the time period at issue in this litigation. -2-

Plaintiff argues that he did not file appeals because such filings would have been " re d u n d a n t or frivolous," because by the time such an appeal would have been addressed he had filed additional initial grievances alleging the same wrong. Plaintiff also argues that he a c t e d vigorously to pursue relief and even if he did not always file formal administrative a p p e a l s , he wrote any number of government offices supporting his claim for relief and a s s e rtin g the injuries done to him by the Medical Defendants and others. Additionally, these g rie v a n c e s were ­ so Wilson alleges ­ being forwarded to the Medical Department or CMS a s a matter of course, so his writing CMS functioned as an appeal. Finally, Plaintiff alleges th a t it is common practice for prison officials not to return IRFs, thereby precluding appeals o f grievances. II. S T A N D A R D OF REVIEW T h e Motion is brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the d is m is s a l of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which re lie f can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been s ta te d , Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and dismissal is a p p ro p ria te only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiff has f a ile d to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell A tla n tic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating "no set of facts" language f o u n d in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This

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requirement "calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will re v e a l evidence of" necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. Furthermore, in o rd e r satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff must "provide the grounds of his e n title m e n t to relief," which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic re c ita tio n of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Phillips v. County of A lle g h e n y , 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (brackets and quotations marks omitted) (q u o tin g Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the c o m p la in t, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F .3 d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] t h a t a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are b a s e d on the [attached] document[s]." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. In d u s ., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are a lle g e d in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not p h ys ic a lly attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic A ss 'n , 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). Generally, the court may not rely on other parts of th e record in determining a motion to dismiss. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & F ra n k e l, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). III. A N A L Y S IS T h e Prison Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA") of 1995, as codified at 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1997e, states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under S e c tio n 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, o r other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are e x h a u s t e d . " 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).2 The exhaustion of all administrative remedies, at all le v e ls of review, is mandatory, even if (1) the prisoner believes they are ineffective, or (2) the a v a i l a b le administrative process cannot grant the desired remedy. Booth v. Churner, 532 U .S . 731, 739-41 (2001); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Therefore, to c o m p ly with the PLRA, a prisoner must properly exhaust administrative remedies as a p re c o n d itio n to bringing a federal claim in federal court, or risk defaulting the claim. Warren v . Pennsylvania, 316 Fed. Appx 109, 112 (3d Cir. 2008). As explained, not one of the IRFs put forward by either party indicates that Plaintiff e v e r took an administrative appeal of any of his grievances filed in connection with this m a tte r. Plaintiff does not even squarely deny this in his multiple filings. Plaintiff's c h a ra c te riz a tio n of the mandatory administrative appeals process as "redundant or frivolous" d o e s not excuse his noncompliance or render those procedures "unavailable" to him. M o re o v e r, Plaintiff's position that writing other government offices or CMS directly because

Generally, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense u n d e r the PLRA. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Defendants "have the burden of p le a d in g and proving the defense in a motion for summary judgment or at trial." Kounelis v . Sherrer, Civil Action No. 04-4714, 2005 WL 2175442, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2005). As e x p la in e d below, dismissal under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard based on the exhaustion defense is appropriate on the particular facts of this case. -5-

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appeals were being referred to them as a matter of course does not excuse his noncompliance. H is argument is not supported by any law. His argument that as a matter of common practice, IRFs are regularly not returned by p riso n officials (before or after appeal) is troubling. But the question is not what the common p ra c tic e is or is not in regard to other prisoners or involving other disputes between the DOC a n d Wilson, but whether Wilson's IRFs were returned to him after he filed his initial g rie v a n c e s in connection with this matter. Even the IRFs Wilson filed as exhibits in this a c tio n do not show that any appeals were taken: obviously those IRFs were returned to him. A n d Wilson does not argue that the collection of IRFs he put forward as exhibits is less than a complete set, nor does he offer any specifics in regard to any missing IRFs allegedly w ith h e ld by DOC. What particular grievance did such allegedly missing IRFs seek to v in d ic a te ? ; in relation to a harm occurring on what date?; when was the IRF initially filed; w h e n was appeal taken?; and what remedy was he offered (if any) by the administration? W ith o u t these details, even assuming there were some IRFs which neither party supplied as a n exhibit, that is, even taking Plaintiff's factual allegation in regard to the existence of u n re tu rn e d but otherwise appealed and exhausted IRFs as true, there is no reason to believe th a t the missing IRFs would furnish a sufficient basis for the legal claims at issue in this litig a tio n . Cf. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.3 For these reasons, it appears that Defendants'
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The Court has also considered the possibility that Plaintiff filed an initial grievance, but the IRF was not returned. In these circumstances, it might be argued that an appeal was not available and so is excused. But here too, Plaintiff makes no showing at all. He offers no specificity or detailed allegations in regard to any IRFs which do not appear in the record. Absent such credible allegations, -6-

exhaustion defense succeeds. The Court will exercise its discretion not to hear the s u p p le m e n ta l state law claims, which are dismissed without prejudice. IV. C O N C L U S IO N F o r the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS the Medical Defendants' M o tio n to Dismiss, (Doc. No. 15), as to all Defendants on exhaustion grounds, the remaining m o tio n s to dismiss, (Doc. No. 59 & Doc. No. 67), are DISMISSED as moot, the state law c la im s are dismissed without prejudice, and this action is TERMINATED.

DATE: June 15, 2010

s/ William J. Martini William J. Martini, U.S.D.J.

Defendants' exhaustion defense would appear to succeed. -7-