NISSEN et al v. ROZSA
Filing
87
OPINION AND ORDER denying 82 Appeal Magistrate Judge Decision to District Court. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 1/19/12. (dc, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ROBERT NISSEN and ARTHUR
BLUMENTHAL,
Civil Action No.: 08-5563 (JLL)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
v.
THEODOR ROZSA and TR STRATEGIC
GROUP, LLC
Defendant.
LINARES, District Judge,
This matter comes before the Court on appeal of Magistrate Judge Michael Hammer’s
October 31, 2011 Opinion and Order denying Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint. The Court has considered the submissions of the parties and for good cause
shown, Plaintiff’s appeal is denied.
A United States Magistrate Judge may hear and determine any [non-dispositive] pretrial
matter pending before the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The district court will
only reverse a magistrate judge’s decision on these matters if it is “clearly erroneous or contrary
to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(1)(A). Therefore,
“this Court will review a magistrate judge’s findings of fact for clear error.” Lithuanian
Commerce Corp., Ltd. v. Sara Lee Hosiery, 177 F.R.D. 205, 213 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing Lo Bosco
v. Kure Eng’g Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (D.N.J. 1995)). Under this standard, a finding is
clearly erroneous when “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). The district court will not reverse the magistrate judge’s
determination, even in circumstances where the court might have decided the matter differently.
Bowen v. Parking Auth. of City of Camden, 2002 WL 1754493, at *3 (D.N.J. July 30, 2002). “A
district judge’s simple disagreement with the magistrate judge’s findings is insufficient to meet
the clearly erroneous standard of review.” Andrews v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 191
F.R.D. 59, 68 (D.N.J. 2000).
In matters where the magistrate judge is authorized to exercise his or her discretion, the
decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Kresefky v. Panasonic
Commc’ns & Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J. 1996) (“Where, as here, the magistrate has
ruled on a non-dispositive matter such as a discovery motion, his or her ruling is entitled to great
deference and is reversible only for abuse of discretion”). “This deferential standard is
‘especially appropriate where the Magistrate Judge has managed this case from the outset and
developed a thorough knowledge of the proceedings.’” Lithuanian Commerce Corp., 177 F.R.D.
at 214 (quoting Pub. Interest Research Group v. Hercules, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 1525, 1547 (D.N.J.
1993), aff’d on other grounds and rev’d on other grounds, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995)).
However, a magistrate judge’s legal conclusions on a non-dispositive motion will be reviewed de
novo. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992); Lo Bosco, 891 F. Supp.
at 1037. A ruling is “contrary to law” when the magistrate judge has misinterpreted or
misapplied the applicable law. Pharm. Sales & Consulting Corp. v. J.W.S. Delavau Co., Inc.,
106 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (D.N.J. 2000).
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Plaintiff alleges that Magistrate Judge Hammer erred in his order denying Plaintiffs’
motion to amend complaint for failure to show good cause under Rule 16. Plaintiffs argue that
the more liberal standard of Rule 15 should have been applied. Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’
appeal and argue that review under Rule 16 was proper, and even if Magistrate Judge Hammer
had considered Plaintiff’s request under Rule 15, Plaintiffs’ request would be denied because it is
futile, unduly prejudicial, and unduly delayed.
Rule 16(b) provides that Plaintiffs must establish good cause before being allowed to
amend their pleadings. Harrison Beverage Co. v. Dribeck Importers, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 463, 469
(D.N.J. 1990). A Magistrate Judge has the discretion in determining what kind of showing the
moving party must make in order to satisfy Rule 16(b)’s requirement. Rule 15(a) provides that
amendment must be granted unless there is evidence of “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of
the amendment . . .” Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
This Court finds that Magistrate Judge Hammer properly considered Rule 16(b) when he
denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their Complaint. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend was
filed two years after the deadline to amend pleadings expired and nine months after fact
discovery ended. As Magistrate Judge Hammer correctly noted, “requiring less than good cause
would nullify the Court’s ability to enforce its [] orders.” Further, Plaintiffs did not act with due
diligence or suffer any circumstances that would constitute excusable neglect.
Plaintiffs rely on this Court’s June 2011 Opinion as good cause for their proposed
amendments. In that Opinion, this Court wrote that it would “not address causes of action raised
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for the first time in Plaintiffs’ summary judgment brief,” and noted that “the proper procedure for
plaintiffs to assert a new claim is to amend the complaint.” Plaintiffs misinterpreted this
statement as indicating that Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their Complaint. However,
this Court only intended to clarify that if Plaintiffs wished to assert news claims, they should
have attempted to amend their Complaint prior to filing their summary judgment motion.
Plaintiffs further contend that because Magistrate Judge Hammer has not managed this
matter from the outset, “has no particular knowledge of the history of this matter” and therefore
is not entitled to deference. Pl. Br. at 6. However, Plaintiffs argument completely misstates the
standard by which magistrate appeals are governed. Magistrate Judge Hammer is authorized to
exercise his discretion and it will only be reviewed for an abuse of same. That deference is
especially appropriate when a Magistrate Judge has managed a case from the outset, does not
therefore indicate that deference is not appropriate here. To the contrary, there is no indication
that Magistrate Judge Hammer did not understand the law or facts at issue in Plaintiffs’ motion.
Rather, Judge Hammer’s October 31, 2011 Opinion includes a detailed factual and legal analysis
of his decision. It is hardly the empty factless judgment that Plaintiffs describe in their appeal.
This Court finds that Magistrate Judge Hammer’s Opinion and Order was neither clearly
erroneous nor contrary to law. Furthermore, Magistrate Judge Hammer has been actively
involved in discovery and has demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the proceedings in this
matter. He is to be accorded deference under the standard set forth above.
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Accordingly, IT IS on this 19th day of January, 2012
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s appeal of Magistrate Judge Hammer’s October 31, 2011
Opinion and Order is denied.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Jose L. Linares
JOSE L. LINARES
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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