CARR v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al

Filing 53

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying Pltf.'s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint [CM/ECF No. 47 ]. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mark Falk on 5/3/12. (dc, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DR. WILLIAM CARR,
Civil Action No. 09-913 (WJM)
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, SUPERIOR
COURT OF NEW JERSEY, NEW
JERSEY JUDICIARY, PETER
CONERLY, AND COLLINS E. IJOMA,

ORDER

Defendants.

FALK, U.S.M.J.
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint. [CM/ECF No. 47.] Based upon the following, the motion is denied.

1.

Plaintiff, William Carr, was formerly employed by the Probation Division of
the Superior Court of New Jersey. He filed a Complaint on March 2, 2009,
against the State of New Jersey, the Superior Court of New Jersey, the New
Jersey Judiciary, Essex County Vicinage Chief Probation Officer Peter
Conerly, and Essex County Vicinage Trial Court Administrator Collins E.
Ijoma (collectively “Defendants”), alleging that he was denied a promotion to
Vicinage Chief Probation Officer on account of his race and in retaliation for
having filed a previous discrimination lawsuit against the Vicinage in 2000.

2.

On June 29, 2009, Defendants responded to the initial complaint by filing a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff filed a cross-motion to amend his Complaint, which was granted on
September 14, 2009. On January 13, 2010, Defendants filed a partial motion
to dismiss certain counts in the First Amended Complaint. The motion to
dismiss was granted on June 17, 2010. The operative complaint remains the
First Amended Complaint.

3.

The Undersigned issued an initial scheduling order on August 19, 2010. All
discovery was to be completed by March 1, 2011. Any amendments to the
Complaint were due by November 1, 2010. Thereafter, the scheduling order
was amended and discovery extended on two occasions. Discovery finally
closed on June 30, 2011.

4.

On January 13, 2012, following close of the discovery period, Defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion became fully briefed on
March 16, 2012.

5.

On March 20, 2012, after the motion for summary judgment became fully
briefed, Plaintiff filed the present motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint. Plaintiff’s request to amend his Complaint seeks to add an entirely
new claim of disparate impact discrimination. More specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants’ policy when considering individuals for promotion is
to ignore the candidate’s prior work history and “base the decision whether to
grant an individual a second interview on the interview panel’s subjective
belief about the performance of the candidate’s performance on the first
interview.” (Pl.’s Br. 3.) Plaintiff claims this policy has “a disparate impact.”
(Id.) Plaintiff contends that he learned of the information supporting the
claim during depositions and that the amendment should be freely granted.

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6.

Defendants oppose the motion to amend, arguing that the information that
supposedly supports the claim was known prior to the close of discovery
nearly eight months ago. They also argue that Plaintiff has delayed in filing
his motion, and that any further amendment would be prejudicial and require,
among other things, a re-opening of discovery, additional depositions, and
further motion practice.

7.

Motions to amend pleadings are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a). Once a responsive pleading has been filed, “a party may amend its
pleadings only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend is generally granted unless there is:
(1) undue delay or prejudice; (2) bad faith; (3) dilatory motive; (4) failure to
cure deficiencies through previous amendment; or (5) futility. See, e.g.,
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court has broad discretion in
determining whether to grant or deny leave to amend. See, e.g., Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1970).

8.

The Court may refuse to allow an amendment of the Complaint if a plaintiff’s
delay in seeking amendment is undue or if unfair prejudice results to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. In terms of delay, while the
mere passage of time alone does not require that a motion amend be denied,
“at some point the delay will become prejudicial placing an unfair burden on
the opposing party.” Adams v. Gould, Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 2004).
Delay may also become undue “when a movant has had previous
opportunities to amend a complaint.” Id. (citing Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d
1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) and Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Tr., 155
F.3d 644, 654-55 (3d Cir. 1998)). Ultimately, the question of delay requires
that the Court “focus on the movant’s reasons for not amending sooner.”
Adams, 739 F.2d at 868.

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9.

“Substantial or undue prejudice to the non-moving party is [also] a sufficient
ground for denial of leave to amend.” Lorenz, 1 F.3d at 1414. The issue of
prejudice requires that the Court “focus on the hardship to the defendants if
the amendments were permitted.” Adams, 739 F.2d at 868. Among other
things, prejudice may exist when permitting an amendment “would result in
additional discovery, cost, and preparation to defendant against new facts or
new theories.” Id.; see also Rolo, 155 F.3d at 655; Cornell Co., Inc. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n , 573 F.2d 820, 823-24 (3d Cir.
1978) (finding prejudice when proposed amendment changed legal and
factual basis of claim).

10.

Plaintiff’s proposed amendment is denied on the grounds of both undue delay
and unfair prejudice. Turning first to delay, this case has been pending for
more than three years. The Scheduling Order deadline for amending
pleadings and adding parties was November 1, 2010. Plaintiff claims that the
information supporting his newly proffered claim was not uncovered until
certain witnesses were deposed in June 2011, thus presumably making
amendment prior to the Scheduling Order deadline impossible. (Pl.’s Reply
Br. 3.) Defendant counters that the motion to amend could have been made
years ago. (Defs.’ Br. 6.) However, even assuming Plaintiff is correct and
that the information was not uncovered until June 2011, Plaintiff nevertheless
completely fails to explain why he delayed from June 2011 (when the
information supposedly came to light) until March 2012 (when his motion
was filed) before seeking leave to amend his Complaint for a second time.
Indeed, Plaintiff’s papers are silent on this point. The result in a nearly nine
month period of unexplained delay.

11.

Moreover, when the information supposedly supporting the new claim
came to light in June 2011, discovery was still open. Had Plaintiff raised the
issue promptly, the Court could have considered whether it would have been
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appropriate to add the claim to the case at that time. Instead, prior to raising
the issue of amendment, Plaintiff allowed discovery to close, attended a
conference with the Court in July 2011, waited until the summary judgment
motion was fully briefed, and let nearly nine months pass by. As explained
more in the following two paragraphs, this delay crosses the line from the
mere passage of time into legitimate prejudice to Defendants. The Court is
satisfied there has been undue delay in seeking leave to amend the complaint.

12.

The proposed amendment, at this stage, would also prejudice Defendants.
Plaintiff seeks to bring an entirely new claim and theory—an alleged disparate
impact claim—that will change the scope of this case. If the amendment were
allowed, Defendants would be required to defend against (and take discovery
relating to) a disparate impact claim, which differs in type and scope from the
claims in this case to date. The Court agrees with Defendants that this will
have a legitimate, prejudicial impact on Defendants’ preparation and defense.
See, e.g., Stallings ex rel. Estate of Stallings v. IBM Corp., No. 08-3121, 2009
WL 2905471, at *17 (D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2009) (“Prejudice may result from an
amendment where a party has to change tactics or case theories because of
new claims.”).

13.

In addition, Plaintiff acknowledges his newly proposed claim may require the
Court to re-open discovery, which has been closed for many months. (Pl.’s
Reply Br. 5.) It would also require the Court to defer ruling on a fully briefed
and pending summary judgment motion. The Third Circuit has approved
denial of leave to amend where, as here, there has been a delay in seeking
leave; the amendment injects new issues into the case; and the amendment
requires additional discovery, including the re-opening of a closed discovery
period. See, e.g., Bergen v. Edgewater Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 911, 924 (3d
Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is plain that allowing the amendment would inject new issues
into the case requiring extensive discovery. The motion came not only four
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and one-half months after the information on which it was based became
available, but also after the close of an extended discovery period.”); Clark v.
Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 624 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming denial of motion to amend
based on unexplained three month delay and prejudice resulting from new
theories and need for additional discovery). This Court finds that it would be
prejudicial to Defendants to re-open the long closed discovery period, put
aside the fully briefed motion for summary judgment, and force Defendants to
only now begin to evaluate a new claim that could have been brought many
months ago and which could require additional and different discovery than
has been taken in this case to date. See, e.g., Bergen, 911 F.2d at 924;
Stallings, 2009 WL 2905471, at *17 (“Prejudice may also result where the
amendment will require the re-opening of discovery, would delay resolution
of the matter, or would unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation” (citation
omitted)).

14.

Based on the above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file a second amended complaint must be denied on the bases of undue delay
and unfair prejudice.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS on this 3rd day of May 2012,
ORDERED that, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint
[CM/ECF No. 47] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
s/Mark Falk
MARK FALK
United States Magistrate Judge

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