PRESSLEY v. EAST DISTRICT PRECINCT et al
Filing
112
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 10/22/15. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 09-3215 (WJM)
DORIAN PRESSLEY,
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
EAST DISTRICT PRECINCT, et al.,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Dorian Pressley filed this action against six police officers
(“Defendants”), raising an excessive force claim. This matter comes before the Court on
Plaintiff’s appeal of Magistrate Judge Falk’s August 20, 2015 Order denying Plaintiff’s
motion to reopen discovery and compel additional discovery. There was no oral
argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s appeal is
DENIED, and Judge Falk’s August 20, 2015 Order is AFFIRMED.
I.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
In July 2009, Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights Complaint, alleging that
Defendants assaulted him during the course of his arrest. ECF doc. 1. In March 2010,
then-Magistrate Judge Shwartz denied Plaintiff’s motion to appoint pro bono counsel
because he failed to satisfy the factors set forth in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d
Cir. 1993). ECF doc. 14. Judge Shwartz found that Plaintiff “demonstrated an
understanding of the actions he should take in furtherance of his claim.” Id. at 2. In
November 2010, Judge Shwartz denied Plaintiff’s discovery request for police records.
ECF doc. 31. Discovery concluded in March 2011. See ECF doc. 38.
In January 2012, Judge Cavanaugh denied Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. ECF docs. 47, 48. In September 2013, Plaintiff moved to reopen discovery
and for additional discovery. ECF docs. 64, 66, 68. Magistrate Judge Clark denied the
request. ECF doc. 69. In October 2014, this Court granted Plaintiff pro bono counsel.
ECF doc. 86. The Court stated that, “[t]he case is now ready for trial,” and appointed
counsel based on the factors set forth in Tabron. Id.
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In July 2015, Magistrate Judge Falk entered an order scheduling a final pretrial
conference. ECF doc. 96. Plaintiff, through counsel, again sought to reopen discovery
and compel limited discovery, i.e., the Defendants’ depositions and the production of
police records, including police “closeout reports.” ECF doc. 97. Plaintiff also sought to
present two expert witnesses at trial. Id. Defendants opposed. ECF doc. 99. In August
2015, Judge Falk held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion. ECF doc. 106 (Tr.).
At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Falk denied Plaintiff’s motion. Id. at 12.
Judge Falk reasoned that: (1) Judge Shwartz had previously determined that Plaintiff
demonstrated an understanding of the actions he should take in furtherance of his claim;
(2) when this Court appointed pro bono counsel, it was to help Plaintiff try his case, and
not because the Court intended to reopen discovery; and (3) appointment of pro bono
counsel does not constitute good cause for reopening discovery. Id. at 12-15. Judge Falk
did, however, order Defendants to produce the closeout reports. Id. at 15; see also ECF
doc. 103 (Order).
B. The Instant Appeal
Plaintiff now appeals Judge Falk’s Order. ECF doc. 105. Plaintiff claims that
Judge Falk’s decision is “contrary to law,” because Judge Falk analyzed his motion under
the Tabron standard, not the good cause standard. Id at 2. Plaintiff also argues that he
should “be granted ‘wider latitude’ as to discovery issues because he was acting pro se
during the entirety of the discovery period.” Id. (citing Childers v. Slater, 197 F.R.D.
185, 188 (D.D.C. 2008)).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Judge Falk erred in describing prior opinions of this
Court as stating that “it’s not clear that the case will turn on credibility determinations or
to what extent,” because this Court opined in its October 2014 Order that the case was
likely to turn on credibility determinations. Id. at 5. Defendants oppose. ECF doc. 109.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may reverse a magistrate judge’s order if it finds the ruling to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);
L. Civ. R. 72.1(c)(1)(A). However, this Court recognizes the discretion afforded to the
Magistrate Judge in case management matters, including scheduling deadlines. See
Spencer v. Cannon Equip. Co., CIV. 07-2437, 2009 WL 1883929, at *4 (D.N.J. June 29,
2009). Consequently, when an appellant “seeks review of a matter within the purview of
the Magistrate Judge, such as a discovery dispute, an even more deferential standard, the
‘abuse of discretion’ standard, must be applied.” Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. v.
Hunt Control Sys., Inc., No. 11–3684, 2014 WL 5798109, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2014)
(quoting Salamone v. Carter’s Retail, Inc., No. 09-5856, 2012 WL 821494, at *4 (D.N.J.
March 9, 2012)).
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III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s claims on appeal are unavailing. First, Judge Falk did not analyze
Plaintiff’s motion under the Tabron standard instead of the good cause standard. Rather,
Judge Falk discussed Tabron in describing the reasons this Court granted Plaintiff pro
bono counsel. Moreover, Judge Falk explicitly stated that appointment of counsel does
not constitute good cause for reopening discovery. See e.g., Marlowe Patent Holdings
LLC v. Dice Electronics, LLC, 293 F.R.D. 688, 699 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[R]etention of new
counsel is not alone sufficient to show good cause to modify the court’s scheduling
order”) (internal citations omitted). And, contrary to Plaintiff’s claim, Judge Falk did not
err in describing prior opinions of this Court.
Finally, a party seeking to reopen discovery bears “the burden of demonstrating
that despite its diligence, it could not reasonably have met the scheduling order deadline.”
Grossbaum v. Genesis Genetics Inst., LLC, No. CIV.A. 07-1359, 2010 WL 3943674, at
*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2010) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff argues in broad strokes that
he has “good cause” to reopen discovery, but does not provide any evidence to support
this conclusion. As Judge Falk noted, Judge Shwartz determined in March 2010 that
Plaintiff had “demonstrated an understanding of the actions he should take in furtherance
of his claim.” Plaintiff has not provided any justification for failing to take depositions or
conduct additional discovery while he was proceeding pro se and not in prison. See e.g.,
Marlowe Patent Holdings LLC v. Dice Electronics, LLC, 293 F.R.D. 688, 698 (D.N.J.
2013). Accordingly, Judge Falk’s Order is not an abuse of discretion and will be
affirmed. See Koninklijke, No. 11–3684, 2014 WL 5798109, at *2.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s appeal is DENIED, and Judge Falk’s August
20, 2015 Order is AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: October 23, 2015
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