SKOORKA v. KEAN UNIVERSITY et al

Filing 115

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 1/6/2013. (nr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRUCE M. SKOORKA,
Plaintiff,
V•

Civ. No. 2:09-03428
(KM)(MAH)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KEAN UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
KEAN UNIVERSITY, KEAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS,
COUNCIL OF NEW
JERSEY
STATE
COLLEGE
LOCALS,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,
WILLIAM M. KEMPEY, DAWOOD FARAHI,
VINTON THOMPSON, ALFRED NGOME
NTOKO, and MARIA DEL C. RODRIGUEZ
Defendants.

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(i), pro se Plaintiff Bruce Skoorka seeks
reconsideration, Docket No. 108, of my Opinion (the “Opinion,” Docket No. 102)
and Order (the “Order,” Docket No. 103), filed November 15, 2013, which
denied Plaintiff’s Letter of Appeal dated June 27, 2012, Docket No. 90. I write
this unpublished opinion primarily for the parties and will not repeat the
analysis in that prior opinion; familiarity with it is assumed. This motion for
reconsideration is denied, as such relief is not necessary to correct a clear error
of law or to prevent manifest injustice. I deny it without oral argument,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. Skoorka’s motion raises no substantial
arguments that have not already been thoroughly briefed, considered, and
decided on the Letter of Appeal of certain of Magistrate Judge Hammer’s
discovery orders following a June 6, 2013 status conference, Docket Nos. 84,
86.
Furthermore, Plaintiff alternatively requests that this Court certify this
matter for interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit pursuant to either 28

U.S.C. Section 1292(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). I find certification under either
of these provisions to be inappropriate and deny Skoorka’s request.
I. Legal Standard
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i).
Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletics Assoc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J.
2001). That Rule states:
[A] motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed within 14
days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original motion
by the Judge or Magistrate Judge. A brief setting forth concisely
the matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the
Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked shall be filed with the
Notice of Motion.
L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).
A motion for reconsideration is “an extremely limited procedural
vehicle.” Tehan v. Disability Mgmt. Serus., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549
(D.N.J. 2000) (quoting Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, Inc.,
830 F. Supp. 826, 831 (D.N.J. 1992)). The movant has the burden of
demonstrating either: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has
occurred; (2) evidence not previously available has become available; or (3) it is
necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Max’s
Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir.
1999); Beety—Monticelli u. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x 743, 747 (3d Cir.
2009) (non—precedential). In other words, such a motion may be granted where
facts or controlling legal authority were presented to, but not considered by,
the court. Mauro v. N.J. Supreme Ct., 238 F. App’x 791, 793 (3d Cir. 2007)
(non—precedential).
Reconsideration is not warranted, however, where (1) the movant simply
repeats the cases and arguments previously analyzed by the court, Arista
Recs., Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (D.N.J. 2005); see also
Tehan, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (“Motions for reconsideration will not be granted
where a party simply asks the court to analyze the same facts and cases it had
already considered . . . .“); or (2) the movant has filed the motion merely to
disagree with or relitigate the court’s initial decision, id.; see Morris v. Siemens
Components, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D.N.J. 1996) (“A party’s mere
disagreement with a decision of the district court should be raised in the
ordinary appellate process and is inappropriate on a motion for reargument.”).
The motion is not a vehicle for a litigant to raise new arguments or present
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evidence that could have been raised prior to the initial judgment. See Bapu
Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., Civ. No. 07—5938, 2010 WL 5418972, at *2
(D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2010) (citing P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Cendant Corp.,
161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (D.N.J. 2001)).
Accordingly, relief pursuant to Rule 7.1 is reserved for those instances
where the Court may have “overlooked” pertinent facts or controlling case law.
See L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). Because the requirements are so stringent, motions for
reconsideration typically are not granted; rather, relief is “an extraordinary
remedy” to be granted “sparingly.” A.K. Stamping Co., Inc., v. Instrument
Specialties Co., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 627, 662 (D.N.J. 2000) (quoting NL Indus.,
Inc., v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996)).

III. Analysis

The Court refers the parties to the statement of facts in the Court’s
November 15, 2013 Opinion. Docket No. 102. In that Opinion, I affirmed
Magistrate Judge Hammer’s well-reasoned and balanced discovery decisions
following a June 6, 2013 status conference, reflected in the Orders dated June
17, 2013 (Docket No. 84) and June 26, 2013 (Docket No. 86), and denied
Skoorka’s appeal. This Court found that Magistrate Judge Hammer’s discovery
rulings were within the bounds of his discretion and that they were not clearly
erroneous or contrary to the law. While Judge Hammer has ordered Defendants
to produce the majority of the documents requested by Plaintiff, he found that
certain discovery requests were overly broad and/or irrelevant under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26. Recognizing Judge Hammer’s thorough knowledge of these
proceedings, I agreed with Judge Hammer’s reasoning and denied Skoorka’s
appeal.
Plaintiff now argues that the Court’s denial of his appeal creates a
“manifest injustice” and that the decision should be reconsidered. In short, he
argues that it would be a manifest injustice to compel Plaintiff to proceed
without full discovery relevant to his claims. Furthermore, Plaintiff requests, if
this Court denies this motion, that it certify this matter for interlocutory appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 1292(b) and Fed R. Civ. P. 54(b). I will consider each request
below.

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A. Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff maintains that this Court “overlooked the relevant facts and law”
in denying his appeal. Docket No. 108 at 6, 9. He argues that the Court
overlooked the fact that Plaintiff is entitled to the entirety of his discovery
requests, not just those items that Judge Hammer ordered to be produced. He
maintains that the Court also overlooked “the law that discovery is broad and
that the material sought herein are particularly relevant.” IcL at 18.
Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that Skoorka’s “barely modified
resubmission of his original objections to the original discovery order” fails to
establish any grounds for relief. Docket No. 110 at 2.
I agree that Plaintiff has not met his burden on this Motion for
Reconsideration. Plaintiff has failed to establish grounds for the relief he now
seeks. He has not produced evidence that was unavailable when the Court
considered his objections to Judge Hammer’s discovery orders, does not cite to
any changes in the controlling law, and does not detail how the Court’s
Opinion and Order contain any clear error of law or how this Court’s ruling will
result in manifest injustice. See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). Skoorka does not specify what
facts or law this Court has overlooked or how such facts and legal precedent
support his motion for reconsideration. Instead, Plaintiff reasserts the same
arguments made in support of his earlier appeal. Such a reiteration does not
suffice under the reconsideration standard. Indeed, Skoorka’s motion appears
to be a “classic attempt at a ‘second bite at the apple.” Bhatnagar v. Surrendra
Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1231 (3d Cir. 1995).
As the Court has already specifically addressed each of Skoorka’s
objections as to his specific discovery requests, see Opinion at 4—7, the Court
will not again address each document request individually. As I held in my
Opinion and Order, Judge Hammer, well-versed in the background of these
proceedings, exercised sound judgment to strike a proper balance between
Plaintiff’s requests and the bounds of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26’s relevance standard.
On appeal, Plaintiff reiterated that he believed himself to be entitled to the
entirety of his discovery requests, but failed to explain how Judge Hammer’s
rulings were clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Finding no clear error, I
affirmed Judge Hammer’s rulings. While Plaintiff certainly has the right to
disagree with this Court’s ruling, such disagreement, without more, is
insufficient under the motion for reconsideration standard under L. Civ. R.
7.1(i). Thus, the extraordinary remedy of reconsideration is inappropriate here.

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Finally, Skoorka argues that Magistrate Judge Hammer has failed to take
remedial action in regard to Defendants’ failure to produce documents that
Judge Hammer ordered to be discovered. Docket No. 114. He contends that
Judge Hammer has failed to hold Defendants accountable for their discovery
violations. Docket No. 114 at 2. These objections seem to be in the nature of a
motion to compel discovery that has been ordered by Magistrate Judge
Hammer; they are not relevant to this appeal from adverse discovery rulings.
To the extent these objections may relate to documents that Judge Hammer did
not order to be discovered, I deny Skoorka’s Motion for Reconsideration for the
reasons stated above.
B. Certification for Interlocutory Appeal to the Third Circuit
In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to an interlocutory
appeal under Fed R. Civ. P. 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. Section 1929(b). I find that
neither provision is applicable under these circumstances and I will not certify
these discovery rulings for interlocutory appeal.
Federal Rule 54(b) provides:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as
a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final
judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties
only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason
for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, however
designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights
and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action
as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
the parties’ rights and liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Supreme Court has set forth the steps a court must
take in making determinations under Rule 54(b). First, a district court must
determine that it is dealing with a “final judgment.” “It must be a judgment’ in
the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be
‘final’ in the sense that it is ‘an ultimate disposition of an individual claim
entered in the course of a multiple claims action.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 7 (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351
U.S. 427 (1956)). Only upon a finding of finality, the court must then determine
whether there is “any just reason for delay.” Id. at 8.
These are discovery rulings. None of Plaintiff’s claims for relief have been
adjudicated by the orders in question. Therefore, no final judgment has been or
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will be directed by the Court on any claim or against any party. Accordingly,
certification to the Third Circuit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is unwarranted
here.
Certification for interlocutory appeal is likewise inappropriate under 28
U.S.C. Section 1292(b). The statute provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not
otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in
such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of
an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit
an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it
within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however,
That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay
proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the
Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). A district court may certify a non-final order for
interlocutory appeal where the following criteria are met: “(1) the issue
involve[s] a controlling question of law; (2) as to which there are substantial
grounds for difference of opinion; and that (3) an immediate appeal of the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” Simon v.
United States, 341 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2003). Even where these
requirements are met, the decision to certify an appeal rests within the
discretion of the Court. See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 607 F.
Supp. 2d 701, 704 (M.D. Pa. 2009). An interlocutory appeal is used sparingly,
and should not be used merely because a party disagrees with a Court’s ruling.
Cardona v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting
Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 575 F.Supp. 280, 282 (E.D.Pa. 1983)).
Plaintiff has not met his burden to show why he is entitled to an
interlocutory appeal of these discovery disputes. The issue before the Court
does not raise a controlling or novel question of law; it is primarily one of
discretion. There is no dispute that the Magistrate Judge and this Court have
broad discretion in managing discovery and other pre-trial issues. There is no
disagreement as to the proper standard of review. Judge Hammer’s discovery
rulings struck a proper balance between Plaintiff’s requests and the bounds of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26’s relevance standard. On appeal, Plaintiff reiterated that he
believed himself entitled to all discovery requested, but he failed to explain how
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Judge Hammer’s rulings are clearly erroneous or contrary to the law. Finding
no clear error in regard to this routine discovery ruling, I affirmed Judge
Hammer’s rulings. An appeal of the discovery order would, if anything, delay,
not hasten, the ultimate termination of this already-protracted litigation.
Accordingly, Skoorka has not established a right to interlocutory appeal for this
Court’s discovery order and his request for certification under 28 U.S.C.
Section 1292(b) is denied.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of Bruce M. Skoorka’s Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED. An appropriate order will be filed with this
opinion.

KEVI MCNULTY
United States District’3udge

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