MEDINA et al v. DAIMLER TRUCKS, NORTH AMERICA L.L.C. et al

Filing 94

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 3/31/2015. (ld, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARIA E, MEDINA, Individually, MARIA E.
MED INA, Administrator of the Estate of
Edvin Medina, Deceased, MARIA E.
MEDINA, Guardian Ad Litem for G.M., E.P,
and T.L.. Minors,

Civil Action No. 10-623 (JLL)

OPINION

Plaintiffs

DAIMLER TRUCKS NORTH AMERICA,
LLC, A Daimler Company, THOMAS J.
O’NEIL, Individually, and T.P. SAMPSON
COMPANY, INC.
Defendants.
LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Maria E. Medina (“Plain
tiff’)’s
motion to preclude Keven Granat (“Mr. Granat”), Jon S. Olson (“Mr. Olson”), and
Jacob L. Fisher
(“Dr. Fisher”), experts for Defendant Daimler Trucks North America, LLC
(“Defendants”)
pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (ECF No. 83). The Court
has considered
the submissions made in support of and in opposition to the instant motion. For
the reasons that
follow, Plaintiff’s motion to preclude the experts, (ECF No. 83), of Mr. Granat
, Mr. Olson, and
Dr. Fisher is denied.

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I.

BACKGROUND
A. General Case Summary

The Court has previously articulated the relevant factual background in its Opinion
regarding Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 77). Therefore, the Court
briefly restates the following. On February 5, 2008, at approximately 7:20 AM, Thomas O’Neill
(“O’Neill”) lost control of his white minivan as he was crossing an overpass on Interstate 91 in
Brattleboro, Vermont. (Docket #58-4: 1; Exhibit A). The minivan struck the left and right side
guardrails and eventually came to a halt on the overpass. Id. at 6-7. Moments later, Plaintiff’s
husband, Edvin Medina (“Medina”), approached the overpass driving a tractor which was pulling
a 54-foot trailer. Id. at 1, 5, 14. Medina saw O’Neil’s crashed minivan and took action to avoid
hitting it. itt, at 5. As a consequence, the tractor-trailer driven by Medina crashed into the bridge
guardrails and plummeted off the overpass through a high-voltage power line. Id. at 11-12. At
some point after the tractor-trailer crashed into the guardrails, but before it fell off the bridge, the
tractor caught on fire. Id. at 12. Though unseen, Medina was heard screaming from the burning
tractor. (Docket #58-5: 33; Exhibit F at 95:5-7). He was pronounced dead at 9:37 AM. (Docket
#58-4: 25, Exhibit C at 2). The medical examiner, Dr. Bundock, concluded that Medina died
of
blunt force trauma and thermal injuries. (Docket #58-4: 24, Exhibit C at 1).
Plaintiff alleges that a design defect in the truck that Medina was driving caused her latehusband’s death. She contends, through George H. Meinsehein’s expert report, that “mounting
the
batteries on the outboard side of the frame rail and in close proximity to the fuel tank is a design
defect that presented a contributory cause in the instant.

.

.

flre[.J” (Docket #58-5: 44, Exhibit G

at 4). According to Plaintiff, the fire was started by a shower of electric sparks that originated
from the truck’s battery box, which was located inches away from the driver side fuel tank.
(See

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e.g. P1, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ¶29, “The left fuel tank was attached to the frame

just below the driver’s door and within inches of the metal battery box.”). During the accident,
the fuel tank was pierced and began spilling diesel, the batteries were ripped off the tractor, and
the loose wires from the battery box caused electrical arcing, which ignited the fuel vapors and
caused the fire. (Docket #58-5:44, Exhibit G at 4).
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on February 4, 2010. (Docket #1). Count I of the Complaint
asserts a claim of design defect, Count II asserts a claim of wrongful death, and Counts III and IV
assert claims of survivorship on behalf of Plaintiff and Medina’s surviving children. (Id.) This
Court has jurisdiction over the matter at hand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332, as there is diversity
between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 minimum.
B. Facts Pertinent to the Instant Motion

On January 23, 2015, Plaintiff moved to preclude Defendants’ experts, Keven Granat, Jon
S. Olson, and Jacob L. Fisher. (ECF Nos. 84 & 85). Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants’ experts
do not satisfy the standards required by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 591-92 (1993). Plaintiff further claims that Defendants’ experts rely on speculative and
inconsequential facts.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Fed. R. Evid.
702. This Rule allows a witness qualified as an expert to give testimony if: (i) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (ii) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (iii) the expert witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case. Fed .R. Evid. 702; Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Paoli R.R.
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Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 74 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit has explained that Rule 702
“embodies a trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification, reliability, and fit.”
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404 (citing In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741—43). A District Court is required to
act as a gatekeeper, preventing the admission of opinion testimony that does not meet these three
requirements. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)). The
proponent of the evidence bears the burden of establishing the existence of each factor by a
preponderance of the evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; In re Paoii, 35 F.3d at 743—44. A court’s
rejection of expert testimony should be the exception rather than the rule. Fed. R. Evid. 702
Advisory Committee Note. As the Supreme Court noted in Daubert, “vigorous cross-examination,
presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional
and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” 509 U.S. at 595.
An expert’s opinion is reliable if it is “based on the ‘methods and procedures of science’
rather than on ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation’; the expert must have ‘good grounds’
for his or her belief.” Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., US.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003)
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589). “Daubert suggests several factors that a district court should
take into account in evaluating whether a particular scientific methodology is reliable[.j” In re
Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. The factors that Daubert and this Court have already declared important
include:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis; (2) whether the
method has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique’s operation; (5) whether the method is generally accepted; (6) the
relationship of the technique to methods which have been established to be
reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness testifying based on *746
the methodology; and (8) the non-judicial uses to which the method has
been put.

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Id, at 742 n. 8 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238—41 (3d Cir. 1985)).
The Third Circuit in Kumho Tire, however, makes clear that this list is non-exclusive and
that each factor need not be applied in every case. The Court further explained that:
{Tjhe trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular
case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider the specific factors
identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability
of expert testimony.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152; see also Milanowicz v. The Raymond Corp., 148 F.Supp.2d 525, 536
(D.N.J. 2001)(reconfiguringDaubert for application to “technical” or “other specialized” subjects
such as engineering and identifying several factors for trial courts to consider in evaluating
reliability, including relevant literature, evidence of industry practice, and product design and
accident history). As such, “[tjhe inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is.

.

.

a flexible one.” Daubert,

509 U.S. at 594.

III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that this Court should preclude Defendants’ experts from testifying at trial.
Plaintiff claims that the Defendants’ experts do not satisfy the standards required by Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993). The Court notes that much of
Plaintiff’s argument relates to the credibility of the experts, a matter reserved for trial. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion to exclude the expert testimonies of Mr. Granat, Mr.
Olson, and Mr. Fisher is denied.
A. Mr. Keven Granat

Keven Granat is Defendants’ proffered expert in the field of accident reconstruction. He
earned a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from Purdue University and has over 20 years
of experience working as an automotive engineer. According to Mr. Granat, his expert opinion is
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based on the facts of the case, his experience as an automotive engineer, his formal training as an
engineer, and his extensive review of the materials listed above.
Mr. Granat analyzed the crash involving Mr. Edvin Medina.

Prior to drawing his

conclusions, Mr. Granat investigated (1) the crash environment, (2) the vehicles involved, and (3)
the drivers. (Docket #10-623, Exhibit S, at 2). Upon review of construction diagrams, aerial
imagery, police reports, and numerous photographs, Mr. Granat created a scaled diagram of the
bridge configuration as it existed at the time of the crash. Mr. Granat concluded that Mr. Medina
“was operating his vehicle at a speed too great for the existing conditions.” Id. at 7. Mr. Medina’s
excessive speed prevented him from retaining control over the vehicle under those circumstances,
“and caused it to crash into the guardrails and through the bridge rail along 1-91.” Id. Finally, Mr.
Granat stated: “[n]o characteristics of the.

.

.

tractor caused the subject crash.” Id.

Plaintiff opposes Mr. Granat’s conclusions, claiming they failed to “form the basis for a
reliable, admissible opinion.” (Pl.’s Br. at 14).

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that “Granat’s

implication that excessive speed was the reason Medina ‘perished’ is legally deficient in analyzing
a products liability claim.” Id. at 11. Plaintiffs final contention is one of relevancy, claiming that
Mr. Grant’s opinion that no feature of the tractor caused the crash is irrelevant. Id. The Court finds
Plaintiffs arguments unpersuasive.
However, Plaintiff has failed to convince this Court that Mr. Granat’s opinions are
unreliable, as they are based on widely accepted scientific methods and procedures. See Altana
Pharma AG v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74211 at *8 (2013) (“The
proponent of expert testimony need not prove that its expert is correct, but that the expert’s
‘opinion is based on valid reasoning and a reliable methodology”) (citing Oddi v. Ford Motor
Co., 234 F.3d 136, 145 (2000)). Indeed, not only does Mr. Granat have extensive experience

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working as an automotive engineer, he used photogrammetric analysis, scaled diagrams,
photographs, physical evidence, video, specifications, testimony, accepted accident reconstruction
techniques, and other documentation in conducting his analysis. (Docket #10-623, Exhibit S, pg.
2-6). Plaintiff neglects to acknowledge this important fact, but rather, remarkably, claims Mr.
Grant’s opinions have no foundation. Therefore, the Court cannot find that Mr. Granat based his
conclusions and opinions upon a subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate how Mr. Granat neglected to apply the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of this case. Plaintiff’s criticisms of Mr. Granat’s methodology, and
the reliability and relevancy of his opinions, are, at their core, targeted to weight and credibility,
not its admissibility. That is, Plaintiff opposes Mr. Granat’s factual conclusions, not his credentials
or methods. See Oddi, 234 F.3d at 145-46 (“The test of admissibility is not whether a particular
scientific opinion has the best foundation or is demonstrably correct. Rather, the test is whether
the particular opinion is based on valid reasoning and reliable methodology.”). The alleged
weaknesses of Mr. Granat’s opinions are best left to the consideration of the jury, presented
through cross-examination and other appropriate evidence at trial. Kannankeril v. Terminix
International, Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. (1997) (“The analysis ofthe conclusions themselves
is for the trier of fact when the expert is subjected to cross-examination.”).

B. Mr. Jon Olson
Jon S. Olson is a professional engineer, certified fire & explosion investigator, and
a
certified vehicle fire investigator. (Docket #10-623, Exhibit P, at 1-2). He received
his Bachelor
of Science in Mechanical Engineering Technology from Lake Superior State University
and an
MBA from Baker College. Id. at 1. He has worked as an automotive engineer for
more than 20

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years with education, experience, and training in automotive facilities and tooling design,
engineering development and testing, computer-aided engineering, fire investigation, and forensic
engineering disciplines. Id. at 2. Mr. Olson was hired to offer opinions regarding the sequence of
events leading to the fire that occurred in Mr. Medina’s tractor-trailer. Id. at 1. His report discusses
“the principles of fire investigation, fire science, properties of diesel fuel, competent/available
ignition source(s), sequence of events leading to the ignition of the first fuel ignited, and the spread
of fire and subsequent involvement of secondary and tertiary fuels.” Id.
Plaintiff asserts that because Mr. Olson’s opinion relied on Mr. Granat’s accident
reconstruction, Mr. Olson’s analysis must fail. Id. at 6. Plaintiff’s argument fails to recognize that
Federal Rule of Evidence 703 states that an expert may formulate an opinion based on facts or data
that he or she did not personally observe. Fed. R. Evid. 703 (“An expert may base an opinion on
facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.”) (emphasis
added). Indeed, one of the possible sources of “facts or data” an expert may rely on to form his or
her opinion is data gathered “outside of court and other than by his [or her] own perception.” Fed.
R. Evid. 703, Advisory Committee Notes. The Advisory Committee provides an example:
[A] physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from
numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by
patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and
other doctors, hospital records, and X rays.
His validation, expertly
performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial
purposes.
.

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.

Id. Similarly, Mr. Olson relied on a variety of sources in drawing his conclusions, including, but
not limited to: numerous photos and videos of the accident scene; state police and fire department
reports; and deposition testimony from witnesses to the accident, police officers, and the fire
chief
of the Brattleboro fire department. (Docket #10-623, Exhibit P, at 2-3).

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Plaintiff fails to provide any authority indicating that Mr. Olson’s reliance on his co
expert’s work is improper. Given the plain language of Rule 703, the Court does not afford this
argument much weight. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims regarding the flaws in Mr. Olson’
s
methodology do not warrant excluding Mr. Olson’s testimony at this juncture, particularly
in light
of this Court’s finding that Mr. Granat’s expert opinion was based on sufficient facts and data; Mr.
Granat’s testimony was the product of reliable principles and methods; and Mr. Granat applied
the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of this case. Fed. R. Evid. 702; Schnei
der v. Fried,
320 F,3d 396, 407 (3d Cir. 2003).
Finally, Plaintiff does not articulate how (if at all) Mr. Olson neglected to apply
the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of this case. Therefore, this Court finds
that Mr.
Olson’s findings and conclusions regarding the sequence of the events leading
to the fire that
occurred in Mr. Medina’s tractor-trailer “reliably flow from the facts known to the
expert and the
methodology used.” Heller v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
C. Dr. Jacob L. Fisher

Jacob L. Fisher, Ph.D., was hired to perform a biomechanical analysis’ of the tractor
-trailer
crash. (Docket #10-623, Exhibit

Q, at 1). Dr. Fisher is a professional engineer and holds a Ph.D.

in bioengineering from the University of Pennsylvania. (D’s Br. at 10).
He evaluated “Mr.
Medina’ s occupant kinematics during the crash.

.

.

determine[d] the biomechamcal mechanisms.

• and assess[ed] the severity of the blunt force injuries detailed in his autops
y report.” Id.

A “study of biomechanics” is “the study of the action of external and
internal forces on the
living body, especially on the skeletal system.” Biomechanical Defini
tion, DIcTI0NARY.coM,
http://dictionary.reference.comi’browse/biomechanical?s=t.

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For this analysis, Dr. Fisher relied on several sources in making findings and drawing his
conclusions, including but not limited to: digital photographs of the accident scene; deposition
testimony from witnesses to the accident, police officers, the fire chief of the Brattleboro
fire
department, and the medical examiner; autopsy records; a video of the accident scene;
and
published biomechanical data involving volunteers, instrumented dummies, and cadave
rs. The
Court finds this reliance sufficient to overcome Plaintiffs purported Daubert obstac
les. Plaintiff
alleges that Dr. Fisher’s theories have been contradicted, and that he has based his
opinions and
conclusions upon unsupported speculation. (P1’s Br. at 27). Plaintiff also claims
that because Dr.
Fisher’s opinion relied on Mr. Granat’s accident reconstruction, Dr. Fisher’s analys
is must fail.
Id. at 6. As outlined above, Federal Rule of Evidence 703 holds that an expert may formul
ate an
opinion based on facts or data that he or she did not personally observe. Fed.
R. Evid. 703 (“An
expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or
personally observed.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, Plaintiff does not provid
e any support for
the claim that Dr. Fisher may not rely on his co-expert’s work. The Court notes
that “the inquiry
envisioned by Rule 702 is

.

.

.

a flexible one

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.

.

the focus must be solely on principles and

methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at
594.
As Plaintiff, again, neglects to articulate why Dr. Fisher’s testimony does
not meet the
flexible standards set forth in Daubert, rather than attacking his credibi
lity and findings, Plaintiff
has failed to give a sufficient reason to warrant excluding Dr. Fisher’
s testimony at this time.
Furthermore, as described above, any alleged deficiencies of Dr. Fisher’
s conclusions are best left
to the consideration of the jury. Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 806. Additi
onally, Defendants’ “burden
is only to provide an expert opinion that is relevant and reliable and
that will assist the trier of fact

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•

.

.

issues of credibility arise after the determination of admissibility. Credibility is for the jury.”

Id. at 809-10.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based on the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to preclude Defendants’ experts,
(ECF No. 83), is denied.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Date:

Jose t. Linares
IJilted States District Judge

March 31, 2015

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