WOLFE v. CHRISTIE et al
Filing
60
OPINION. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 6/25/13. (gmd, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DONNELL WOLFE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRIS CHRISTIE, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civil Action No.: 10-2083 (ES)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
DONNELL WOLFE, Plaintiff pro se
#000064
East Jersey State Prison – Special Treatment Unit
8 Production Way, CN-905
Avenel, New Jersey 07001
DANIEL MICHAEL VANNELLA, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE N.J. ATTORNEY GENERAL
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
25 market Street, P.O. Box 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Counsel for Defendants Johnson and Hastings
SALAS, District Judge
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a motion for summary
judgment (D.E. No. 48) filed on behalf of Defendants, Steven Johnson
and Beverly Hastings.
Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to
Defendants’ motion at this time.
This motion will be decided on the
papers, without oral argument, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, and dismiss the Complaint as against these
Defendants accordingly.
I.
BACKGROUND
On or about April 23, 2010, Plaintiff, Donnell Wolfe, filed this
civil rights Complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the
following defendants: Chris Christie, the Governor of New Jersey;
Paula Dow, Attorney General for the State of New Jersey; Gary Lanigan,
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”);
Jennifer Velez, Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human
Services (“NJDHS”); Steven Johnson, NJDOC Administrator; and Merril
Main, NJDHS Administrator.
(Complaint, Caption and ¶¶ 4b-4g).
In
an Opinion and Order, entered respectively on July 19, 2010 and August
25, 2010 (D.E. Nos. 2, 3), the Honorable Peter G. Sheridan, U.S.D.J.,
dismissed the Complaint without prejudice, in its entirety as against
all named defendants, for failure to state a claim,
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
pursuant to 28
Plaintiff was permitted to seek leave
to re-open his case and file an amended pleading that would cure the
deficiencies noted in the Court’s July 19, 2010 Opinion.
On or about August 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint (D.E. No. 5), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the
following defendants: Jennifer Velez, Commissioner of the New Jersey
Department of Human Services (“NJDHS”); Steve Johnson, Assistant
2
Superintendent at the East Jersey State Prison, Special Treatment
Unit (“EJSP-STU”); Dr. Merril Main, Clinical Director at EJSP-STU;
Kenneth Sharpe, Assistant Attorney General for the State of New
Jersey; John Main, Chief Director of the NJDHS at the Ann Klein
Forensic Center in Trenton, New Jersey; and Debbie Hasting, New
Jersey Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”) Superintendent at the
Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center (“ADTC”) in Avenel, New Jersey.
In an Opinion and Order entered on April 4, 2011. Judge Sheridan
dismissed the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, except
with respect to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging lack
of potable water.
Plaintiff had asserted an unconstitutional
conditions of confinement claim, alleging that he is subjected to
poor living conditions, such as cold showers, poor ventilation,
contaminated water and bug infestation.
In particular, Plaintiff
alleged that the drinking water is bad, and that he was told each
resident would get a case of water each month, but the water goes
to staff instead.
Plaintiff alleged that these conditions are
ongoing and have not been addressed by Defendants.
Judge Sheridan
found that the lack of potable water is a significant hardship and
deprivation that, if true, would rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.
Accordingly, this limited claim was allowed to proceed,
and all other allegations were dismissed.
2011 Opinion at 12-34).
(D.E. No. 13, April 4,
Only Defendants Steve Johnson and Beverly
3
Hastings 1 have responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and they now move
for summary judgment.
On May 11, 2012, Plaintiff’s deposition was taken.
48-4, May 11, 2012 Transcript).
(D.E. No.
Defendants provide the following
Statement of Material Facts, pursuant to L. Civ. R. 56.1, taken from
Plaintiff’s May 11, 2012 deposition.
In May 2010, Plaintiff and other civilly committed residents
of the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”) facility in Kearny, New Jersey,
were transferred to a newly opened STU facility in East Jersey State
Prison’s former administrative segregation unit, now the EJSP-STU.
(T12:25-14:6).
administrator
The
for
the
named
New
Defendant
Jersey
Steve
Department
(“NJDOC”), who oversaw the EJSP-STU facility.
Johnson
of
is
an
Corrections
(T26:20-27:1).
Plaintiff was told at some point in time that “water will
be supplied to [the residents moving to the new STU facility] ....
You can get it on [y]our own or we will give you a case of water
each month for yourselves so you can have that.”
(T36:6-15).
Plaintiff testified, however, that he believes that the cases of
water meant for him and other STU residents instead were given to
officers.
(T35:21-22).
Hastings was mistakenly plead as “Debbie” Hastings. Plaintiff
admits that the Defendant is properly named Beverly Hastings. (D.E.
No. 48-4, Plaintiff’s May 11, 2012 Deposition at 11:5-12).
4
1
Plaintiff admitted that he has no evidence that Defendant
Johnson was made aware of any written complaints regarding his access
to potable water.
(T41:11-42:1).
The EJSP-STU residents were told
during community meetings at the EJSP-STU facility that they would
be supplied with water.
(T37:24-38:4).
Beginning with Plaintiff’s arrival at the EJSP-STU facility
in May 2010, “big jugs” of water were made available outside in the
yard for the residents.
(T28:25-29:6, T30:3).
The EJSP-STU
facility has its own filtering system of the water.
(T29:3-4).
When the jugs of water are empty, they are refilled and brought back
outside.
(T33:14-17).
Plaintiff has five yard movements – two in the morning, two in
the afternoon, and one in the evening – when he can go outside and
access the water jugs.
(T33:18-22).
This free water supply has
always been available to plaintiff, except when it was freezing cold
or snowing outside.
(T31:10-13).
Cases of bottled water (24-pack) are also available for sale
in the canteen.
(T32:3-13).
STU residents can also order water
from an outside “source” or “vendor.”
(T31:25-32:3).
Plaintiff further testified that he is able to collect enough
water from the yard at a time that he does not need to go outside
every day.
(T32:14-21).
Plaintiff collects up to three gallons of
water at a time when he goes outside.
5
(T32:21-24).
Plaintiff also
admits that he is not raising any claims concerning the lack of
drinking water against Defendant Beverly Hastings.
(T9:18-20,
T10:17-19, T12:2-18, T12:14-15:8).
Plaintiff also stated in his deposition that, as injunctive
relief for his claims against Defendants, he seeks to be transferred
off of “D wing” and “to have the pipes and stuff, plumbing and
everything, fixed.”
(T43:1-7).
However, Plaintiff does not make
either of those demands for injunctive relief (¶ 18) in his Amended
Complaint.
Plaintiff resides in the “south building” or “south wing” of
the STU facility.
(T27:14-25).
Plaintiff does not assert any
physical injury as a result of his claims regarding the drinking water
at the EJSP- STU facility.
(T19:13-26:19).
Plaintiff stated in his
deposition that he is not seeking punitive damages in this matter.
(T43:20-44:7).
Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
On or about March 14, 2012, this Court received an
“addendum” from Plaintiff in which he complains about water problems
at the EJSP-STU facility.
(D.E. No. 37).
Plaintiff alleges that,
on March 2, 2012, the water system was not functioning properly and
that the hot water pipe “busted again.”
(Id.).
When the hot water
does work, Plaintiff breaks out in a rash for which he is prescribed
“Hydrocerin” cream.
(Id.).
On March 9, 2012, Plaintiff received
6
a memo from Defendant Johnson stating that, starting March 12, 2012,
due to the hot water problem, the residents had “a choice to take
a shower or washing [] clothes.”
(Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges
that Sgt. Susan Smith was ordered to tell correctional officers not
to drink or use the water.
(Id.).
On August 17, 2012, Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court in
which he raises other, unrelated issues to this action.
However,
Plaintiff also reiterated his allegation that correctional officers
were told not to use or drink the water at EJSP-STU, and were given
“powerful anti-bacteria[l] soap on their hands.”
II.
A.
(D.E. No. 46.).
ANALYSIS
Legal Standard
Summary
judgment
is
appropriate
“where
the
pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits
show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Azur v. Chase
Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010)(quoting
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805–06 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56)).
“To be material, a fact must have the potential
to alter the outcome of the case.”
DeShields v. Int’l Resort Props.
Ltd., 463 F. App’x 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2012)(citation omitted).
“Once
the moving party points to evidence demonstrating no issue of
material fact exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set forth
7
specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists
and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor.”
601 F.3d at 216.
Azur,
“In determining whether summary judgment is
warranted ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and
all
justifiable
inferences
are
to
be
drawn
in
his
favor.’”
DeShields, 463 F. App’x at 119 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
B.
Action Against Defendant Hastings
Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that there are no remaining
claims
in
this
action
against
Defendant
Hastings.
Further,
Plaintiff conceded that Defendant Hastings should be dismissed from
this action.
establishes
As there is nothing in the evidentiary record that
Hastings’
personal
involvement
with
regard
to
Plaintiff’s denial of potable water claim, Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment will be granted and this action will be dismissed
in its entirety as against Defendant Hastings.
C.
Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated a Constitutional Deprivation
As stated above, the only claim remaining in this action
pertains to Plaintiff’s allegations that he has no potable water at
the EJSP-STU.
Plaintiff is a civilly committed sexually violent
predator (“SVP”) under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act
(“SVPA”), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24, et seq.
As a civilly committed
person, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies with
8
respect to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim.
See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982)(“Persons who have
been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate
treatment
and
conditions
of
confinement
than
criminals
whose
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”); see also Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d
150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). 2
Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that civilly
committed persons not be subjected to conditions that amount to
punishment, Bell, 441 U.S. at 536, within the bounds of professional
discretion,
Youngberg,
457
U.S.
at
321–22.
Specifically,
in
Youngberg, the Supreme Court held that civilly committed persons do
have constitutionally protected interests, but that these rights
must be balanced against the reasons put forth by the State for
restricting their liberties.
Id. at 307.
The Constitution is not
concerned with de minimis restrictions on patients’ liberties.
at 320.
Id.
Moreover, “due process requires that the conditions and
2
“[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the
Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where
the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication,
the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537, n. 16
(quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72, n. 40 (1977));
see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S.
239, 244 (1983).
9
duration of confinement [for civilly confined persons] bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed.”
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001).
While the nature of an
SVP’s confinement may factor in this balance of what is reasonable,
it
is
clearly
established
that
the
substantive
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to SVPs.
due
process
See Andrews
v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001)(applying the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard to excessive force
claims brought by civilly committed SVPs).
Under a Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim
as asserted here by Plaintiff, “the proper inquiry is whether those
conditions [at issue] amount to punishment of the detainee.” Bell,
441 U.S. at 535.
Bell established a two-prong standard for
determining whether conditions of confinement violate Due Process:
whether the questioned “restrictions and practices” (1) “are
rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose[,]” and (2) “whether they appear excessive in relation to
that purpose.”
Id. at 561.
The first prong of the Bell analysis
requires a two-part inquiry, analyzing “first, whether any
legitimate purposes are served by [the] conditions [of confinement],
and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these
purposes.”
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2005).
10
“In assessing whether the conditions are reasonably related
to the assigned purposes, [a court] must further inquire as to whether
these conditions cause [inmates] to endure [such] genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to
them.”
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 159 (quoting Union County Jail Inmates
v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir.1983)).
Turning to the specific claim alleged in this action, there is
no doubt that potable water constitutes a basic human need and that
“[w]ater that is suitable for drinking and bathing” be supplied to
inmates.
24, 2006).
Bellezza v. Fischer, 2006 WL 3019760, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
See also Cruz v. Jackson, No. 94 Civ. 2600(RWS), 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1093, at *19–20, 1997 WL 45348 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
1997)(“Because contaminated water may pose serious health problems,
an allegation that prison officials persistently provided only rusty
drinking water would satisfy the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim.”); Donahue v. Conn. Dep't of Corr., No. 3:11–cv–
656(CFD), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105447, *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 16, 2011).
However, Plaintiff is not constitutionally entitled to
perfectly filtered water.
In Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470 (7th
Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment in connection with a prisoner’s claim that the
drinking water at Stateville was contaminated with radium in excess
11
of EPA standards.
The Seventh Circuit observed:
[F]ailing to provide a maximally safe environment, one
completely free from pollution or safety hazards is not [a form
of cruel and unusual punishment]. Many Americans live under
conditions of exposure to various contaminants. The Eighth
Amendment does not require prisons to provide prisoners with
more salubrious air, healthier food, or cleaner water than are
enjoyed by substantial numbers of free Americans.
Carroll, 255 F.3d at 472–73.
See also Truidalle v. Taylor, 2011 WL
6780690, *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2011). 3
Here, Plaintiff generally asserts that the water at the EJSP-STU
is contaminated or bad to use or drink.
Plaintiff does not provide
anything in the way of documentary evidence, however, to support this
claim.
3
At most, Plaintiff contends that the shower water, on
This Court notes that the constitutional protections afforded under
the Fourteenth Amendment are greater than those provided by the
Eighth Amendment, which applies to convicted prisoners. See
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 167 n. 23. More precisely, as stated supra,
under the Eighth Amendment, sentenced prisoners are protected from
punishment that is “cruel and unusual,” while under the Fourteenth
Amendment standard, detainees are protected from any punishment.
Id. However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that
claims by pre-trial detainees have parameters that are coextensive
with those of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. See Keller v. County of Bucks, 2006 WL 3779749
*3 (3d Cir. Dec.22, 2006). For instance, and pertinent here, the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
imposes duties on prison officials to provide prisoners with the
basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing, shelter,
sanitation, medical care and personal safety. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,
31 (1993). Prison conditions may amount to cruel and unusual
punishment if they cause “unquestioned and serious deprivations of
basic human needs ... [that] deprive inmates of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities.” Tillman v. Lebanon County
Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir.2000).
12
occasion, has caused him to break out in rashes for which he is
provided topical cream for relief.
Nevertheless,
despite
Plaintiff’s
complaint
about
an
occasional rash, he does not provide any evidence that the water
actually is contaminated.
In contrast, Defendants have shown that
the weekly water tests for the entire 2012 year for the representative
site closest to the EJSP-STU facility yielded normal results.
(See
D.E. No. 45-1, Dec. of David Brogle, Assistant Director of Production
at the Middlesex Water Company ¶¶ 7-12).
More significantly, this Court observes that Plaintiff was
provided with an ample supply of filtered drinking water for the
entire period at issue.
Plaintiff freely admitted in his deposition
that he had access, at least five times a day, to a supply of filtered
water at the start of his arrival at EJSP-STU.
Each time Plaintiff
collected water from this filtered supply, he could collect several
gallons of water to bring back to his room.
Moreover, Plaintiff
alleges no harm from drinking this water made available to him.
Consequently, under these undisputed facts, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated a constitutional deprivation with respect to his lack
of potable water claim, the only remaining claim in this action, and
Defendants therefore are entitled to summary judgment. 4
4
See Yellen
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s action is motivated by
resentment that he does not receive a free case of water every month,
13
v. Olivarez, 2012 WL 3757373, *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2012)(summary
judgment granted where plaintiff failed to show evidence that the
water at the prison presented a substantial risk of harm to
plaintiff’s health, and that defendants were not deliberately
indifferent to plaintiff’s health or safety); Martinez v. Lape, Civ.
No. 9:09–CV–0665 (TJM/RFT), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116106, at *27–
28, 2011 WL 4527943 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2011)(dismissing an inmate’s
claim that the facility’s water was “interm[i]ttently discolored and
smells of either chemicals or fecal/sewage matter,” in part because
plaintiff made “a general, blanket conclusory allegation that the
‘water system is not operating on a constitutional level,’” and the
inmate had failed to link the claim to the alleged injury); Crocamo
v. Hudson County Correctional Center, 2007 WL 1175753, *6 (D.N.J.
April 19, 2007)(the mere allegation that plaintiffs’ skin became dry
or developed a rash or “minor skin infections,” without any other
evidence, cannot alone establish that the water caused a serious
illness. In addition, plaintiffs acknowledge it was treated with
ointment) (citing Ford v. Mercer County Correctional Center, 171 Fed.
App’x 416, 421 (3d Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment on behalf
of the remaining Defendant Johnson, and dismiss this action in its
as allegedly promised. This argument is digressive given the fact
that Plaintiff has admitted that he has access to filtered water about
five times a day.
14
entirety.
Having determined that this matter should be dismissed,
the Court need not reach Defendant Johnson’s remaining arguments and
defenses regarding qualified immunity, supervisor liability, and
official capacity liability.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims for
punitive damages and injunctive relief are rendered moot given that
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment and this action will be
dismissed accordingly.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment, and this action will be dismissed in
its entirety.
An accompanying Order is filed herewith.
s/Esther Salas
United States District Judge
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?