WILLIAMS v. CLANCY et al

Filing 6

OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter G. Sheridan on 04/14/2011. (nr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSEPH WILLIAMS,
Civil No. I 02449 (PGS)

Plaintiff,
V.

JOHN CLANCY, et aL,

OPINION

Defendants

APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH WILLIAMS, Plaintiffg se
248 New York Avenue
Jersey City, New Jersey 07307
LINARES, District Judge
Plaintiff Joseph Williams seeks to bring this action j forma pauperis pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§ 1915. The Court will grant Plaintiffs application to proceed j formapauperis and, for

the reasons expressed below, will dismiss the federal claims raised in the Complaint and decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under New Jersey law.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts violations of his constitutional rights by 13 officials at Talbot Hall
:
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Assessment and Treatment Center in Kearny, New Jersey. Plaintiff asserts the following facts
According to the New Jersey Department of Corrections, “Talbot Hall is a Residential
Community Release Program (RCRP) that partners with the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (DOC) to assist prisoners as they reenter the community. Talbot Hall functions as a
cornerstone facility along a continuum of care between the NJ prison system and reintegration
into the community for the offenders.” N.J. Dept. of Corrections, http://wwv.state. nj.us/
(continued...)

1. On May 13, 2008, defendant Keith Hooper, Supervisor of Operations,
instructed defendant John Doe Counselor “to place him within a holding cell for
the Plaintiffs failure to properly smile during the process of his identification
photograph.” (Docket Entry #1, p. 3.)
2. On May 13, 2008, defendants “did endorse an unscrupulous policy that failed
to provide the Plaintiff with a Law Library while he was a resident of the
Community Education Center known as Talbot Hall.” (, p. 4.)
3, On May 13, 2008, defendants “did deny him access to the Courts by not
possessing a Law Library within the boundaries of the facility known as Talbot
Hall, a branch of the Community Education Center, Inc.” (Id., p. 5.)
4. On June 16, 2008, defendants “did record his legal communication with the
Clerk of the United States District Court.” (Id., p. 6.)
5. On June 18, 2008, defendants “did take total control over the funds in his
possession upon his placement within a holding cell of the Community Education
Center known as Talbot Hall.” (Id.)
6. On June 18, 2008, defendants “did withhold his legal documents from him
and/or his family.” (çj)
7. On June 18, defendants “did conspire to withhold the Plaintiffs legal
documents by not returning this documentation to either him or his family.” (Id.)
8. On June 19, 2008, “Defendant, Mr. McClary, [Business Manager,] did
withhold a check sent from the parent facility, Northern State, by taking full
control over those funds and the remainder of the funds stated in the Plaintiffs
Trust Account, upon his return to prison.”
p. 7.)
9. On June 18, 2008, “Defendant, Jacqueline Perry, [Contract Administrator,] did
fail in her obligation to properly oversee the return of his legal documents, the
funds in his possession, and, the funds within his Trust Account by the staff of the
Community Education Center known as Talbot Hall.” (Id.)
(Docket Entry #1, pp. 3-7.)

l(,,

.continued)
corrections/SubSites/OCP/ocprcrplocs/Talbot.html (Mar. 24, 2010).
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This Court’s rendition of Plaintiffs allegations excludes Plaintiffs conclusions.

Plaintiff maintains that defendants violated his constitutional rights and New Jersey law.
He seeks declaratory reliet unspecified injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive
damages. (Docket Entry #1, p. 10.)
II. STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134,

§

801-810, 110 Stat.

132 1-66 to 132 1-77 (April 26, 1996), requires the Court, prior to docketing or as soon as
practicable after docketing, to review a complaint in a civil action in which a plaintiff is
proceeding j forma pauperis or a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or
entity. $g 28 U.S.C.

§

1915(e)( )(B), 1915A. The PLRA requires the Court to g sponte

dismiss any claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief çj. A claim is frivolous if it “lacks even an arguable basis in law’ or its factual allegations
describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); see
also Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990).
The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the United States Supreme Court in
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009),
where the Supreme Court clarified as follows:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,
the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.
Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.... Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code
pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.
Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint
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be a context-specific task
states a plausible claim for relief will
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct. the complaint has alleged-hut it has not “show[nf
“that the pleader is entitled to relief” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
.

.

.

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
tiamework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Igbal, 129 S. Ci. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit observed that Iqbal hammered the “final nail-in-the-coffin” for the “no
set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (l957), which was
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203

applied to federal complaints before Twombly.
(3d Cir. 2009).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter. accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

‘

lqbal. 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(quoting Twombly. 550 U.S. at 570). The Third Circuit instructs that, to determine the
sufficiency of a complaint under the pleading regime established by Iqbal and Twombly,
a court must take three steps: First, the court must “tak{eJ note of
the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal. 129 S.

‘The Conlev court held that a district court was permitted to dismiss a complaint for
fiuilure to state a claim only if”it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conlev v. Gibson. 355 U.S. at
45-46.

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Ct, at 1947, Second, the court should identify allegations that,
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are well—
pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Township. 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010): see also Fowler. 578 F.3d
at 210—11 (“a complaint must do more i/ian allege the plainii/fs entitlement to relief A

complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts”) (emphasis supplied).
The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pg se pleading must he construed
liberally in favor of’ the plaintiffi even after lqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus. 551 U.S. 89(2007).
With these precepts in mind, the Court will determine whether the Complaint should be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Iii. DISCUSSION

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

Mansfield, C. & F. M. Ry. Co. v.

Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 383 (1884). “[Tjhey have only the power that is authorized by Article Ill of
the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport
Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). A district court may exercise original jurisdiction
over “Cases, in Law and Equity. arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States.

and Treaties made. or which shall be made, under their authority.” U.S. Const. art. 111..
28 U.S.C.

§

1331. Specifically, 42 U.S.C.

§

§

2; see

1983 authorizes a person to seek redress for a

violation of his or her federal rights by a person who as acting under color ol’ state law. Section
1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance.
regulation. custom. or usage. of any State or Territory
subjects.
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
.

c

.

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
To recover under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person

deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law,

$ West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Sample v. Diecks,
885 F.2d 1099, 1107 (3d Cir. 1989).
This Court reads the Complaint as attempting to assert the following claims under 42
U.S.C.

§ 1983: (A) the placement of Plaintiff in a holding cell for failing to properly smile for

his identification photograph violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; (B) the taking of Plaintiff’s funds violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (C) the failure to provide access to a law library, the recording of his
communication to the Clerk of this Court, and the withholding of unspecified legal documents
from Plaintiff violated his First Amendment right of access to courts.
A. Placement in Holding Cell
Plaintiff asserts that “on May 13, 2008, Defendant, Keith Ilooper, [Supervisor of
Operations at Talbot Hall,j instructed Defendant, John Doe Counselor #1 to place him within a
holding cell for the Plaintiff’s failure to properly smile during the process of his identification
photograph.” (Docket Entry #1, p. 3.) This Court construes this allegation as an attempt to assert
claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment.

6

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids states from denying “life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, ‘One must have an interest in life, liberty, or

property before due process protections are triggered.” Artway v. Attorney General of the State
of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Inmates have no liberty interest arising by force
of the Due Process Clause itself in remaining in the general population.

$ Hewitt v. Helms,

459 U.S. 460, 466-67 & n.4 (1983). Plaintiff has no state-created liberty interest in avoiding
placement in a holding cell, as this is not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.

$ Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (prisoner has no

liberty interest in avoiding 30 days in disciplinary segregation); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141,
150 (3d Cir. 2002) (detention for 15 days and administrative segregation for 120 days was not
atypical treatment for New Jersey prisoner); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3d Cir. 1997)
(prisoner has no liberty interest in avoiding segregation for 15 months as a suspect in the rape of a
female corrections officer). Plaintiff does not indicate how long he was confined in the holding
cell or describe the conditions. Because the facts alleged by Plaintiff do not show that he was
deprived of a liberty interest, this Court will dismiss the due process claim. However, because
Plaintiff may be able to assert facts stating a claim, the dismissal is without prejudice to the filing
of an amended complaint stating a cognizable due process claim under Sandin.
4

If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint stating a due process claim, he should
include specific facts regarding the duration and the conditions of confinement. S Pressley v.
Blame, 352 Fed .App’x 701 (3d Cir. 2009) (In determining whether a protected liberty interest
exists, the court must consider: (1) the duration of the disciplinary confinement; and (2) the
conditions of that confinement in relation to other prison conditions).
7

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege both an objective

element and a subjective element. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825. 834 (1994). To
establish a conditions of confinement claim, an inmate must show objectively that the alleged
deprivations are sufficiently serious.

Faer, 5 11 U.S. at 834. Conditions are sufficiently

serious when they deny the inmate one identifiable basic human need or deprive him of the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991).
A prisoner must also show that the official acted or failed to act with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of harm to his health or safety, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 305;
Nami, 82 F.3d at 67. A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he or she “knows that
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take
reasonable measures to abate it.” Fanner, 511 U.S. at 847.
The problem with Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claim is that the mere
confinement in a holding cell did not deny Plaintiff’ a basic human need or deprive him of the
minimal civilized measure of lifes necessities. Thus. Plaintiffs allegations do not satis1’ the
objective component of the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, Plaintiffs allegations do not satisfy
the deliberate indifference standard. as the placement in a holding cell did not constitute a
substantial risk of serious harm. Because the alleged deprivation was not sufficiently serious to
inflict cruel and unusual punishment and no defendant was deliberately indifferent, the Court is
constrained to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim with prejudice.
13. Taking ot Plaintitis Funds
Plaintiff complains that on June 18, 2008. 1)efendants

...

did take total control over the

funds in his possession upon his placement within a holding cell of the Community Education

8

Center known as Talbot HalL” (Docket Entry #1, p. 6.) He further asserts that on or after June
18, 2008, Jacqueline Perry, Contract Administrator for Talbot Hall, “did fail in her obligation to
properly oversee the return of.

.

.

the funds in his possession, and, the funds within his Trust

Account by the staff of the Community Education Center known as Talbot HalL”

(I, p. 7.) The

Court construes these allegations as an attempt to assert that defendants deprived him of property
without due process of law. However, this due process claim fails as a matter of law because the
New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”), N.J. Stat, Ann,

§ 59:1-1 et seq., provides all the process

that is due. The NJTCA provides an adequate post-deprivation judicial remedy to persons,
including inmates such as Plaintiff, who believe they were wrongfully deprived of property at the
hands of prison officials. See Holman v. Hilton, 712 F.2d 854, 857 (3d Cir. 1983); Asquith v.
Volunteers of America, I F. Supp,2d 405, 419 (D.N.J. 1998),

186 F,3d 407 (3d Cir. 1999).

Because the NJTCA is an available remedy providing all the process which is due, Plaintiffs due
process claim regarding the confiscation of funds fails and will be dismissed with prejudice.
C. Access to Courts
Plaintiff asserts that defendants “did endorse an unscrupulous policy that failed to provide
the Plaintiff with a Law Library while he was a resident of the Community Education Center
known as Talbot Hall;” defendants “did deny him access to the Courts by not possessing a Law
Library within the boundaries of the facility known as Talbot Hall;” defendants “did conspire to
stymie his ability to petition the Courts with the absence of a Law Library at Talbot Hall;”
defendants “did record his legal communication with the Clerk of the United States District
Court;” defendants “did withhold his legal documents from him and/or his family;” defendants
“did conspire to withhold the Plaintiffs legal documents by not returning this documentation to
9

either him or his family;” and defendants failed “to properly oversee the return of his legal
documents.” (Docket Entry #1, pp. 4, 5, 6, 7.)
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of access to the
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F. 3d 198, 205 (3d

courts,

Cir.), cert. denied, Stover v. Beard, 129 S. Ct. 1647 (2008). “Where prisoners assert that
defendants’ actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show
(1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’ that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or
-

‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other ‘remedy’ that may be awarded as
recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Monroe at 205
(quoting Christopher v. Harbry, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). To establish standing, “[t]he
complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than
mere hope,’ and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.” Monroe at 205-206 (quoting Christopher at
416-17).
In Monroe, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of
inmates’ access to the courts claim for failure to state a claim that was based on the confiscation
of legal materials:
In this case, the defendants confiscated all of the plaintiffs’
legal materials, including their legal briefs, transcripts, notes of
testimony, exhibits, copies of reference books, treatises, journals,
and personal handwritten notes. In their initial pleadings, the
plaintiffs’ claim rested solely on the ground that the defendants
confiscated their legal materials, contraband and non-contraband
alike. That claim, on its face, was insufficient to state a claim
under Harbury. So too were their subsequent amendments, which
alleged that they lost the opportunity to pursue attacks of their
convictions and civil rights claims but did not specie’ facts
demonstrating that the claims were nonfrivolous. Nor did they
maintain that they had no other remedy to compensate them for
.

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their lost claims, Even liberally construing their complaints as we
must do for pg se litigants, they do not sufficiently allege that they
have suffered actual injury.
Monroe, 536 F. 3d at 206 (citations and footnote omitted).
The Complaint before this Court suffers the same pleading deficiencies as the complaints
in Monroe. Accordingly. this Court vill dismiss the First Amendment access to courts clairn.
See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. 1)ep’t of Law & Public Safety-Div. of State Police. 411 F.
3d 427. 444-45 (3d Cir. 2005> (dismissing denial of access claim for failure to specify causes of
action lost). However, because Plaintiff may be able to correct the aibresaid pleading
deficiencies by filing an amended complaint, the dismissal of the access to courts claim will be
without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint stating a cognizable access to courts
claim within 30 days. $ç Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F. 3d 103. 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
D. Claims Arising Under New Jersey Law
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert claims arising under state law, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims because all federal claims over
which the Court has original jurisdiction are being dismissed, 28 U.S.C.

§ l367(c)(3): Growth

Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 383 F.2d 1277, 1284-5 (3d Cir. 1993).

To the extent that Plaintiff raises a due process claim based on the loss of his legal
materials, that claim is also dismissed. In Monroe. the Court of Appeals dismissed the inmates’
procedural due process claim on the grounds that pre-deprivation notice is not constitutionally
required and the prison grievance procedure provided an adequate post-deprivation remedy for
the loss. See
536 F. 3d at 210.

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IV. CONCiUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants Plaintiffs application to proceed
forma pauperis, dismisses the federal claims asserted in the Complaint, and declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.

I iJ ) Yk4_
PETER G. SHERIDAN, U.S.D.J.

Dated:

,

2011

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