GARCIA et al v. SPEZIALE et al
Filing
88
OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 3/23/15. (dc, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FELIX GARCIA and LUZ GARCIA.
Civil Action No.: 1O-cv-2637
Plaintiffs,
OPINION
V.
JERRY SPEZIALE, individually and in his
official capacity as Passaic County Sheriff, and
COUNTY OF PASSAIC,
Defendants.
CECCHI, District Judge.
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court upon a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant
1
Jerry Speziale pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant County of
Passaic submitted a letter request to join in the summary judgment motion in lieu of a formal brief,
2
pursuant to Local Civ. R. 7.1 (d)(4). The Motion is decided without oral argument pursuant to
3
Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the reasons set forth below. Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judanent is aranted.
‘ECFNo. 76.
ECF No. 77.
The Court considers any new arguments not presented by the parties to be waived. See
Brenner v. Local 514. United Bhd. of Caenters & Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283. 1298 (3d Cir.
1991) (“It is well established that failure to raise an issue in the district court constitutes a waiver
of the argument.”).
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II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Felix Garcia and Luz Garcia, husband and wife, filed this action on fvlay 21. 2010
against Defendants Jerry Speziale and the County of Passaic (“Defendants”). At all relevant times,
Defendant Speziale served as the Passaic County Sheriff Plaintiff Felix Garcia (“Mr. Garcia”)
was an employee of the Passaic County Sheriff’s Office from approximately 1972 to 2003. Compl.
¶ 12; Def.
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Stat. of Mat. Facts (“DSF”) ¶ 1; P1. Resp. to DSF (“PSF”) ¶ 1. On February 13, 2004,
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afier leaving his job with the Sheriff’s Office, Mr. Garcia filed a lawsuit (the “2004 Lawsuit”)
against the County of Passaic and Defendant Speziale, alleging discrimination and retaliation
based on his race and his political activism. DSF ¶4; PSF ¶4. In 2007, the parties reported to the
Court that they had reached a settlement in the 2004 Lawsuit. DSF ¶ 5; PSF ¶5. On June 27, 2007,
the Court dismissed the 2004 Lawsuit pursuant to the settlement, which was ultimately approved
by the Passaic County Freeholders in December 2007. DSF
¶ 5; PSF ¶ 5.
On December 5, 2007 Defendant Speziale notified “All Personnel” at the Sheriff’s
Department that the County of Passaic was experiencing a “debilitating budget crisis.” Speziale
Deci., Ex. 1. From December 2007 to M.ay 2008, Defendant Speziale, the Passaic County Sheriff’s
Department, and the New Jersey State Department of Personnel discussed several versions of a
layoff plan needed to balance the County’s budget. Speziale Dech, Ex. 1-9. On May 14, 2008,
Defendant Speziale sent a notice to the Department of Personnel outlining changes to the previous
layoff plan. Speziale Dcci.. Ex. 7. The notice increased the amount of layoffs. and added “Micro
Film Clerk” to the list of positions that would be eliminated. kL On May 20. 2008, the Department
ECF No. 76-1.
ECF No. 83.
of Personnel approved the updated layoff plan, which contemplated eliminating fifty five (55)
employees. Speziale Deci., Ex. 8.
Plaintiff Luz Garcia (‘Mrs. Garcia”) was the Micro Film Clerk at the Passaic County
Sheriffs Department, where she had worked since March 1995. DSF
¶ 5; PSF ¶ 5. On May 23,
2008, Defendant Speziale notified Mrs. Garcia that her position would be subject to layoff or
demotion. Ex, D-9 to DeDio Decl. On June 20, 2008, the New Jersey Department of Personnel
notified Mrs. Garcia that she was being laid off effective July 7, 2008. DeDio Decl., Ex. E.
In the present suit, Mr. Garcia alleges that following the settlement of the 2004 Lawsuit in
2007, Defendant Speziale began retaliating against him. DSF
¶ 7; PSF ¶ 7. Mr. Garcia contends
that Defendant Speziale retaliated against him by (i) disparaging his professional reputation, (ii)
violating his right to privacy by videotaping his political activities, and (iii) denying his application
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for a Retired Law Enforcement Officer Permit to Carry a Handgun. Pls. Br. Opp’n at 23. He also
contends that his wife was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for his successful settlement of the
2004 Lawsuit. Compi.
¶ 20. In addition, Mrs. Garcia raises her own individual claims of
discrimination, alleging that she was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for her husband’s 2004
Lawsuit. Compi. ¶ 43-47.
III.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Garcia filed the Complaint on May 21, 2010. naming as Defendants
Jerry Speziale, in his individual and official capacity, and the County of Passaic, Sççgcril’
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Compi. On January 31, 2013. Defendant Speziale filed a Motion for Summary Judnent that
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ECF No. 83.
ECF No. 53.
was granted in part and denied in part by Judge Cavanaugh’s Opinion dated September 27, 2013
(“Opinion, Cavanaugh, J.”).
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Judge Cavanaugh’s Opinion granted summary judgment for
Defendants on Count IV (“Violation of Public Policy”) and Count VI (Mr. Garcia’s claim for
“Retaliation in Violation of the NJLAD”) of the Complaint. Opinion, Cavanaugh, J. at 6-7.
Accordingly, four claims remained following Judge Cavanaugh’s Opinion: (1) Count One
Garcia’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant Speziale; (2) Count Two
1983 claim against Defendant County of Passaic; (3) Count Three
—
—
Mr.
Mr. Garcia’s Section
claim for violations of both
Plaintiffs’ rights under Article 1, Sections 6 & 18 of the New Jersey State Constitution; and (4)
Count Five
—
unlawfttl retaliation against Mrs. Garcia under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”). Compi.
¶J 2 7-47.
On October 24, 2013, Defendant Speziale’s attorney withdrew and was substituted by a
new attorney. See Substitution of Attorney.
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Defendant Speziale subsequently requested
permission to file another motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court granted leave to file a
motion on July 22, 2014. Text Order, July 22, 2014,’° Pursuant to the Court’s leave, Defendant
Speziale filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment on September 22, 2014.
IV.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the “depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations.
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and, construing all
facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, “the moving party is entitled
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ECFNo. 56.
ECFNo,
9 61.
‘° ECF No, 75.
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to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Pollock v.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Long Lines. 794 F.2d 860. 864 (3d Cir. 1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The moving party has the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party has the burden of identifying specific facts to show that, to the contrary, a genuine
issue of material fact exists for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 5 86-87 (1986). In order to meet its burden, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the
pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (stating
that “[t]he object of [Rule 56(e)] is not to replace conclusory allegations of the complaint.., with
conclusory allegations of an affidavit.”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986); Big Apple BMW, inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (stating that “[t]o raise a genuine issue of material fact,” the opponent
must “exceed the ‘mere scintilla’ threshold...”).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict in the nonmoving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248. 106
S. Ct. 2505. 91 LEd.2d 202 (1986). A fact is materia1” if. under the governing substantive law,
a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
V.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert Federal and State claims against Defendants, therefore the Court exercises
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and over Plaintiffs’ State
§ 1367. Defendants seek dismissal of the Complaint in its entirety,
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arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding any of Plaintiffs’ claims. Def. Br.
Supp.” at 25-27. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment.
A.
Plaintiff Felix Garcia’s Claims
Mr. Garcia asserts Section 1983 Claims against Defendants Speziale and the County of
Passaic. The claims against both defendants are essentially the same, and arise out of the alleged
retaliation caused by Defendant Speziale’ s actions, individually and as the employee of the County
of Passaic. See Compl. ¶j 27-35. The Court will address Mr. Garcia’s Section 1983 claims against
each defendant in turn.
1.
1983 Claims Against Defendants Speziale
Count One of the Complaint raises violations of Plaintiff’s freedom of speech, “political
activities and affiliation,” and equal protection, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Compl. ¶ 27-3 1. However, Mr. Garcia only
argues that Defendant Speziale retaliated against him “for having reached a successful and
favorable resolution of the 2004 Lawsuit.” P1. Br. Opp’n at 22-23. Mr. Garcia argues that
Defendant Speziale retaliated against him by defaming his professional reputation, violating his
right to privacy, denying his gun permit, and firing his wife, Id. at 23.
To succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the
activity in question is protected by the First Amendment, and (2) that the protected activity was a
substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action” jflv, Borough of Kutztown, 455 F3d 225,
241 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F3d 118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005)). It is well
“ECF No. 76-2.
settled that the filing of a lawsuit is considered a protected activity for the puiposes of a First
Amendment retaliation claim, Meenan v. Harrison, 264 F. Appx 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2008). To meet
the second element of the claim, a plaintiff must show that defendant’s action was “sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising” her rights. Revell v. City of Jersey City, 394
F. Appx 903, 906 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, to establish the requisite causal connection under
the second element, a plaintiff must prove either: (1) unusually suggestive temporal proximity
between the protected activity and the alleged retaliation; (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with
timing that establishes a causal link; or (3) causation “from the evidence gleaned from the record
as a whole.” Revell, 394 F. App’x at 906 (citing Lauren W. ex rd. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480
F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007)).
While Plaintiff has clearly established that he engaged in conduct protected by the First
Amendment
—
i.e. filing the 2004 Lawsuit
—
the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding the second necessary element of a First Amendment retaliation claim. First,
the Court agrees with Judge Cavanaugh’s Opinion that Plaintiff’s claim that he was disparaged
2
and defamed by Defendant Speziale does not rise to the level of retaliation.’ Opinion, Cavanaugh,
J. at 5; See also, Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 422 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that certain conduct
is not sufficiently grave to support a Section 1983 retaliation claim) (citing Suarez Corp. Indus. v.
McGraw, 202 R3d 676, 685 (4th Cir, 2000). Mr. Garcia also has not pointed to any specific
evidence that supports a link between the alleged right to privacy violations and the 2004 Lawsuit.
See P1. Br, Opp’n at 1619; see also yj1a, Borou
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of Throo
,
387 F. Appx 219, 222 (3d Cir.
Judge Cavanaugh ultimately denied summary judgment due to a factual dispute as to
the timing of Mrs. Garcia’s layoff. As explained below, the record presently before the court
eliminates this dispute.
2010) (affirming summary judgment where district court found that plaintiff “presented no
evidence by which a jury could conclude that his filing of a ievance was a ‘substantial motivating
factor” for the alleged retaliatory conduct). Additionally, the Court finds that Mr. Garcia’s
allegations that his handgun application was denied in retaliation for settling the 2004 Lawsuit are
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, because Mr. Garcia has failed to link the denial
of his gun permit to the 2004 Lawsuit. Viola, 387 F. App?x at 222. According to Mr. Garcia, he
3
received notice that his gun permit was denied in August 2008, (Mr. Garcia Decl.’ ¶ 13), more
than 4 years after the 2004 Lawsuit was filed and 14 months after it was dismissed by the Court
pursuant to the settlement in June 2007. Ex. B-i to DeDio Dccl. Though there is no “hard and
fast standard” for temporal proximity, the Third Circuit has found the inference cannot be drawn
where 19 months elapse between the protected conduct and retaliation. Estate of Smith v. Marasco,
318 F.3d 497, 512 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir.
1997)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to point to any unusually suggestive
timing that could support a retaliation claim based on the alleged defamation, right to privacy
violations, or the denial of his gun permit.
With regards to Plaintiffs allegations that his wife, Mrs. Garcia, was fired in retaliation for
the 2004 Lawsuit, the Court similarly finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
the “causation” element of the First Amendment retaliation claim,
While Judge Cavanaugh
previously denied summary judgment on this claim due to a factual dispute as to the timing of Mrs.
Garcia’s layoff (Opimon, Cavanaugh, J. at 5), the record presently befOre the Court clearly reveals
the relevant timeline. The parties agreed to settle the 2004 Lawsuit in June 2007, when the Court
‘
ECF No. 833.
8
Garcia
settlement. Ex. B-i to DeDio Dccl. Mrs.
issed the case after receiving notice of
dism
Lawsuit had
May 23, 2008, almost a year after the 2004
received notice of her possible layoff on
led
record reveals that Mrs. Garcia was not sing
15
Mrs. Garcia Decl. ¶ 10. Moreover, the
other
in a layoff plan that involved fifty five (55)
out. Mrs. Garcia’s position was included
employees
appealed her layoff with five other civilian
employees, (Speziale Dccl., Ex. 8.), and she
to DeDio
ent that were also laid off in July 2008. Ex. G
of the Passaic County Sheriffs Departm
whether
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
Dccl. Accordingly, the Court finds that there
op, 387
2004 Lawsuit. See Viola v. Borough of Thro
Mrs. Garcia was laid off in retaliation for the
to
Court finds that Mr. Garcia has also failed
’x 219, 222 (3d Cir. 2010). Therefore, the
F. App
suit.
pt to retaliate against him for the 2004 Law
show that his wife was laid off in an attem
,
t that despite any lack in temporal proximity
Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiffs argumen
and layoff
Defendant Speziale’s denial of the gun permit
a jury could infer “retaliatory animus” in
theory, a
To establish causation under an “antagonism”
of Mrs. Garcia. P1. Br. Opp’n at 18-19.
period’
tic conduct or animus’ in ‘the intervening
plaintiff needs “to show ‘actual antagonis
v. Cahill,
iation.” Buck Foston’s New Brunswick LLC
between the protected activity and the retal
*15 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting Marra v.
.A. 11-03731 FLW, 2013 WL 5435289, at
No. CIV
point to
(3d Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff has failed to
iaj9us.Autli, 497 F.3d 286, 302
Ilae1h
Speziale.
gonistic conduct” or “anirnus” by Defendant
any specific facts which evidence such “anta
settled.
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off because of newspaper articles
Plaintiff also argues that Mrs. Garcia was laid
s that
the 2004 Lawsuit. However, the record show
published on May 20, 2008 that discussed
nt of Personnel
layoff plan submitted to the Departme
Mrs. Garcia’s position was included in the
finds there
, on May 14, 2008. Accordingly, the Court
six days before the articles were published
was added to the
whether Mrs. Garcia’s position
is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
les.
layoff plan because of the newspaper artic
‘ECF No, 83-2.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff Felix Garcia has failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact regarding his First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant
Spezi ale. Plaintiff has failed to point to specific allegations raising a genuine issue of material
fact. Accordingly, the Court grants Summary Judgment for Defendants on Count One of the
Complaint. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
2.
1983 Claims Against the County of Passaic
Count Two of the Complaint asserts violations of Plaintiff Felix Garcia’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights by the Defendant the County of Passaic. Compl.
¶J 32-3 5. Count
Two seeks to impose liability on the County of Passaic for Defendant Speziale’s conduct. j
Plaintiff has not made any allegations that anyone other than Defendant Speziale committed
constitutional violations. See Compl. The Court has already determined that summary judgment
should be granted against Mr. Garcia’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant Speziale (Count
One). Supra, Part V.A. 1. Accordingly, in the absence of any separate allegations against the
County of Passaic, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against this defendant (Count Two), and summary judgment is also
granted on this claim.
B.
Plaintiffs’ State Constitutional Claims
Count Three of the Complaint raises claims by both Plaintiffs for violations of the New
Jersey State Constitution. art. I
6. 18. Compi.
36-39. Those Constitutional provisions
involve freedom of speech and the right to assemble and petition the government. N.J. Const. art.
I
§ 6, 18. Plaintiffs argue that the New Jersey Constitution provides broader provisions than the
Federal Constitution, and contend their retaliation claim should therefore survive summary
judgment,
at 20-22. Defendant argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted free
10
speech matters consistently with Federal First Amendment standards, and therefore Plaintiffs’
State claims should be dismissed. Def. Br. Supp. at 14. The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ State
Constitutional claim is essentially the same as their Section 1983 claim
—
they allege that
Defendants retaliated against them for filing and settling the 2004 Lawsuit. P1. Br, Opp’n at 2224.
The New Jersey State Constitution affords greater protections to persons’ free speech rights
than the Federal Constitution. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134, 149, 775 A.2d
756, 765 (App. Div. 2001). For example, while the Federal Constitution generally affords limited
rights of free speech in privately owned property, New Jersey’s Constitution has been interpreted
much more broadly. See Comm. For A Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n,
192 N.J. 344, 357, 929 A.2d 1060, 1067 (2007) (outlining the broader scope of New Jersey’s free
speech guarantees). However, it is clear that in the context of retaliation, New Jersey courts rely
on federal constitutional principles in interpreting the State Free Speech clause. Mineer v. Sheriff
James McGettigan, No. A-6560-05T3, 2008 WL 2744376, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July
16, 2008) (citing Karins v. City of Ati. City, 152 N.J. 532, 547, 706 A.2d 706, 713 (1998)). Thus,
the Court finds that the same standards applied to Mr. Garcia’s Section 1983 First Amendment
claim also apply to Plaintiffs’ retaliation claim under the New Jersey Constitution. Id.
As noted in Part V.A. 1,
Plaintiff have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding their Federal retaliation claim. Plaintiffs base their State Constitutional claim in Count
Three of the Complaint upon the same facts as their Federal ci.aim. Accordingly, because Court
has already determined that the allegations do not support the Federal claim, summary judguent
is also granted on Plaintiffs’ State Constitutional retaliation claim (Count Three).
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C.
Plaintiff Luz Garcia’s Claim Under the NJLAD
Count Five of the Complaint raises Mrs. Garcia’s claim for violations of the NJLAD.
Compi. ¶j 43-47.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Mrs. Garcia has sufficiently proven
discriminatory retaliation under the NJLAD.
P1. Br. Opp’n at 24-26.
To state a claim for
discriminatory retaliation, a plaintiff must show (i) that she engaged in a protected activity known
to the employer, (ii) that the employer retaliated against her, and (iii) that engaging in the protected
activity was a cause of the retaliation. Jamison v. Rockaway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 242 N.J. Super.
436, 447 (App. Div. 1990). Thus, like the First Amendment retaliation claim discussed above, a
NJLAD retaliation claim also requires showing a causal connection between the protected activity
and the alleged retaliatory action. Id.
As noted in Part V.A. 1. supra, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the causal connection between Mrs. Garcia’s layoff and the 2004 Lawsuit. Additionally,
Plaintiffs do not raise any new arguments or point to any specific facts that support their allegation
that Mrs. Garcia was laid off due to the 2004 Lawsuit. P1. Br. Opp’n. at 24-28. In the absence of
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” the Court finds that summary
judgment is also appropriate on Mrs. Garcia’s NJLAD claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted for Defendants on Count V of the Complaint.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact regarding Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s
Motion for summary judgment, and judgment is entered in favor of Defendants. An appropriate
Order accompanies this Opinion.
DATED:
t)v 3
CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.
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