NEALE et al v. VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC et al

Filing 289

OPINION. Signed by Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh on 10/16/13. (jd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOANNE NEALE, et al.,

Hon. Dennis M. Cavanaugh

Plaintiffs.
v.

OPINION
:

Civil Action No. 2:1 0-CV04407 (D\IC )(J13C)

VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA.
LLC. and VOLVO CAR CORPORATION:
Defendants.

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGI-I. U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon Motion for Reconsideration by Defendants Volvo
Cars of North America, LLC, and Volvo Car Corporation (“Defendants”) pursuant to L. Civ. R.
7.1(i) (ECF No. 381). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. no oral argument was heard. After carefull
considering the submissions of the parties. and based upon the following, it is the finding of this
Court that Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) is denied.
I.

B&cKGRouD

On March 26. 201 3. this Court issued an Opinion that granted Plaintiffs’ motion for
certification of statewide classes in Massachusetts, Florida, Hawaii. New Jersey. California. and
Maryland. In its Opinion, this Court found that Plaintiffs satisfied the prerequisites for class
certification set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), which provides that the party

seeking certification must demonstrate I) the existence of nurnerosity of the class; 2)
commonality of the questions of law or fact; 3) typicality of the named parties claims or

defenses; and 4) adequacy of representation. Defendants argue that this Court should reconsider
its decision due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrcnd, 133 S. CL 1 426
(2013), which came out one day after this Court issued its Opinion. Defendants filed the instant
Motion for Reconsideration on March 29, 2013 (‘Def.’s Mot.,” ECF No. 281). Plaintiffs tiled an
Opposition on April 22, 2013 (ECF No. 285).
II.

STANDARD OF REviEw

The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is “to correct manifest errors of law or fact

or to oresent newly discovered evidence” l-larsco Corp. v. Zlotnieki. 779 F.2d 906. 909 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171(1986) (citation omitted). Reconsideration is “an
extiaordinaiy remedy” that is to be granted veiy sparmgly

‘

NL Indus Inc

Commercial

Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp.
621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986)). Local Rule 7.1(i), under which such motions are governed, does not
contemplate a recapitulation of arguments considered by the Court before rendering its original
dccision Bermmgham

\‘

Sony Corp ol Am mc, 820 F Supp 834 856 (D N J 1992) jf

37 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994). It is improper to “ask the court to rethink what it ha[sj already
thought through

—

rightly or wrongly.” Oritani Say. & Loan Ass’n v. Fid. & Deposit Co.. 744

F. Supp. 1311, 1314 (D.N.J. 1990). Rather, a motion for reconsideration may be granted oni if
(1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously
available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent

manifest injustice. Database Am.,

Inc.

v. Bellsouth Adver. & Pub. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1 2 1 6.

1220 (D.N.J. 1993); see also North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 (3d Cir, 1995).
lii.

DiscussioN
Defendants argue that this Court should reconsider its Opinion that granted Plaintiffs’

mOtiOfl

for certification of statewide classes due to the Supreme Courts decision in Comeast,

That case involved a class of former and current subscribers of Comcast who sought damages
for alleged violations of federal antitrust laws. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1429-30. The plaintiffs
proposed four different theories of antitrust violation, but the District Court only accepted one.
Id. at 1430-31. To establish damages, the plaintiffs relied on the testimony of one expert. who
designed a damages model. Id. at 1431. However, this model did not isolate damages from any
one theory of antitrust violation. Id. The District Court certified the class, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed. Id. In response to the defendants argument that the damages model liiled to
attribute damages to the only theory of antitrust violation remaining in the case. the Court of
Appeals found that “such an ‘attac[kj on the merits of the methodology [had] no place in the
class certification inquiry.” 1d (quoting Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182. 207 (3d Cir.
2011)). The Supreme Court reversed and stated the following:
Respondents’ class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3), By
refusing to entertain arguments against respondents’ damages model that bore on
the propriety of class certification, simply because those arguments would also be
pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of our
precedents requiring precisely that inquiry. And it is clear that, under the proper
standard for evaluating certification, respondents’ model falls far short of
establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis.

Id. at 1432-33. Essentially, because the case had been reduced to one theory of antitrust
violation, the Supreme Court found that the damages model was improper because it did
not distinguish damages arising tIom this theor

from damages arising

from

the three

theories that the District Court decided were invalid. Id. at 1433. As such, the Supreme
Court stated that the model “cannot possibly establish that damages are susceptible ot
measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).” Id.
In the present case, Defendants argue that the Court should reconsider its Opinion
because [ijn Comcast, as here, the lower courts refused to entertain the defendants damages
arguments” (Def.’s Mot. at 3). However, this case is entirely distinguishable from Eomcast. In
Comcast, the damages theory was based on a model designed by an

expert

that compared

actual cable prices with hypothetical prices that would have existed if the defendants had not
engaged in the alleged anticompetitive activities. Id. at 1431. Here, the damages issue is much
more straightforward

—

all class members who purchased Defendants’ product were allegedly

damaged by a design defect. As this Court stated in its Opinion: “This is a classic example ota
case that warrants class action. Plaintiffs seek to represent six statewide classes of Volvo
purchasers or lessees whose individual damages may well be small enough to render individual
litigation prohibitively expensive.” Neale v. Volvo Cars of N, Am., LLC, No, 2:10-C V-4407,
2013 WL 1223354, at *12 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2013). Defendants cannot reasonably point to
Comcast and argue that because the Supreme Court rejected a flawed hypothetical damages
model in that case, certification in this case was improper. Further, in Comcast, the plaintiffs

4

solely relied on one expert to establish classwide damages, and the Supreme Court found that
experts methodology to be unsound. Comcast. 133 S. Ct. at 1431. Here, Defendants have
already moved to preclude Plaintiffs’ damages expert and this Court denied the motion because
“Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding damages in their Motion for Class Certification do not rely
exclusively on [the expert’s] Report.” Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, No. 2:l0-CV4407. 2013 WL 785056, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2013). Because this case is distinnuishable from
Comcast. this Court finds no reason to reconsider its Opinion. Accordingly. Defendants’
Motion is denied.
IV.

(oNciusIoN

For the reasons stated, it is the finding of this Court that Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(i) is denied.

Date:
Orig.:
cc:

Octohe20 13
Clerk
All Counsel of Record
Hon. James B. Clark. U.S.M.J.
File