NEALE et al v. VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC et al

Filing 291

OPINION. Signed by Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh on 10/16/13. (jd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOANNE NEALE. et a!..
Plaintiffs,

Hon.

Dennis M. Cavanaugh
OPiNION

Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-4407 (DMC)(JBC)
VOLVO CARS OF NORTH AMERICA.:
LLC, and VOLVO CAR CORPORATION:
Defendants,

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH. U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court upon Motion for Reconsideration by I)efendants Volvo
Cars of North America, LLC, and Volvo Car Corporation (“Defendants”) pursuant to L. Civ. R.
7. 1(i) (ECF No. 277). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. no oral argument was heard. After carefully
considering the submissions of the parties, and based upon the following, it is the finding of this
Court

I.

that Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) is denied.
BACKGROUNI)
On February 28, 2013, this Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Preclude the Testimony of

Defendants’ Expert Christine T. Wood (Wood”), finding that Wood’s opinions were not based
on a review of facts specific to this case. For example, Wood concluded that vehicle purchasers
would not read the owner’s manuals that Plaintiffs claim should have been provided to them

because they are hundreds of pages long. However, Wood conceded that she did not review the
manuals for the vehicles in this case and did not know how

long

they were. Wood also stated she

had no idea what kind of safety information was contained in the manuals. vet admitted that this
could affect how the information is processed due to the amount of “information to filter
through.” Additionally, in Wood’s proffered opinion on the effectiveness of recall notices, she
cited a general study that demonstrated that, on average, 70% of vehicle owners respond to recall
notices, with response rates as low as 23% and as high as 96%. However, Wood never
ascertained where Volvo owners fell within that range. Accordingly, this Court excluded
\\‘oods testimony as speculative and without foundation. Defendants tiled the instant Motion for
Reconsideration on March 14. 2013 (“Def.’s Mot.. ECF No. 277). Plaintiffs liled an Opposition
on April 1, 2013 (“PL’s Opp’n,” ECF No. 284).
11.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is “to correct manifest errors of law or tact

or to present newly discovered evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cii’.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986) (citation omitted). Reconsideration is ‘an
extraordinary remedy” that is to be granted “very sparingly.” NT. Indus. Inc. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp. 513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Maldonado v. Lucca, 636 F. Supp,
621, 630 (D.N.J. 1986)). Local Rule 7.1(i), under which such motions are governed, does not
contemplate a recapitulation of arguments considered by the Court before rendering its original
decision. Bermingham v. Sony Corp. ofAm.. Inc.. 820 F. Supp. 834. 856 (D.N..J. 1992). atid
37 1 3d 1485 (3d Cu 1994) it is improper to ask the court to rethink hat

it

Ii i[s] aheady

thought through

rightly or wrongly.” Oritani Say. & Loan Ass’n v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 744

F. Supp. 1 3 11. 1314 (E.N.J. 1990). Rather, a motion for reconsideration may be granted only if

(1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred; (2) evidence not previously
available has become available; or (3) it is necessary to correct a clear error ol law or prevent
manifest injustice. Database Am., Inc. v. Bellsouth Adver. & Pub. Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1 21 6,
1220 (D.N.J. 1993); see also North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194,
1218 (3d Cir. 1995).
II.

1)ISCUSSION
Defendants do not allege that there has been an intervening change in controlling law or

that there is new evidence that was not previously available. Rather. Defendants arcue that its
Motion for Reconsideration should be granted because this Court’s “grounds for exclusion were
based on clear errors of fact and law” (DeL’s Mot. at 4).
Defendants first argue that this Court should not have excluded Wood’s opinions
regarding the owner’s manuals because Wood testified that owner’s manuals are hundreds of
pages long, and Defendants did in fact submit a Volvo manual to the Court that is hundreds of
pages long (Defs Mot, at 4-5). However, Wood also admitted that she did not read the manuals
for the vehicles in this case. Thus, the fact that she correctly guessed that the Volvo manual
submitted to the court was hundreds of pages does not make her testimony relevant to this case.
Defendants also argue that Wood adequately relied on a published study showing that different
people read different parts of an owner’s manual (Id. at 5). This study concluded that as little as
27% of drivers read the owner’s manual and only 1% seek out safety information (id.). However.

as Plaintiffs correctly

point out,

this study relates to warning compliance rather than how a

disclosure affects a purchasing decision. Also, a single study does not render an expert’s opinion
reliable. Defendants further argue that Wood’s opinions should be admissible because she relied
on testimony from one of the named Plaintiffs. However, simply quoting a named Plaintiffs
isolated statements does not render Woods testimony helpful and reliable.
With respect to the recall notices, Defendants argue that this Court misunderstood the
content of Wood’s opinion regarding the study that demonstrated the percentage of people that
respond to recall notices (Defs Mot. at 8). Defendants assert that because this study shows that
a significant amount of vehicle owners ignore safety recalls, it shows that some members of the
Class would ignore a disclosure made by Volvo regarding water leaks that could occur from
clogged sunroof drains (Id.). However, Wood neglected to collect any information specifically
relevant to Volvo owners. Thus. this Court was correct in deciding that her opinions are not
based on facts from this case.
Essentially, Wood’s opinions do not relate to the substance of the instant case. Therefore.
this Court was correct in deciding that a rational finder of fact could not draw helpful
conclusions about this case from Wood’s general observations. The fact that Woods opinions
rest heavily on the cited studies instead of the specific facts of this case is particularly telling.
Accordingly, this Court did not make a clear error of law. and Defendants’ Motion for
Reconsideration is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is the finding of this Court that Defendants’ Motion for
4

Reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(i) is denied.

Dc
Date:
Orig.:
cc:

4

October
2013
Clerk
All Counsel of Record
Hon. James B. Clark, U,S.M.J,
File

nis

M. Cavanaugh, U.S

.J.