T.C. v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Filing
26
LETTER OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 7/26/11. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. FEDERAL BLDG. & U.S. COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT STREET, P.O. BOX 419
NEWARK, NJ 07101-0419
(973) 645-6340
WILLIAM J. MARTINI
JUDGE
LETTER OPINION
July 26, 2011
Randi Mandelbaum
The State University of New Jersey
Rutgers School of Law - Newark
Child Advocacy Center
123 Washington Street
Newark, New Jersey 07102
(Attorney for Plaintiff)
Suzanne M. Haynes
Social Security Administration
26 Federal Plaza
Room 3904
New York, New York 10278
(Attorney for Defendant)
RE:
T.C. obo Z.C. v. Commissioner of Social Security
Civ. No. 10-5229 (WJM)
Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff Tamiko Carswell (“Carswell”) brings this action on behalf of her minor
child Z.C. (“Claimant”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking review of
a final determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”)
denying her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) Benefits. For the
reasons that follow, the Commissioner‟s decision is AFFIRMED.
1
I.
BACKGROUND
Claimant was born on January 15, 2001 and first presented with symptoms of
Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (“ADHD”) when he was about six years old.
(Administrative Transcript, hereinafter “Tr.,” 522.) At the age of three, he first exhibited
signs of a learning disorder while attending programming at the Neighborhood Center
Day Care Program in Montclair, New Jersey. After the Claimant completed
kindergarten, Plaintiff and her family moved to North Carolina for a period of nine
months. They subsequently returned to Montclair, NJ. (Id. at 216.) At the time of the
hearing before the ALJ, claimant was eight years old and attending the third grade at the
Rand Elementary School. (Id. at 49.)
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI Benefits on behalf of the claimant on August
16, 2007 alleging disability due to ADHD. (Id. at 23.) Her claim was initially denied on
May 14, 2008, and after a request for reconsideration, again denied on July 8, 2008. (Id.
at 72, 75.) A hearing was held on November 13, 2009, before ALJ Kenneth Chu. (Id. at
45.)
A. Hearing Testimony
Claimant was not present at the hearing but was represented by Mr. Tim Kozicki.1
Mr. Kozicki argued that the Claimant suffers from ADHD, combined type, a condition
characterized in the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual by inattentive, impulsive behavior
and hyperactivity. (Id. at 46.) Additionally, Mr. Kozicki stated that the Claimant
presents with language delays, learning disabilities and behavior problems. (Id.)
Ms. Carswell, Claimant‟s mother, was also present at the hearing and offered
testimony. (Id. at 50.) She described the persistent need to remind Z.C. to get ready for
school and to perform important tasks like brushing his teeth. (Id.) Ms. Carswell stated
that when she takes Z.C. out in public he must be kept occupied so that he does not
wander off or cause a disruption. (Id. at 60.) Other individuals are incapable of taking
Z.C. out in public because they are unable to control him. (Id.)
Ms. Carswell provided a synopsis of Z.C.‟s academic troubles and his inability to
complete his school work on his own. (Id. at 51.) She explained that Z.C. would be
unable to complete his homework without her assistance and would quickly lose focus
without her constant presence. (Id.) Ms. Carswell testified that Z.C. is incapable of
1
Tim Kozicki was a “Student Attorney” with the Rutgers School of Law-Newark Child
Advocacy Clinic.
reciting all the letters of the alphabet and does not know basic numbers. (Id.) She also
stated that from the time Z.C. entered pre-school he has caused disruptions in class. (Id.
at 52.) Z.C.‟s academic troubles were observed by his teachers in both North Carolina
and Montclair. (Id. at 53.) He is in special education and is classified as multiplydisabled as a result of his poor performance in various core elements of the school
curriculum. (Id.) These difficulties required that Z.C. be placed at a grade level below
other students his age. (Id. at 55.) He has been placed in both speech and occupational
therapy. (Id. at 56.) Each day after school he attends the Montclair Center where he
receives therapy and additional help for his hyperactivity. (Id. at 61.)
Mr. Kozicki also asked Ms. Carswell about any medication that has been
prescribed for Z.C. (Id.) She explained that he was prescribed different medications,
including Ritalin, to treat his hyperactivity. (Id.) Although the medication seems to
work, Ms. Carswell described how Z.C. would complain that the medication hurt his
stomach, resulting in a reduction in dosage. (Id. at 57.) She testified that once Z.C.
discovered that the medicine was intended to control his hyperactivity he would refuse to
take it. (Id.) Even when Z.C. does take his medication he still suffers from an inability to
focus. (Id. at 57-58.)
Ms. Carswell testified that she first decided to apply for SSI payments on behalf of
Z.C. after being told about the program by a teacher. (Id. at 61.) She stated that she
looked into the program and found that SSI would provide assistance for hyperactive
children like Z.C. (Id. at 61-62.) After persistent questioning, Ms. Carswell added that
she knew how to go through the process of applying for SSI benefits for Z.C. because of
her previous experience with her other children. (Id. at 63-64.)
B. School Reports
The ALJ was provided with medical records and teacher evaluations from: (1)
Green Hope Elementary School, the school attended by Z.C. while his family was living
in North Carolina from January 2007 through November 2007; (2) Nishuane Elementary
School in Montclair Public School District, which he attended from Fall 2007 through
Summer 2009; and (3) Rand Elementary School. These included multiple reports from
teachers, reporting how Z.C. enjoyed his time at school and liked to interact with other
students. (Id. at 47.) However, the teacher reports also indicated that Z.C. was often
unable to focus, was easily distracted, and was inattentive during class. (Id.)
The schools Z.C. attended created plans to provide support. At Green Hope
Elementary School, an “Action Plan” was constructed, which identified Z.C.‟s poor
reading skills and noted that he was hyperactive and disruptive. (Id. at 157-59.) He was
then referred to special education in September 2007. (Id. at 171.) At Nishuane
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Elementary, the Child Study Team implemented an Individualized Education Program
(“IEP”) for Z.C. between September 22, 2008 and June 24, 2009. (Id. at 281-83.) The
Child Study Team set goals of improving Z.C.‟s abilities in the areas of communication,
fine motor skills, sensory and perception, language arts, reading, and math. (Id. at 29096.) A review of Z.C.‟s IEP progress, conducted on May 20, 2009, showed he had made
a marked improvement from his prior abilities, especially in following directions and
recognizing categories of items. (Id. at 473.) However, Z.C. still needed help with
identifying some letters and sounds, drawing inferences, reading out loud, and with math.
(Id.)
Z.C.‟s skill levels were generally described by teachers as below average. Z.C.‟s
first grade teacher at Nishuane Elementary School, Ms. Rourke, completed a Social
Security Administration Teacher Questionnaire on May 1, 2008. (Id. at 194-201.) Ms.
Rourke noted that Z.C. had an obvious problem understanding vocabulary, giving
adequate oral descriptions, and remembering material that he had previously been taught.
(Id. at 195.) She described his ability to understand and complete math assignments, as
well as his reading and writing skills, as serious problems. (Id.) When assessed by a
speech-language specialist on July 17 and 18, 2008, Z.C. placed below average on tests
used to assess an individual‟s ability to identify and label pictures and in the “very low
range” on a test used to measure an individual‟s language functioning. (Id. at 336-37.)
The speech-language specialist concluded that Z.C. required development in the fields of
receptive and expressive language. (Id. at 342.)
Finally, Z.C. underwent psychological evaluations as well. He was evaluated by
the Nishuane School Psychologist on July 3, 2008, and by Rand Elementary School‟s
psychologist on November 12, 2009. (Id. at 343-45, 541.) The Nishuane School
Psychologist determined that Z.C.‟s level of cognitive function was in the average range
and that he demonstrated average ability in non-verbal problem solving and perceptual
reasoning. (Id. at 345.) She also noted that Z.C. demonstrated weak verbal
comprehension and reasoning, an inability to adequately express himself, and a poor
ability to maintain focus and pay attention. (Id.) The Rand Elementary School
psychologist described Z.C. as a student in a self-contained special education classroom,
classified him as Multiply Disabled, and described his inability to work independently
and his constant need to be reminded to stay on task. (Id. at 541.)
C. Medical and Mental Health Records
The ALJ was also provided with Z.C.‟s medical and mental health records. On
June 8, 2007, Z.C. received a “Well Child Exam” at Triangle Family Practice, located in
Durham, North Carolina. (Id. at 248.) The examining physician noted that Z.C. did not
appear to be hyperactive while in the examination room. (Id.) On February 7, 2008, Z.C.
was examined by the Family Center at Montclair‟s Outpatient Health Services division.
(Id. at 265-69.) The Family Center‟s examination yielded an initial diagnosis of ADHD
and asthma, and Z.C. was given a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of
55. (Id.) After this examination, the Center‟s clinician recommended that Z.C. be
evaluated by a psychiatrist and placed into individual and family therapy. (Id. at 269.)
On May 29, 2008, the Family Center‟s Dr. Yasir Ahmad issued a prescription for
Wellbutrin and Concerta. (Id. at 270-71.)
On May 5, 2008, Z.C. was examined by Dr. Marc Friedman, a psychologist
employed by the Social Security Administration. (Id. at 252.) Dr. Friedman noted that
Z.C. was able to express himself in short sentences and speak clearly, and that his IQ test
scores were indicative of a significant learning disability. (Id. at 252-53.) His verbal
comprehension skills were below average but his processing skills were above average.
Dr. Friedman recommended that Z.C.‟s special education placement be continued. (Id.)
On May 13, 2008, Dr. Emanuel Elfenbein, employed by the Social Security
Administration, completed a Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Childhood
Disability Evaluation Form. (Id. at 259-64.) Dr. Elfenbein reported that Z.C.‟s
impairments were severe but did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal the
SSA‟s listings. (Id. at 259.) While Z.C. did have a marked limitation acquiring and
using information, he either had a less than marked limitation or no limitation in the other
functional domains evaluated by the doctor. (Id. at 261-62.) On July 3, 2008, an
additional SSA Childhood Disability Evaluation Form was completed by Dr. Samuel
Kaye, a Pediatric Specialist. (Id. at 272-77.) Dr. Kaye similarly concluded that Z.C.‟s
condition resulted in no more than a minimal functional limitation. (Id. at 272.) This
decision was subsequently affirmed on July 7, 2008 by Dr. Thomas Shubeck. (Id. at
278.)
On October 6, 2008, Z.C. was examined by Dr. Joseph Nazareth, a Pediatric
Neurologist. (Id. at 358.) His clinical impression, after administering various tests, was
that Z.C. had ADHD combined type, a learning disability with processing deficits, and a
speech and fine motor skill deficit. (Id. at 361.) He recommended that Z.C. be placed in
a well structured classroom environment and receive behavioral and occupational
therapy. (Id.) The doctor noted that at a follow up visit he would consider placing Z.C.
on medicine for his ADHD. (Id.)
Finally, the ALJ also reviewed Z.C.‟s full medical records as compiled by
Mountainside Family Practice between February 2, 2002 and August 20, 2009. (Id. at
509-36.) On August 20, 2009, a “well child check” was conducted by Dr. Anthony
Macarthy. (Id. at 510.) Dr. Macarthy noted that Z.C. was able to “ride [a] bicycle, tie
knots,…walk a straight line and be able to keep up with other children when he plays
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with them.” (Id.) The doctor also recorded that Z.C. had no sign of behavior or
emotional problems. (Id.) Mountainside‟s records consistently note Z.C.‟s ADHD
beginning in March 2009. (Id. at 510-20.) The first mention of Z.C.‟s ADHD came on
August 30, 2008 when he was first evaluated for the disorder. (Id. at 522.) His medical
records for that date state that Z.C.‟s symptoms included fidgeting, an inability to remain
seated, a tendency to be easily distracted, an inability to pay attention, and difficulty
listening. (Id.) The evaluating staff member listed that these problems were first evident
when Z.C. was about six years old. (Id.)
D. ALJ’s Decision and Plaintiff’s Appeal
After considering testimony, school records, and medical records, the ALJ issued
his opinion on December 10, 2009, finding that the claimant, while impaired, does not
meet the Social Security Act‟s disability requirements. (Id. at 37.) Specifically, the ALJ
made the following determinations, among others: (1) Claimant has the following severe
impairments: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and a learning disability; (2)
Claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1; and (3) Claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
functionally equals the listings. (Id. at 26-37.)
Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, which was denied on August
12, 2010, and then this action followed. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff provides the following
reasons for reversing the ALJ‟s determination, or in the alternative remanding the matter
to a different ALJ for further consideration: (1) failure by the ALJ to fully and fairly
develop the record by disregarding relevant and probative evidence without providing
adequate reasons, (2) failing to provide adequate explanations or analysis for his decision
that claimant does not meet or functionally equal the listings; (3) the ALJ erred by
neglecting to consider the effects of a structured setting on the claimant‟s functioning; (4)
the ALJ erred by giving greater weight to one time evaluations and by failing to give
appropriate weight to evidence provided by physicians and specialists who evaluated the
claimant; (5) the ALJ‟s findings were against the substantial weight of the evidence; and
(6) the ALJ‟s inappropriate conduct at the hearing resulted in a denial of the claimants
right to a fair hearing.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
At the administrative level, a three step sequential evaluation process is used to
determine whether an individual under the age of 18 is disabled and therefore entitled to
benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). In the first step, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. An individual is engaging in
substantial gainful activity if he is doing significant physical or mental activities for pay
or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. If the individual is engaging in substantial gainful
activity, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). If the individual is not engaging in
substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to the second step.
In the second step, the ALJ must conclude whether the claimant has a medically
determinable “severe” impairment or a combination of impairments that is “severe.” For
an individual who has not attained age 18, a medically determinable impairment or
combination of impairments is not severe if it is a slight abnormality or a combination of
slight abnormalities that causes no more than minimal functional limitations. If the
claimant does not have a medically determinable sever impairment, he is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 416.924(c). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the analysis proceeds to
the third step.
In the third step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the criteria of a listing, or
that functionally equals the listing for an individual who is under 18. In determining
whether an impairment or combination of impairments functionally equals the listings,
the ALJ must assess the claimant's functioning in terms of six domains: (1) acquiring and
using information, (2) attending and completing tasks, (3) interacting and relating with
others, (4) moving about and manipulating objects, (5) caring for himself, and (6) health
and physical well-being. To functionally equal the listings, the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments must result in “marked” limitations in two domains of
functioning or an “extreme” limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). Social
security regulations describe how to determine when a child's limitation is either marked
or extreme. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.926a(e)(2)-(3).
The district court reviews the ALJ‟s application of the law de novo. See Monsour
Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1191 (3d Cir. 1986). On the other hand, factual
findings are reviewed to determine whether they are supported by substantial evidence.
See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). When substantial evidence for
an ALJ's factual findings exists, this Court is bound by those determinations of the ALJ.
See Id. (citing 42 U.S. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of
the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d
Cir. 2004) (quoting Jesurum v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48
F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995)). “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Under the substantial evidence
standard, the district court is required to review the record as a whole. Schaudeck v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). If there is more than one
7
rational interpretation of the evidence in the record, this Court must accept the
conclusions of the ALJ and affirm his decision. See Izzo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 186
Fed. Appx. 280, 284 (3d Cir. 2006). The Court is “not permitted to weigh the evidence
or substitute [its] own conclusions for that of the fact-finder.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312
F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir.
1992)). Overall, the substantial evidence standard is a deferential standard of review,
which requires deference to inferences drawn by the ALJ from the facts, if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431.
Additionally, the Third Circuit requires an ALJ to “set forth the reasons for his
decision,” so that the district court can conduct meaningful judicial review. See Burnett
v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the ALJ is not required to use
any particular language or follow any specific formula, as long as sufficient details are
provided to allow for meaningful judicial review. Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
B. ALJ’s Alleged Failure to Properly Develop the Record and Evaluate the
Evidence at Step Three
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to perform his duty of developing a full and
fair record. (Pl. Br. 8.) Plaintiff alleges this failure resulted when the ALJ disregarded
relevant and probative evidence without providing a reason. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff also
claims that the ALJ failed to provide an adequate explanation for his decision that the
claimant does not meet or equal the listings, including Listing 112.11 as contained in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 11.) The Court disagrees.
The Third Circuit has held that ALJs have a duty to fully and fairly develop the
administrative record in Social Security cases. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d
Cir. 1995). This duty requires that the ALJ develop the facts in an attempt to investigate
arguments both for and against granting benefits to a claimant. See Carmichael v.
Barnhart, 104 Fed. Appx. 803, 805 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an ALJ‟s request for
comprehensive examinations and medical records was evidence of the ALJ‟s fulfillment
of his duty to develop the record). Here, the ALJ ensured that the administrative record
was sufficiently developed. The Claimant was represented by counsel, and said counsel
submitted a brief on claimant‟s behalf. During the hearing, information was introduced
about Z.C.‟s impairments, his difficulties learning, and the different programs and
medications that had been prescribed to assist Z.C. (Tr. 45-63.) The ALJ also questioned
Ms. Carswell about Z.C.‟s daily activities and the process of applying for SSI benefits.
(Id. at 63-67.) The representation provided by counsel and the submission of a plethora
of supporting documents had the effect of making unnecessary any further requests by
the ALJ.
C. ALJ’s Alleged Failure to Provide Adequate Explanations for the Finding that
Z.C. does not Meet or Functionally Equal the Listings
Plaintiff alleges that the record is incomplete because it does not provide
information about how the ALJ reached his decision that claimant does not meet or equal
a Listed Impairment. (Pl. Br. 11.) Plaintiff is correct that an ALJ‟s mere conclusory
statement that a claimant does not meet or equal the listings prevents meaningful judicial
review. Burnett v. Comm’r, 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000). An ALJ must provide
some indication of what evidence was utilized to support a decision and what evidence
was rejected. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981). In doing so, the ALJ
allows a reviewing court to determine if probative evidence was properly considered. Id.
Where an ALJ references a specific listing and discusses the evidence at length, sufficient
judicial review is permitted. Jaramillo ex. rel. Mesa v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., 140 Fed.
Appx. 557, 561 (3d Cir. 2005). An ALJ is not required to provide a “comprehensive
explanation” each time evidence is rejected. Perdomo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 092972(WJM), 2010 WL 4615111, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2010).
Here, Plaintiff relies in part on Burnett to support her contention that the ALJ‟s
failure to cite evidence supporting his decision as to listing 112.11 requires reversal and
remand. (Pl. Br. 12). However, the ALJ‟s decision includes a synopsis of much of the
claimants academic and mental health records, providing information suitable to allow
meaningful judicial review. (Tr. 26-29.) When the ALJ‟s decision is read as a whole, the
factors used to determine that the claimant‟s impairment does not meet or medically
equal one of the impairments listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 are
plainly discernable. When explaining that Z.C. does not functionally equal the listings,
the ALJ reviews the six domains of functioning that he is required to consider and
provides evidentiary support for his conclusion as to each domain. (Id. at 31-37.) The
Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds that the ALJ adequately explained his reasoning
at Step Three.
D. The ALJ’s Alleged Failure to Consider the Effects of a Structured Setting on
the Claimant’s Functioning
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not considering the effects of a structured
setting on Z.C.‟s functioning, as stipulated by 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b)(5). (Pl. Br. 22.)
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ disregarded copious evidence pertaining to Z.C.‟s need for
structured settings and their effect on him, requiring at least a remand to a different ALJ.
(Id. at 24-28.) Under the SSA‟s regulations, applicants for SSI benefits must be
considered outside of a structured setting in which they have been placed. 20 C.F.R. §
416.924a(b)(5)(iv)(C); SSR-09-3P. However, the fact that a claimant may or may not
have been placed in special education is not itself determinative of the claimant‟s
9
disability status. Richardson v. Barnhart, 136 Fed. Appx. 463, 466 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.924a(b)(7) (2005)).
Here, the ALJ adequately considered the structured settings in which Z.C. had
been placed along with Z.C.‟s ability to function outside of such settings. The ALJ stated
in his decision that he evaluated Z.C. “as provided in 20 CFR 416.926a(b).” (Tr. 30.)
This included an evaluation of how Z.C. “functions in all settings and at all times, as
compared to other children the same age who do not have impairments.” Id. Other
courts in this District have used similar language when describing the appropriate level of
analysis to be employed by ALJs. Cruz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-3721(SRC), 2009
WL 2448517 at *10 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2009) (noting that ALJs “should
consider…generally, how the child‟s functioning compares to that of children the same
age who do not have impairments.”). The ALJ noted that: (1) Z.C. had been referred to
his school‟s resource center for assistance, (2) “had difficulty with functioning
independently,” (3) had “trouble following instructions and focusing in school and at
home,” (4) had been given a “full time aide to assist him in school and (5) that he is
attending speech and occupational therapy two times per week in a self-contained special
education classroom.” (Tr. 28-30.) The Court finds that the ALJ properly considered
Z.C.‟s functioning in all settings and noted his participation in structured programming.
E. The ALJ’s Alleged Failure to Give Proper Weight to Treating Physicians’
Evaluations
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ‟s decision is not in keeping with 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(d)(2), which provides that more weight is to be given to a claimant‟s treating
sources because they have a greater ability to provide a complete picture of the claimant‟s
functionality. (Pl. Br. 28.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ granted more
weight to the evaluations conducted by SSA physicians while affording less weight to the
claimant‟s own physicians. (Id. at 30.) Plaintiff also believes that the ALJ did not give
due weight to evaluations conducted by specialists. (Id. at 32.)
A treating physician‟s opinions should be given great weight, especially when
such opinions and judgments are based on treatment and observation of a patient over a
prolonged period of time. Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing
Rocco v. Heckler, 826 F.2d 1348, 1350 (3d Cir. 1987)). However, a treating physician‟s
determination that a claimant is “„disabled‟… is not dispositive of the issue.” Adorno v.
Shalala, 40 F. 3d 43 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (3d Cir.
1990)). Agency physicians are capable of providing expert analysis when conducting
Social Security disability evaluations and their analysis is entitled to great deference.
Perdomo, 2010 WL 4615111, at *7 (citing Alexander v. Shalala, 927 F.Supp. 785, 795
(D.NJ. 1995); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(f)(2)(i)).
A review of the ALJ‟s decision indicates that he did indeed afford adequate weight
to the opinions of the claimant‟s treating physicians. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ
disregarded treatment records from Mountainside Family Practice and Dr. Nazareth, but
the ALJ stated that he had carefully considered Z.C.‟s medical and non-medical records
in their entirety and found that they were consistent with the reports issued by the SSA
physicians. (Tr. 27-28.) These reports, having been written by SSA consultants, are
entitled to the weight afforded to them by the ALJ. See Perdomo, 2010 WL 4615111, at
*7. The Third Circuit has upheld ALJ decisions where the opinions of treating
physicians were disregarded due to their inconsistency with substantial evidence found in
other parts of a claimant‟s record. See generally Drejka v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 61 Fed.
Appx. 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2003). Here however, the ALJ found the decisions of all of
Z.C.‟s evaluators to be consistent. (Tr. 31.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ
gave adequate to the findings of treating physicians.
F. ALJ’s Findings Allegedly Against the Substantial Weight of the Evidence
Plaintiff claims substantial evidence cannot exist where, as is alleged here,
medical evidence has been disregarded or inadequately analyzed. (Pl. Br. 33.)
According to the Plaintiff, if all of the evidence had been appropriately analyzed by the
ALJ, then the substantial weight of the evidence would indicate that Z.C. functionally
equals the listings for ADHD. (Id. at 35.) A claimant functionally equals the listings
when “the claimant‟s impairment or combination of impairments…result in „marked‟
limitations in two domains of functioning or an „extreme‟ limitation in one domain. (Id.
at 24 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d))). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that there is
substantial evidence to support the assertion that Z.C. functionally equals the listings
because he has at least marked limitations in three of the six functional domains which
the ALJ must consider. (Id. at 35.)
When the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence, reviewing
courts may not conduct their own interpretation of the facts and must give deference to
the agency‟s determination. Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d
Cir. 1986). When evidence supports the ALJ‟s determination, it is irrelevant whether a
different determination could have been reached. Simmonds v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 54, 58
(3d Cir. 1986).
Here, the record contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ‟s determination
that Z.C. had a marked limitation in acquiring and using information but had less than a
marked limitation or no limitation in the other domains. (Tr. 32-37.) Plaintiff contests
this determination in regard to the domains of “attending and completing tasks” and
“interacting with others.” (Pl. Br. 35.) The ALJ‟s determination that Z.C. has less than a
11
marked limitation in attending and completing tasks is supported by indications in the
record that Z.C. has an overall level of cognitive functioning in the average range.
According to the record, this information indicates that Z.C. has average ability to solve
problems and use reasoning skills. (Tr. 344.) Substantial evidence also supports the
ALJ‟s determination that Z.C. has no limitation in interacting and relating with others.
As the ALJ‟s decision indicates, the record is rife with examples of Z.C.‟s ability to
successfully interact with his peers and adults. (Id. at 35, 287, 398.) These records, as
cited by the ALJ, provide substantial evidence for his determination.
G. ALJ’s Allegedly Inappropriate Conduct at the Hearing
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ acted inappropriately at the hearing and thus
this matter, if remanded, should be assigned for consideration before a different ALJ. (Pl.
Br. 35.) In support of this allegation, Plaintiff claims that the hearing was conducted in
an adversarial manner even though such a manner is improper for an administrative
hearing. (Id. at 36.) Plaintiff also takes issue with several questions asked by the ALJ,
stating that the ALJ‟s questioning reflected his partiality and resulted in unfair
implications. (Id. at 38.) Additionally, Plaintiff believes the ALJ was hostile throughout
the hearing, treating the claimant‟s representative unfairly and asking irrelevant
questions. (Id. at 37, 39.)
A remand may be required where an ALJ displays individual bias while
adjudicating a matter. Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 904 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1984)). In Ventura, the Third Circuit found an
ALJ‟s conduct to be inappropriate and remanded the claimant‟s case for consideration by
a different ALJ. Id. at 902. There, the Court recognized instances in which the ALJ
repeatedly interrupted the claimant‟s representative and accused the claimant of being
untruthful. Id. at 903. The Court also pointed out several instances in which the
transcript of the hearing illustrated the ALJ‟s blatant intimidation of the claimant‟s
representative. Id.
Here, unlike Ventura, the ALJ conducted himself in a professional manner. The
ALJ politely introduced himself to the Plaintiff at the beginning of the hearing and told
her to “relax, take it easy and speak up.” (Tr. 45.) He allowed Mr. Kozicki, the
claimant‟s representative, to deliver an opening statement and then to examine Plaintiff.
(Id. at 48-63.) Mr. Kozicki‟s questioning of Plaintiff comprised a large portion of the
hearing and was conducted without any interruption by the ALJ. Id. The ALJ then
proceeded to ask Plaintiff a few questions. (Id. at 63.) After one instance of
interruption, the ALJ continued to question Plaintiff without incident. (Id. at 64-67.)
Plaintiff advances the belief that the ALJ sought to imply that Plaintiff applied for
benefits whether or not her children had an actual disability. (Pl. Br. 38.) This belief,
though, appears to be only speculation as Plaintiff offers no additional evidence to
support this serious assertion. Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ‟s questions about her
financial stability and home environment were irrelevant and indicate the ALJ‟s bias.
(Id. at 38-39.) However, as Ventura instructs, the ALJ has a duty to fully develop the
record and collect information regarding a claimant‟s right to benefits. Ventura, 55 F.2d
at 902. After reviewing the hearing transcript it is evident that the ALJ‟s conduct was
proper.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner‟s decision is AFFIRMED. An
appropriate Order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
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