PARK v. SHINSEKI et al
Filing
38
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise on 12/16/13. (sr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SOON PARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civ. No. 10-6762 (KM)
OPINION
ERIC K. SHINSEKI,
Defendant.
Appearances by:
THE BELL LAW GROUP, P.C.
By: Joseph J. Bell, Esq.
150 Mineral Springs Drive
P.O. Box 220
Rockaway, New Jersey 07866
Attorneys for Plaintiff
PAUL J. FISHMAN
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By: Peter G. O’Malley, Esq.
970 Broad Street, Suite 700
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Attorneys for Defendant
DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge
This matter arises out of the involuntary commitment of Plaintiff Soon Park. On
December 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of
the Department of Veterans Affairs, asserting a cause of action for discrimination based on
national origin, in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim.1 For the reasons set
forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Since 1992, Plaintiff has been employed as a medical technologist at the James J. Peters
VA Medical Center in New York (the “VA”). Plaintiff is originally from South Korea, where
she attended university, and has somewhat limited fluency in English.
Plaintiff generally received positive reviews at work. However, she was suspended on
two occasions. In addition, when she made mistakes, she would say that it was someone else’s
fault and people were out to make her look bad. (Shahidi Dep., 14-15.) Indeed, she often
harbored paranoid beliefs that many of her co-workers, particularly her supervisor, Darryl
Williams, were “against her” and trying to “sabotage” her. (Id. at 9); (Park Dep., 20.)
Plaintiff was also convinced that she, at times, “saw [Darryl] Williams standing in her
bedroom in the doorway of the bathroom and the bedroom[.]” (Shahidi Dep., 9.) She said that
although the bedroom door was locked from the inside, she could still see him. (Id.) Plaintiff
further believed that, at times, she was being followed home from work and refused to enter her
apartment. On one occasion, Plaintiff called Dr. Shahidi late at night to say that she had been
followed home, and that, “if I don’t show up tomorrow, something happened to me.” (Shahidi
Dep., 10.) Dr. Shahidi ultimately encouraged Plaintiff to see a therapist, but Plaintiff refused,
stating that it would harm her image in the Korean community.2
1
See Note 6.
Dr. Shahidi testified that Plaintiff told her that she saw a therapist in Korea, who told
her that she was fine, but that she worked with very bad people. (Shahidi Dep., 16.) Plaintiff
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2
Plaintiff also believes that she has been subject to harassment in the workplace, largely at
the hands of Mr. Williams. Plaintiff recalls two specific incidents of harassment in 2003. The
first incident took place when Plaintiff was asked by a cleaning person at work whether his
cleaning team had done a good job cleaning a room that she has been working in. She told them
that it was “beautiful; I like it.” (Park Dep., 22.) The cleaning person left, but later came down
with Mr. Williams and said that Plaintiff had told the cleaning person that his teams had done a
poor job.
The second incident occurred when Plaintiff had received an incorrect lab sample from
the VA’s psychiatric ward. She placed a call to the psychiatric ward and, after beginning to
explain the situation over the telephone, was told that her English was not understandable.
Plaintiff believes that this was intentional. She further believes that Mr. Williams, along with
three or four individuals in the psychiatric ward, would at times pretend not to understand her
English.
Plaintiff recalls other incidents. At one point, when she had some sort of fungal
infection, Mr. Williams asked her if all Koreans were infected by “that special fungus.” (Id. at
82.) Plaintiff also recounts a time when she asked Mr. Williams for cleaning supplies, and Mr.
Williams intentionally placed them on the floor so that she would have to bend over and pick
them up. (Id. at 87-88.) Finally, she recalls an instance when Mr. Williams scolded her English
based on her failure to distinguish between the words “order” and “odor.” (Id. at 96.)
According to Plaintiff, this sabotage and harassment culminated in her involuntary
commitment, on October 6, 2008. That morning, Plaintiff and a colleague, Luis Benabe, were
testified that she saw a psychiatrist at Dr. Shahidi’s request and was prescribed medication, but
refused to take it. (Park Dep., 29-30.)
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engaged in conversation. Plaintiff recalls that, during their conversation, Mr. Benabe told her
that the VA knew a lot of personal things about her and that there were cameras installed in her
home. See (id. at 54-55). Plaintiff responded that such activity would last until she died and
asked why she had to kill herself. (Id. at 55, 56). According to Plaintiff, Mr. Benabe told her
that if she wanted to die, she should starve herself to death, to which she responded that she
could not kill herself because it would, as a matter of Korean culture, bring great shame to her
family. (Id. at 56.)
Plaintiff believed that Mr. Benabe was joking with her. (Id. at 57.) Therefore, she told
him that, in order to die, she would have to be killed by an act of god and asked if he knew if
anyone was planning on blowing up an airplane. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, “the whole
conversation made no sense.” (Id.)
Mr. Benabe has a different recollection of this conversation. According to Mr. Benabe,
on the morning of October 6, 2008, Plaintiff appeared “upset” and “hesitant.” (Benabe Dep.,
16.) At approximately 10am, Plaintiff asked him who he thought were “watching these videos,”
to which he asked “what videos?” (Shahidi Dep., 19.) Plaintiff referred to the videos from the
cameras in her apartment. She was convinced that “they watch everything that I do.” (Id.) Mr.
Benabe told Plaintiff that she should change the lock on her door, to which Plaintiff responded,
“[I]t doesn’t help. They come to my home and they come to my apartment. I know this is
someone from the hospital because they know when I’m not there.” (Id. at 20.)
Mr. Benabe then took a coffee break. When he returned from his break, Plaintiff asked
him if there was an easy way to kill oneself. Mr. Benabe said that he jokingly responded that she
could always stop eating. Plaintiff responded that she did not want to starve and asked if there
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was an easier way. Mr. Benabe then told Plaintiff that he was going to report her statement
regarding suicide.3 Plaintiff remained silent.
Mr. Benabe then approached Mr. Williams and told him that Plaintiff had asked how to
kill herself.4 (Benabe Dep., 22.) Plaintiff worked alone for several hours and “got very sad.”
(Park Dep., 57.) Specifically, she was upset that people hated her to the point that they were
watching her and tapping her phone. (Id. at 57-58.) While she didn’t have “clear evidence” of
this, she could “feel” and “sense it.” (Id. at 58.) At one point, she “cried a lot.” (Id. at 58.)
At 2:30pm, Mr. Williams entered Dr. Shahidi’s office and told her that Mr. Benabe had
approached him and said that Plaintiff asked “if there was an easy way to kill oneself.” (Shahidi
Dep., 18.) Dr. Shahidi told Mr. Williams that they had to engage in suicide prevention
measures.5 Dr. Shahidi had Mr. Williams bring Mr. Benabe into her office to have him recount
his conversation with Plaintiff that morning.
Thereafter, Mr. Williams and Dr. Shahidi reported the incident to a Dr. Paronetto, chief
of pathology. They also called Lou Ruggiero, a VA supervisor. At 3pm, Mr. Ruggiero came to
Dr. Shahidi’s office with Amy Nathan, a mental healthcare worker, and asked Dr. Shahidi to call
Mr. Benabe and Plaintiff into her office. Plaintiff “didn’t know what was going on” and felt that
she “was being bullied.” (Park Dep., 59.) Mr. Williams was asked to wait outside. Ms. Nathan
asked Mr. Benabe to recount his conversation with Plaintiff. Mr. Benabe told her that when he
According to Mr. Benabe, Plaintiff had joked about killing herself to Mr. Banabe on
prior occasions. But this time he believed that she was serious. (Benabe Dep., 17, 18.)
3
Mr. Williams had also seen Plaintiff crying at her station that morning. Mr. Williams
asked Plaintiff if she was ok, but Plaintiff did not respond.
4
According to Dr. Shahidi, the VA had recently completed certain suicide prevention
training and there was a suicide prevention policy in place. (Shahidi Dep., 18-19.)
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returned from his coffee break that morning, Plaintiff asked him if there was an easy way to kill
oneself.
Ms. Nathan then turned to Plaintiff and asked if this was true. Plaintiff was “shocked”
and “didn’t know what do say.” (Park Dep., 60.) She felt unable to deny it because nobody
would believe her. She also felt that this incident was part of a pattern and practice of “false
accusations.” (Id.) Plaintiff “just gave up and . . . said no comment.” (Id.)
Ms. Nathan told Plaintiff that “this is serious.” (Shahidi Dep., 22.) However, Plaintiff
continued to say “no comment.” (Id.) Ms. Nathan then told Plaintiff that people sometimes get
depressed and encouraged Plaintiff to talk, but Plaintiff did not want to talk. Plaintiff left Dr.
Shahidi’s office, and Ms. Nathan followed her back to the lab.
Plaintiff told Ms. Nathan, “I’m not killing myself, don’t worry. . . . I am depressed but
I’m not killing myself. I never said anything like that.” (Park Dep., 60-61.) However, Ms.
Nathan refused to leave Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff relented and began to have a discussion with
the Ms. Nathan. Ms. Nathan then left the lab. Thereafter, Dr. James Chou, a VA psychiatrist,
Ms. Nathan, and two other individuals who Plaintiff does not remember, approached Plaintiff
where she was working. Dr. Chou had recently been asked by a VA administrator to evaluate
Ms. Park because she was exhibiting paranoid behavior and was asking how she could kill
herself. See (Chou Dep., 21, 25.)
According to Plaintiff, as they began to speak, certain individuals began making a loud
noise with a cart to prevent her from speaking. She believed that “this was to induce [her] or to
take [her] to the emergency room.” (Park Dep., 62.) Plaintiff further believed that “[t]he whole
thing was set up. It was teamwork.” (Id.) Dr. Chou then “said let’s go someplace quiet.” (Id.)
Plaintiff followed Dr. Chou and ended up in the emergency room. Dr. Chou believed that he
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needed to bring Plaintiff to the emergency room in order to conduct a complete evaluation
because she was not being conversant in her work area. (Chou Dep., 22.)
Upon evaluation, Plaintiff appeared anxious, depressed, and paranoid. (Id. at 23.) She
told Dr. Chou that people at work were conspiring against her by bugging her telephone, spying
on her through her air conditioner, stealing her computer password, puncturing her tires, and
blaming lab mix ups on her. (Id., Ex. 1.) According to Dr. Chou, Plaintiff said that these
activities had been occurring for the past fifteen years and had recently gotten worse. (Id. at 2324.) Plaintiff also mentioned that she was being watched at home, has trouble sleeping, and feels
more depressed. (Id., Ex. 1.) She acknowledged the statements regarding suicide that she had
made to her coworkers, but denied that she was suicidal. (Id. at 24-25, Ex. 1.) She said that, if
she were actually suicidal, she would not tell anyone. (Id. at 25, Ex. 1.)
Plaintiff then tried to walk out of the emergency room but was stopped and told that,
under the law, she had to be watched for 72-hours because she had tried to commit suicide. She
protested that she was not trying to kill herself, but the staff refused to let her leave. Indeed, Dr.
Chou decided that Plaintiff “clearly was psychotic” and exhibited “suicidal ideation.” (Id. at 27.)
Plaintiff then called her cousin, a female attorney, for help. Her cousin showed up at the
emergency room and told the staff that Plaintiff was not the type of person to attempt suicide,
and that she would watch Plaintiff and ensure that she saw a psychiatrist. But the emergency
room staff refused to let her leave.
Eventually, Plaintiff’s cousin left, and Plaintiff was taken to the psychiatric ward where
she was further evaluated. She was offered something to eat but refused, afraid that “they might
put something inside my meal.” (Park Dep., 69.) She also tried not to sleep because she
“thought they could do something while I’m asleep.” (Id.) However, she ultimately fell asleep.
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The following day, Dr. Chou and his resident evaluated Plaintiff and decided to admit
her. Plaintiff was also evaluated separately by a Dr. Kesselman, chief of the psychiatric ward.
Dr. Kesselman wanted to keep Plaintiff at the hospital for a second night, to which Plaintiff
angrily responded that she would have her cousin sue everyone if she was not released right then.
Dr. Kesselman then agreed to speak with Plaintiff’s cousin over the telephone. Shortly
thereafter, Plaintiff was released to her cousin’s custody.
Plaintiff showed up to work the following day without incident. Approximately one
week later, the VA administration asked Plaintiff to get a psychological evaluation. She received
an evaluation from Dr. Oh, who subsequently sent a letter to the VA detailing the results. Upon
reviewing this letter, Mr. Ruggiero asked Plaintiff to take a leave of absence. In taking leave,
Plaintiff was required to exhaust all of her sick and leave days for that year, in addition to taking
time without pay. She returned to work in April 2009 after seeing another psychiatrist that found
her fit to return to work.
Plaintiff was most recently evaluated by Dr. Dongsoo Kim, Ph.D., who Plaintiff retained
as an expert for her lawsuit. Dr. Kim’s report states that Plaintiff is “clearly psychotic” and
suffers from paranoid delusions. (Kim Rep., 4.) The report points out a number of facts cutting
against the clinical necessity of hospitalizing Plaintiff on October 6, 2008, including that (1) a
“delusional disorder” generally presents itself without “suicidal ideation;” (2) Plaintiff was
discharged from the hospital after just one day and allowed to return to work; and (3) at the time
of Plaintiff’s evaluation by Dr. Kim, Plaintiff “did not show any signs or symptoms suggesting
depression and strongly denied suicidal ideation.” (Id. at 5.)
On the other hand, Dr. Kim observed that Plaintiff is “extremely defensive and guarded,”
and was “trying to present an extremely favorable view of herself as honest, moral, and
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conforming.” (Id. at 4.) Therefore, according to Dr. Kim, “it is very likely that her profile is an
underestimation of her psychological problems.” (Id.)
II.
DISCUSSION
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).6 In doing so, Defendant argues that the Complaint fails to state a
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff argues that (1) Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment fails because Defendant failed to provide a statement of undisputed material
facts, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1; (2) the Complaint and attached
exhibits give rise to a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
A.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For an issue to
be genuine, there must be “a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find
for the non-moving party.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006). For
a fact to be material, it must have the ability to “affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law.” Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude granting summary
judgment.
In the alternative, Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rule 12(d) states that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or
12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. All parties must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d); see also In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1426 (“what is critical is whether the
claims in the complaint are based on an extrinsic document and not merely whether the extrinsic
document was explicitly cited.”). However, in their motion papers, both parties attach exhibits
not relied on, or intrinsic to, the Complaint.”) Here, both parties attach several documents to
their motion papers that are not intrinsic to the Complaint, and that the Court will not exclude.
Consequently, Defendant’s motion must be treated as one for summary judgment.
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6
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine
dispute of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the
moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may discharge its burden under the
summary judgment standard by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. Id. at 325. If the moving party can make such a showing, then the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence that a genuine factual dispute exists and a trial
is necessary. Id. at 324. In meeting its burden, the non-moving party must offer specific facts
that establish a material dispute, not simply create “some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).
In deciding whether a dispute of material fact exists, the Court must consider all facts and their
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Pa. Coal Ass’n v.
Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). The Court’s function, however, is not to weigh the
evidence and rule on the truth of the matter, but rather to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If there are no issues
that require a trial, then judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Id. at 251-52.
B.
Plaintiff’s Claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
The Complaint alleges that, “[a]s an employee who was born in South Korea and
experiences difficulty in expressing herself clearly in the English language with respect to
interpersonal communications and personnel-related matters in the workplace, Plaintiff was a
clear target of the statements made by Louis Benabe and others that led to her detention in the
psychiatric ward. Plaintiff is in a protected class of individuals who are protected from race,
ethnicity, and national origin discrimination.” (Compl. ¶ 25.)
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Claims asserting unlawful discrimination under Title VII are demonstrated through the
familiar analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 (1973).
See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). The
McDonnell Douglas analysis proceeds in three stages. As applicable here, Plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the statute. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802. With respect to discrimination in the form of an adverse employment action, she must show
that she (1) “is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for the position; (3) suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action was made under
circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Rodriguez v. Nat’l RR.
Passenger Corp., 2013 WL 3814985, at *1 (3d Cir. July 24, 2013). With respect to
discrimination manifested as harassment, Plaintiff must show that (1) she suffered from
intentional discrimination because of her race or national origin; (2) the discrimination was
pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected her; (4) the discrimination
would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in her position. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641,
643 (3d Cir. 2007).
If she succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Defendant “to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for” the adverse employment action against
Plaintiff. Id. If Defendant meets this burden, Plaintiff must then provide evidence that the
legitimate reason offered by Defendant is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804-05.
Plaintiff fails to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination based on adverse
employment action or harassment. With respect to adverse employment action, Plaintiff fails to
satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie case. There is simply no indication whatsoever that
Plaintiff’s involuntary commitment or subsequent leave had anything to do with her status as a
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Korean immigrant. To the contrary, the record suggests that it had everything to do with the fact
that she suffered from paranoid delusions and had been mentioning the notion of suicide to her
coworkers.
Similarly, there is no evidence that any perceived harassment was connected to Plaintiff’s
status as a Korean immigrant. While the majority of the perceived harassment was based on
Plaintiff’s admittedly limited command of the English language, taking a language barrier into
account in the workplace does not, by itself, amount to unlawful discrimination. See Fragante v.
City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 596-97 (9th Cir. 1989) (“There is nothing improper
about an employer making an honest assessment of the oral communications skills of a candidate
for a job when such skills are reasonably related to job performance.” Citing EEOC Compliance
Manual (CCH) ¶ 4035 at 3877-78 (1986)); see also Mejia v. New York Sheraton Hotel, 459 F.
Supp. 375, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Dominican chambermaid properly denied promotion to front
desk because of her “inability to articulate clearly or coherently and to make herself adequately
understood in . . . English.”).
To be sure, Plaintiff points to an instance where Mr. Williams asked whether Koreans
were infected by a certain fungus. However, even if this question amounted to intentional
discrimination, there is no evidence that such questions were pervasive or had any detrimental
effect on Plaintiff. Consequently, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
claim under Title VII for unlawful discrimination is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, in its entirety, with prejudice.
The Court will enter an order implementing this opinion.
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_/s/ Dickinson R. Debevoise__________
DICKINSON R. DEBEVOISE, U.S.S.D.J.
Dated: December 16, 2013
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