ANTHONY v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 9/2/14. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 2:11-cv-00796 (WJM)
WALTER ANTHONY,
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Agnes Wladyka’s request for
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Wladyka represented Plaintiff before this
Court in connection with his appeal of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security
(the “Commissioner”) denying his application for a period of Disability Insurance
Benefits. After the government consented to remand Plaintiff’s appeal to the
Commissioner for further findings, an administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) issued a
favorable decision finding Plaintiff disabled as of February 12, 2007. The Social
Security Administration then awarded Plaintiff $133,338.00 in past due benefits. The
Commissioner withheld 25 percent of Plaintiff’s retroactive benefits – or $33,347.00 –
for attorney’s fees.
Upon entering into a retainer agreement with Wladyka, Plaintiff agreed to pay up
to 25 percent of any award of past benefits to her for her services. Wladyka thus seeks
$33,347.00 in attorney’s fees for work she performed in the proceedings before this Court
and at the administrative level. On May 29, 2012, this Court awarded attorney’s fees
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under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the amount of $5,231.31 to Wladyka.
Plaintiff never paid that amount. And on April 9, 2014, the ALJ authorized a fee of
$15,000 for Wladyka’s work at the administrative level. Wladyka’s fee request is
unopposed.
Under § 406(b)(1)(A), “[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a
claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation,” but
that fee may not exceed “25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the
claimant is entitled.” In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, the Supreme Court clarified that “§
406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements.” 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Rather,
Ҥ 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure
that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Id. Agreements are unenforceable
to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of past due benefits. Id.
Within the 25 percent boundary, an attorney for a successful claimant must show that the
fee sought is reasonable given the services rendered. Id.
Courts in the Third Circuit have considered the amount of time spent on the case,
the result achieved, the experience of counsel, the nature of contingent fees and the risk
of non-recovery, counsel’s typical hourly rate, the EAJA fee previously requested, and
whether the attorney is responsible for any unreasonable delays in the proceeding when
determining if a fee is reasonable. Wilson v. Astrue, 622 F. Supp. 2d 132, 136 (D. Del.
2008) (approving a fee of $21,958.13, a sum representing 25 percent of the past due
benefits, for 19 hours of work); Perez v. Barnhart, No. 02-3779, 2006 WL 781899, at 3-4
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(E.D. Pa. March 23, 2006) (reducing a fee request of $20,563.50 for 17.2 hours of work
to $13,932.00). Regarding the amount of time spent on the case, a court should consider
only the hours billed for representation on the district court level; time spent before the
administrative agency is not considered. Id.
Plaintiff provided documentation showing that she spent 79 hours on Plaintiff’s
case, which includes 29 hours for proceedings before this Court. As the ALJ already
awarded Plaintiff $15,000 for work performed at the administrative level, the Court will
consider only the remaining $18,347.00 of the $33,347.00 requested fee. And, as
explained above, the Court will only consider the time that Wladyka spent representing
Plaintiff before this Court when evaluating the reasonableness of this fee.
A fee of $18,347.00 for 29 hours of work results in an attorney fee of $632.66 per
hour. The Court will award the entire $18,347.00 fee. Wladyka is a highly experienced
practitioner in this area and has appeared before judges in this district many times. She
provided a record of the hours spent on this case, and the line items and time attributed
for each task are reasonable. Moreover, her submissions to the Court reflect the time and
experience involved, and she produced excellent results for Plaintiff. Further, while her
typical fee for representing individuals in federal court is $300.00, the higher contingency
fee is reasonable given that she would have received nothing if Plaintiff’s appeal were
unsuccessful. See Certification of Agnes S. Wladyka in Support of Pl’s Mot. for
Attorney Fees under EAJA ¶ 3, ECF No. 16-1. And she was not responsible for any
delays in the proceeding. Finally, the Court acknowledges that the EAJA hourly fee that
Wladyka previously requested is lower than $632.66 per hour, but finds that this does not
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outweigh the other factors in favor of awarding the requested fee. The Court thus
GRANTS Wladyka’s motion and awards Wladyka attorney’s fees in the amount of
$18,347.00. Given that Wladyka will receive compensation for her work on this case
through the instant fee, the Court VACATES its May 29, 2012 Order granting EAJA
fees.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: September 2, 2014
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