RAMIREZ et al v. THE CITY OF NEWARK et al
Filing
85
OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 1/28/14. (sr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GEORGE RAMIREZ,
JOSHUA RUIZ,
Civil Action No. 11-CV-1150
(SDW-MCA)
Plaintiffs,
v.
OPINION
THE CITY OF NEWARK, ESSEX
COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
AND OFFICERS JOHN DOE 1-10 (names
being ficticious),
January 28, 2014
Defendants,
THE CITY OF NEWARK,
Defendant/ Third Party
Plaintiff,
COUNTY OF ESSEX, ESSEX COUNTY
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, RICHARD
ROE, DAVID ZOE (names being ficticious)
Third Party
Defendants.
WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before this Court are two separate Summary Judgment Motions filed by Defendant City of
Newark and Third Party Defendant County of Essex (“Essex County”). This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1367. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b). This Court, having considered the parties’ submissions, decides this matter without oral
argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons stated below, this Court
DENIES Newark’s motion in part and GRANTS Newark’s motion in part, but GRANTS Essex
County’s motion.
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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case is about Plaintiffs George Ramirez (“Ramirez”) and Joshua Ruiz (“Ruiz”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) seeking redress for their arrest and detention in the City of Newark (the
“City” or “Newark”) and subsequent incarceration in the Essex County Correctional Facility. On
June 3, 2009, Plaintiffs were apprehended by officers of the Newark Police Department while they
were driving in a vehicle on Montclair Avenue in Newark, NJ. (See Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.)
Plaintiffs had just left a job center and were on their way to pick up a friend when police cars
suddenly surrounded Ramirez’s vehicle and officers approached the vehicle with guns drawn. (See
id. at ¶ 11; Pls.’ Supplemental Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SSUF”) ¶ 1.) After
Plaintiffs exited the vehicle, they were forced to the ground and handcuffed. (See Pls.’ Am. Compl.
¶ 11.) The victims of the crime that Plaintiffs had allegedly committed were then asked to identify
Plaintiffs. (Pls.’ Responsive Statement of Undisputed Material Facts “RSUF” ¶ 1.) Victim no. 1
positively identified Plaintiffs as the assailants, although Plaintiffs were face down on the ground
and victim no. 1 was sitting in the back seat of a police car and not wearing his glasses. (Id.) After
the identification, Plaintiffs were then transported to the Second Precinct at One Lincoln Avenue
and placed in a cell for several hours without having been read their Miranda rights or informed
of the charges against them. (Pls.’ SSUF ¶¶ 3-4; Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs were later
transported to Newark Central Booking where they were held for five days prior to appearing
before a judge. (Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiffs were then transferred to Essex County
Correctional Facility. (Pls.’ SSUF ¶ 5; Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) It should be noted that at no time
were Plaintiffs identified in a lineup or identified in any other manner after the initial identification.
(Pls.’ RSUF ¶ 1.)
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While incarcerated at Essex County Correctional Facility, Plaintiffs were assaulted by
unknown inmates. (Pls.’ RSUF ¶ 7.) Ramirez’s head was repeatedly bashed into a toilet by other
inmates, resulting in Ramirez getting seven stitches to heal a wound on his head. (Pls.’ SSUF ¶
7.) Ramirez now has a two to three inch scar on his forehead to which he must apply skin cream
daily. (Id.) After his release, he was reclusive and did not want to socialize. (Id.) For his part,
Ruiz was physically and sexually assaulted, resulting in chipped teeth, hot flashes, cold sweats,
and traumatic flashbacks. (Id. ¶ 6.) He developed kidney stones from the high-sodium food served
in Essex County Correctional Facility. (Id.) Additionally, the incarceration period ended the
relationship with his high school sweetheart and mother of his child. (Id.) Plaintiffs were offered
plea bargains on three separate occasions while they were incarcerated in Essex County
Correctional Facility, but they denied each offer, proclaiming that they were innocent of the
charges filed against them. (Pls.’ SSUF ¶ 5.) After being held at the Essex County Correctional
Facility for thirteen months, the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the charges against
Plaintiffs. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts “SUF” ¶ 6.)
On March 1, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against ten unnamed police officers of the
Newark Police Department and the City itself (collectively, “Newark”). (Dkt. No. 1.) On April
29, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint adding Essex County Correctional Facility as a
defendant. (Dkt. No. 5.) The Amended Complaint asserts six different causes of action. (See id.)
First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Police Officers, the City, and Essex County Correctional
Facility, acting willfully and knowingly, deprived Plaintiffs of their rights secured by the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Pls.’ Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 30-33.) Second, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Officers willfully deprived Plaintiffs
of their constitutional rights under Article 1, Section 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, and that the
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City is vicariously liable for said deprivation. (See id. at ¶¶ 37, 38.) Third, Plaintiffs claimed
damages for the “willful, unlawful, unwarranted, and intentional assault and battery upon
Plaintiffs” committed by Defendant Officers. (Id. at ¶ 41.) Fourth, Plaintiffs alleged that the City
maliciously prosecuted them by bringing criminal charges against them absent probable cause.
(See id. at ¶ 44.) Last, Plaintiffs claimed that the City negligently hired and retained officers it had
reason to know posed a danger to society thereby resulting in Plaintiffs’ injuries. (See id. ¶¶ 5055.) Plaintiffs and Defendants stipulated to the dismissal of the fifth cause of action claiming
negligent infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. No. 13.)
On July 26, 2011, the City filed an answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Dkt. No. 14.) Then,
on January 13, 2012, the City filed a motion seeking an order permitting leave to file an amended
answer to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and a third party complaint. (Dkt. No. 27.) The motion
was granted and the City subsequently filed an amended answer to Plaintiffs’ complaint and a third
party complaint against the Essex County Prosecutor’s Office and Essex County seeking
indemnification from Essex County for Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Dkt. No. 30.)
On March 26, 2012, Essex County filed a motion to dismiss the City’s third party
complaint. (Dkt. No. 36.) In an Opinion dated July 14, 2012, this Court granted Essex County’s
motion inasmuch as the City asserted tort claims against Essex County; however, this Court denied
Essex County’s motion with respect to the City’s contribution claims for damages relating to
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. See Ramirez v. City of Newark, Civil Action No. 11-CV-1150 (June 14,
2012). Thereafter, both Essex County Correctional Facility (dkt. no. 72) and the Essex County
Prosecutor’s Office were dismissed as defendants, leaving only the City as a defendant and Essex
County as a third party defendant.
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On June 6, 2013, Essex County filed the instant summary judgment motion seeking to end
the City’s third party action. (Dkt. No. 78.) The next day, the City filed its own summary judgment
motion looking to obtain judgment against Plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 79.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant,
and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the suit. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party must show that if
the evidentiary material of record were reduced to admissible evidence in court, it would be
insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its burden of proof. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Once the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant
who must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of its pleadings. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001).
The court may not weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but rather should
determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
In doing so, the court must construe the facts and inferences in “a light most favorable” to the
nonmoving party. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 521 (1991). The
nonmoving party “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or
suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. United States Postal Serv., 409
F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). If the nonmoving party
“fail[s] to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it]
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has the burden of proof,” then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
The City of Newark’s Summary Judgment Motion
1.
Qualified Immunity
As a threshold matter, the City argues that it is entitled to qualified immunity for the actions
of its officers. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citing Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978)). In determining whether qualified immunity applies, the
first step is to determine whether the officer violated a constitutional right. Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The second step is to assess whether the right was clearly established
when the defendant engaged in the misconduct. Id.
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that the officers arrested Plaintiffs based upon the
identification of a victim who was not wearing his glasses and sitting in the back seat of a police
car; Plaintiffs were also face down on the ground at the time of the identification. No further
identification attempts of Plaintiffs were made. Significantly, a grand jury did not indict Plaintiffs
for the crimes for which they were arrested. After their arrest, Plaintiffs were also confined to a
jail cell for five days before they appeared before a judge. On this evidence, a jury could conclude
that Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. Moreover,
these rights were clearly established when Plaintiffs were arrested. Therefore, qualified immunity
is inapplicable.
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2.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiffs assert § 1983 claims based upon the City’s deprivation of their Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights. (Pls.’s Opp. Br. 8-12.) The City argues that
Plaintiffs cannot prove § 1983 violations because they have failed to obtain discovery on the
customs and practices of the Newark Police Department. (Def.’s Br. 9.) As such, Newark argues
that Plaintiffs cannot establish an essential element of their § 1983 claims. Id. Plaintiffs counter
that the actions of the police officers in failing to read Plaintiffs their Miranda rights, allowing
them access to an attorney, taking their statements, or obtaining evidence to corroborate the
victims’ account of the events give rise to an inference of a custom of the City’s police officers
violating constitutional rights. (Pls.’ Opp. Br. 12.)
In relevant part, § 1983 states as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In general, a public entity may not be liable under § 1983 for the actions of its
employees unless the injury is the result of the “execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “A policy
is made ‘when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with
respect to the action issues a final proclamation, policy or edict.’” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). A custom, on the other hand, is an
act that although has not been officially approved by an appropriate decisionmaker, is “so
widespread as to have the force of law.” Id. (citation omitted). The Third Circuit has articulated
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three situations in which a public entity may be liable under § 1983: (1) the alleged injury results
from a public employee implementing a “generally applicable statement of policy”; (2) although
there is no stated policy, the policymaker acts in violation of a federal law; and (3) “the
policymaker has failed to act affirmatively at all, . . . [such] that the policymaker can reasonably
be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the [obvious] need” to act. Id.
Here, genuine questions of material fact exist as to whether the police officers acted
reasonably in their apprehension, arrest, and incarceration of Plaintiffs. A jury could conclude that
the identification of Plaintiffs was unreliable because Plaintiffs were face down when they were
identified, and the victim was sitting in the back of a police car, not wearing his glasses.
Additionally, a jury could also determine that it was unreasonable to deprive Plaintiffs of their
liberty by confining them to a jail cell after their arrest for five days before they appeared before a
judge. A jury could very well find this to be a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth
Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, genuine issues of material
fact exist as to whether Newark violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights secured by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and Newark’s summary judgment motion is denied inasmuch as it seeks
judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights1.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. (Pls.’s Opp. Br. 9-12.)
“To prove malicious prosecution under section 1983 when the claim is under the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the
Plaintiffs’ cause of action in Count II for violation of the New Jersey State Constitution is properly brought pursuant
to the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”). N.J.S.A. 10:6-1 et seq. It is well-settled that NJCRA claims are
interpreted analogously to § 1983. Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011); see also
Hurdleston v. New Century Financial Servs., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443 (D.N.J. 2009). As such, Plaintiffs’ claims
for violation of New Jersey State Constitution are duplicative of their § 1983.
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criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable
cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure
as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).
The undisputed evidence shows that Newark initiated criminal proceedings against
Plaintiffs, that the criminal proceedings ended in Plaintiffs’ favor, and that Plaintiffs suffered
deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure. (See Def. Ex. H, Dismissal Order,
May 27, 2010.) Newark does not contest that the evidence establishes these three elements. (Defs.’
Br. 15-16.) Newark, however, does argue that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiffs. (Id.)
They point to the fact that a grand jury indicted Plaintiffs. (Id.) This argument is unavailing.
Although a grand jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause, this presumption is
rebuttable. See Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989)). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs were not indicted for
the charges for which they were arrested, namely, carjacking, kidnapping, robbery, and conspiracy
with respect to victim no. 2. (See Def. Ex. D, Arrest Report; Def. Ex. H, Dismissal Order, May
27, 2010.)
The fact that the grand jury appears to have indicted them under a
conspiracy/accomplice liability theory with respect to victim no. 1 does not substantiate the initial
charges. (See Def. Ex. H, Dismissal Order, May 27, 2010.) In the malicious prosecution context,
where there is prosecution for more than one charge, probable cause must exist for each charge.
See Johnson, 477 F.3d at 85 (“[A] cause of action for malicious prosecution may be based on the
prosecution of more than one charge, and the validity of the prosecution for each charge comes
into question inasmuch as the plaintiff was subject to prosecution on each individual charge . . .
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.”) Here, a reasonable jury could conclude that the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest
Plaintiffs. As discussed supra, a jury could determine that the identification of Plaintiffs was
invalid, and without a proper identification of Plaintiffs, the officers did not possess probable cause
to arrest them. Moreover, whether or not probable cause exists in a § 1983 action is generally a
question of fact for the jury. Merkle v. Upper Dubin School Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir.
2000) (citing Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998)).
There is also a question of fact regarding whether the officers possessed malice. “Actual
malice in the context of malicious prosecution is defined as either ill will in the sense of spite, lack
of belief by the actor himself in the propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an extraneous
improper purpose.” Morales v. Busbee, 972 F. Supp. 254, 261 (D.N.J. 1997). A reasonable jury
could determine that the police officers lacked a belief in the propriety of the arrest of Plaintiffs.
The undisputed evidence shows that the police officers were reluctant to arrest Plaintiffs. One
officer commented that the circumstances surrounding the underlying criminal incident did not
make sense. (See Def. Ex. J, Plaintiff Joshua Ruiz Deposition at 35:1-15 (February 11, 2013).)
The officers also mentioned that they did not have any reason to arrest Plaintiffs.
(Id.)
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs were still arrested and jailed. Thus, a jury could conclude that the officers
acted with legal malice in arresting Plaintiffs. Therefore, Newark’s summary judgment motion
with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is denied.
3.
Plaintiffs’ Assault and Battery and
Negligent Hiring and Retention Claims
Plaintiffs also assert causes of action for assault and battery and negligent hiring and
retention. Under New Jersey law, police officers are privileged to use as much force as necessary
to effectuate an arrest; if the officers use more force than necessary in making an arrest, the officers
may be liable for assault and battery. See Hill v. Algor, 85 F. Supp. 2d 391, 411 (D.N.J. 2000); see
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also Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995). Here, there is no
evidence of record that the police officers used excessive force in arresting Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
have not advanced any evidence establishing that the arresting officers used more force than was
necessary to arrest them and therefore, Newark is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
assault and battery claim.
Likewise, Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring and retention claim fails as well. New Jersey law
subjects a municipality to liability for its own negligence in the hiring and retention of a police
officer. Denis v. City of Newark, 307 N.J. Super. 304, 312-14 (App. Div. 1998). A plaintiff must
demonstrate that the municipality knew or should have known of the police officer’s dangerous
propensities to be successful under this theory. Id. Specifically, the plaintiff must first prove that
the municipality “knew or had reason to know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or
dangerous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have foreseen that such qualities
created a risk of harm to other persons.” Di Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 173 (N.J. 1982). Second,
the plaintiff must prove that, as a result of the municipality hiring the officer, the officer’s
“incompetence, unfitness or dangerous characteristics” was the proximate cause of his injuries.
Id. at 174. There is no evidence of record with regard to the officers’ “incompetence, unfitness or
dangerous characteristics.” As such, Newark is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
negligent hiring and retention claim.
B.
Essex County’s Summary Judgment Motion
Essex County moves for summary judgment on Newark’s contribution claim arguing, inter
alia, that it is not subject to § 1983 liability. (Third Party Def.’s Br. 8-9.) The gravamen of Essex
County’s argument is that since this Court has already dismissed any tort claims against it and the
only remaining claim against it is Newark’s § 1983 contribution claim, Essex County is entitled to
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summary judgment on the remaining claim because the undisputed evidence shows that it is not
liable to Plaintiffs. (See generally, Third Party Def.’s Br.) Newark counters that Plaintiffs
remained in Essex County’s custody for the vast majority of the time Plaintiffs were incarcerated
because Plaintiff’s were held in the Essex County Correctional Facility. (Third Party Pl.’s Br. 56.) As such, Newark argues, Essex County is subject to § 1983 liability. (Id.)
As in initial matter, in the Opinion dated June 4, 2012, this Court dismissed any tort claims
against Essex County but maintained Newark’s third party § 1983 contribution claims, which is
the only remaining claim against Essex County. See Ramirez v. City of Newark, Civil Action No.
11-CV-1150 (June 14, 2012). “Typically, a right to contribution is recognized when two or more
persons are liable to the same plaintiff for the same injury and one of the joint tortfeasors has paid
more than his fair share of the common liability.” Northwest Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union,
451 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981). Contribution recognizes “the view that when two or more persons
share responsibility for a wrong, it is inequitable to require one to pay the entire cost of reparation.”
Id. Accordingly, in order for contribution to apply, there must be two or more joint tortfeasors.
See id.
An analysis of the Amended Complaint, the parties’ briefs, and the evidence of record as
developed during discovery reveals that Plaintiffs do not have any direct claims against Essex
County. Thus, Essex County cannot be adjudged a joint tortfeasor and contribution is inapplicable.
Indeed, to the extent that the evidence shows that Plaintiffs have claims for inmate-on-inmate
assault that they experienced while incarcerated in the Essex County Correctional Facility, this
Court has already dismissed Essex County Correctional Facility as a defendant. (Dkt. No. 72.)
Plaintiffs’ remaining claims in this matter are only against Newark; Plaintiffs did not assert any
claims against Essex County directly. In any event, this Court has already ruled that pursuant to
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the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:5-2(b)(4), Essex County is immune from Plaintiffs’
inmate-on-inmate claims that arose during their incarceration in the Essex County Correctional
Facility. See Ramirez v. City of Newark, Civil Action No. 11-CV-1150 (June 14, 2012). In
conclusion, because Essex County is not a joint tortfeasor, Newark’s § 1983 contribution claim is
not cognizable. Therefore, Essex County is entitled to summary judgment on Newark’s § 1983
contribution claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court grants Newark’s summary judgment motion
with respect Plaintiffs’ assault and battery and negligent hiring and retention claims; however,
this Court denies Newark’s summary judgment motion with respect to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 causes
of action. This Court also grants Essex County’s summary judgment motion.
S/Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.
Orig: Clerk
Cc:
Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.M.J.
Parties
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