CLARK v. AVILES et al

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 10/26/11. (jd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ELIJAH CLARK,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIRECTOR AVILES, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 11-2156 (SDW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
ELIJAH CLARK, #226359, Plaintiff Pro Se
Hudson County Correctional Center
35 Hackensack Avenue
Kearny, NJ 07032
WIGENTON, District Judge:
Plaintiff, Elijah Clark, who is currently incarcerated at Hudson County Correctional
Center (“HCCC”) in Kearny, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, asserting violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, arising from his
incarceration. This Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations, as required by 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court will dismiss the federal claims raised in the Complaint,
without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint (that is complete on its face), and decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law.

I. BACKGROUND
Elijah Clark brings this Complaint against Oscar Aviles ( Warden of HCCC), Corrections
Officers Lt. T. Monteleone, Sgt. Gaines, Sgt. Feldman, C.O. Lisojo, and C.O. Pastrana, alleging
violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violation of New Jersey law,
while he was incarcerated at HCCC. Plaintiff asserts the following facts:
In October 2009, thru January 2011, the defendants engaged in
illegal lockdown of the C-5-East cellblock for pretrial detainees
without due process of law. The lockin lasted in excess of 240
days. Pretrial detainees were locked in the cell 22-hrs a day five
days a week, 32 hours 2-days per week. I was denied complete
outdoor outside fresh air recreation from Jan. 2010 to October
2010. I was locked in my cell as described above from October
2009, then from January 2010 - continuously on a daily basis until
September 2010. Thereafter December 2010, and the practice
ceased in January 2011.
(Dkt. 1 at 3.)
Plaintiff states that he suffered the following injuries: emotional distress, mental anguish
and loss protected liberty interests w/out due process of law the confinement complained of was
atypical hardship by a pretrial detainee not adjudicated guilty of any crime.” (Dkt. 1 at 3.)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for violation of his constitutional rights.
(Dkt. 1 at 15.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat.
1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil
action in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a prisoner is seeking redress against
a government employee or entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court determines

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that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), hammered the “final nail-in-the-coffin” for the
“no set of facts” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),1 which was
previously applied to determine if a federal complaint stated a claim. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009). To survive dismissal under Iqbal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' ”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citation omitted). Officials may not be held liable under § 1983 for the
unconstitutional misconduct of their subordinates. Id. at 1948-49. Rather, the facts set forth in
the complaint must show that each government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. This Court must
disregard labels, conclusions, legal arguments, and naked assertions. Id. at 1949. The
plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief”, and will be
dismissed. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Conley court held that a district court was permitted to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at
45-46.
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The Third Circuit instructs that, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the
pleading regime established by Iqbal,
a court must take three steps: First, the court must “tak[e] note of
the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that,
“because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010); see also Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009) (“a complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts”)
(emphasis supplied). The Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading
must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, even after Iqbal. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89 (2007).
III. DISCUSSION
A court’s initial task is to “tak[e] note of the elements [Plaintiff] must plead” in order to
state a claim of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Iqbal, 129 S Ct. at 1947-48. Section 1983
of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) a person
deprived him or caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A. Conditions of Confinement
This Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint as attempting to state a conditions of
confinement claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment under the
standard set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), i.e., whether the conditions of
confinement amounted to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. As the Supreme Court
explained,
[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does
not, without more, amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a
restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal - if it is arbitrary or purposeless - a court permissibly may
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment
that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 (footnote and citation omitted).
The maintenance of security, internal order, and discipline are essential goals which at
times require “limitation or retraction of . . . retained constitutional rights.” Bell, 411 U.S. at
546. “Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail
security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are
discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been
released while awaiting trial.” Id. at 540. “In assessing whether the conditions are reasonably

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related to the assigned purposes, [a court] must further inquire as to whether these conditions
cause [inmates] to endure [such] genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of
time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.”
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d at 159 (quoting Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d
984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)).
The Third Circuit has “distilled the Supreme Court’s teachings in Bell into a two-part
test. We must ask, first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by these conditions, and
second, whether these conditions are rationally related to these purposes.” Hubbard v. Taylor,
538 F. 3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the
Fourteenth Amendment standard of unconstitutional punishment, like the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishments standard, contains both an objective component and a subjective
component:
Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and
subjective components. As the Supreme Court explained in
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 . . . (1991), the objective component
requires an inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was] sufficiently
serious” and the subjective component asks whether “the officials
act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]” Id. at 298 . . . .
The Supreme Court did not abandon this bipartite analysis in Bell,
but rather allowed for an inference of mens rea where the
restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, or where the restriction is
excessive, even if it would accomplish a legitimate governmental
objective.
Stevenson, 495 F. 3d at 68.
Objectively, under the Due Process Clause, as well as the Eighth Amendment, prison
officials must satisfy inmates’ “basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). To satisfy the objective
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component, an inmate must show that he was subjected to genuine privation and hardship over
an extended period of time. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 (confining pretrial detainees “in such a
manner as to cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of
time might raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether those conditions
amounted to punishment”); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (“the length of
confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional
standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days and
intolerably cruel for weeks or months”).
In this Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his unit was on lockdown for over 240 days and,
during this time, detainees had no access to outdoor recreation and they were confined for 16 to
22 hours per day. Plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy the objective component because they are
not sufficiently serious in that they do not show that Plaintiff endured genuine privations and
hardship over an extended period of time. See Hubbard, 538 F. 3d at 235 (holding that triple
celling of pretrial detainees and use of floor mattresses did not violate Due Process because the
inmates “were not subjected to genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of
time”); Foreman v. Lowe, 261 Fed. App’x 401 (3d Cir. 2008) (immigration detainee’s
confinement in maximum security did not violate due process). Nor do his allegations satisfy
Iqbal’s plausibility standard. Plaintiff complains that the pretrial detainee unit on which he was
housed was on lockdown for over 240 days, during which time detainees had no outdoor
recreation. Although Plaintiff’s allegations are consistent with a finding that the lockdown and
denial of access to outdoor recreation were arbitrary and purposeless, Plaintiff’s allegations are
also consistent with restrictions that constitute a rational response by jail officials to an incident
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or other circumstances warranting a need for heightened security during this period. As written,
Plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy the objective component of a conditions of confinement
claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nor do Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the subjective component of a conditions of
confinement claim under the Due Process Clause. First, an individual defendant in a civil rights
action must participate in the alleged wrongdoing, and Plaintiff does not assert facts showing
how each named individual defendant participated in the alleged wrongdoing, i.e., arbitrarily
placing detainees on lockdown and arbitrarily denying outdoor recreation for 240 days. See
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits,
a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs”). Second, Plaintiff does not assert facts showing that each named individual
defendant was deliberately indifferent to his health or safety. To establish deliberate
indifference, a plaintiff must set forth facts “show[ing] that the official was subjectively aware”
of the allegedly substandard conditions. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
Moreover, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm
ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
Here, Plaintiff makes no allegations whatsoever with respect to the subjective component.
Moreover, as previously stated, Plaintiff’s allegations are consistent with the conclusion that jail
officials reasonably responded to a security concern. Because the Complaint makes no factual
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allegations showing the deliberate indifference of each named defendant, and because vicarious
liability does not apply under § 1983, the Complaint fails to satisfy the subjective component of a
conditions of confinement claim as to any named individual defendant. However, because it is
conceivable that Plaintiff simply neglected to specify facts that could make out a conditions of
confinement claim, this Court will grant him leave to file an amended complaint that is complete
on its face stating a conditions of confinement claim under the Due Process Clause and § 1983
against one or more of the defendants named here.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction
"Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and decide state-law claims along
with federal-law claims when they are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy." Wisconsin Dept. of
Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Where a district court has original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over federal claims
and supplemental jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the district court
has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware
County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284-1285 (3d Cir. 1993). In exercising its discretion,
?the district court should take into account generally accepted principles of <judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the litigants.’” Growth Horizons, Inc., 983 F.2d at 1284 (quoting
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Where the federal claims are
dismissed at an early stage in the litigation, courts generally decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; Growth
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Horizons, Inc., 983 F.2d at 1284-1285. In this case, since this Court is dismissing every claim
over which it had original subject matter jurisdiction, this Court declines at this juncture to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court will grant in forma pauperis status, dismiss the federal
claims (without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint that is complete on its face), and
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

s/Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
Dated: October 26, 2011

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