MARTINEZ v. THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al
Filing
32
OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 6/11/12. (dc, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-02223
(SDW) (MCA)
ROBERT MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
OPINION
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
JOSE RIVERA, ANTHONY DEVITO,
CAPRICE CALDWELL, CHRISTOPHER
BIRARDI, DENNIS FLYNN, JOHN
BOZINOWSKI, JOHN DOES 1-5,
June 8, 2012
Defendants.
WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss the amended complaint of plaintiff Robert
Martinez (“Plaintiff” or “Martinez”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
and motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56
(“Defendants’ Motion”) by defendants Jose Rivera, Caprice Caldwell, Christopher
Birardi, 1 and Dennis Flynn (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff also filed a motion to
amend his first amended complaint (“Motion to Amend”).
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332
and 1343(a)(3), and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
This Court, having considered the parties’ submissions, decides this matter
without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78.
1
Pled as “Christopher Berardi” in the initial and amended complaint.
For the reasons stated below, this Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion.
Specifically, the request for the dismissal of claims for false arrest, malicious
prosecution, conspiracy, and violation of First Amendment rights will be granted.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will be denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges that on December 6, 2009, he visited his son, an inmate at Eastern
Jersey State Prison (“EJSP”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.)
At the conclusion of this visit,
Plaintiff, along with other prison visitors, was escorted to an outdoor area where he
awaited release. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff asserts that after waiting an hour, he complained to
Defendants, and that Defendants “immediately apprehended him, placed him in custody,
and beat him senseless.” (Id. ¶¶ 18 19.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to
arrest and physically abuse him. (Id. ¶ 20.) As a result of this incident, Defendants
charged Plaintiff with two criminal complaints for aggravated assault by attempting to
cause bodily injury to a corrections officer. 2 (Id. ¶ 21.)
On April 19, 2011, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants. On April
25, 2011, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) with
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, and conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights. (Id. ¶¶ 22-26.)
Plaintiff also alleges violations of the New Jersey Constitution and the New Jersey Civil
Rights Act. (Id. ¶¶ 27-28.)
On November 17, 2011, Defendants’ Motion was filed, and on January 24, 2012,
Plaintiff filed opposition and the Motion to Amend.
2
The criminal charges against Plaintiff that resulted from this incident were dismissed and “Plaintiff
merely [pled] guilty to a municipal ordinance violation of disorderly conduct.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 2-3; Def.
Ex. C at DOC65.)
2
LEGAL STANDARD
Motion to Dismiss
The adequacy of pleadings is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint allege “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This Rule “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted); see
also, Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that Rule 8
“requires a ‘showing’ rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief.”).
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court must “‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233
(quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). However,
“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). If the “well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint
should be dismissed for failing to “show[] that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required
by Rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 679.
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According to the Supreme Court in Twombly, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his[/her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The Third Circuit summarized the
Twombly pleading standard as follows: “‘stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d
at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, the Third Circuit directed district courts to
conduct a two-part analysis. 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the court must
separate the factual elements from the legal conclusions. Id. The court “must accept all
of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions.”
Id. at 210-11. Second, the court must determine if “the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal,
566 U.S. at 679). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts. Id.
(citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35.)
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmovant, and it is material if, under the substantive law, it would affect
the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
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moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to
admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to
carry its burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Once the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the
nonmovant who must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial and may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254
F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001). The court may not weigh the evidence and determine the
truth of the matter but rather determine whether there is a genuine issue as to a material
fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In doing so, the court must construe the facts and
inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991). The nonmoving party “must present more
than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions’ to show the existence of a
genuine issue.” Podobnik v. United States Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). If the nonmoving party “fail[s] to make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the
burden of proof,” then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights under the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments 3 and under the New Jersey State Constitution,
Article I, Paragraph 7, because Defendants falsely arrested Plaintiff and used excessive
force in doing so. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, 28.) In addition, Plaintiff maintains that
3
The Court notes that while Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also refers to the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments, no claim regarding violations of these rights is specified or pled.
5
Defendants conspired to violate his civil rights by falsely arresting him and using
excessive force in doing so. (Id. ¶ 26.)
In addition to other arguments, Defendants assert that they are shielded from
liability in this case based on the doctrine of “qualified immunity.” “Qualified immunity
is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’” Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
It applies to the “discretionary functions” of government officials whose actions do not
“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In the instant
matter, however, Plaintiff asserts that the claims are brought against Defendants in their
individual capacities, and not in their official capacities. (Pl’s Opp’n Br. 4; Am. Compl.
¶ 14.) As this Court bases its dismissal of specific claims on other grounds at this stage,
this Court will not engage in an analysis based on qualified immunity.
As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and
malicious prosecution are not sustainable as a matter of law and they will be dismissed.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not stated a viable claim for violation of First Amendment
rights and the conspiracy claim is not adequately pled and will be dismissed.
Defendants’ Motion does not address Plaintiff’s excessive force claims, and those claims
remain. The claims against Defendants Caldwell and Birardi will be dismissed.
I. FALSE ARREST CLAIMS
For a claim of false arrest “‘[t]he essential thing is the constraint of the person’ . .
. ‘[t]he gist of false imprisonment is merely unlawful detention without more.’” Adams v.
City of Camden, 461 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270 (D.N.J. 2006) (internal citation omitted); see
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also, Merman v. City of Camden, No. 07-cv-3449, 2010 WL 2521422, at *12 (D.N.J.
2010). However, a plaintiff must establish that he was arrested without probable cause to
state a claim for false arrest under § 1983. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 817-818
(3d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir.
2007); Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 512, 561 (D.N.J. 2000); Palma v.
Atlantic County, 53 F. Supp. 2d 743, 755 (D.N.J. 1999). The Third Circuit has concluded
“that a guilty plea — even one for a lesser offense — does not permit a later assertion of
no probable cause.” Walker v. Clearfield Cnty. Dist. Att’y, 413 F. App’x 481, 483 (3d
Cir. 2011).
In the instant matter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants falsely arrested him. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 23-24, 28.) Defendants argue that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
(Defs’ Br. 14-16.) Plaintiff pled guilty to a municipal ordinance violation of disorderly
conduct. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 2-3; Def. Ex. C at DOC65.) Plaintiff’s guilty plea to the
disorderly conduct charge arising out of the events at EJSP on December 6, 2009, does
not support Plaintiff’s assertion of no probable cause and the false arrest claim arising
from the same events.
Even if Plaintiff could prove the absence of probable cause, his claim would fail
because it would imply the invalidity of the conviction for the lesser offense. See
Walker, 413 F. App’x at 484 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)).
That is, the basis of Plaintiff’s suit is that the Defendants unreasonably seized him
without probable cause. If he proved that allegation, it would necessarily imply that
Plaintiff’s conviction was invalid because his guilty plea and resulting conviction were
based solely on his actions at EJSP on December 6, 2009.
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There is no dispute that Plaintiff pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge (Pl.’s
Opp’n Br. 2-3; Def. Ex. C at DOC65.) As there is no genuine dispute as to a material
fact regarding Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest, the disposition of this claim is appropriate
for summary judgment. As the case law discussed above indicates, Plaintiff does not
have a viable claim for false arrest as a matter of law given his plea.
II.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not state a claim for malicious prosecution.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint, if allowed would
attempt to add such a claim, Plaintiff cannot maintain a viable claim for malicious
prosecution. Under § 1983 and New Jersey State law, a plaintiff can only state a claim
for malicious prosecution when the criminal action ended in his favor. See, e.g., Pittman
v. Metuchen Police Dept., 441 F. App’x 826, 829 (3d Cir. 2011); Mondrow v. Selwyn,
412 A.2d 447, 450 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1980). Reduced charges are not considered
favorable for purposes of a malicious prosecution action. 4 Pittman, 441 F.App’x at 82930; Mondrow, 412 A.2d at 450.
Plaintiff concedes that Defendants originally charged him with two criminal
complaints for aggravated assault by attempting to cause bodily injury to a corrections
officer. (Am. Compl. ¶ 21.)
Pursuant to an agreement between Plaintiff and the
prosecution, one charge was dismissed and Plaintiff pled guilty to a municipal ordinance
violation of disorderly conduct. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 2-3; Def. Ex. C at DOC65.) Thus,
4
Voluntarily compromised charges are not viewed as favorable for the purposes of malicious prosecution
for two reasons: “‘Sometimes it is said that this is an admission of probable cause; but the better reason
seems to be that the accused has consented to a termination which leaves open the question of his guilt and
possible conviction, and so he cannot take advantage of it, after the prosecutor has foregone the opportunity
of proving that there really was guilt.’” Mondrow, 412 A.2d at 450 (quoting William Prosser, Torts § 119
(4 ed. 1971).).
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Plaintiff failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution upon which relief can be granted
because the criminal action upon which the claim is based did not end in his favor.
Accordingly, the Court grants Defendant’s request for summary judgment as to a
purported claim for malicious prosecution.
III.
VIOLATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
In addition to other rights, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First
Amendment rights.
For a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation, Plaintiff must show that
Defendants, while acting under color of state law, violated “a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States . . . .” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
see also, Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994). “Title 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place ‘under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . .’” Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (U.S. 1982).
To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Plaintiff must show the following: (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First
Amendment; (2) the “defendant’s retaliatory action was sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness from exercising his or her rights; and (3) that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the retaliatory action.” Lauren W. ex rel.
Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007); see Thomas v. Independence
Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006). Additionally, the absence of probable cause is
essential to proving the causal connection between the protected activity and the
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retaliatory action. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2006); Walker, 413 F.
App’x at 483.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff has not adequately pled a violation of First
Amendment rights. Under Fowler, the Court must engage in a two part analysis. 578
F.3d at 210-11.
First, the Court must separate the factual elements in Plaintiff’s
complaint from the legal conclusions. Id. With regard to Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claim, Plaintiff alleges the following facts: Plaintiff visited his son at EJSP on
December 6, 2009. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) After the visit, Plaintiff waited with other visitors
in an outdoor area to be released. (Id. ¶ 17.) After an hour-long wait that prevented
Plaintiff from taking his medication, he complained. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Immediately upon
hearing Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendants allegedly apprehended Plaintiff, placed him
into custody, and “beat him senseless.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Defendants then charged Plaintiff with
two criminal complaints of aggravated assault by attempting to cause bodily injury to a
corrections officer. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Plaintiff’s statement that “[c]learly, Mr. Martinez’s
complaining was not sufficient probable cause for an arrest,” is a legal conclusion that the
court may disregard. (Id. at ¶ 19); See Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211.
Next, once the court separates the facts from the legal conclusions, it must
determine whether the factual matter, taken as a whole, is enough “‘to suggest’ the
required element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In
other words, the Court must determine whether the Plaintiff “nudged [his] claim[] across
the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. After viewing
Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as required, this Court finds
that the facts pled are insufficient to establish even the first element of a claim for
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retaliatory action. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges merely that Plaintiff “complained.” (Am.
Compl. ¶ 18.) Not all speech is protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Houston v.
Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 n.12 (1987); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). Plaintiff does not specify how the Defendants violated his First Amendment
rights, and thus, has not made a plausible claim for the violation of First Amendment
rights. (See Am. Compl.) As the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fail to
nudge Plaintiff’s claim for First Amendment retaliatory action from conceivable to
plausible, it cannot survive a motion to dismiss.
IV.
CONSPIRACY
With regard to the conspiracy claim, at this stage, this Court also evaluates this
claim under the motion to dismiss standard. “To properly state a § 1983 conspiracy
claim, a plaintiff must allege that ‘persons acting under color of state law conspired to
deprive him of a federally protected right.’” Novellino v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr.
Mountainview Youth Corr. Facility, No. 10–4542, 2011 WL 3418201, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug.
3, 2011) (quoting Perano v. Twp. of Tilden, No. 10–2393, 2011 WL 1388381, at *4 (3d
Cir. Apr. 13, 2011)).
At the motion to dismiss stage, the allegations of conspiracy “must provide some
factual basis to support the existence of the elements of a conspiracy: agreement and
concerted action.” Capogrosso v. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 185 (3d
Cir. 2009). “[A] plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be
inferred.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d
Cir. 2010). In other words, there must be a “meeting of the minds.” See Startzell v. City
of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).
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Plaintiff has not set forth a claim for conspiracy in the Amended Complaint, and
the proposed Second Amended Complaint does not address deficiencies in the conspiracy
claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired by “acting in concert” to falsely arrest
and “physically abuse him” and “agreeing to falsely arrest him and use excessive force
upon him.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 26.) Simply alleging “agreement” without facts from
which that agreement can be inferred is insufficient. See Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d at
178. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that establish that Defendants agreed to do anything
unlawful. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief for conspiracy under
§ 1983.
V.
VIOLATION OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION/NEW JERSEY
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
The New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2, was
modeled after § 1983, and creates a private cause of action for violations of civil rights
secured under the New Jersey Constitution. Celestine v. Foley, No. 10-1775, 2010 WL
5186145, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2010). “Courts have repeatedly construed the NJCRA in
terms nearly identical to its federal counterpart: Section 1983.” Chapman v. New Jersey,
Civil No. 08-4130 (AET), 2009 WL 2634888, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2009); See also
Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587, 604 (D.N.J. 2010) (accepting the
comparison between the NJCRA and §1983 made by the Chapman court); Pettit v. New
Jersey, Civil No. 09-3735 (NLH) 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011). As
discussed, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1983. Plaintiff’s claims under
NJCRA are based on the same amended complaint alleging the same facts. As such, this
Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under NJCRA as well.
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VI.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will be denied as it would be futile at this point.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), if not within the first 21 days of a
service of the original complaint or a motion under Rule 12(b), “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Defendants’
filed the motion to dismiss on November 17, 2011. (Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss 2.)
Plaintiff’s filed his response on January 23, 2012. (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 15.) Accordingly,
Plaintiff properly requested the court’s leave in accordance with Rule 15(a)(2). (Pl.’s
Opp’n Br. 13-15.)
Plaintiff’s proposed Second Amended Complaint fails to allege any different or
additional facts from the first Amended Complaint that would further set forth his claims.
As noted, this Court will grant summary judgment regarding the claims for false arrest
and malicious prosecution as there are no material facts in dispute regarding those claims
and Plaintiff cannot prevail on those claims as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s proposed
Second Amended Complaint also does not set forth facts to support the conspiracy or
First Amendment violation claims which this Court will also dismiss.
VII.
DEFENDANTS CALDWELL AND BIRARDI
Defendants request summary judgment on all claims against Defendants Caldwell
and Birardi, based on the assertion that they had limited personal involvement in this
matter. (Defs’ Br. 20.) Plaintiff notes that Defendant Birardi was “a [s]enior Investigator
at the East Jersey State Prison, initiated the criminal proceedings against Martinez. . . . In
fact, Birardi signed the criminal complaints charging Plaintiff with two counts of
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aggravated assault.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 11 (citing Defs’ Ex. F).) 5 However, as discussed
above, the claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and First
Amendment violations will be dismissed.
It does not appear that either Defendant
Caldwell or Birardi were physically present at EJSP on December 6, 2009 at the time of
the incident. (See Defs’ Ex. E, F.) Plaintiff has not disputed or argued otherwise. It does
not appear that Plaintiff is stating a claim for excessive force (not currently before this
Court in Defendants’ Motion) separate from conspiracy against Defendants Caldwell and
Birardi. Thus, claims against Defendants Caldwell or Birardi will be dismissed without
prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, this Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
Plaintiff’s claims regarding false arrest, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and violation
of First Amendment rights will be dismissed. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is DENIED.
s/Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.
Orig: Clerk
Cc:
Madeline Cox Arleo, U.S.M.J.
Parties
5
The Court notes that Plaintiff did not set forth any specific arguments in his opposition regarding
Defendants’ request for summary judgment as to Defendant Caldwell.
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