LUXAMA et al v. IRONBOUND EXPRESS, INC. et al

Filing 355

OPINION. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 8/16/21. (jc, )

Case 2:11-cv-02224-JMV-JBC Document 355 Filed 08/16/21 Page 1 of 9 PageID: 7762

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VAUDRAL LUXAMA, CHANDLER
LUXEUS, JAVIER R. GARCIA, FREDO
BONHOMME, SANTOS MALDONADO, and
CHANEL FONTIN, each individually and as
class representatives,

Civil Action No. 11-2224
OPINION

Plaintiffs,
v.
IRONBOUND EXPRESS, INC.,
Defendant.
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s Opinion, D.E. 333 (“Summary Judgment Opinion” or “SJ Op.”), and Order, D.E. 334.
The Court reviewed all submissions made in support of the motion and considered the motion
without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons
that follow, Defendant’s motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court’s Summary Judgment Opinion contained a detailed factual background, which
is incorporated by reference here. Summary Judgment Opinion at 2-7. As a result, the Court
provides only a brief discussion of the relevant background.
The operative pleading is Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint, D.E. 118 (“TAC”). SJ
Op. at 2, n. 3. Defendant is an intermodal container and chassis transport company based in
Newark, New Jersey. Id. at 2-3. Defendant contracts with steamship lines and other customers to

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transport shipping containers and chassis to and from ports, shipping terminals, and customer
locations throughout the Northeast and elsewhere in the United States. Id. at 3. Named Plaintiffs
are six individuals who perform services as owner-operator truck drivers and who leased or
currently lease their tractors to transport shipping containers and/or chassis for Defendant. Id.
Defendant engages drivers, such as Plaintiffs, to provide transportation services pursuant to a
written lease agreement (the “Lease”). Id.
The Lease is subject to the Truth-in-Leasing regulations (the “Regulations”), 49 C.F.R. §
376.1 et seq., promulgated under the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. Id. at 21. The
purpose of the Regulations is to “protect independent truckers from motor carriers’ abusive leasing
practices.” Id. at 22 (quoting Fox v. Transam Leasing, Inc., 839 F.3d 1209, 1211 (10th Cir. 2016)).
The Regulations mandate certain required terms in leases between the carriers, like the Defendant,
and independent truckers, like the Plaintiffs, and include a private right of action. Id. at 22-25.
Plaintiffs claim that the Lease fails to comply with the Regulations in several respects and that
Defendant breached the Lease. Id. at 2; see also id. at 22-25.
On January 29, 2019, Defendant requested leave to file a motion for summary judgment,
accompanied by its statement of material facts. D.E. 236. Plaintiffs filed their letter in opposition,
D.E. 239, later submitting their responsive statement of material facts, D.E. 242. On April 1, 2019,
Plaintiffs requested leave to file a motion for summary judgment, accompanied with their
statement of material facts. D.E. 255. Defendant filed its opposition and its responsive statement
of material facts. D.E. 270. The Court permitted the parties to file their respective summary
judgment motions, D.E. 273, 274, which the parties did, D.E. 281, D.E. 282.
On March 26, 2021, the Court issued the Summary Judgment Opinion and an Order
resolving the motions for summary judgment. See SJ Op.; D.E. 334. The Court granted in part

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and denied in part Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court granted Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment (1) that Paragraph 17 of the Lease complies with 49 C.F.R. §
376.12(h); (2) that Paragraph 18 of the Lease complies with 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h); and (3) that
Paragraph 20(e) of the Lease complies with 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(j)(3). D.E. 334 at 1-2. The Court
otherwise denied Defendant’s motion. Id. The Court also granted in part and denied in part
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (1) for breach of contract as to Paragraph 17(b) of the Lease; (2) for a declaratory
judgment that the Lease violates 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.12(d), 12(g), 12(h); and (3) for injunctive relief
as to 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.12(d), 12(g), and 12(h). Id. at 2. The Court otherwise denied Plaintiffs’
motion. The present motion followed.
II.

RECONSIDERATION STANDARD
Defendant moves for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P 59(e).

A motion for

reconsideration is appropriate based on “‘(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion . . . ; or (3)
the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.’” In re Vehicle
Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 87 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended (Jan. 25, 2017).
“Reconsideration motions may not be used to relitigate old matters or to raise arguments or present
evidence or allegations that could have been raised prior to entry of the original order.” Edison C.
F. v. Decker, No. CV 20-15455 (SRC), 2021 WL 1997386, at *4 (D.N.J. May 19, 2021)
(addressing reconsideration motion under Fed. R. Civ. P 59(e) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5 (2008)).
Defendant states that its motion is based on “clear errors of law” and the need to “prevent
manifest injustice.” D.E. 337-1 at 1. However, in light of Defendant’s arguments, its actual basis

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is not clear.
III.

ANALYSIS
Defendant appears to contend that the Court found that Defendant’s act of overcharging

Plaintiffs for workers compensation insurance violated 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(h). See e.g., D.E. 3371 at 1-2; id. at 8. This is not accurate. Instead, the Court held there was no dispute that Defendant
breached Paragraph 17(b) of the Lease – which only permitted Defendant to chargeback to
Plaintiffs the “cost” of workers compensation insurance – based on Defendant’s admission that
“the aggregate deductions from the drivers’ pay exceeded the amount Ironbound advanced for the
premiums from 2007 to 2011.” SJ Op. at 21 (quoting Def. RSOMF1 ¶ 45). Yet Defendant does
not appear to challenge this aspect of the Summary Judgment Opinion2; rather, Defendant
continuously cites to page 28 of the Summary Judgment Opinion, which denied a portion of
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and did not involve Plaintiffs’ motion for summary

1

Capitalized terms and abbreviations not otherwise defined herein shall have the same definitions
as those provided in the Summary Judgment Opinion.
2

Defendant does not argue that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims under Paragraph 17(b) of the
Lease fail for lack of damages. However, Defendant does improperly raise an issue as to the
breach of contract claim in its reply brief. See D.E. 348. The Court does not consider this
argument. See, e.g., Cobra Enterprises, LLC v. All Phase Servs., Inc., No. CV 20-4750 (SRC),
2020 WL 2849892, at *1 (D.N.J. June 1, 2020) (“[T]his Court will not accept arguments offered
for the first time in the reply brief, as they were not properly asserted in the opening brief and
Plaintiffs have not had the opportunity to respond to them.”). In fact, reply papers are ordinarily
not permitted for motions for reconsideration. L. Civ. R. (d)(3) (“No reply papers shall be filed,
unless permitted by the Court, relating to the following motions . . . Reconsideration under
L.Civ.R. 7.1(i) . . .”). Moreover, even if the Court considered the merits of Defendant’s argument,
the Court would still deny the motion. The Court’s decision to reserve the amount of damages for
trial while simultaneously concluding there was no dispute that Defendant breached the terms of
the Lease was consistent with settled New Jersey law. City of Trenton v. Cannon Cochran Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., No. A-5576-09T1, 2011 WL 3241579, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2011)
(affirming grant of partial summary judgment as to liability on breach of contract claim and
reasoning “liability for breach of contract does not require proof of damage beyond the breach
itself.” (quoting Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228 (N.J. 1984)).
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judgment.
Defendant’s motion is also untimely. Defendant asserts that its motion is made pursuant
Fed. R. Civ. P 59(e) and is therefore subject to a 28-day filing deadline rather than the 14-day
deadline under L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). However, Rule 59 only applies to final orders rather than
interlocutory orders denying summary judgment. K.J. v. Greater Egg Harbor Reg’l High Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. CV 14-145 (RBK/JS), 2020 WL 3542305, at *3 (D.N.J. June 30, 2020)
(citing Mitchell v. Twp. of Willingboro Municipality Gov’t, 913 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D.N.J. 2012)
(“The provisions of Rule 59 are designed to address orders rendering a final judgment, not
interlocutory orders denying summary judgment.”)). Because Defendant seeks reconsideration
“of an ‘interlocutory order[] denying summary judgment,’ rather than a final judgment, the 14-day
time limit in Rule 7.1(i) controls.” Id.
The Summary Judgment Opinion and Order were entered on March 26, 2021. D.E. 333,
D.E. 334. Defendant filed the motion for reconsideration on April 26, 2021. Under either the Fed.
R. Civ. P. 59(e) or L. Civ. R. 7.1(i), the motion is untimely. Defendant moved for an extension
nunc pro tunc. D.E. 341. However, that motion is based on the incorrect premise that “[p]ursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Defendant was permitted 28 days to seek reconsideration of the Opinion
and a motion for reconsideration was due to be filed on April 23, 2021.” D.E. 341-1 at 2. As
discussed, this is incorrect.

K.J., No. CV 14-145 (RBK/JS), 2020 WL 3542305, at *3.

Accordingly, the motion for an extension is denied, and the motion for reconsideration is denied
as untimely under L. Civ. R. 7.1(i).3

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The standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) are identical. Compare In re
Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d at 87 with Carmichael v. Everson, No. 03-4787,
2004 WL 1587894, at *1 (D.N.J. May 21, 2004) (citations omitted); see also VisionSoft Consulting,
Inc. v. Cognitus Consulting, LLC, No. 319CV11526BRMDEA, 2020 WL 5542790, at *7 (D.N.J.
Sept. 16, 2020)(“[The] standard for a motion brought under L.Civ.R. 7.1(i) is the same as that for
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However, even if the Court were to consider the substance of Defendant’s motion, the
motion would be denied. The Court construes Defendant as challenging the Court’s denial of
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count Four of the TAC. See D.E. 337-1 at 9
(citing SJ Op. at 28). As noted, Defendant challenges the conclusions reached on page 28 of the
Summary Judgment Opinion relating to workers compensation insurance. By way of background,
Defendant moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claims under the Regulations, arguing
that even if the Regulations were violated, Plaintiffs had suffered no damages. D.E. 282-1 at 1417. Despite its admission that it overcharged Plaintiffs for workers compensation insurance from
2007 to 2011, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs had suffered no damages because (a) Defendant
later undercharged Plaintiffs for workers compensation insurance and (b) because Plaintiffs would
have paid more for workers compensation insurance if they bought it on the open market. Id. The
Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that, even if it were true that Plaintiffs “would have paid
more for insurance if they bought it on the open market,” Defendants had failed to provide “legal
authority as to why this would act as a damages offset.” SJ Op. at 28.
The Court sees no basis to reconsider this aspect of its opinion, which was based on
Defendant’s failure to meet its burden to show its entitlement to “judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court concluded that Defendant failed to provide the requisite legal
authority as to the issue of offset. SJ Op. at 28. Subsection II.B. of Defendant’s brief in support
of its motion for summary judgment (captioned “Plaintiffs Sustained No Damages When They
Voluntarily Purchased Parking And Workers Compensation Coverage From Ironbound Because
They Were Cheaper Than What Could Be Bought Elsewhere”), D.E. 282-1 at 16-17, did not

a motion brought under Rule 59(e), which governs motions to alter or amend a judgment.”).
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contain a single citation to legal authority. On the motion for reconsideration, Defendant still fails
to provide legal authority much less establish a cognizable basis for reconsideration.
In fact, Defendant appears to concede that the issue is appropriate for jury resolution.
Defendant writes: “how can Plaintiffs viably claim to be ‘overcharged’ by a vendor selling a
subsidized product at the lowest available price?4 Such a factual dispute at the heart of this issue
surely must be resolved by a jury.” D.E. 337-1 at 4-5 (emphasis added). Yet, the Court did leave
this issue for the jury. The Court found that Defendant had breached the Lease but left the issue
of damages for jury consideration. SJ Op. at 28; see also id. at 21 (“[S]ummary judgment is not
granted as to the amount of damages caused by the breach.”).
Defendant next argues that “the Court overlooked controlling law—submitted by
Ironbound—that it is entirely lawful for Ironbound to make a . . . profit from its offering of
insurance premiums through the subsidized group policy it obtained for and offered to the drivers.”
D.E. 337-1 at 5 (emphasis added (citing Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift
Transp. Co. (AZ), No. CV-02-1059-PHX-PGR, 2007 WL 2808997, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007)
(“Swift I”)). Defendant appears to contend that a District of Arizona case is binding on this Court.
No district court decision is binding on this Court.5 Defendant does not cite a precedential Third
Circuit or Supreme Court decision that this Court overlooked.

Regardless of whether the

Regulations permitted Defendant to profit from charges relating to workers compensation

4

Defendant’s rhetorical question also ignores the express language of the Lease – that the parties
specifically agreed that Defendant would only chargeback the “cost” of workers compensation
insurance to Plaintiffs. See SJ Op. at 20 (quoting Lease ¶ 17(b)).
5

Defendant’s brief includes a block quote from Swift I that cites to decisions from district courts
in the Middle District of Florida and the District of Utah. Decisions by such courts are in no sense
binding or “controlling” on this Court as Defendant claims, nor or any of the non-Third Circuit,
non-Supreme Court decisions cited in Defendant’s motion.
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insurance, Defendant was not permitted to do so under the plain terms of the Lease. Id.
Defendant next argues that “the Court granted Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion based
on a determination that Ironbound’s ability to offset the (albeit non-existent) harm to Plaintiffs by
the far greater cost to Ironbound in subsidizing the drivers’ insurance premiums is not a disputed
issue of material fact.” D.E. 337-1 at 8 (citing SJ Op. at 28). Defendant is mistaken. The portion
of the Summary Judgment Opinion that Defendant cites to did not grant any aspect of Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment; the portion denied Defendants’ motion. See SJ Op. at 28. Instead,
the Court held that Defendant failed to provide legal authority for its offset argument. Id.
Defendant next claims that the Court erred in denying “Ironbound’s motion for summary
judgment after finding a genuine issue of material fact related to workers’ compensation insurance
damages.” D.E. 337-1 at 9 (citing SJ Op. at 28). Defendant again mischaracterizes the Court’s
Opinion. As explained, the Court concluded Defendant failed to provide the requisite legal
authority as to the issue of offset. SJ Op. at 28. Moreover, the Court ultimately granted Defendant
summary judgment that “the workers’ compensation provision of the Lease complies with Section
376.12(h); there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to this issue . . . Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on the issue is granted.” SJ Op. at 33-34. In other words, the Court found that
the relevant section of the Lease complied with the Regulations but that Defendant had
nevertheless breached its express terms.
Finally, Defendant’s contention that Plaintiffs suffered no damages is an impermissible
attempt to reargue its summary judgment motion. Edison C. F., No. CV 20-15455 (SRC), 2021
WL 1997386, at *4. Defendant’s reconsideration brief and motion for summary judgment are
nearly identical on this issue. Compare D.E. 337-1 at 10 with D.E. 282-1 at 16-17.
Defendant does not raise an intervening change in the controlling law or the availability of

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new evidence not previously available. Defendant has otherwise failed to show clear errors of law
or the need to prevent manifest injustice. The motion for reconsideration is denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration, D.E. 337, is denied

and Defendant’s motion for an extension of time, D.E. 341, is denied. An appropriate Order
accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: August 16, 2021
__________________________
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

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