SANCHEZ v. POAG et al
Filing
39
OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 3/22/16. (DD, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JHON SANCHEZ,
No. 1 1-cv--3824 (KM)(MAH)
Plaintiff pro
Se,
OPINION
V.
JONATHAN POAG, et al.,
Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion (ECF No. 32) of all
defendants to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No. 18) of the plaintiff,
Jhon Sanchez, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Reviewing the complaint, I find that it does not set forth facts sufficient to
make out a plausible claim for relief against the defendants. Accordingly, the
motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED, albeit without prejudice to the
filing of a second amended complaint within 45 days.
I.
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BACKGROUND
Mr. Sanchez is a civilly committed detainee of East Jersey State Prison’s
Special Treatment Unit (“STU”). (Am. Compl. 2—3) The defendants are New
Jersey state officials from the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) or
employees at the STU. (Am. Compi. 4a-4d)
1 The facts that follow
are taken from the complaint. They are assumed to be
true solely for the purposes of the motion to dismiss.
1
Mr. Sanchez filed his original complaint in July 2011. (ECF. No. 1) After
he moved for default judgment in April 2014 (ECF No. 16), this Court denied
that motion and instructed Sanchez to “prepare a new, amended complaint on
the proper form, containing in a single document all of the claims that he
currently wishes to assert.” (ECF No. 17) Sanchez filed his (first) amended
complaint in October 2014. The defendants have moved to dismiss it for failure
to state a claim. (ECF No. 32)
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a valid claim for relief under Rule
12(b)(6), the complaint must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief
sought. Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a).
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged in the
complaint are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor
of the plaintiff. N.J. Carpenters & the Trs. Thereof v. Tishman Const. Corp. of
N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2014). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) does not require that
a complaint contain detailed factual allegations. Nevertheless, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Bell Ati. Corp.
V.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 1964—65 (2007). Thus, the complaint’s factual allegations must be
sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, so that a
claim is “plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570; see also W. Run Student Hous.
Assocs., LLC u. Huntington Nat. Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2013).
2
From the seminal modern cases of Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.s.
544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the Third Circuit
has extracted a three-step process for reviewing a complaint:
To determine whether a complaint meets the pleading standard,
our analysis unfolds in three steps. First, we outline the elements
a plaintiff must plead to a state a claim for relief. See [Iqbal, 556
U.S.] at 675; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. Next, we peel away those
allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not
entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679;
Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. Finally, we look for well-pled factual
allegations, assume their veracity, and then “determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679; Argueta, 643 F.3d at 73. This last step is “a context-specific
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).
In a case brought pro se such as this one, the Court must construe the
complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94,
127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.
Ct. 594, 596—97 (1972). Liberal construction does not, however, require the
Court to credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.”
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Even apro
se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the allegations set
forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed as supplying facts to support a claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (An example of the limits of courts’ procedural
flexibility regarding pro se litigants is that “pro se litigants still must allege
sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”).
B. Analysis
I find that the complaint fails to state a claim against the defendants.
Even under the most liberal construction of the complaint, Mr. Sanchez has
failed to allege facts sufficient to support a cognizable claim. See generally
Haines, 404 U.S. at 520—2 1, 594 S. Ct. at 596—97. In his amended complaint,
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Mr. Sanchez simply lists seven defendants, their positions, and a one sentence
allegation towards each of them. A short complaint is of course desirable, even
admirable. But the factual allegations must be sufficient to make out a
plausible claim for relief and enable defendants to understand what it is they
are alleged to have done.
1. Jonathan Poag
Mr. Poag was the Director of the DHS Division of Mental Health Services.
As to him, the complaint alleges only this: that Poag was “[fjailing to oversee
the interferences that DOC is doing to therapy. And the using of psychiatric
being used as a form of prison punishment.” (Am. Compl. 4a)
In conclusory fashion, this allegation simply states that an unsavory
practice is underway. Sanchez does not state any facts as to when, where, and
how, and against whom psychiatric treatment has been used as a form of
prison punishment. It does not so much as give an example. Nor does the
complaint allege that Sanchez personally has been subject to that practice or
has been injured as a result of it. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to
state a claim for relief.
2. Menu Main
Merill Main was the clinical director of STU. As to him, the complaint
alleges only this: that Merill Main was “[ajuthorizing and giving Corrections the
authority of placing us (residents) under the prison policy. Knowing that we are
civilly committed residents.” (Am. Compl. 4a) Again, Sanchez fails to provide
any facts. The complaint does not state what “prison policy” is referred to; how,
when, or to whom it was applied; or any other facts. Again, no example or
examples are given. Nor does the complaint state that Sanchez himself has
been subjected to such policies or injured as a result. This conclusory
allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.
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3. Shantay Adams
Ms. Adams was a unit director of STU. As to her, the complaint alleges
only this: that Adams “[k]nowingly, knows that this treatment facility is being
ran as a prison facility, and [was] disregarding the mental and physical abuse
that DOC is causing and inflicting upon me.” (Am. Compi. 4b) This allegation,
again, is wholly conclusory and contains no facts. It does not state what the
“abuse” might consist of, when it occurred, or by whom it was perpetrated. It
does not give an example of what is meant. This conclusory allegation is
insufficient to state a claim for relief.
4. Jacelyn Ottino
Ms. Ottino was a program director at STU. As to her, the complaint
alleges only this: that Ottino was “[o]verlooking the abuse of Corrections filing
False Reports on me. Causing serious interference with my treatment.” (Am.
Compl. 4b) This allegation, like the others, is devoid of facts. It does not state
what reports are referred to, or in what way they were false. The interference
with treatment is not described, even generally, nor are examples given. This
conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.
5. Brian Friedman
Dr. Friedman was a psychologist at STU. As to him, the complaint alleges
only this: that Friedman was “[djisregarding my grievances and verbal
complaints of being discriminated against towards my treatment by
Corrections.” (Am. Compl. 4c) This allegation is insufficient to state a claim for
relief. Sanchez fails to provide examples of grievances and complaints that were
disregarded, to describe them in any way, or to state when and to whom they
were made. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.
6. Jennifer Velez
Commissioner Velez was the commissioner of DHS. As to her, the
complaint alleges only this: that Velez was “[fjailing to answered my complaints
of being mental and physically abused by Corrections. And for failing to send
someone to this Facility to oversee the DOC and their corruptive ways of
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treatment.” (Am. Compl. 4c) This allegation fails to give examples of complaints
made to Velez, to describe them in any way, or to provide facts as to when and
how Sanchez was abused. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a
claim for relief.
7. John Main
John Main was the CEO of DHS Hospitals. As to him, the complaint
alleges only this: that John Main was “[ajllowing Corrections to apply the 10:A
Code (prison rules) for us. Knowing that we are civilly committed residents.”
(Am. Compl. 4d) Sanchez fails to provide examples of how prison rules were
applied, state how they were applied, or describe how he was harmed as a
result. It does not state how Sanchez was harmed personally; it merely states
generally that civilly committed prisoners are treated as if they were prisoners.
This conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief.
In sum, Mr. Sanchez has failed to provide “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct.
at 1964—65). The complaint thus fails to state a claim for relief that is
“plausible on its face,” and it will be dismissed for failure to comply with the
pleading standards of Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED and Mr. Sanchez’s amended complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to the submission within 45 days of a Second Amended
Complaint containing the necessary factual allegations. If he wishes, Mr.
Sanchez may use extra sheets and file his Second Amended Complaint as a
supplement to the current version on file
Dated: March 22, 2016
Hon. evin McN ty
United States Di
t Judge
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