OGUNBAYO v. HERTZ CORPORATION
Filing
18
LETTER OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 12/16/11. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. FEDERAL BLDG. & U.S. COURTHOUSE
50 WALNUT STREET, P.O. BOX 419
NEWARK, NJ 07101-0419
(973) 645-6340
WILLIAM J. MARTINI
JUDGE
LETTER OPINION
December 16, 2011
Fausat Ogunbayo
P.O. Box 100532
Staten Island, NY 10310
(Plaintiff)
Jennifer Rygiel-Boyd
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.
10 Madison Avenue, Suite 400
Morristown, NJ 07960
(Attorney for Defendant Hertz Corporation)
RE:
Ogunbayo v. Hertz Corporation
Civ. No. 11-4209 (WJM)
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Hertz Corporation’s (“Hertz’s”)
motion for partial dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint,1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Specifically, Hertz moves to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Fausat
Ogunbayo’s claim that Hertz violated New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD),
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The Court will also address Plaintiff’s July 29, 2011 Application for Entry of Default.
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1, et seq. For the reasons set forth in this Letter Opinion, Defendant’s
motion will be GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
As this is a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the following version of events assumes
Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint are true.2 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007). Plaintiff Fausat Ogunbayo began her employment with Defendant Hertz
Corporation in March 2001. Ms. Ogunbayo was a member of Teamster Local 641, and
the terms of her employment were governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(“CBA”) between Local 641 and Hertz.
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she received excellent reviews throughout the
majority of her employment with Hertz, but that beginning in late 2010, her supervisors
began to unfairly target her. Specifically, on October 29, 2010, an administrative
manager singled her “out of all employees and management to warn about bringing my
personal bags to work [even though e]verybody take [sic] personal bags to work.”
(Compl. 12, ECF 1-1.) Additionally, on December 22, 2010, when a phone began
ringing, another manager “snapped” at Ms. Ogunbayo in front of a customer, demanded
to know whose phone it was, and sent Ms. Ogunbayo home when she continued assisting
the customer instead of responding to the question. (Id. at 13.) This was not the first time
that manager was disrespectful to Ms. Ogunbayo in front of customers. (Id.)
On December 22, 2010, Ms. Ogunbayo wrote a letter to Hertz’s President and
CEO, detailing these two incidents. Plaintiff characterizes this as “reporting the
discrimination, harassments and abuse” that she was subjected to at work. (Id. ¶ 1.) On
January 12, 2011, Ms. Ogunbayo was suspended from her position, pending an
investigation into the incidents. On March 15, 2011, Ms. Ogunbayo’s employment with
Hertz was formally terminated.
On May 19, 2011, Plaintiff instituted this action in New Jersey Superior Court,
alleging that her termination, and the treatment she endured leading up to it, violated the
CBA and the “Law against discrimination.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks
$10,000,000,000.00 in damages from Hertz for her unlawful termination. Defendant
removed this matter to District Court on July 21, 2011. Plaintiff does not challenge
removal. On August 11, 2011, Hertz filed its Answer and Motion to Dismiss. (ECF Nos.
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This timeline is gleaned from a number of letters between Plaintiff and various
other Hertz employees, attached as exhibits to Plaintiff’s Complaint.
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5 and 6, respectively.) Prior to Defendant’s timely filing of these documents, on July 29,
2011, Plaintiff requested entry of a default judgment against Hertz. (ECF No. 4.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motions to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of the Complaint,
in whole or in part, if Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A
12(b)(6) motion may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the
Complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint has failed to set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
B.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Will Be Granted Because Plaintiff’s
Complaint Fails to Set Forth a Prima Facie LAD Claim
New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination affords broad protections against
workplace discrimination.3 Nonetheless, for plaintiff to establish a prima facie LAD
claim, she must allege that she suffered an adverse employment action because she was
[1] a member of a LAD-protected group, or [2] engaged in a LAD-protected activity.
N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12 (a), (d); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., Inc., 117 N.J. 539, 551
(1990); Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996).
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges neither. Ms. Ogunbayo does not assert that she is a
member of a group protected under the LAD, much less that her on-the-job “harassment”
and eventual termination occurred because she belonged to such a group. Nor does Ms.
Ogunbayo assert that she was discriminated against because she engaged in an activity
protected under the LAD. Bringing personal bags to work and refusing to answer a
manager’s question are not LAD-protected activities. Similarly, Ms. Ogunbayo’s mailing
of a letter to Hertz’s CEO complaining about these incidents, and characterizing them as
“discrimination, harassments and abuse” is not protected. See Hood v. Pfizer, Inc, 322
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Specifically, employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees
because of their “race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, civil union
status, domestic partnership status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex,
gender identity or expression, disability or atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of any
individual, or because of the liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States or the
nationality of any individual.” N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12.
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Fed.Appx. 124, 131 (3d Cir. 2009) (employee’s question to CEO at town-hall meeting
asking “why more wasn’t being done to promote [company] diversity” too general to
constitute “protected conduct” under the LAD); and Barber v. CSX Distribution Services,
68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995) (employee’s letter to Human Resources complaining
about generally unfair treatment and expressing dissatisfaction that position was awarded
to someone else - but never specifically complaining about age discrimination - was not
“protected conduct” under federal age discrimination statute).
In short, even viewing all the allegations in the Complaint in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, Ms. Ogunbayo still fails to set forth sufficient factual matter to state
a prima facie claim for relief under the LAD. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s LAD claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) will be GRANTED.
C.
Ms. Ogunbayo’s Request for Default Judgment Against Hertz is
Procedurally Improper
Before Hertz timely filed its Answer on August 11, Ms. Ogunbayo applied for
default judgment. Entry of default judgment is appropriate “[w]hen a party against whom
a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(a). In this matter, Hertz, the lone defendant, has timely responded to
Plaintiff’s Complaint and is not in default. Accordingly, Ms. Ogunbayo’s request that
default judgment be entered against Hertz will be DENIED.
III.
CONCLUSION
Based on the reasons set forth in this Letter Opinion, Hertz’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s LAD claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) will be GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s request for a default judgment will be DENIED.
s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
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