HURLEY v. TOYOTA MOTOR CORP. et al
Filing
16
OPINION AND ORDER denying #5 Motion to Remand action to Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County. Signed by Judge William H. Walls on 12/9/2011. (nr, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
GABRIEL J. HURLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP.; FORD MOTOR
COMPANY; JOHN DOES (1-5), being
fictitious persons, and XYZ CORP. (1-5),
being fictitious entities,
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OPINION and ORDER
Civ. No. 2:11-4689 (WHW)
Defendants.
Walls, Senior District Judge
Plaintiff Gabriel Hurley filed this case, which arises out of a car accident in which he was
seriously injured, in the Superior Court of New Jersey—Law Division, Middlesex County.
Plaintiff Hurley had previously filed a case arising out of the same car accident against the owner
and driver of one of the other vehicles involved, a Toyota Celica, and the driver of a third car.
The plaintiff then moved to consolidate the two cases in state court. Toyota Motor Corporation
(Toyota) and Ford Motor Company (Ford) removed this case before the motion to consolidate
was considered. The plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which the defendants oppose. Under
Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the motion is decided without oral argument.
For the following reasons, the plaintiff’s motion to remand is denied.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff alleges that he was seriously injured on June 18, 2009 when a Toyota Celica
driven by Michael O’Malley struck the Ford Mustang the plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff filed a
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
complaint against both the owner and driver of the Toyota and the driver of a third vehicle on
January 25, 2010 (the “O’Malley case”) in state court as Docket No. MID-L-617-10. In June
2011, just before the statute of limitations ran, the plaintiff’s expert discovered an air compressor
from a Toyota Celica in the plaintiff’s car. The plaintiff’s expert concluded that the air
compressor had struck the plaintiff in the head and face, causing his injuries.
Based on his expert’s finding, the plaintiff filed this action against Toyota and Ford on
June 15, 2011, three days before the statute of limitations ran, as Docket No. MID-L-4427-11
(the “Toyota case”). The complaint asserts claims based on defective design, breach of express
and implied warranty, and the New Jersey Products Liability Act against both Toyota and Ford.
On July 25, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate the O’Malley case with the
Toyota case in state court; the motion had a return date of August 19, 2011. Toyota and Ford
removed the Toyota case to this Court on August 15, 2011 based on diversity jurisdiction. The
Toyota case was removed before the Superior Court of New Jersey—Law Division, Middlesex
County ruled on the motion to consolidate the Toyota case and the O’Malley case. On August
26, 2011 defendant Ford brought a third-party complaint in this Court against all three named
defendants from the O’Malley case. On October 6, 2011 Toyota cross-claimed against Ford and
the defendants from the O’Malley case.
On September 9, 2011 the plaintiff filed a motion to remand the Toyota case. Toyota
filed a brief in opposition. Third-party defendants, also defendants in the O’Malley case, filed a
brief in support of the remand motion.
STANDARDS
“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants ….” 28
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U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2011). District courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions between
citizens of different states (including foreign states) where the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011). Diversity must exist between each defendant and the plaintiff
in order to remove on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S.
61, 68 (1996).
28 U.S.C. §1447(c) provides for remand:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under
section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment, it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.
When confronted with a motion to remand, the removing party has the burden of establishing the
propriety of removal. Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
Moreover, “removal statutes ‘are to be strictly construed against removal, and all doubts resolved
in favor of remand.’” Id. at 111 (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
“Cases may be remanded under § 1447(c) for (1) lack of district court subject matter
jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal procedure." PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352
(3d Cir. 1993). First, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). The removing party has shown that there is complete diversity of citizenship between
the parties and the amount in controversy is over $75,000. Notice Removal ¶¶ 3-4. The motion
for remand does not dispute either of these assertions. Second, Toyota and Ford have met the
procedural requirements for removal. Both named defendants have joined in removal, the
appropriate paperwork has been filed with the notice of removal, and removal is timely. See
Delalla v. Hanover Ins., No. 11-1532, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20651, at *18-19 (3d Cir. Oct. 12,
2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1446. The plaintiff does not allege a procedural defect in the notice of
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removal. Instead, the plaintiff asserts “Had Toyota and Ford been added as defendants in the
state court action, there would be no diversity ….” Notice Remand ¶ 21.
The plaintiff notes that had he had time before the statute of limitations ran, he would
have amended the O’Malley complaint rather than bring a separate complaint. Id. Plaintiff tried
to have the cases consolidated in state court, but after removal of the Toyota case he “had to
withdraw [the] motion to consolidate.” Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff argues that the O’Malley and Toyota
cases should be tried together in the “interest of justice, judicial economy and … [to avoid] risk
of inconsistent verdicts ….” Id. at ¶ 23, 26. The plaintiff does not support the argument that a
case can be remanded on this basis with any cases or other legal authority nor does he provide a
statutory basis for his motion to remand. See Id. at ¶ 22-26. There is no legal basis for remanding
a case on the basis that the plaintiff would have followed a different procedural course had he
had more time. The plaintiff made a choice to bring a separate complaint, even if that choice was
constrained by timing.
The plaintiff has not made clear whether the request for remand is based on § 1447(c) or
some other statutory basis, but remand is improper regardless. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) does not
apply here because the plaintiff has not sought “to join additional defendants whose joinder
would destroy subject matter jurisdiction ….” It follows that plaintiff cannot seek remand on the
basis that joinder of the O’Malley case defendants would defeat diversity jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is on this 9th day of December, 2011:
ORDERED that Gabriel J. Hurley’s motion to remand is DENIED.
s/ William H. Walls
United States Senior District Judge
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