GARRIS- BEY v. AURORA LOAN SERVICES LLC et al

Filing 4

OPINION and ORDER granting 3 Motion to Dismiss with prejudice, etc ***CIVIL CASE TERMINATED. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 3/1/12. (jd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

CLOSED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CELESTINE GARRIS-BEY,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No.: 11-6115 (JLL)
OPINION AND ORDER

v.
AURORA LOAN SERVICES, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Aurora Loan Services, LLC’s
(“Aurora” or “Defendant”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. Although pro
se Plaintiff Celestine Garris-Bey’s allegations are somewhat unclear, it appears she seeks to
“quiet title” to her property and argues that, as a result of defective assignments of her mortgage,
all claims to the property are void. However, as Plaintiff has already received a final judgment in
a foreclosure action, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine and the
Doctrine of Res Judicata. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.
On or about March 3, 2006, Allied Home Mortgage Capital Corporation (“Allied”)
loaned Plaintiff $386,400.00 (the “Loan”), which is evidenced by a promissory note (the “Note”).
As security for the Loan, Plaintiff granted a purchase money mortgage (the “Mortgage”) to
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for Allied, on a property
at 93 Davenport Avenue, Newark, New Jersey 07107 (the “Property”). The Note contained an
agreement that if any installment payment should remain unpaid for thirty days after the same
shall fall due, the whole principal sum, with all unpaid interest, fees, costs and advances, should,

at the option of the Note Holder or its representatives, become immediately due and payable.
Plaintiff failed to make her monthly payment on February 1, 2008 and all payments due
thereafter. Therefore Plaintiff’s loan was in default as of March 1, 2008. On May 13, 2008, the
Mortgage was assigned to Aurora. On May 22, 2008, Aurora commenced a foreclosure
proceeding in state court in New Jersey bearing docket number ESX-F-19767-08. Plaintiff failed
to file an Answer to the Complaint in this action and default was entered against Plaintiff on
November 6, 2008. Defendant obtained a final judgment in this action on October 23, 2009. A
sheriff’s sale with respect to the Property was originally scheduled for March 9, 2010 and
adjourned nine times with the sale eventually occurring on October 26, 2010. After the sale took
place, Plaintiff filed and Order to Show Cause in the state court action to extend the redemption
period for ninety days on the basis of “fraud [and] misrepresentation.” On November 17, 2010
the Honorable Kenneth S. Levy, P.J.Ch. denied Plaintiff’s application to extend the redemption
period.
New Jersey’s Entire Controversy Doctrine bars a party from raising any claim that has
been withheld from prior litigation. $ Riemer v. St. Clare’s Riverside Medical Center, 300
N.J. Super. 101, 108 (App. Div. 1997). The Doctrine is codified in

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4:30A, which provides

that failure to raise a claim “shall result in the preclusion of omitted claims” in future
proceedings. The Third Circuit has elaborated on this rule by stating that “[p]ursuant to the
Entire Controversy Doctrine.

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a plaintiff is precluded from litigating in a subsequent

proceeding both claims that it actually litigated and claims that it could have litigated in an
earlier proceeding.” Bernardsville Ouarry v. Borough of Bernardsville, 929 F.2d 927 (3d Cir.
1991). Indeed, the Entire Controversy Doctrine requires litigants to raise all affirmative claims in
a single proceeding. $ Cogdell v. Hospital Center at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 24 (1989).

However, in a mortgage foreclosure action, the Doctrine only applies to relevant claims
or counterclaims. Whether an issue is germane to the action should be construed liberally.
Leisure Technology-Northeast. Inc. v. Klingbeil, 137 N.J. Super. 353, 358 (App. Div. 1975). For
example, the court in Joan Ryno, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of South Jersey, 208 N.J. Super. 562,
570 (App. Div. 1987) held that “germane” in the foreclosure context means only that “the
counterclaim must be for a claim arising out of the mortgage foreclosed.”
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, fraud and misrepresentation by Defendant and that “diligent
research has so far revealed no connection whatsoever between [Aurora and Allied]

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Complaint ¶J 5, 14. In this case, Plaintiffs allegations are certainly germane as they pertain to
Defendants’ ability to foreclose on the property. Such claims could and should have been made
in the underlying proceeding. However, as Plaintiff never appeared in the Foreclosure Action,
she never raised these allegations. Her failure to previously assert the germane claims bars her
from raising them now. Accordingly, Plaintiffs complaint must be dismissed.
Similarly, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Doctrine of Res Jzidicata. Res Judicata will
bar a future proceeding where: 1) the judgment in the first action is valid, final, and on the
merits; 2) the parties in both actions are the same or are in privity with each other; and 3) the
claims in the second action arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the claims in the first
action. Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel and Casino. Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991). Further, in
New Jersey, “a default judgment is a valid and final adjudication on the merits and therefore has
resjudicata effect barring future litigation.” Tagayun v. Citibank, N.A., 2006 WL 5100512 *4
(D.N.J. June 9, 2006) (citing Evangelical Baptist Church v. Chambers, 96 N.J. Super. 367, 37071 (Ch. Div. 1967)).
In this case, the Final Foreclosure Judgment is a valid, final judgment on the merits. The

Defendants in this action were involved in the prior foreclosure action, either as a party to such
action or in privity with a party. Lastly, all of Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the claims in the Foreclosure Action. As such, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by
the Doctrine of Res Judicata.
Accordingly, IT IS on this /-y of March, 2012,
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety is

granted with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the court shall docket copies of this order under docket

numbers: 2:ll-cv-6116and2:11-cv-7321; anditisfurther
ORDERED that the clerk of the Court shall administratively terminate the pending

motions to dismiss in 2:ll-cv-6l16 and 2:1l-cv-732l as duplicative of this action and close the
files in these matters.
SO ORDERED.

DISTRICT JUDGE