WARD v. AVILES et al

Filing 40

OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 4/25/14. (gmd, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 11-6252 (KM)

CHARLES WARD,
Plaintiff Pro Se,

OPINION

V.

OSCAR AVILES, et al.
Defendant.

MCNULTY, D.J.:

Plaintiff Charles Ward, appearing pro Se, was an inmate at the Hudson
County Correctional Center (“the Center”) in Kearny, New Jersey. On October
23, 2011, he commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Oscar Aviles,
director of the Center, as well as two deputy directors of the Center, named as
Mr. Barker and Mr. Eady, seeking (A) injunctive relief, (B) “damages if the ends
of justice so require,” and (C) an “emergency order [forl time in the facility law
library to do research and typing.” (Complaint [ECF’ No. 11 at 6-7). His request
for an “emergency order” was denied by District Judge William J. Martini, to
whom this case was previously assigned. (See Order [ECF No. 17]).
In the Complaint, Ward makes numerous allegations concerning
allegedly unacceptable conditions at the Center, ranging from grievance
resolution procedures to cleanliness and food quality. He most prominently
alleges that he was not given adequate access to the law library at the Center.
On March 26, 2013, I granted Defendants’ motion for leave to file a
motion for summary judgment. [ECF No. 22]. Defendants’ brief and other
papers in support of summary judgment, submitted with their motion for leave
[ECF 211, were deemed filed as a motion. In the interim, however, Ward had
been transferred from the Center (where he was detained pending trial) to
South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey (where he was to serve his
sentence). [See ECF No. 31]. After numerous extensions of time, Ward filed his
opposition to the motion. [ECF No. 36]. Defendants submitted a reply, in which
they argued that Ward’s claims were moot as a result of his transfer to South
Woods. [ECF No. 39]

I agree with Defendants that Ward’s claims for injunctive relief as to
conditions at the Center were mooted by his transfer to South Woods. The
doctrine of mootness, however, would not bar claims for compensatory
damages, and so I consider them under the standards for summary judgment.
For the reasons expressed herein, I GRANT IN PART and DENY IN
PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The sole claim that I do not
dismiss here is Ward’s claim for damages arising from the alleged denial of
access to the law library at the Center.
LEGAL STANDARDS AND DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment
should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 223 F.3d 202, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe all facts and
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Boyle v.
County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). The
moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of
material fact remains. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322—23,
(1986). “[Wjith respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the
the burden on the moving party may be discharged by
burden of proof
‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
...

If the moving party meets its threshold burden, the opposing party must
present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for
trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth
types of evidence on which nonmoving party must rely to support its assertion
and
that genuine issues of material fact exist). “[UJnsupported allegations
summary judgment.” Schoch v. First Fid.
pleadings are insufficient to repel
Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Gleason v. Norwest
Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A nonmoving party has created
a genuine issue of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a
jury to find in its favor at trial.”).
...

The summary judgment standard, however, does not operate in a
vacuum. “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view
the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary
burden.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S.at 254 (1986).

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B. Plaintiff’s Claims for Injunctive Relief
It is well established that “the federal courts may not decide an issue
unless it presents a live case or controversy.” Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d
195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993). Case law firmly establishes that “[a]n inmate’s transfer
from the facility complained of generally moots the equitable and declaratory
claims.” Griffin v. Beard, 401 F. App’x 715, 716 (3d Cir. 2010) (not
precedential). In particular, after a prisoner who seeks an injunction pertaining
to prison library conditions is released, he “ha[sj no interest” in those
conditions, and the injunction he seeks can no longer provide him any
meaningful relief. See Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 206; see also Ghana v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91121, *1416 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2011)
(Simandle, C.J.).
There is a venerable, narrow exception to this rule for conditions
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. V. ICC,
219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). That exception has two requirements: “(1) the
challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable likelihood that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Abdul-Akbar,
4 F.3d at 206 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46
L.Ed.2d 350 (1975); see also Ghana, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91121 at*1416.
Here, Ward was transferred from the Center to South Woods on October
22, 2012. [ECF No. 31]. Accordingly, the injunctive relief Ward seeks with
respect to conditions at the Center, even if granted, would not benefit him.
Further, I see no reason to apply the “capable of repetition” equitable exception.
The conditions Ward complains of are not intermittent or evanescent. And
because Ward has been transferred to a long-term facility to serve the rest of
his sentence, there is no likelihood that he will ever again be affected by
conditions at the Center. Cf. Griffin, 401 F. Appx at 716; Ghana, supra.
It may be objected that the mootness doctrine may deny equitable review
of conditions at facilities which generally transfer or release their inmates
within a short period. Nevertheless, it is clear that the basic preconditions of
equitable relief are lacking here. Ward is an individual plaintiff, not, for
example, the representative of a class, and he sues for relief that will not
benefit him. I am constrained to dismiss his equitable claims as moot. The
motion for summary judgment as to all of Ward’s claims for injunctive relief is
therefore GRANTED.
C. Plaintiff’s Claims for Compensatory Damages
That leaves Ward’s claims for compensatory damages. Logically, the
same mootness considerations do not apply; if a plaintiff was damaged, and is
entitled to compensation, his transfer to a new institution will not vitiate his
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claim. Thus the case law is clear that a transfer to a new prison “does not
render moot [a] claim for monetary damages.” Griffin, 401 F. Appx at 717. The
issue, then, is whether Ward has asserted any claim for damages that can
withstand Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff’s prayer for relief asks for “damages if the ends of justice so
require.” (Complaint at 6). I liberally interpret that somewhat equivocal request
to graft a claim for money damages onto the causes of action asserted in the
Complaint. The question then becomes whether such a claim for compensatory
damages is valid as a matter of law, and whether the evidence submitted to the
Court raises a genuine issue of material fact.
1. Law library access
Ward may have a Constitutional claim regarding access to the Center’s
law library, if Defendants’ alleged denial of access had the effect of denying
Ward’s guaranteed access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351
(1996). Attaches to Ward’s Complaint are inmate request forms for additional
time in the law library to work on a discovery motion and habeas petition.
(Exhs. RQ-A, RQ-B, RQ-C to Complaint [ECF No. 1-3 at p. 41-43]). Also
attached is an inmate grievance form complaining of “inadequate access to law
library,” “insufficient time to type legal papers,” and denial of “access to the
courts.” (Exh. GRV-A to Complaint [ECF No. 1-3 at p. 29]). In his interrogatory
responses, too, he describes being turned away from the law library. (See
Dermody Cert. at Ex. B).
Ward has also suggested, if not established, an actual injury
compensable with damages. In his opposition brief, Ward explains that he was
unable to file certain court papers, including “a pro-se motion in his criminal
case before the Hudson County Superior Court, to address the Prosecution’s
failure to present exculpatory evidence to the Hudson County Grand Jury
[T]hat issue has been forever lost to the plaintiff due to his failure to raise the
issue before Hudson County Superior Trial Court... [T]he inadequacies in the
law library have caused ‘actual prejudice with respect to a contemplated or
existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a
claim.” (Pltf’s Opp. Br. at 5-6). Although a brief is not evidence, I view such pro
se filings liberally.
These allegations, if properly supported by evidence, might establish the
‘actual injury’ prong of standing. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. A prisoner has a right
of access to the courts, and has standing to sue for a violation of that right if
he can “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal
assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id. Further,
such evidence could support a “direct injury” claim under Section 1983, for
which compensatory damages may traditionally be recovered. Urbano v.
McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161, 169 (D.N.J. 1971) (“The direct injury is actionable
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per se. A deprivation of a federally protected right usually presents a case in
which damages either in money or other remedies may be awarded.
Compensatory money damages, especially in the instant case, may not
necessarily make a plaintiff whole. As a result, courts have tried to redress
plaintiffs’ injuries by other awards...”).
Defendants, problematically, do not cite any evidence that directly
refutes Ward’s assertion that he was denied access to the library. Defendant
Aviles’s certification contains a general statement of policy: “With respect to
access to the law library, inmates are granted law library access on a rotating
basis by housing location. The inmates know in advance the schedule and sign
up to be taken there. They are allowed to use the resources of the law library
and they can request copies of materials which will be copied by jail personnel
and then taken to the inmates.” (Aviles Affidavit, Ex. D to Attorney Cert., at
¶J3-4). It does not address the actual level of access that Ward received, or the
consequences for his court case. Defendants’ briefs state, correctly, that the
court.” (Def. Br.
Complaint “does not allege any prejudicial outcome in any
at 6-7). What the Complaint does do, however, is allege inadequate law library
access and attach evidence from which the reader might infer that there was a
negative impact on his case. (See Exhs. GRV-A, RQ-C to Complaint). And, at
least in his briefing, Ward comes out and says it: he lost the opportunity to
present at least one claim with respect to the failure to present exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury. (Pltf’s Opp. Br. at 5-6). The viability, or not, of such
a claim has not been briefed.
...

I have given Ward’s pro se papers a liberal interpretation. It may not be
fair to expect the Defendants to have anticipated, and responded to, this
analysis. And even assuming that there is a viable constitutional claim based
on inadequate law library access, there are significant barriers to any award of
damages: evidence of causation, for one. My denial of Defendants’ summary
judgment motion as to this claim will therefore be without prejudice.
Defendants will be granted leave to file a more focused, properly supported
motion for summary judgment as to the claim for compensatory damages
based on inadequate law library access. If there is further discovery to be taken
under the rules and procedures of this Court, Defendants may choose to delay
in renewing their motion.
2. Other claims for compensatory damages
Ward’s other allegations, construed as claims for damages, are more
general in nature. Many are in the nature of general gripes, lacking any specific
claim that he suffered compensable harm. As to these, I will grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment.
For example, Ward alleges that the Center’s grievance procedure is
inadequate, and cites his personal experience with it, but does not say how, if
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at all, he was harmed in a way that an award of damages could redress. (See
Attachment to Complaint [ECF No. 1-3] at 7-1 1). The same is true of his
allegations concerning the Center’s allegedly substandard rules and
regulations. Claims regarding poor ventilation, lack of repairs, lack of
recreation, and poor food, too, are general and untethered to any concrete
claim of harm. (Ward alleges that some other inmates, not himself, have
suffered, e.g., stomach aches from the prison food.) Ward’s claims regarding
the social worker’s alleged ineptitude, dirty linens, lack of supplies, the
overpriced commissary, and poor living spaces, are similarly general, and are
silent as to any concrete harm to Ward. (See icL at 11-24).
D. Defendants’ Additional Arguments that Plaintiff’s Action is
Barred by Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
and/or Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert two other more general defenses, which are not, or at
least not currently, suitable for resolution on summary judgment. Of course, as
to claims already dismissed, these defenses are moot, or at best, alternative
grounds. I will therefore focus on the surviving claim for damages based on
inadequate access to the law library.
First, Defendants assert that the Prison Reform Litigation Act (PLRA)
“requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies” and that “Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims should be dismissed, to the extent that he has not
exhausted his administrative remedies,” (Dfd’s Br. at 10). Defendants do not
back up these legal conclusions with facts. They fail to state, for example, what
Ward needed, but failed, to do. Ward, in contrast, has submitted as exhibits to
his complaint several letters to prison officials, grievance forms, and request
forms. See Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112-113 (3d Cir. 2002)(stating that
the PLRA “only requires that prisoners exhaust such administrative remedies
‘as are available.”). Ward’s answers to interrogatories also document his
attempts to resolve grievances internally. Ward’s interrogatory responses will
also bear the interpretation that he alleges that prison authorities thwarted or
obstructed his efforts to pursue a grievance. See id.
Lacking anything specific from Defendants, I cannot grant summary
judgment in their favor on this issue. Defendants have the “burden of proving
the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust remedies under the [PLRA}.” They
have not met that burden, particularly in light of Ward’s submission of
evidence to the contrary. See id. at 111. Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be denied as to their claim of failure to exhaust under the PLRA.
Second, Defendants assert that Ward’s claims against them are barred
by qualified immunity. They contend that “there is no evidence that any of
these persons, as supervisors” had knowledge of or acquiesced in conduct that

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they knew, or should have known, was unconstitutional. (Def. Br. at 1 113).1
As to law library access in particular, neither the briefs nor the supporting
factual submissions as to qualified immunity are well developed. As noted
above, this may be attributable, at least in part, to the unclear formulation of
the issues.
Having moved for summary judgment on these grounds, Defendants
have the burden of demonstrating that they are entitled to the shield of
qualified immunity. See Rouse v. Plantier, 987 F.Supp. 302, 314-15 (D.N.J.
1997)(”Defendants have not sustained their burden of demonstrating that they
should not be charged with knowing the legal significance of their conduct.”).
The plaintiff must simply “com[e] forward with some competent evidence that
[the official] engaged in conduct that violated a clearly established federally
secured right of the plaintiffs and that was a proximate cause of the alleged
injury.” Good, 891 F.2d at 1097. That is enough to shift the burden of proof to
the defendant officials. The issue is “whether the defendant official[s] engaged
in the conduct alleged to have violated a clearly established right.” Brown v.
Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990)(emphasis added); see also
Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, 891 F. 2d 1087, 1092-1097 (3d Cir.
1989). This requires assessment, in light of the evidence, of “whether the legal
norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time
of the challenged actions.” Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1109-1110 (3d
Cir. 1990) (citing Mitchel v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (asking whether there was a violation of a
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”); and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987) (“the contours of the right [allegedly violated] must be sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right.”)).
Plaintiff has introduced evidence tending to show a potential violation. In
response, Defendants have not been specific. Their involvement with denial of
library access, if any, is unexplored. And critically, there is little to no evidence
or argument concerning whether they knew or should have known that
enforcing the limited library access policy could interfere with a clear
constitutional right of access to the courts. It may be that discovery, or
affidavits and briefing more specifically tailored to this issue, are required.
Thus, on the qualified immunity issue, too, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment will be denied, but without prejudice.

Defendants seem also to be claiming that they as supervisors had nothing to do with
whatever violations may have occurred. That is a distinct point, and it may present a
factual issue.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The claims for injunctive relief
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as moot. The claims for compensatory
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, too, will be DISMISSED, except for the claims
arising out of alleged denial of access to the law library. As to that claim of
alleged denial of access to the law library, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. An appropriate order follows.

KNU
United States District Judge
Date: April 25, 2014

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