WILLIAMS V. FORT LEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al
Filing
33
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 12/23/13. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 2:11-06314 (WJM)
DEONCA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
CONSOLIDATED OPINION
v.
FORT LEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendants.
Civ. No. 2:12-03853 (WJM)
DEONCA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
FORT LEE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
and FORT LEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendants.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Pro se Plaintiff Deonca Williams filed this action against Fort Lee Board of
Education (improperly pleaded as Fort Lee Public Schools) (“FLBE”) and Fort Lee
Education Association (“FLEA,” and together with FLBE, “Defendants”), alleging
various wrongdoings in connection with her brief employment at Fort Lee High School.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. There was no oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b).
1
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED, and Williams’s Complaints are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I.
BACKGROUND
FLBE hired Williams to teach Spanish at Fort Lee High School for the 2010-2011
school year. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. D, ECF No. 27-1.) The Director of Human
Resources of the Fort Lee Public School District provided Williams with new employee
information, and Plaintiff attended orientation with the other newly hired employees.
(Cert. of Counsel, Ex. K ¶¶ 4-9, ECF No. 27-1.) On September 7, 2010, the first day of
school, administrators determined that, due to overcrowding issues, Williams would need
to switch classrooms with a history teacher during third period. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I
¶¶ 4-8, ECF No. 27-1.) These types of changes to classroom assignments were not
uncommon at Fort Lee High School and were made at the commencement of each school
year. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶ 4-8, Ex. H ¶ 4, Ex. L ¶ 5, ECF No. 27-1.) Here, the
switch was necessary because Williams had a larger classroom than the history teacher
and, during third period, had a much smaller class. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶ 8, ECF No.
27-1.) According to Priscilla Church, the school principal, Williams initially resisted the
change. However, Williams eventually moved her class to the smaller room. (Cert. of
Counsel, Ex. I ¶ 9, ECF No. 27-1.)
The next day, September 8, 2010, at 4:22 a.m., Williams sent an email to several
school officials stating: “I regret to inform you that effective today I am unable to change
rooms during period [three].” (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. E, Ex. I ¶ 10, Ex. L ¶¶ 3-4.) Later
that morning, at the end of second period, Principal Church and Officer Vincent Buda
2
were conducting an administrative tour of the school and saw that students from both
Williams’s Spanish class and the history class were gathered around Williams’s
classroom. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶ 12, Ex. J ¶ 4.) Principal Church quickly proceeded
inside, where Williams informed Principal Church that she would not be moving to the
smaller room. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶ 13-16.) Principal Church states that during this
discussion, which took place in front of the students, Williams became angry, belligerent,
and accusatory. (Cert of Counsel, Ex. I; ¶ 9.)
Principal Church eventually convinced Williams to leave her classroom to discuss
the issue. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶ 18.) At Williams’s request, FLEA President Gary
Novosielski then spoke privately with Williams. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶ 16-17, Ex. L
¶¶ 3-10.) He recommended that she comply with the request to switch rooms. (Cert. of
Counsel, Ex. I ¶ 16-17, Ex. L ¶¶ 3-10.) Superintendent Raymond Bandlow then arrived
and attempted to talk to Williams, who was on her cellphone. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶
17-18, Ex. H ¶ 5, Ex. J ¶¶ 7-8.) Williams refused to hang up her cellphone to speak with
him. (Cert. of Counsel Ex. I ¶ 18, Ex. H ¶ 5, Ex. J ¶¶8, Ex. L, ¶ 11.) After several
attempts to speak with Williams, Dr. Bandlow asked her to leave the building and told
her that that he planned to recommend terminating her employment for insubordination.
(Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶ 18-20, Ex. J ¶¶ 8-11, Ex. L ¶ 12.) At Dr. Bandlow’s request,
Officer Buda then escorted Williams out of the building. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶ 1820, Ex. J ¶¶ 8-11, Ex. L ¶ 12.) Plaintiff had her handbag with her when she left and was
told to contact Principal Church to set up an appointment to retrieve her belongings from
3
her classroom. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶ 20-21.) She never set up an appointment to
retrieve her belongings. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶ 20-21.)
In a letter dated that same day, Dr. Bandlow informed Williams that she was being
placed on paid administrative leave and that he would recommend terminating her
employment effective October 14, 2010 at the next FLBE meeting. (Cert. of Counsel,
Ex. F, Ex. H ¶ 9.) FLBE subsequently terminated Williams’s employment for
insubordination, and she received pay until October 14, 2010. (Cert. of Counsel, Ex. G.)
Plaintiff filed the instant action (Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-06341) on October 27,
2011, and a related action (Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-03853) concerning the same issues
and facts on June 20, 2012. The Court consolidated these actions on July 24, 2012.
(Consolidation Order, July 24, 2012, ECF No. 20.) Williams’s litany of allegations
include claims that she was “singled out for adverse treatment (i.e. an assassination plot
etc.),” that the room change was a “scheme” intended to force her to “break the law” by
leaving students unattended, and that she was “almost murdered by one of [Defendant’s]
police officers.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 1, 9, ECF No. 1.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides for summary judgment “if the
pleadings, the discovery [including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file] and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32223 (1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual
4
dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and is
material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court considers all
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
Initially, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party
has met this burden, the nonmoving party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise,
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. The opposing party must
do more than just rest upon mere allegations, general denials, or vague statements.
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). Rather, to withstand a proper
motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and
affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 256–57.
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move for summary judgment on “any and all claims” that Williams
pleads against them in this matter. (Def.’s Letter Rep. Br. 1, ECF No. 31.) The Court
will first consider the claims alleged in the Complaint filed on October 27, 2011 (the
“First Complaint”). The Court will then turn to the remaining issues from the Complaint
filed June 20, 2012 (the “Second Complaint”), and Williams’s Opposition to the Motion
for Summary Judgment (the “Opposition Brief”).
5
A. The First Complaint
The First Complaint alleges six counts:
(1) Count One: Violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
(2) Count Two: Defamation;
(3) Count Three: Theft of Property;
(4) Count Four: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
(5) Count Five: Records Tampering and Providing False Statements; and
(6) Count Six: Attempted Murder and Terroristic Threats.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts. The Court will address each
count in turn.
i. Count One: The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Plaintiff first alleges discrimination, wrongful termination, retaliation, conspiracy,
and terroristic threats in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et
seq., 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. These allegations boil down to claims for discriminatory
discharge and retaliation.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the United States
Supreme Court established the basic framework for the allocation of the burden of proof
in an employment discrimination case. This framework applies to both discriminatory
discharge and retaliation cases. See id.; Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342
(3d Cir. 2006). Under this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a
prima facie case of either discriminatory discharge or retaliation. Id.; see also Robinson
v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Nelson v. Upsala College, 51
F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07
(1993).
6
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory – or in a retaliation case, nonretaliatory – reason for the discharge. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07; Moore, 461 F.3d at
342. If the defendant can do so, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the defendant's articulated reason is actually a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.
Jones, 198 F.3d at 410. To defeat summary judgment in a discrimination case, the
plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, which could lead a
reasonable fact finder to disbelieve the employer's articulated reasons, or believe that a
discriminatory reason was likely a motivating or determinative cause for the plaintiff’s
discharge. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). In a retaliation case, the
plaintiff must produce evidence “both that the employer's proffered explanation was
false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.”
Moore, 461 F.3d at 342 (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d
Cir. 1997)). This “places a difficult burden on the plaintiff.” Kautz v. Met–Pro Corp.,
412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment on
Title VII claim if she can demonstrate either that: (1) the plaintiff is unable to establish a
prima facie case; or (2) if plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff cannot
produce sufficient evidence of pretext to rebut the defendant's asserted reason for the
discharge. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764 (3d Cir. 1994); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701,
706–07 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990).
Defendants, who incorrectly briefed this issue as a matter of New Jersey law and
then proceeded to misstate New Jersey case law, argue that Williams failed to establish a
7
prima facia case under Title VII because there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for her discharge. Whether there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory,
non-retaliatory reason for discharge is not part of the prima facia case for either
discriminatory discharge or retaliation. Rather, this element comes into play after the
plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facia case, when the burden of production shifts to the
defendant. Williams has made no cognizable legal argument in response to Defendants’
arguments. For the purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that Williams has
established a prima facia case for her Title VII claims, and consider Defendants’
arguments at the proper stage of the analysis.
The Court finds that Defendants have set forth evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for Williams’s discharge. Williams repeatedly
refused to abide by the directives of her supervisors to relocate her class, causing
disruption for the students affected by the change. She then refused to talk to the
Superintendent of Schools, Dr. Bandlow, when he attempted to discuss the situation with
her. She was thus fired for insubordination, a reason that is legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-retaliatory. See Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708 (finding that
insubordination is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharge).
The burden now shifts to Williams to show that this reason is mere pretext for
discrimination or retaliation. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-04; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. She has
failed to do so. The summary judgment record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever to
discredit Defendants’ proffered reason for Williams’s discharge. Williams has provided
8
no affidavits, depositions or other relevant evidence to support her claims. Her mere
unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (stating that once the
moving party has properly supported its motion, “its opponent must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts”). Thus, because William
has not produced any evidence to rebut Defendant’s asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for her discharge, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on her Title VII claims.
ii. Count Two: Defamation
In Count Two of her First Complaint, Williams alleges defamation. To establish
defamation under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) made a
false and defamatory statement about the plaintiff, (2) communicated the statement to a
third party, and (3) had a sufficient degree of fault. Mangan v. Corporate Synergies Grp.,
Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing Singer v. Beach Trading Co., 876
A.2d 885 (N.J. App. Div. 2005)).
Defendants argue that Williams has not produced any evidence showing that they
made a statement about her. The Court agrees. In support of her claim, Plaintiff points to
an article on NorthJersey.com about her case. (Pl.’s Brief in Opp’n Ex. C, ECF No. 303.) Defendants did not write, and were not quoted in, that article. (Id.) In fact, the article
states that a FLBE representative was asked about the pending litigation with Williams
and declined to comment. (Id.) Defendants are thus entitled to summary judgment on
Williams’s defamation claim.
9
iii. Count Three: Theft of Property
Williams also asserts a claim for theft on the basis that Defendants did not issue
her a paycheck on September 8, 2010 and illegally seized her property from her
classroom. Defendants claim that Williams received pay until October 14, 2010, the date
on which her employment ended, and never set up an appointment to retrieve her class
materials. Defendants have submitted sworn affidavits supporting their claims. (See
Cert. of Counsel, Ex. I ¶¶ 20-21, Ex. G.) Williams has not submitted a single affidavit,
deposition or other piece of evidence supporting her allegations. Therefore, the Court
will grant summary judgment to Defendants on this claim.
iv. Count Four: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Williams next asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
New Jersey, a plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress must establish
intentional and outrageous conduct by the defendant, proximate cause, and severe
distress. Buckley v. Trenton Saving Fund Soc., 544 A.2d 857, 863 (N.J. 1988). A
plaintiff must prove conduct by the defendant “so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Id. (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46, comment d). The conduct must be so atrocious that it is “utterly
intolerable in a civilized community.” Id.
Williams has produced no evidence showing that Defendants engaged in
outrageous conduct. Moreover, Defendants’ affidavits show that Williams was given
numerous opportunities to comply with the reasonable request to switch classrooms with
10
another teacher for one period of the day. She repeatedly refused. Accordingly,
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
v. Count Five: Records Tampering and Providing False
Statements
In Count Five, Williams argues that Defendants tampered with records of a phone
call that she made to 911 on the morning of September 8, 2010. Williams does not
identify a legal basis for this claim. The Court, which could identify no civil cause of
action for tampering with records, construes her claim as alleging violations of 18 U.S.C
§ 1519 (criminalizing falsification of records in federal and bankruptcy proceedings), N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-4 (criminalizing falsifying or tampering records), N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:28-7 (criminalizing tampering with public records). Williams further argues that
Defendants made misleading statements to the Department of Labor in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001.
Plaintiff’s claims in Count Five arise from alleged violations of criminal statutes.
These criminal statutes do not provide a private right of action for civil damages. See
Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007); R.J. Gaydos Ins. Agency, Inc.
v. Nat'l Consumer Ins. Co., 773 A.2d 1132, 1142 (N.J. 2001) (“New Jersey courts have
been reluctant to infer a statutory private right of action where the Legislature has not
expressly provided for such action.”). The Court will thus summary judgment to
Defendants on each of these claims.
vi. Count 6: Attempted Murder and Terroristic Threats
11
Finally, Williams alleges that Defendants attempted to murder her and subjected
her to terroristic threats. The Court has uncovered no precedent supporting a civil action
for either attempted murder or terroristic threats under either federal or New Jersey law.
Similar to the claims in Count 5, these are criminal offenses that do not provide a basis
for civil liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 1113; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:5-1; N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:12-3. Furthermore, even assuming that a civil cause of action exists, Williams has
provided absolutely no evidence supporting her allegations. Accordingly, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it
pertains to the First Complaint, and the First Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Court will next address the remaining allegations from William’s
Second Complaint and Opposition Brief.
B. Remaining Issues
Williams’s Second Complaint alleges six Counts based on the same facts as the
First Complaint. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Counts alleging
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress for the reasons stated above. In the three remaining Counts, Williams
alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, hate crimes, and civil conspiracy.
Because there is no legal or factual basis for any of Williams’s allegations, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment on each of these claims. First, Sections 241 and 242,
as well as the statutes governing hate crimes, are criminal statutes that lack private rights
of action. See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(b); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3; Shahin v. Darling,
12
606 F. Supp. 2d 525, 539 (D. Del. 2009); Thompson v. Eva's Vill. & Sheltering Program,
Civ.A. 04-2548JAP, 2006 WL 469938 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2006) aff'd, 243 F. App'x 697 (3d
Cir. 2007). Furthermore, Williams has provided no evidence supporting any underlying
wrong that could provide the basis for a conspiracy. See Earl v. Winne, 101 A.2d 535,
544 (N.J. 1953) (“The general rule is that a conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a
civil action unless something is done which, without the conspiracy, would give a right of
action.”). The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
regarding the Second Complaint, and the Second Complaint is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Finally, in her Opposition Brief, Plaintiff discusses two additional causes of
action, one for violations of the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.
34:19–1, et seq., and the other for fraudulent conspiracy to hire. Plaintiff did not plead
these theories in either her First or Second Complaint. Thus, they are not bases for
liability in this case, and the Court need not address them further.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED and the First Complaint and the Second Complaint are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: December 23, 2013
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?