HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. et al v. SMITH & NEPHEW, INC.

Filing 103

OPINION (Markman Hearing). Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 7/9/13. (sr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. and
STRYKER IRELAND LTD.,
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 11-CV-6498
11-CV-6499
11-CV-6500
11-CV-6511

v.
(SDW) (MCA)
DEPUY ORTHOPAEDICS, INC.,
Defendants.
HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. and
STRYKER IRELAND LTD.,
Plaintiffs,

OPINION (Markman Hearing)

v.
July 9, 2013
WRIGHT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY,
INC.,
Defendant.
HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. and
STRYKER IRELAND LTD.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SMITH & NEPHEW, INC.,
Defendant.
HOWMEDICA OSTEONICS CORP. and
STRYKER IRELAND LTD.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ZIMMER, INC.,
Defendant.

1

WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before the Court are the briefs and supporting materials of Plaintiffs Howmedica
Osteonics Corporation (“Howmedica”) and Stryker Ireland Limited (“Stryker”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) and Defendants DePuy Orthopaedics, Incorporated and DePuy Products,
Incorporated (“DePuy”); Wright Medical Technology, Incorporated (“Wright”); Smith &
Nephew, Incorporated (“S&N”); and Zimmer, Incorporated (“Zimmer”) (collectively
“Defendants”) regarding the request for a patent claim construction pursuant to Local Patent
Rule 4.5(a).
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(a).
Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1400(b). This Court held a Markman hearing
on May 2, 2013 and May 9, 2013 regarding patent claims in Plaintiffs’ U.S. Patent No.
6,475,243 (“the ’243 Patent”) and Defendants’ U.S. Patent No. 6,610,097 (“the ’097 Patent”). 1
After carefully considering the parties’ written and oral arguments regarding nine claims in
dispute as to the ’243 Patent and fourteen claims in dispute as to the ’097 Patent, this Court has
construed several claim terms, as discussed below.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2
This matter relates to two patents involving surgical implants used in hip replacement
procedures—the ’243 and ’097 Patents. In the simplest terms, hip replacement surgery involves
removing a diseased hip joint and replacing it with an artificial joint, called a prosthesis. There
are two components of a hip prosthesis—the acetabulum (socket) and the femoral head (ball).
The acetabular component consists of a shell designed to fit the acetabulum and a bearing (or
insert) designed to secure into the shell, as illustrated below.
1

Four individual cases relating to this matter—11-cv-6498, 11-cv-6499, 11-cv-6500, and 11-cv-6511—were
consolidated sua sponte under the lead case—11-cv-6498—on May 9, 2013.
2
Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the parties’ submissions.

2

Shell

Pelvic Bone
Bearing

The ’243 Patent addresses acetabular cup technologies featuring a dual-locking
mechanism and the capability to accommodate different types of bearings (i.e. a soft
polyethylene bearing and a hard ceramic or metal bearing). On May 22, 1998, the original
parent application of the ’243 Patent was filed. On November 5, 2002, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued the ’243 Patent. On December 7, 2010, the PTO issued
an Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate confirming the validity of the ’243 Patent. Howmedica
owns the ’243 Patent and Plaintiffs are joint assignees of this patent.
The ’097 Patent addresses prosthetic cup assembly which includes components
possessing a self-locking taper and associated method. The ’097 Patent’s parent application was
filed on March 15, 2000. On September 25, 2001, the PTO issued a restriction requirement
directing DePuy to choose between different sets of claims. DePuy chose to proceed with claims
covering two-piece assemblies and not three-piece systems. The amended patent application
dated June 24, 2002 reflects DePuy’s intent to claim two-piece systems. The ’097 Patent was
issued in 2003. DePuy is the owner and assignee of the ’097 Patent.
On November 4, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging patent infringement and
indirect patent infringement of the ’243 Patent. On February 13, 2012, Defendants filed
counterclaims seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement as to the ’243 Patent,
3

declaratory judgment of invalidity as to the ’243 Patent, and declaratory judgment of rights as to
the ’243 Patent. DePuy filed a counterclaim seeking patent infringement of the ’097 Patent and
indirect infringement of the ’097 Patent. On November 19, 2012, the parties filed a Joint Claim
Construction and Prehearing Statement for the ’243 Patent and the ’097 Patent. A Markman
hearing was held before this Court on May 5, 2013 and May 9, 2013.
LEGAL STANDARD
Markman Hearing and Claim Construction
Patent claim construction is a matter of law for the court.

Markman v. Westview

Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995). During interpretation of a claim, courts
should initially look to intrinsic evidence, namely “the patent claims, the specification and the
prosecution history if in evidence.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Immunex, 86 F. Supp. 2d 447,
448 (D.N.J. 2000). “[I]ntrinsic evidence is the most significant source of the legally operative
meaning of disputed claim language.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582
(Fed. Cir. 1996). “The court should presume that the terms in the claim mean what they say,
and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of
claim terms.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448. A person of ordinary skill in the
art “is deemed to read the claim term . . . in the context of the entire patent.” Phillips v. AWH
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d
1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We cannot look at the ordinary meaning of the term . . . in a
vacuum. Rather, we must look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the written description
and the prosecution history.”) (citation omitted); see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
If the intrinsic evidence alone will not resolve the ambiguity, the court may rely on
extrinsic evidence, which includes expert testimony, treatises, dictionaries and articles. Bristol-

4

Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49. Extrinsic evidence may not be used to vary or
contradict the meaning established by the intrinsic evidence. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318-19,
1324. “The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the
patent’s description of the invention will be . . . the correct construction.” Id. at 1316.
A key aspect of claim construction is to assist the jury in understanding complicated
language and concepts. See Encap LLC v. Oldcastle Retail, Inc., No. 11-cv-808, 2012 WL
2339095, at *9 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2012) (“Claim construction is not intended to allow for
needless substitution of more complicated language for terms easily understood by a lay jury.”);
see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(“[M]erely rephrasing or paraphrasing the plain language of a claim by substituting synonyms
does not represent genuine claim construction.”); AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., Inc., 239
F.3d 1239, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“It is critical for trial courts to set forth an express
construction of the material claim terms in dispute, in part because the claim construction
becomes the basis of the jury instructions, should the case go to trial. It is also the necessary
foundation of meaningful appellate review.”) (internal citation omitted); High Point SARL v.
Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-cv-02269, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155932, at *35 (D. Kan. Jan. 24,
2011) (“A court may . . . refuse to construe a commonly understood term if the proposed
construction would create ambiguity or confuse the jury.”).
DISCUSSION
The parties dispute the meanings of twenty-three claim terms or phrases with respect to
the ’243 Patent and the ’097 Patent.

The disputed terms in the ’243 Patent are (1)

intraoperatively; (2) system; (3) kit; (4) assembly; (5) selection of the internal bearing member;
(6) juxtaposed with/location of the recess relative to the taper; (7) selectable for effective

5

selective securement; (8) the bearing member; and (9) language relating to securement tapers.
The disputed terms in the ’097 Patent, in essence, are: (1) between and cavity; 3 (2) configured
with and (ii); (3) engage and connection; 4 (4) inner surface; (5) anti-rotation recesses and antirotation protrusions; 5 (6) upper bearing rim; and (7) bearing.
The ’243 Patent
a. “intraoperatively”
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree on the meaning of “intraoperatively” as used in claims
41 and 53 which explain that a bearing can be secured within a shell intraoperatively. 6 For
instance, claim 41 recites, in pertinent part, “whereby the first and the second of the internal
bearing members each is selectable for effective selective axial securement within the cavity of
the shell member to complete the acetabular cup assembly intraoperatively.” U.S. Patent No.
’243, Re-exam., Cl. 41 (issued Dec. 7, 2010).
Plaintiffs define “intraoperatively” as “during an operation.”

(Plaintiff’s Opening

Markman Brief (“Pls. Op. Br.”) at 9.) Defendants argue that “intraoperatively” means “in an
operating room during surgery.” (Defendant’s Opening Markman Brief (“Defs. Op. Br.”) at 10.)
Both parties’ proposed constructions capture the principle that “intraoperatively” means “during
an operation” or “during surgery.” The real dispute pertains to whether “intraoperatively”
requires that the surgery or operation occur in the operating room. Defendants include the
limitation that the surgery occur “in the operating room” while Plaintiffs do not. (Defs. Op. Br.
10-11; Pls. Op. Br. 9-10.)

In support of their argument, Defendants contend that

“during prosecution [Plaintiffs] clearly and repeatedly emphasized that the intraoperative
3

The disputed language including “between” and “cavity” relate to six different claim terms.
The disputed language including “engage” and “connection” relate to two different claim terms.
5
The disputed language in connection with “anti-rotation recesses” and “anti-rotation protrusions” relate to two
different claim terms.
6
The parties agree that “intraoperative” and “interoperative” have the same meaning in the ’243 Patent. (Markman
Hrg. Tr. at 22-23 (May 2, 2013).)
4

6

selection and assembly of the acetabular cup occurs ‘in the operating room.’” (Defendants’ Joint
Responsive Markman Brief (“Defs. Resp. Br.”) at 9 (citing to Dkt. No. 74, Ex. 2 at
STRTRID00006676-78, Ex. 3 at STRTRID00006997-7016, Ex. 4 at STRTRID00007340; Dkt.
No. 73 at 11-13).) Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs concede in their opening brief that “an
operating room is undoubtedly where most operations occur.” (Defs. Resp. Br. 10 (citing to Dkt.
No. 76 at 9).)
During interpretation of a patent claim, courts should initially look to intrinsic evidence.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448. “The court should presume that the terms in
the claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary
and accustomed meaning of claim terms.” Id. Nothing in the patent or prosecution history
indicates that the term “intraoperatively” requires that an operation take place specifically in an
operating room. See U.S. Patent No. ’243 (issued Nov. 5, 2002). Defendants point to the
language that “valuable time in the operation room is thus saved” in reference to
“intraoperatively.” (Defs. Op. Br. 12 (citing STRTRID00007340).) However, the focus of this
language is that time is saved because surgeons can choose which bearing member is appropriate
during the surgery.

(Plaintiffs ’243 Patent Markman Powerpoint Presentation (“Pls. ’243

Markman PP”) at 18; Pls. Op. Br. 10.) This does not serve to modify “intraoperatively” such
that it requires that the procedure take place in an operating room. Furthermore, many places can
serve as “an operating room” while not technically being an operating room, such as an office.
Based on the intrinsic evidence, in construing “intraoperatively,” this Court finds that it is
not necessary to include a locale limitation.

A combination of the parties’ proposed

constructions is appropriate here. Accordingly, this Court concludes that “intraoperatively”
means “during a surgical procedure.”

7

b. “system”; “kit”; “assembly”
The next three terms—system, kit, and assembly—will be discussed consecutively
because their definitions are hierarchal in nature and directly affect one another. The parties
agree that these terms should have different meanings as both Plaintiffs and Defendants propose
different constructions for “system,” “kit” and “assembly.” See Nystrom v. TREX Co., Inc., 424
F.3d 1136, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“When different words or phrases are used in separate claims,
a difference in meaning is presumed.”). Additionally, both parties acknowledge the following
hierarchy: (1) “system” is broader than “kit” or an “assembly”; (2) a “kit” is narrower than
“system” but broader than an “assembly”; and (3) an “assembly” is narrower than a “kit” or a
“system.” (Defs. Resp. Br. 18; Pls. Op. Br. 11-17; Markman Hrg. Tr. at 36-37 (May 2, 2013).)
“system”
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree on the construction of “system” as used in claim 41.
Plaintiffs contend that “system” means “a group of related parts.” (Pls. Op. Br. 13.) Defendants
define a “system” as “a set of related component parts.” (Defs. Resp. Br. 18.) On its face, the
key difference between the parties’ proposed constructions is that Defendants include the word
“component” as part of their definition of “system” whereas Plaintiffs do not. (Id.)
Plaintiffs contend that inclusion of the word “component” in the definition of “system” is
potentially confusing because “the required parts of the system can include a plurality of
different bearings . . . [b]ut these bearings do not work together and are not components of one
another.” (Pls. Op. Br. 14.) Further, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]o the extent ‘component’ is meant
to convey that the shell and bearing are indeed parts of the system, such verbiage is redundant
and unnecessary.” (Id. at 15.) Defendants, however, acknowledge that they “have not assigned
any special or misleading meaning to the word ‘components.’” (Defs. Resp. Br. 17.) Indeed,

8

Defendants’ argument supports Plaintiffs’ construction that “[a] ‘system’ is a group of related
parts.” (Defs. Op. Br. 19.) Furthermore, Defendants assert that “the primary dispute relates to
the differences between ‘system,’ ‘kit,’ and ‘assembly.” (Defs. Resp. Br. 17.)
As previously discussed, in interpreting a patent claim, courts should initially look to
intrinsic evidence. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448. In this instance, the term
“system” appears only in the preamble of the claim. U.S. Patent No. ’243, Re-exam., Cl. 41
(issued Dec. 7, 2010). The specification does not provide any insight into the meaning of the
term “system.” 7 (See Id.) Additionally, the parties appear to agree that “system” should be
defined as either a group or set of related parts. Accordingly, this Court finds that “system” is “a
set of related parts.”
“kit”
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree on the construction of “kit of component parts” as it
appears in claim 27. Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of “kit” is “a set of parts from which a
subset can be selected to create an assembly.”

(Pls. Op. Br. 16.)

Defendants’ proposed

construction of “kit” is “a set of claimed component parts packaged together.” (Defs. Op. Br.
16.) The parties do not dispute that “[a] kit includes various parts, such as a shell and bearings
made of different materials.” (Defs. Resp. Br. 16.) The parties’ main dispute is that Defendants
define “kit” as parts that are “packaged together” whereas Plaintiffs essentially refer to “kit” as a
“subset” of related parts.
As previously discussed, in interpreting a patent claim, courts should initially look to
intrinsic evidence. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448. In support of their
proposed construction, Plaintiffs point to claim 27’s preamble language which teaches that “[t]he
7

The term “system” was added during re-examination of the patent and did not originally appear in the ’243 Patent.
(See U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 41-48 (issued Dec. 7, 2010); see Defs. Resp. Br. 18. (citing to Dkt. No. 74,
Ex. 4 at STRTRID00007318).)

9

kit . . . includes parts that can be used to assemble a bearing and a shell assembly.” (Pls. Op. Br.
16.) Plaintiffs note that the ’243 Patent specification does not reference the word “packaged” or
any analogous language. (See id. at 17.)
Defendants contend that their proposed construction of “kit” aligns with the plain and
ordinary meaning of the word along with how it is used throughout the ’243 Patent. (See Defs.
Op. Br. 16.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ proposed construction ignores the specification
which teaches that “key aspects of a ‘kit’ . . . [include that] the components are ‘made available,’
‘provided,’ or ‘furnished’ to the user.” (Id. at 17 (citing U.S. Patent No. ’243 at col.5:6-22,
col.7:65-8:1, col.9:19-21 (issued Nov. 5, 2002)).) Defendants are also concerned about the
differentiation between “kit” versus “system” and “assembly” and argue that their proposed
construction effectively takes into account the necessary distinctions. (See Defs. Resp. Br. 17.)
Because the intrinsic evidence is ambiguous, it is proper for this Court to consult
extrinsic evidence such as dictionary definitions. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at
448. Plaintiffs provide, for example, one definition of “kit” from Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary
as “a set of parts to be assembled or worked up.” (Pls. Op. Br. 17 (citing App. D9).) Plaintiffs
note that based on dictionary definitions, the inclusion of “packaging” is not required for a “kit.”
(See id.)

One of the definitions that Defendants point to is from Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary (1993) which defines “kit” as “a collection of equipment and often
supplies typically carried in a box or bag.” (Defs. Op. Br. 17 (citing Ex 29).)
Based on the intrinsic evidence, this Court finds that nothing in the patent language or
prosecution history requires that the concept of parts being “packaged together” be included in
the definition of “kit.” To the contrary, as both parties agree, the specification supports that a
“kit” includes parts—such as a shell and various bearings—to create a bearing and shell

10

assembly.

Additionally, the extrinsic evidence also demonstrates that parts need not be

“packaged together” in order to establish a “kit.”
Accordingly, based on the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, this Court finds that a “kit” is
“a subset of related parts.” Defining “kit” in this way adequately construes it more narrowly
than “system.” 8

Moreover, this construction would assist a lay jury in understanding the

difference between a “kit” and a “system.” See Encap LLC, 2012 WL 2339095, at *9 (“Claim
construction is not intended to allow for needless substitution of more complicated language for
terms easily understood by a lay jury.”).
“assembly”
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree on the construction of an “assembly” as it appears in
claims 20, 27, 41 and 53. (Pls. Op. Br. 11; Defs. Op. Br. 13.) Plaintiffs’ proposed construction
of “assembly” is “a collection of parts that can be fitted together as a unit.” Defendants’
proposed construction of “assembly” is “a set of related component parts combined to form a
completed structure.” (Defs. Op. Br. 13.) The heart of the parties’ dispute is whether an
“assembly” refers to related parts that can be combined—as proposed by Plaintiffs—versus a set
of related parts that have already been combined—as proposed by Defendants. (Id. at 14.)
First, this Court will look to the intrinsic evidence in construing the term “assembly.”
See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448. Both parties argue that the intrinsic
evidence supports their respective positions. Defendants point out that claim 27 relates to “[a]
kit of component parts for assembling an acetabular cup assembly” and recites that “the one and
the another of the internal bearing members each is selectable for effective selective securement
within the shell member to complete the acetabular cup assembly[.]” (See Defs. Op. Br. 14; U.S.

8

Specifically, inclusion of the word “subset” in defining a “kit” makes it narrower than a system. For instance, a
“system” is “a set of related parts,” while a “kit” is a “subset of related parts.”

11

Patent No. ’243, Cl. 27 (issued Nov. 5, 2002) (emphasis added).) Claims 40 and 41 contain
similar language. 9 Defendants note that the language of claim 53—a method claim—references
the “completion of the acetabular cup assembly.” 10 (Defs. Op. Br. 14; U.S. Patent No. ’243,
Reexam., Cl. 53 (issued on Dec. 7, 2010).) Based on the claim language, Defendants contend
that an “assembly” is the completed structure that results from securing a bearing member within
the shell. (See Defs. Op. Br. 15.) Defendants also argue that the patent specification supports its
proposed construction. (See id.) For instance, Defendants point to figures where the “assembly”
is complete.” (See U.S. Patent No. ’243, Fig.1 (issued Nov. 5, 2002); Id. (citing to U.S. Patent
No. ’243 at col.3:47-49 (issued Nov. 5, 2002)).) Lastly, Defendants contend that the prosecution
history supports that an “assembly” is a completed structure. (See Defs. Op. Br. 15.) The
relevant language in the prosecution history is as follows: “the present invention presents an
acetabular shell and bearing system in which a surgeon is able to select any one of a plurality of
available bearing members for assembly with a shell member and then assemble the selected
bearing [member] with the shell member to establish an acetabular cup assembly in the operating
room.” (Id. (citing Ex. 2 at STRTRID00006676 (emphasis added)))
On the other hand, Plaintiffs argue that claim 20’s preamble does not require that a shell
and bearing be combined to create an “assembly.” 11 (Pls. Op. Br. 12.) Plaintiffs argue that an
assembly exists when a bearing member is available “for selective securement” within a shell, as

9

U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 40, 41 (issued Dec. 7, 2010).
Plaintiffs concede that in claim 53, the inventors expressly claimed that an “assembly” refers to an “actual
securement of the parts.” (Plaintiffs Responsive Markman Brief (“Pls. Resp. Br.”) at 7.)
11
The preamble of claim 20 states:
An assembly having a shell member and an internal bearing member for selective securement
within the shell member interoperatively, the internal bearing member being selected from a
plurality of bearing members having different characteristics, including different securement
characteristics, such that the acetabular cup assembly selectively is provided with characteristics
corresponding to the characteristics of the selected internal bearing member, the shell member
comprising:
U.S. Patent No. ’243, Cl. 20 (issued Nov. 5. 2002).
10

12

noted in the preamble language of claim 20. (Id.) Plaintiffs also contend that the specification
supports their proposed construction.

(See id.)

Plaintiffs identify several figures in the

specification—including figures 10, 13, 20, and 24—as examples of an “assembly” where the
parts are not combined. (Id. (citing to U.S. Patent No. ’243, Fig. 10, 13, 20, 24. (issued Nov. 5.
2002).) Additionally, Plaintiffs refer to figure 22, as reproduced below:

U.S. Patent No. ’243, Fig. 22 (issued Nov. 5, 2002). This figure is “an exploded elevational
view, partially sectioned, showing another embodiment including an assembly in which a
bearing component is to be assembled with a securing component.” (U.S. Patent No. ’243 at
col.4:32-35 (issued Nov. 5, 2002); Pls. ’243 Markman PP at 38 (emphasis added).) According to
Plaintiffs, an “assembly” refers to related parts that are unassembled as well as assembled
together.

(Pls. Resp. Br. 6.) (noting that “[o]nce the pieces are combined, they still are

considered ‘an assembly’”) (emphasis in original).
This Court finds that Plaintiffs’ argument that an “assembly” exists whether or not the
parts are combined may be misleading or confusing to a jury.

Specifically, it blurs the

distinction between a “kit” and “assembly” as both terms can potentially include parts that can be
fitted together as a unit.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ contention that the words “for selective

13

securement” in the claim language modify the term “assembly” such that an “assembly” exists so
long as a bearing member is available “for selective securement” is misguided. The terms “for
selective securement” appear to describe the functionality of the bearing rather than the scope or
nature of the assembly. Additionally, as Defendants point out, an “exploded” view—as shown in
figure 22 above—is designed to illustrate the component parts of an assembly and how they fit
together to form an assembly. (See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. 1.84(h)(1) (explaining that exploded views
“show the relationship or order of assembly of various parts”); Defendants ’243 Patent Markman
Powerpoint Presentation (“Defs. ’243 Markman PP”) at 127.)

Lastly, Plaintiffs point to

instances in the specification describing an acetabular cup “assembly assembled” to argue that
the word “assembled” would be superfluous if an assembly consisted of combined parts. This
argument is not persuasive. For example, it would not be improper to note that “a chair [that is]
assembled” in referencing a complete, assembled chair. Similarly, noting an “assembly [that is]
assembled” does not necessitate that an assembly be unsecured and uncombined parts.
Based on the intrinsic evidence, this Court concludes that an “assembly” does require that
the shell and bearing be secured together. Because neither party’s construction fully captures the
essence of an “assembly,” a combination of the parties’ proposed constructions is appropriate
here. This Court finds that an “assembly” is “a collection of related parts that have been
combined to form a completed unit.”
c. selection of the internal bearing member
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree on the construction of language relating to the
selection of the internal bearing member as it appears in claims 20 and 27. 12 The disputed
language is as follows:

12

The parties originally disputed the language in claim 53 as well. However, at the Markman hearing, defense
counsel indicated that the parties agreed that claim 53 need not be construed. (Markman Hrg. Tr. at 78 (May 2,

14

(1) claim 20’s description that “the internal bearing member being selected from a
plurality of bearing members having different characteristics, including different
securement characteristics, such that the acetabular cup assembly selectively is
provided with the characteristics corresponding to the characteristics of the
selected internal bearing member”; and
(2) claim 27’s description that “a plurality of bearing members having different
characteristics, including different securement characteristics, such that the
acetabular cup assembly selectively is provided with the characteristics
corresponding to the characteristics of a selected one of the internal bearing
members.”
(Pls. Op. Br. 18; Defs. Op. Br. 20.) Plaintiffs contend that this Court does not need to construe
these terms. (Pls. Op. Br. 19.) Defendants propose the following construction with respect to
the language relating to selection of a bearing member: “requires a surgeon to select one bearing
member from a plurality of bearing members with different securement characteristics.” (Defs.
Op. Br. 20.) The center of the parties’ dispute is whether the disputed language requires the
“capability” for selection—as Plaintiffs argue—versus active selection of a particular bearing
member—as Defendants argue.
This Court will look to the intrinsic evidence in construing the language relating to
selection of the internal bearing member. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
In support of their proposed claim construction of the language relating to selection of a bearing
member, Defendants rely on intrinsic evidence, namely the claim language. Defendants cite to
the language of claim 20 which states that “the internal bearing member being selected from a
plurality of bearing members having different characteristics, such that the acetabular cup
assembly selectively is provided with the characteristics corresponding to the characteristics of
the selected internal bearing member.” (Defs. Op. Br. 20-21) (emphasis added). Defendants
argue that this requires a surgeon to start with a plurality of different bearings and end up
choosing a single bearing to be secured within the shell. (Id. at 21.) Defendants reason that if a
2013); Defs. ’243 Markman PP at 136-37.) Thus, for purposes of this Opinion, briefing and arguments relating to
claim 53’s language relating to selection of a bearing member will not be addressed.

15

surgeon only had one bearing available, claim 20 would not be infringed upon because the
surgeon is not “selecting” from a plurality of bearing members. (Id.) Alternatively, Defendants
contend that if a surgeon has a plurality of bearings but does not actually “select” one to be
secured within the shell, there would be no infringement of claim 20. (Id.) Accordingly,
Defendants contend that claim 20 requires active selection of a single bearing from a plurality of
bearings. (Id.) Similarly, Defendants argue that the language of claim 27—“the acetabular cup
assembly selectively is provided with the characteristics corresponding to the characteristics of a
selected one of the internal bearing members”—requires active selection of an internal bearing
member. (Id.)
Plaintiffs argue that no construction is necessary here because the claim language at issue
is readily understandable by a person of ordinary skill in the art. (Pls. Op. Br. 19); Finjan, Inc. v.
Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (indicating that the Court should
give effect to the claim’s clear language and reject the proposed construction which would
unjustifiably narrow the claim’s scope). The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that the claim
language provides that a bearing is capable of being selected, but does not actually need to be
selected. (Pls. ’243 Markman PP at 43-44.) In support of this argument, Plaintiffs point to
specification language which recites that “any one of which bearing sockets then being capable
of securement in place in the shell member interoperatively.” (Pls. ’243 Markman PP at 43
(citing U.S. Patent No. ’234 at col.5:11-21 (issued Nov. 5, 2002)).) Plaintiffs also point to the
prosecution history which states, in pertinent part, that “any one of a plurality of bearing
members having different characteristics . . . can be selected for interoperative securement within
a single shell member.” (Pls. ’243 Markman PP at 44 (citing Feb. 13, 2002 Amendment at
STRTRID00007006).) Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants improperly seek to define

16

whole paragraphs rather than pointing to particular words or terms requiring construction. (Pls.
Op. Br. 19.) Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ proposed construction is overly narrow in
requiring a surgeon to select a bearing. (Id. at 20.)
In light of the intrinsic evidence, this Court finds that the language relating to the
selection of a bearing member does not require construction and should be given its plain and
ordinary meaning as Plaintiffs suggest. The words in the claim themselves appropriately and
adequately describe what is required for selection of the internal bearing member. Nothing in the
claim terms is ambiguous. Nothing in the claim terms requires that this Court read into the
disputed language “active selection” of a bearing member. Additionally, Defendants concede
that the disputed claim language does not identify an actor (i.e. a surgeon) to make the selection
of a bearing. 13 (Markman Hrg. Tr. at 78 (May 2, 2013); Defs. Resp. Br. 22.) Accordingly, there
is no reason to construe the disputed language to include a surgeon.
d. “juxtaposed with”/location of the recess relative to the taper
The parties dispute the claim language relating to the location of the recess relative to the
taper, including the words “juxtaposed with.” 14 This language is used in claims 20, 27, 41, and
53 as follows:
1. claim 20: “the first and second securing structures being juxtaposed with one
another and placed at relative locations such that the effectiveness of each of
the first and second securing elements is maintained while in the presence of
the other of the first and second securing elements”;
2. claim 27: “the first and second securing elements being juxtaposed with one
another and placed at relative locations such that the effectiveness of each of

13

This Court notes Defendants’ argument that “the intrinsic record clearly and repeatedly indentifies the surgeon as
this actor.” (Defs. Resp. Br. 22.) Nevertheless, the absence of the requirement of a “surgeon” in the plain claim
terms indicates that no such restriction should be included in this Court’s construction of the disputed claim
language.
14
The parties do not fully agree as to which language is in dispute. Plaintiffs contend that the terms “juxtaposed
with” and “effectiveness” require claim construction while Defendants point to several phrases including
“juxtaposed with one another,” “placed at relative locations,” “such that the effectiveness of each,” and “is
maintained while in the presence of the other.” (Pls. Op. Br. 22; Defs. Op. Br. 24.)

17

the first and second securing elements is maintained while in the presence of
the other of the first and second securing elements”;
3. claim 41: “the securement recess and the internal securement taper being
juxtaposed with one another and placed at relative locations such that the
effectiveness of each of the securement recess and the internal securement
taper is maintained while in the presence of the other of the securement recess
and the internal securement taper”; and
4. claim 53: “the securement recess and the internal securement taper are in
juxtaposition with one another and placed at relative locations such that the
effectiveness of each of the securement recess and the internal securement
taper is maintained while in the presence of the other of the securement recess
and the internal securement taper.”
(U.S. Patent No. ’243, Cl. 20, 27 (issued Nov. 5, 2002); U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 41,
53 (issued Dec. 7, 2010).) Plaintiffs argue that the disputed language should be construed as “the
first and second securing structures being positioned nearby one another and placed at relative
locations such that the ability of each of the first and second securing elements to secure a
bearing in the shell is maintained while in the presence of the other of the first and second
securing elements.” (Pls. Op. Br. 21.) Defendants contend that the disputed language should be
construed as “the recess is essentially midway along the taper such that the effectiveness of each
is not compromised.” (Defs. Op. Br. 23.)
This Court will first look to the intrinsic evidence in construing the disputed claim
language. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448. Defendants point to all of the
figures in the ’243 Patent and argue that each figure displays the recess within and essentially
midway along the taper. (Defs. Op. Br. 25.) Additionally, Defendants note that the patent
specification includes the following language regarding the relationship of the two locking
mechanisms (the taper and the recess):
Seating surface 110 includes an upper end 112 and a lower end 114 and is divided
by the recess 62 into an upper segment 116 and a lower segment 118 (see FIG. 4).
By placing the recess 62 essentially midway between the upper end 112 and the
lower end 114, engagement of the seating surfaces 106 and 110 . . . is facilitated
by virtue of the locking being accomplished along segments 116 and 118 having
18

generally the same, and therefore maximized, axial length. In this manner, the
effectiveness of the seating surface 110 in assuring appropriate alignment between
the sleeve 100 and the shell member 22 as the sleeve 100 is inserted into the shell
member 22 and in subsequently attaining the desired locking engagement with
seating surface 106 is not compromised by the presence of the recess 62.
(Defs. Op. Br. 26 (citing Ex. 3 at STRTRID00007171 (lines 12-25) (emphases added); Ex. 1 at
7:8-23).) Defendants note that this language relating specifically to the relationship between the
claimed securing recess and taper was not included in the parent application. (Id. at 25 (citing
Ex. 2 at STRTRID00006607-33).) Defendants also focus on Figure 4 of the ’243 Patent—as
depicted below—which was amended to demonstrate the similar length of the upper and lower
segments of the taper.

(Id. at 26 (comparing Ex. 2 at STRTRID00007146 with Ex. 2 at

STRTRID00006636).)

According to Defendants, “[t]he importance of this disclosure regarding how the locations of the
taper and the recess ensure the effectiveness of alignment and locking is underscored by
[Plaintiffs] including the disputed language in the asserted independent claims of the ’243 Patent
at the same time these changes were made to the specification.” (Defs. Op. Br. 26-27 (citing Ex.
3 at STRTRID00007192 (Claim 20), STRTRID00007195 (Claim 27)).)
To the contrary, Plaintiffs argue that a person of ordinary skill in the art would interpret
the disputed terms “juxtaposed with” or “in juxtaposition with” to mean that the first and second
19

securing elements are “positioned nearby” each other in the shell cavity. (Pls. Op. Br. 22.)
Plaintiffs contend that the terms “placed at relative locations” supports the proposed construction
that the securing elements are near each other and not specifically located midway along the
taper. (Id. at 22-23.)
With respect to “effectiveness,” Plaintiffs contend that it should be construed as the
“ability” of each of the securing mechanisms to perform their intended function of “securing the
bearing in the shell.” (Pls. Op. Br. 23.) Other than referencing a dictionary definition, Plaintiffs
do not further provide any explanation as to this aspect of their proposed construction.
In delving deeper into the parties’ proposed constructions, it is helpful to consider the
several substantive arguments that the parties raise with respect to their adversaries’
constructions. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ proposed construction improperly focuses only
on construing “juxtaposition” through use of dictionary definitions.

(Defs. Op. Br. 29.)

Furthermore, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to provide clarification or boundaries of the
claims. (Id.)
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ proposed construction renders several words in dispute
meaningless. (Pls. Op. Br. 23.) Additionally, Plaintiffs rely on Phillips to argue that Defendants
commit the “cardinal sin” of claim construction in attempting to read in a limitation from the
preferred embodiment that is articulated in the specification. (Id. (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1320); see, e.g., U.S. Patent No. ’243 at col.7:5-23 (issued Nov. 5, 2002).) Plaintiffs argue that
the recess being placed midway along the taper is a preferred embodiment of the ’243 Patent and
construing the disputed claim language with this restriction would be improper. (Pls. Op. Br.
24.)
Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ proposed construction violates the

20

doctrine of claim differentiation. (Pls. Op. Br. 24 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344
F.3d 1234, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).) Claim differentiation is a rule of construction that “presumes
that there is a difference in scope among the claims of a patent.” Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v.
Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1479-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Under this doctrine, narrow claim
limitations cannot be read into broader claims to escape infringement. See e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs
note that dependent claims 25 and 32 rely on independent claims 20 and 27, respectively. (Pls.
Op. Br. 24.)

According to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ construction improperly construes the

dependent claims as having the same scope as the independent claims. (Id.)
As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that it is necessary to construe more than just the
terms “juxtaposed with” or “in juxtaposition” in order to clarify the disputed claims for the jury.
The disputed language in claims 20, 27, 41, and 53 imposes three requirements regarding the
location of the securing elements.

First, the first and second securing structures “are in

juxtaposition/being juxtaposed” with one another. Second, the securing structures are “placed at
relative locations such that the effectiveness of the securing elements is maintained.” Third, they
must be “while in the presence of the other” securing elements of the bearing member. A
construction of the disputed language should take into account all of these requirements.
Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of “juxtaposed/juxtaposition” as “positioned nearby” is
broad and vague. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ proposed construction does not serve to clarify the
disputed language. Instead, it provides a synonym to “juxtaposed/juxtaposition,” which is not
helpful for purposes of claim construction. See C.R. Bard, 388 F.3d at 863. Importantly,
Plaintiffs’ proposed construction does not address all of the components requiring construction in
the disputed language. See Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

21

(noting that “claims are interpreted with an eye toward giving effect to all terms in the claim”).
For instance, the jury should be equipped with a solid understanding of the positional
relationship between the securing elements—the recess and the taper—through a construction of
the disputed language.
Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments, it is not improper for this Court to construe
“chunks of claims” for the purposes of claim construction. A court’s construction does not
effectively “swap out” the disputed words in a claim. Rather, the purpose of claim construction
is to provide the jury “with instructions adequate to ensure that the jury fully understands the
court’s claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.” Sulzer Textil
A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Moreover, there is no precedent
indicating that construction of terms of art within claims has to fit neatly within respective
claims. Indeed, as long as construction of claim terms is consistent with use of the words by the
inventor, such construction is proper. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
With respect to Plaintiffs’ “preferred embodiment” argument, Plaintiffs’ reliance on
Phillips is misplaced. In Phillips, the Federal Circuit rejected the contention that if a patent
describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited
to that embodiment. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. In the instant matter, the only embodiment
discussed in the context of the ’243 Patent is where the recess is placed “essentially midway”
along the taper. Although Plaintiffs argue that the securement features can be placed in a host of
“relative locations,” there is no support for this contention in the specification or other intrinsic
evidence. For instance, as DePuy argued at the Markman hearing, “the specification does not
disclose any alternative locations of the taper/recess that are ‘next to,’ ‘abutting,’ or

22

‘overlapping’ with each other.” (Defs. ’243 Markman PP at 44.) In essence, the patent teaches
that the effectiveness of the securing elements is maintained when the recess is placed essentially
midway along the taper.
Additionally, with respect to claim differentiation, as the Supreme Court has held,
“[c]laim differentiation is a guide, not a rigid rule. If a claim will bear only one interpretation,
similarity will have to be tolerated.” Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,
404 (1967); see also Seachange Int’l, Inc. v. C-COR Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(noting that claim differentiation is “not a hard and fast rule and will be overcome by a contrary
construction dictated by the written description or prosecution history”).

As previously

articulated, the specification does not provide any additional configurations that would be
effective in securing the elements in the presence of one another. Although there are dependent
claims in this instance, the lack of any other configurations that would similarly maintain the
effectiveness of the securing elements overcomes the doctrine of claim differentiation. See O.I.
Corp. v. Tekmar Co., Inc., 115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Although the doctrine of claim
differentiation may at times be controlling, construction of claims is not based solely upon the
language of other claims; the doctrine cannot alter a definition that is otherwise clear from the
claim language, description, and prosecution history.”) (citing Hormone Research Found., Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1576 n. 15 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson and Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A]ny presumption created by the
doctrine of claim differentiation ‘will be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the
written description or prosecution history.’”) (citing Seachange Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d at 1369).

23

Based on the intrinsic evidence, this Court finds that the disputed language related to the
location of the recess relative to the taper including “juxtaposed with” means “the recess is
essentially midway along the taper such that the effectiveness of each is not compromised.”
e. “bearing member”
Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree on the construction of “bearing member” as it appears
in claim 20. The terms “bearing member” appear in claim 20 in the following context:
wherein the bearing member includes an external securing surface, and the second
securing surface includes an internal securing surface, the external securing
surface and the internal securing surface having complementary tapered
configurations for interlocking in response to seating engagement of the
complementary tapered configurations; and
wherein the bearing member includes a rib projecting from the bearing member,
and the first securing element includes a recess in the shell member for receiving
the rib of the bearing member, the tapered configuration of the internal securing
surface extends between an upper end and a lower end.
(U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 20 (issued Dec. 7, 2010) (emphasis added); Pls. Op. Br. 27;
Defs. Op. Br. 37.) Plaintiffs contend that “bearing member” as used in claim 20 should be
construed as “bearing member that could be chosen.” (Pls. Op. Br. 27.) Defendants contend that
“bearing member” as used in claim 20 should be construed as “a single bearing member
including both a complementary interlocking taper structure and a rib projecting from the
bearing member.” (Defs. Op. Br. 37-38.)
First, both parties rely on intrinsic evidence in support of their proposed constructions of
“bearing member.” Specifically, both parties refer to the language in claim 20’s preamble which
recites:
20. An assembly having a shell member and an internal bearing member for
selective securement within the shell member interoperatively, the internal
bearing member being selected from a plurality of bearing members having
different characteristics, including different securement characteristics, such that
the acetabular cup assembly selectively is provided with characteristics

24

corresponding to the characteristics of the selected internal bearing member, the
shell member comprising . . .
(U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 20 (issued Dec. 7, 2010); Defs. Op. Br. 38; Pls. Op. Br. 27.)
Based on the language in the preamble, Defendants contend that claim 20 refers to a single
internal bearing member that is actively selected. (Defs. Op. Br. 38.) Furthermore, Defendants
assert that the disputed claim language—namely the two “wherein clauses”—requires that the
bearing member have both a tapered outer surface and a rib to lock into a recess. (Id.) In support
of this construction, Defendants focus on the term “the” before “bearing member” to argue that
the selected bearing member must have all of the securing elements recited in both clauses. 15
U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 20 (issued Dec. 7, 2010).
To the contrary, Plaintiffs argue that “a person of ordinary skill in the art reading claim
20 would understand that the bearing member of the claimed assembly can be selected from
different bearing members that each have different securement characteristics.” (Pls. Op. Br.
28.) Plaintiffs further contend that consistent with the alternate bearings described repeatedly
throughout the specification, the disputed language in the “wherein” clauses describes these
different bearings and their securement mechanisms. (Pls. Resp. Br. 23.) The first clause
describes a bearing member with an external securing surface and a taper mechanism—such as a
ceramic or metal bearing. (Id. at 23-24.) The second clause describes a bearing member with a
rib mechanism—such as a polyethylene bearing. (Id. at 23-24.)
Defendants accurately couch this dispute as “whether [Plaintiffs] should be permitted to
read the phrase ‘that could be chosen’ into the claim, or whether the claim language should be
construed as written.”

(Defs. Op. Br. 37.)

15

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ proposed

Defendants rely on Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp. which states that “[i]t is a rule of law well established
that the definite article ‘the’ particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of limitation as opposed to the
indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an.’” (Defs. Resp. Br. 37 (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp.,
316 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted)).)

25

construction has no basis in the claim language as it improperly seeks to insert the words “could
be chosen.” (Id. at 38-39.) This Court agrees with Defendants that the words “could be chosen”
should not be read into the claim. Additionally, this Court agrees with Defendants that the claim
language should be construed as written. Defendants’ proposed construction, however, does not
construe the claim language as written and is inconsistent with the existence of the alternate
bearings described repeatedly throughout the specification.

See U.S. Patent No. ’243, at

col.5:11-21, 55-60, col.6:12-14, col.9:11-19, col.10:43-46 (issued Nov. 5, 2002). Ironically,
Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the claim language—that the “wherein” clauses describe alternative
bearings—appears to comport with the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim language as it
would be understood by an ordinary person skilled in the art. The first “wherein” clause
describes a bearing member including an external hard surface (i.e. ceramic or metal bearing).
The second “wherein” clause describes a bearing member with a rib projecting securement
mechanism (i.e. polyethylene bearing). Nothing in the patent itself, briefing, or arguments
suggests that what was intended with these clauses was a single bearing member with both a
taper mechanism and rib mechanism. Indeed, no embodiment using both securing mechanisms
is described in the ’243 Patent. 16 Instead, a reasonable understanding of the claim language
suggests that a single bearing member is ultimately chosen from a plurality of bearing members,
such as one with a taper mechanism or one with a rib mechanism.
Rather than provide clarification to the plain language, the parties’ constructions
needlessly complicate the otherwise understandable claim language. Thus, in light of the claim
language and this Court’s analysis, “bearing member” does not need to be construed and should
be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
16

The Court notes that DePuy’s arguments regarding construction of the terms “selective . . . for effective selective
securement” further establish this point. (DePuy Supplemental Opening Markman Brief (“DePuy Suppl. Op. Br.”)
at 2-3, 3 n. 1)

26

f. “selectable . . . effective selective securement”
Plaintiffs and DePuy disagree on the construction of “selectable . . . for effective selective
securement” as it appears in claims 20, 27, and 41. 17 The remaining Defendants—Wright, S&N,
and Zimmer—assert that these terms do not require construction.

Plaintiffs argue that

“selectable . . . for effective selective securement” should be construed as “can be chosen to be
secured by its securement features so as to remain within the shell cavity.” 18 DePuy argues that
“selectable . . . for effective selective securement” should be construed as “requires that the
selected bearing be effectively secured by one securing structure or the other, but not both.” It
appears that the parties’ proposed constructions are substantially similar. The key dispute is that
DePuy’s construction includes the limitation that both securing elements cannot be selected
whereas Plaintiffs’ proposed construction does not. (Pls. Op. Br. 26.)
Plaintiffs argue that the disputed terms should be considered in the context of claim 20’s
language as a whole. Claim 20 recites:
the first and second securing structures being juxtaposed with one another and
placed at relative locations such that the effectiveness of each of the first and
second securing elements is maintained while in the presence of the other of the
first and second securing elements, whereby the one and the another of the
internal bearing members each is selectable for effective selective securement
within the shell member to complete the acetabular cup assembly
interoperatively[.]
U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 20 (issued Dec. 7, 2010). Plaintiffs argue that in this context,
alternate bearings can be chosen to be secured within the shell. (Pls. Op. Br. 25-26.) According
to Plaintiffs, nothing in the claim language requires that only one type of bearing be selected for
17

The disputed language in claim 20 is as follows: “is selectable for effective selective securement within the shell
member.” (U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 20 (issued Dec. 7, 2010); Pls. Op. Br. 25; DePuy. Suppl. Op. Br. 1.)
The disputed language in claims 27 and 41 is as follows: “is selectable for effective selective axial securement
within the cavity of the shell member.” (U.S. Patent No. ’243, Cl. 27 (issued Nov. 5, 2002); U.S. Patent No. ’243,
Reexam., Cl. 41 (issued Dec. 7, 2010); Pls. Open. Br. 25; DePuy Suppl. Op. Br. 1.)
18
Plaintiffs note that they would be amenable to joining Defendants Zimmer, Wright, and S&N’s position that the
terms not be construed at all and instead be given their plain and ordinary meaning. (Pls. Op. Br. 26 n. 11; Pls.
Resp. Br. 20.)

27

securement as Defendants suggest. (Id. at 25-26.) In other words, Plaintiffs assert that “the
language does not prevent additional support of another securement mechanism.” (Id. at 26.)
DePuy argues that the word “selective” requires that one bearing be effectively secured
by one securing structure or the other, but not both. (DePuy Suppl. Op. Br. 2.) Furthermore,
DePuy asserts that the specification does not describe or propose any type of bearing that
includes both types of securement mechanisms—taper and rib securements. (Id. at 3.) DePuy
also relies on the prosecution history of the ’243 Patent in support of its proposed construction.
Specifically, DePuy notes that the Rule 1.131 Declaration submitted during reexamination of the
’243 Patent by Nicholas Dong—one of the inventors of the ’243 Patent—does not describe a
bearing that is secured with both a rib and a taper.

(Id. at 4 (citing Ex. C at ¶5,

STRTRID00007671-7672, Ex. D at ¶¶ 5, 7-9, STRTRID00007699-7701).) Additionally, DePuy
relies on remarks made in the March 16, 2010 Amendment which clarify that “whereby the
selected bearing member would include a securing element compatible with one of the first or
second securing elements in the shell member.” (Defs. ’243 Markman PP at 5.)
In reviewing the language in claim 20, the context for the disputed language is helpful,
namely “whereby the one and the another of the internal bearing members each is selectable for
effective selective securement within the shell member to complete the acetabular cup assembly
interoperatively.” The plain and ordinary meaning of this language suggests that “the one”
bearing and “the another” bearing members are each selectable for effective securement within
the shell member. However, nothing in the plain language indicates that more than one bearing
member can be selected at the same time for securement. In fact, the briefing and Markman
hearing made clear that only one bearing member can be secured in a shell at any given time and
because there is no intrinsic evidence indicating that any bearing member engages both securing

28

elements (taper and rib), it would follow that only one securement element is engaged by each
bearing member. Thus, only one securement element is “selectable” for effective securement.
To the extent that one bearing is chosen and not actually secured, it can be argued that the
alternative bearing member could still be chosen for securement. This, however, would not be
effective “selective” securement.
Accordingly, this Court finds that it would be instructive to a jury and for purposes of
clarifying the terms—as understood in the patent claim language and specification—to include
the concept that only one bearing can be chosen for securement at any given time. Neither
party’s proposed construction effectively captures this concept. Thus, a combination of the
parties’ proposed constructions is appropriate here. This Court finds that “selectable [for]
effective selective securement” means that it “requires that the selected bearing be effectively
secured by one securing structure or the other, but not both simultaneously.”
g. Language relating to securement tapers
Plaintiffs and Defendants—with the exception of S&N—disagree about the language
relating to the securement tapers as it appears in claims 20, 27, 41, and 53. The disputed
language appears in the following context:
1. Claim 20: “the second securing element having a second securing structure
compatible with the securement characteristics of at least another of the
plurality of internal bearing members”;
2. Claim 27: “the second securing element having a second securing structure
compatible with the securement characteristics of at least another of the
plurality of internal bearing members”;
3. Claim 41: “the internal securement taper extending axially and being
compatible with the outer securement taper of the at least one second internal
bearing member of the plurality of internal bearing members to axially secure
the second internal bearing member within the shell member”; and
4. Claim 53: “the internal securement taper is compatible with the outer
securement taper of the second internal bearing member of the plurality of
internal bearing members to axially secure the second internal bearing
member with the shell.”
29

(U.S. Patent No. ’243, Reexam., Cl. 20, 41, 53 (issued Dec. 7, 2010); U.S. Patent No. ’243, Cl.
27 (issued Nov. 5, 2002).) Defendants propose the following construction for the disputed
language: “requires that the internal taper of the shell mates with the external taper of a sleeve
secured to and separate from the bearing member.” (Defs. Op. Br. 31.) Plaintiffs do not offer a
construction for these terms and argue that the ordinary meaning applies. (Pls. Op. Br. 29.)
S&N agree with Plaintiffs that no construction is required for these terms. (Id.; Defs. Op. Br. 30
n. 11.)
In support of their proposed construction, Defendants assert that the ’243 Patent explains
that the tapered securing surface of the shell is compatible with a bearing only by using an
intervening sleeve. (Defs. Op. Br. 32.) Further, Defendants point to the prosecution history
where Plaintiffs described the acetabular shell as capable of accepting plastic, ceramic, or metal
liners where a “titanium adapter” or sleeve is necessary to use the ceramic or metal liner. (Id. at
33 (citing Ex. 4, at SRTRID00007699-700.).) Additionally, Defendants argue that the patent
acknowledges that the hard bearings (i.e. ceramic or metal) do not work with the “snap-fit
connection” into the shell. (Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. ’243 at col.5:32-41, col.6:20-25 (issued
Nov. 5, 2002)).) The patent further explains that a securing sleeve is needed to facilitate the
“tapered” connection for hard bearings. (Defs. Op. Br. 33.) Additionally, Defendants note that
the patent describes three embodiments using a tapered connection and all of them illustrate a
bearing secured to the shell with an intervening sleeve. (Id. at 34 (citing U.S. Patent No. ’243 at
col.6:20-7:10, col.7:24-8:5, col.10:31-11:30 (issued Nov. 5, 2002).))
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ proposed construction which includes the word “sleeve”
has no basis in the claim language. (Pls. Op. Br. 30.) Specifically, Plaintiffs note that the word
sleeve does not appear anywhere in the asserted claims. (Id.) Plaintiffs further argue that “the
30

asserted claims recite the ‘two piece’ acetabular cup assemblies described in the patent as
comprising a shell component and a bearing component.” (Id.) Plaintiffs also contend that
“‘three-piece’ assemblies are expressly claimed in unasserted claims of the ’243 Patent.” (Id.)
At bottom, Plaintiffs argue that the disputed language should be given its plain and ordinary
meaning.
It is appropriate for this Court to first consult the intrinsic evidence related to the disputed
language. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 448. This Court agrees with Plaintiffs
that the word “sleeve” does not appear in the patent itself. However, a review of the patent
specification reveals that the inventor contemplated that the use of a “metallic securing member”
or a sleeve to assemble hard bearings to the shell. U.S. Patent No. ’243 at col.2:1-18, col.8:6-14
(issued Nov. 5, 2002) (identifying securing sleeve as part of “the present invention”).
Importantly, based on documents disclosed during the prosecution of the patent, Stryker
conceded that the contemplated ceramic or metal liner could only be assembled with the shell by
using adaptor sleeves. (See Dkt. 79, Ex. 4, at SRTRID00007699-701).) In essence, Plaintiffs are
attempting to claim a two-piece assembly using a tapered connection without a sleeve; however
there is no evidence that Stryker contemplated a hard bearing being secured to the shell without a
sleeve.

Indeed, at the Markman hearing, when asked about whether Plaintiffs had an

embodiment where a hard bearing could be secured to the shell without a sleeve, Plaintiffs
counsel conceded that none existed. (Markman Hrg. Tr. at 174 (May 2, 2013).)
Accordingly, this Court concludes that the disputed claim language is construed to mean
“requires that the internal taper of the shell mates with the external taper of a metallic securing
member (i.e. sleeve) secured to and separate from the bearing member.”

31

The ’097 Patent
Plaintiffs and DePuy seek claim construction for fourteen disputed claim terms in
connection with the ’097 Patent.

These terms will be addressed categorically as follows:

location terms, connection terms, anti-rotation terms, bearing terms, and typographical errors.
Location Terms
Plaintiffs and DePuy dispute the meaning of “between” and “cavity” as they appear in the
context of six claim terms. These six claim terms relate to the location of elements relative to
either the “shell cavity” or the “bearing cavity.” The disputed terms include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Claim 1: “a female taper between said locking recess and said shell cavity”;
Claim 1: “a male taper between said locking member and said bearing cavity”;
Claim 9: “a female taper between said anti-rotation recesses and said shell cavity”;
Claim 9: “a male taper between said anti-rotation protrusions and said bearing
cavity”;
5. Claim 14: “a locking recess disposed between said anti-rotation recesses and said
shell cavity”; and
6. Claim 14: “a locking member disposed between said anti-rotation protrusions and
said bearing cavity.”
U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 1, 9, 14 (issued Aug. 26, 2003). These six claim terms—namely the
construction of “between” and “cavity”—will be addressed in tandem as they present common
issues to be resolved uniformly.
Plaintiffs argue that the term “between” should be construed as “located in the space that
separates.” (Pls. Op. Br. 8.) Plaintiffs state that their proposed construction is supported by the
intrinsic record and they identify Figures 8-12 for support. (Id.) Plaintiffs also reference a
dictionary definition which defines “between” to mean “in the time, space, or interval that
separates.” (Id (citing Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, App. E4).)
Plaintiffs argue that the word “cavity” should be construed as “the interior volume
defined by the shell/bearing.” (Pls. Op. Br. 8.) Plaintiffs contend that the claim language

32

supports this construction. For instance, the claim language requires “a shell defining a shell
cavity” and a “bearing defining a bearing cavity.” (Id. at 8-9 (citing U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 1
(issued Aug. 26, 2003).) Additionally, Plaintiffs reference Figure 11 illustrating that “the cavity
is the space inside the bowl of the bearing labeled as item 316 below.”

U.S. Patent No. ’097, Fig. 11 (issued Aug. 26, 2003). Plaintiffs note that the bearing fits in the
entire interior volume of the shell and would not fit “into” something smaller. (Pls. Op. Br. 9.)
Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the cavity should be construed as “the interior volume defined by the
shell/bearing.”
DePuy does not offer a specific construction for “between” and instead argues that the
disputed language should include “is located, in an axial direction” before the word “between.”
(DePuy’s Opening Markman Brief (“DePuy Op. Br.”) at 11.) Additionally, DePuy contends that
“cavity” should be construed to mean “the apex of the shell.” (See id.) According to DePuy,
their proposed construction is based on the location of the connection mechanisms, and the way
that the term “cavity” is used in that particular context. (DePuy’s Responsive Markman Brief

33

(“DePuy Resp. Br.”) at 8.) DePuy states that the patent specification supports this proposed
construction. For instance, DePuy points to following language in the ’097 Patent:

The shell 300 possesses a plurality of tangs 310 located at an upper rim 312 of the
shell 300. Each of the plurality of tangs 310 extends inwardly toward the center of
the shell 300 as shown in FIG. 8. The plurality of tangs 310 define a plurality of
anti-rotation recesses 313 which are evenly spaced around the upper rim 312 of
the shell 300 as shown in FIG. 8. The shell 300 also includes an annular recess
314 which is positioned immediately below the plurality of tangs 310 (see FIGS.
8 and 9). The shell 300 also includes a female taper 315 which is defined in an
inner surface of the shell as shown in FIG. 9. The female taper 315 extends
around the entire periphery of the cavity 304 of the shell 300. Moreover, the
female taper 315 extends axially for a distance D1 near its upper rim 312 as
shown in FIG. 9.
(DePuy Op. Br. 11-12 (citing Ex. A, U.S. Patent No. ’097 at col.6:64 – col.7:11 (issued Aug. 26,
2003)).) DePuy argues that in simpler terms, this language means that the anti-rotation recesses
are near the upper rim of the shell; the annular recess is below that moving toward the apex of
the shell; and the female taper extends around the entire periphery of the cavity. (DePuy Op. Br.
12.) DePuy also cites to figures in support of their proposed construction. For instance, DePuy
argues that in Figure 9, as reproduced below, the female taper is located in an axial direction
between the locking recess and the apex of the shell. (Id.)

34

Anti-rotation
recesses

Locking recess
Female Taper

Apex

(DePuy Op. Br. 13; U.S. Patent No. ’097, Fig. 9 (issued Aug. 26, 2003).)
First, Plaintiffs’ proposed construction of “between” as “located in the space that
separates” is not rooted in intrinsic evidence and is merely a dictionary definition. In this
instance, it is not appropriate to reference dictionary definitions or any other extrinsic evidence
because the claim language is not ambiguous. See Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1585 (noting that
it is unnecessary and, hence, legally incorrect to rely on extrinsic evidence when the specification
clearly and unambiguously defines disputed claim term). The intrinsic evidence—namely the
claim language—can guide this Court effectively in construing “between.”

Furthermore,

Plaintiffs’ construction of “between” is vague and may confuse, rather than aid, a jury.
Similarly, DePuy’s proposed construction of the disputed claim language “is located, in an axial
direction” would not serve to aid the jury. Reading the disputed claim language in various
contexts, this Court finds that construction of the claim term “between” is not necessary because

35

its plain and ordinary meaning is clear. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with DePuy that reading
in the words “is located” before “between” would clarify the disputed language for a jury.
Next, Plaintiffs’ construction of cavity being the entire volume of the shell is broad and
does not necessarily comport with the intent of the inventors based on the specification.
Plaintiffs state that their proposed construction is supported by the intrinsic record, but fail to
articulate anything particular in the claim language or patent specification for support other than
pointing to various figures. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ proposed construction would not aid the
jury in further understanding or clarifying the disputed language. Likewise, DePuy’s proposed
construction of “cavity” unnecessarily complicates the meaning of the word. This Court finds
that “cavity” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning and does not require construction.
Accordingly, this Court finds that the disputed language shall be given the following
meanings. First, as used in claim 1, “a female taper between said locking recess and said shell
cavity” means “a female taper is located between said locking recess and said shell cavity.”
Second, as used in claim 1, “a male taper between said locking member and said bearing cavity”
means “a male taper is located between said locking member and said bearing cavity.” Third, as
used in claim 9, “a female taper between said anti-rotation recesses and said shell cavity” means
“a female taper is located between said anti-rotation recesses and said shell cavity.” Fourth, as
used in claim 9, “a male taper between said anti-rotation protrusions and said bearing cavity”
means “a male taper is located between said anti-rotation protrusions and said bearing cavity.”
Fifth, as used in claim 14, “a locking recess disposed between said anti-rotation recesses and said
shell cavity” means “a locking recess is located between said anti-rotation recesses and said shell
cavity.” Lastly, as used in claim 14, “a locking member disposed between said anti-rotation

36

protrusions and said bearing cavity” means “a locking member is located between said antirotation protrusions and said bearing cavity.”
Connection Terms
Plaintiffs and DePuy disagree about the meaning of two “connection” terms: (1) the
taper-taper connection, and (2) the locking member-locking recess connection. The disputed
language—although substantially similar—will be addressed individually as they appear in
different contexts.
Taper-Taper Connection
The disputed language relating to the taper-taper connection appears in claims 1 and 9 in
the following context: “wherein when said bearing is positioned within said shell cavity, (i) said
male taper and said female taper engage each other to provide a first connection between said
bearing and said shell.” U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 1, 9 (issued Aug. 26, 2003). Plaintiffs argue
that these terms should be construed to mean “wherein when said bearing is positioned within
said shell cavity, (i) said male taper and said female taper come together to restrict relative
motion between each other to provide a first locked association between said bearing and said
shell.” (Pls. Op. Br. 14.) DePuy argues that the terms should mean “when the bearing is placed
within the shell, the male taper of the bearing engages the female taper of the shell; this is a first
connection between the bearing and shell.” (DePuy Op. Br. 19.)
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs contend that “engage” means “to come together and
restrict relative motion.” (Pls. Resp. Br. 13.) At the Markman hearing, DePuy noted that it
“does not oppose this aspect of Styker’s proposed construction.” (DePuy ’097 Patent Markman
Powerpoint Presentation (“DePuy ’097 Markman PP”) at 17; Markman Hrg. Tr. at 31 (May 9,
2013).) Because “engage” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, it is unnecessary to

37

construe this term specifically. The key dispute between the proposed constructions relates to
whether there is a “locked” connection. Plaintiffs argue that there is a “locked association”
between the bearing and the shell whereas DePuy does not.
In support of their proposed construction, Plaintiffs rely first on intrinsic evidence. As
explained in the patent specification, “[t]he taper feature of the present invention provides
mechanical lock integrity . . . .” (Pls. Op. Br. 15 (citing U.S. Patent No. ’097, col.6:3-4).)
Plaintiffs note that the specification expressly states that the purpose of tapers is to secure the
bearing in the shell. (Id.) Once the shell and bearing have been engaged, Plaintiffs argue that a
“locked association” is created. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiffs assert that the specification recites that the
tapers “engage and lock” the bearing within the shell. (Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. ’097 at
col.7:37-42, col.6:27-29 (issued Aug. 26, 2003)).)
DePuy argues that the specification makes clear that the tapers have a “connection” to
maintain alignment, but there is no requirement that there be a “locked association.” (DePuy Op.
Br. 21 (citing Ex. A, U.S. Patent No. ’097 at col.5:1-5 (issued Aug. 26, 2003)).) DePuy notes
that the specification explicitly states that tapers “may be a self-holding taper (i.e. self-locking)
or a self releasing taper.” (DePuy Op. Br. 20 (citing Ex. A, U.S. Patent No. ’097 at col.5:5-6
(issued Aug. 26, 2003)).) DePuy contends that requiring a “locked” connection essentially reads
out the “self-locking” limitation of dependent claim 4. (Id.)
This Court agrees with DePuy that the patent claim language and specification do not
require that the “connection” be a “locked” association. Even putting aside the “self-locking”
embodiment for which both Plaintiffs and DePuy put forth arguments, nothing in the intrinsic
evidence suggests that the connection must be “locked.” This Court concludes that DePuy’s
proposed construction is appropriate here. Thus, the disputed language “wherein when said

38

bearing is positioned within said shell cavity, (i) said male taper and said female taper engage
each other to provide a first connection between said bearing and said shell” will be construed as
“when the bearing is placed within the shell, the male taper of the bearing engages the female
taper of the shell; this is a first connection between the bearing and shell.”
The Locking Member-Locking Recess Connection
The disputed language relating to the locking member-locking recess connection appears
in claim 14 and states the following: “wherein when said bearing is positioned within said shell
cavity, (i) said locking member is positioned within said locking recess to provide a first
connection between said bearing and said shell.” U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 14 (issued Aug. 26,
2003). Plaintiffs argue that the disputed language should be construed as “wherein when said
bearing is positioned with said shell cavity, said locking member is positioned within said
locking recess to provide a first locked association between said bearing and said shell.” (Pls.
Op. Br. 18.) DePuy argues that the disputed language should mean “when the bearing is placed
within the shell, a locking member on the bearing is positioned within a locking recess on the
shell, providing a first connection between said bearing and the shell.” (DePuy Op. Br. 22.)
As previously discussed with respect to the taper-taper connection, the key dispute
between the proposed constructions is whether there is a “locked” connection. Plaintiffs argue
that there is a “locked” association whereas DePuy asserts there is not. (See Pls. Op. Br. 18; see
also DePuy Op. Br. 22.)

Plaintiffs and DePuy rely significantly—if not completely—on the

same arguments made with respect to the taper-taper connection. (See Pls. Op. Br. 18; see also
DePuy Op. Br. 22; Pls. Resp. Br. 15-16; DePuy Resp. Br. 14-15.)
For the same reasons articulated with respect to the taper-taper connection, this Court
finds that the intrinsic evidence does not require that the locking member-locking recess

39

connection be a “locked association.” The term “locked” does not appear in the claim language
or patent specification. Including the word “locked” is too specific and potentially misleading as
it is not based in the patent. Defendants’ proposed construction provides a clear construction of
the disputed language. Accordingly, this Court concludes that “wherein when said bearing is
positioned within said shell cavity, (i) said locking member is positioned within said locking
recess to provide a first connection between said bearing and said shell” will be construed as
“when the bearing is placed within the shell, a locking member on the bearing is positioned
within a locking recess on the shell, providing a first connection between said bearing and the
shell.”
Anti-Rotation Terms
Plaintiffs and DePuy dispute the meaning of two “anti-rotation” terms relating to recesses
in the shell and protrusions on the bearing. The disputed language relating to both terms appears
in the following context in claim 5: “anti-rotation recesses defined in said inner surface” and
“anti-rotation protrusions in said outer surface.” U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 5 (issued Aug. 26,
2003). Although relating to different parts of the shell and the bearing, claim construction of
these terms will be addressed simultaneously because the arguments and disputes are
substantially similar.
Plaintiffs argue that the disputed language relating to anti-rotation recesses should be
construed as “depressions defined in the inner surface of the shell to receive protrusions to
prevent rotation of the bearing within the shell.” (Pls. Op. Br. 20.) DePuy argues that the
disputed language relating to anti-rotation recesses means “anti-rotation recesses are in the inner
surface of the shell.” (DePuy Op. Br. 23.)

40

Plaintiffs argue that the disputed language relating to anti-rotation protrusions should be
construed as “extensions extending from the outer surface of the bearing to prevent rotation of
the bearing within the shell.” (Pls. Op. Br. 22.) DePuy argues that the disputed language
relating to anti-rotation protrusions should be construed as “anti-rotation protrusions are in the
outer surface of the bearing.” (DePuy Op. Br. 23.)
There are two key disputes at issue with respect to the claim construction of the antirotation terms.

First, Plaintiffs seek to clarify the meaning of the words “recess” and

“protrusions” while DePuy does not.

Secondly, Plaintiffs use the word “prevent” in their

proposed constructions to clarify “anti-rotation” of the bearing within the shell while DePuy
argues that the anti-rotation protrusions and recesses were designed only to “inhibit” rotational
movement.
Recesses/Protrusions
In construing the disputed language, it is appropriate to first consider the intrinsic
evidence. First, as it relates to the “recesses,” Plaintiffs point to Figure 8 which illustrates the
“depressions or indentations in the shell’s inner rim.” (Pls. Op. Br. 21; U.S. Patent No. ’097,
Fig. 8 (issued Aug. 26, 2003).) Plaintiffs argue that “[i]f the recesses were not depressions, the
bearing’s protrusions could not be accommodated ‘within’ them as the ‘097 Patent requires.”
(Pls. Op. Br. 21.)

With respect to the “protrusions,” Plaintiffs’ reference to Figure 11

demonstrates that the protrusions or “extensions” on the bearing fit within the recesses of the
shell. (Id. at 22-23.) Plaintiffs concede that their “constructions [are] only necessary to ensure
that, through its infringement contentions, DePuy was not seeking to expand the scope of its
patents to cover protrusions that were really recesses and vice versa.” (Pls. Resp. Br. 19-20.)

41

DePuy asserts that the terms “recesses” and “protrusions” should be given their plain and
ordinary meaning.

(DePuy Op. Br. 25.) DePuy opposes Plaintiffs’ proposed inclusion of

“depressions” for “recesses” and “extensions” for “protrusions” because it potentially “add[s]
heightened functional requirements into the claims.” (Id. at 24.) DePuy notes that the words
“depression” and “extension” do not appear in the ’097 Patent. (Id. at 24-25.)
Based on the claim language and patent specification, this Court finds that it is
unnecessary to include the words “depressions” for “recesses” and “extensions” for
“protrusions” in construing the disputed language. The terms “recesses” and “protrusions” do
not present any ambiguity. Moreover, the words “depressions” and “protrusions” are merely
synonyms which do not serve to clarify their meanings. Patriot Universal Holdings, LLC et al v.
Formax, Inc., No. 10-C-355, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60760, at *52 (E.D. Wis. June 7, 2011)
(noting that “[c]laim construction is not an invitation to substitute synonyms”). Thus, the terms
“recesses” and “protrusions” will be given their plain and ordinary meaning.
Anti-rotation Function
In proposing a construction for the term “anti-rotation,” Plaintiffs point to the patent
specification which states that the “anti-rotation” function provides that the “rotational
movement of the bearing [ ] relative to the shell [ ] is inhibited.” U.S. Patent No. ’097 at
col.8:57-59 (issued Aug. 26, 2003). Plaintiffs also note that the patent specification states that
the projections “prevent rotation” of the bearing. (Pls. Resp. Br. 20 (citing U.S. Patent No. ’097
at col.4:5-8 (issued Aug. 26, 2003)).)
DePuy argues that “the anti-rotation protrusions/recesses were designed to ‘inhibit’
rotational movement, and the patent does not require such movement to be completely
prevented.” (DePuy Op. Br. 25-26 (citing Ex. A, U.S. Patent No. ’097 at col.7:63-65, col.8:57-

42

59 (issued Aug. 26, 2003)).) Additionally, DePuy argues that only dependent claim 5 requires
that there rotational movement be inhibited. (DePuy Op. Br. 26.) However, claims 9 and 14
only require a “second connection” between the shell and the bearing. (Id.) DePuy argues that
Plaintiffs are attempting to read limitations from the specification into the claims in their
proposed construction.
In construing the “anti-rotation” function aspect of the disputed claim language, this
Court finds that including the word “prevent” rotational movement is too specific and potentially
confusing. The word “anti-rotation” sufficiently describes the feature to be conveyed and does
not require further construction.
Based on the intrinsic evidence and the arguments presented, this Court agrees with
DePuy’s proposed constructions relating to the anti-rotation terms in dispute. Accordingly,
“anti-rotation recesses defined in said inner surface” is construed as “anti-rotation recesses are in
the inner surface of the shell.” Additionally, “anti-rotation protrusions defined in said outer
surface” is construed as “anti-rotation protrusions are on the outer surface of the bearing.”
Bearing Term
Plaintiffs and DePuy dispute the meaning of “bearing” as it appears and is used in claims
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 12-15. Plaintiffs argue that “bearing” should be construed as “a unitary
structure (as opposed to a liner/bearing subassembly) of a given material with an outer surface
that is generally hemispherical in shape, and an inner surface configured to receive a prosthetic
femoral ball.” (Pls. Op. Br. 27.) DePuy argues that “bearing” should be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. (DePuy Op. Br. 27.)
Plaintiffs make clear that they seek a limited construction of the term “bearing” in an
effort to prevent DePuy from “assert[ing] its patent against a three-piece Stryker product.” (Pls.

43

Op. Br. 27.) Plaintiffs contend that “DePuy has thus far refused to acknowledge that its claimed
‘bearing’ does not encompass a liner/bearing subassembly, thus necessitating construction of the
term by this Court.” (Pls. Resp. Br. 24.) Plaintiffs reference the PTO’s restriction that DePuy
limit its claims.
DePuy repeatedly argues that the term “bearing” is not ambiguous and should be given its
plain and ordinary meaning. A bearing is the part that receives the femoral head, according to
DePuy. (DePuy Op. Br. 27; DePuy Resp. Br. 18.)
Based on the claim language and intrinsic evidence, this Court finds that the term
“bearing” is not ambiguous and does not require construction. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ argument in
support of its proposed construction relies heavily on the fact that the PTO restricted DePuy to
limit its claims to either the two-piece or three-piece claims. However, several courts have
articulated that restriction requirements are administrative tools and do not help inform courts
with respect to claim construction. See e.g., Colorquick v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 06-390,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48739, at *34 (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2008) (“[A]s noted by the significant
number of other courts refusing to use restriction requirements to limit the claims during claim
construction, a restriction requirement is an administrative tool, and therefore offers little
guidance in construing the claim language.”); see also Amersham Pharmacia Biotech, Inc. v.
Perkin-Elmer Corp., No. C-97-04203, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22942, *43-44 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2000) (“A restriction requirement is not a rejection and it cannot be used to controvert the plain
language of the claim.”). In light of the relevant case law and arguments set forth in the briefs
and at the Markman hearing, this Court does not find it appropriate to construe this term.
Accordingly, the term “bearing” will be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

44

Typographical Errors/ Incomplete, Incorrect, or Indefinite Terms
It is within a district court’s power to “correct obvious minor typographical and clerical
errors in patents” but “major errors are subject only to correction by the PTO.” Novo Indus.,
L.P. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003). A district court may correct
an error in a patent if “(1) the correction is not subject to reasonable debate based on
consideration of the claim language and the specification and (2) the prosecution history does not
suggest a different interpretation of the claims.” Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement
Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Novo Indus. L.P., 350 F.3d at 1357).
“Those determinations must be made from the point of view of one skilled in the art.” Ultimax,
587 F.3d at 1353.
Plaintiffs and DePuy dispute the meaning of three claim terms in the ’097 Patent that
DePuy labels as “typographical errors.” Each of the disputed claim terms will be addressed in
turn.
“configured with, and (ii)”
Plaintiffs and DePuy disagree about the meaning of “configured with, and (ii)” as it
appears in claims 1, 9 and 14 as follows:
1. claim 1: “said bearing having an outer surface configured with, and (ii) a locking
member extending outwardly therefrom and (ii) a male taper between said locking
member and said bearing cavity”;
2. claim 9: “said bearing having an outer surface configured with, and (ii) a second
number of anti-rotation protrusions, and (ii) a male taper between said antirotation protrusions and said bearing cavity”; and
3. claim 14: “said bearing having an outer surface configured with, and (ii) a second
number of anti-rotation protrusions, and (ii) a locking member disposed between
said anti-rotation protrusions and said bearing cavity.”
U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 1, 9, 14 (issued Aug. 26, 2003). Plaintiffs argue that the disputed
language is ambiguous and therefore indefinite.

45

(Pls. Op. Br. 12.)

DePuy argues that

“configured with, and (ii)” was a typographical error and should be corrected to “configured with
(i).” (DePuy Op. Br. 27-28.)
The relevant inquiries for this Court to determine are (1) whether the alleged correction is
not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) whether the prosecution history does not suggest a
different interpretation of the claims. It is appropriate to begin with the intrinsic evidence
relating to the disputed language. First, it is helpful to review the disputed language in the
context of the entirety of the claim. Claim 1, with the disputed language highlighted, reads as
follows:
A prosthetic cup assembly, comprising:
a shell defining a shell cavity, said shell including an inner surface
configured with (i) a locking recess defined therein, and (ii) a female taper
between said locking recess and said shell cavity; and
a bearing defining a bearing cavity adapted to receive a prosthetic ball
therein, said bearing having an outer surface configured with, and (ii) a
locking member extending outwardly therefrom, and (ii) a male taper
between said locking member and said bearing cavity,
wherein when said bearing is positioned within said shell cavity, (i) said
male taper and said female taper engage each other to provide a first
connection between said bearing and said shell, and (ii) said locking
member is located within said locking recess to provide a second
connection between said bearing and said shell.
U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 1 (issued Aug. 26, 2003) (emphasis added). The two other claims in
dispute—claims 9 and 14—are similarly structured. See U.S. Patent No. ’097, Cl. 9, 14 (issued
Aug. 26, 2003). As seen in claim 1, there are three sets of romanettes. The first and third
paragraphs contain romanettes (i) and (ii). The second paragraph contains romanettes (ii) and
(ii).

The parties do not dispute that the second paragraph—as written with the duplicate

romanettes —does not say what it means.

46

Plaintiffs argue that the disputed language could mean, for instance, “said bearing having
an outer surface configured with, and (ii) (i) a locking member extending outwardly therefrom,
and (ii) a male taper between said locking member and said bearing cavity;” or “said bearing
having an outer surface configured with (i) a generally hemispherical shape, and (ii) a locking
member extending outwardly therefrom; and (ii)(iii) a male taper between said locking member
and said bearing cavity.” (Pls. Op. Br. 13.) According to Plaintiffs, because the disputed
language could be subject to various interpretations, the claim language is ambiguous and
indefinite. 19 (Id. at 12-14.)
On the other hand, DePuy contends that the only reasonable reading of the claim is that
instead of duplicate romanettes, the second paragraph should have included romanettes (i) and
(ii), similar to the first and third paragraphs. (DePuy Op. Br. 29.) DePuy also points to the
prosecution history to demonstrate that claim 33 in the originally filed parent application to the
’097 Patent properly uses romanettes (i) and (ii) in each of the three paragraphs. (Id. at 29-30.)
Based on the intrinsic evidence, this Court finds that the disputed language resulted from
a typographical error and should be corrected to properly use romanettes (i) and (ii). Despite
Plaintiffs’ arguments, there is no reasonable debate regarding correcting the disputed language.
None of Plaintiffs’ suggestions for alternate interpretations are reasonably viable. Additionally,
the interpretation rendered from the correction is consistent with the prosecution history as well
as the reasonable interpretation of the claim language. It is important to note that this Court is
not construing the disputed terms here. Instead, as it is within the Court’s discretion to correct
typographical errors, it is appropriate in this instance to correct the typographical error in claims

19

In order to conclude that a claim term is indefinite, a court must find that the term is “not amenable to
construction” or is “insolubly ambiguous.” See, e.g., IGT v. Bally Gaming Int’l, Inc., 659 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).

47

1, 9, and 14. Accordingly, the disputed language “configured with, and (ii)” will be corrected to
read “configured with (i).”
“inner surface”
Plaintiffs and DePuy disagree about the meaning of “inner” as it appears in dependent
claims 2, 13, and 15 of the ’097 Patent. Specifically, the claim language in dispute is “and said
locking member extends circumferentially around said inner surface of said bearing.” U.S.
Patent No. ’097, Cl. 2, 13, 15 (issued Aug. 26, 2003). Plaintiffs’ proposed construction is
identical to the claim language—“and said locking member extends circumferentially around
said inner surface of said bearing.” (Pls. Op. Br. 19.) DePuy argues that the term “inner” in this
context was a typographical error and should be corrected to “outer.” (DePuy Op. Br. 31.)
Plaintiffs contend that the patent specifically references and defines the “inner surface” of
the bearing as the interior surface of the bearing. (See Pls. Op. Br. 19.) Furthermore, the
specification notes that “Bearing 16 also includes an inner bearing surface 54 that defines an
opening 55 sized to receive a prosthetic femoral ball.” (U.S. Patent No. ’097 at col.4:12-14
(issued Aug. 26, 2003); U.S. Patent No. ’097 at col.7:19-20 (issued Aug. 26, 2003); U.S. Patent
No. ’097 at col.8:15-16 (issued Aug. 26, 2003).) Based on this intrinsic evidence, Plaintiffs
argue that the disputed language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
DePuy contends that the use of “inner” rather than “outer” was a draftsman’s mistake.
(DePuy ’097 Markman PP at 56.) DePuy argues that the claim language throughout the patent
makes clear that the locking member is located on the outer surface of the bearing. (DePuy Op.
Br. 32.) DePuy notes that “[s]uch a connection [between the shell and the bearing] would not be
possible if the locking member was on the inner surface of the bearing.” (Id. at 32.) DePuy also

48

points to every figure in the patent which illustrates the locking member on the outer surface.
(Id. at 33.)
In considering whether to correct the disputed language or adopt a proposed construction,
this Court must consider (1) whether the alleged correction is not subject to reasonable debate
and (2) whether the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims.
See Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d at 1353 (citing Novo Indus., LP, 350 F.3d at 1357).
Importantly, the correction here is not subject to reasonable debate based on the intrinsic
evidence. Throughout the claim language and patent specification, the ’097 Patent identifies the
locking member being located on the outer part of the bearing. Additionally, at the Markman
hearing, except with reference to the particular disputed language, the parties consistently
referred to the locking member on the outer surface and not the inner surface of the bearing in
the context of the ’097 Patent. (Markman Hrg. Tr. at 16, 66, 76 (May 9, 2013).) Furthermore,
the prosecution history supports DePuy’s position that the locking member was intended to be on
the outer surface of the bearing. This Court notes guidance from the Federal Circuit which has
“repeatedly and consistently . . . recognized that courts may not redraft claims, whether to make
them operable or to sustain their validity.” Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, in this instance, it is clear that inclusion of the word “inner”
instead of “outer” was a typographical error. Accordingly, to correct this error to “outer” rather
than “inner” as intended by the inventor would not amount to redrafting the claim.
Moreover, as DePuy correctly notes, a claim construction that excludes the preferred
embodiment “is rarely, if ever, correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.”
Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583-84 (“[I]t is unlikely that an inventor would define the invention
in a way that excluded the preferred embodiment, or that persons of skill in this field would read

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the specification in such way.”) Here, if the locking member were on the inner surface of the
bearing, every embodiment in the patent would be excluded. The only logical, reasonable
interpretation of the disputed language is rendered by correcting the word “inner” to “outer.”
This Court will not construe the disputed terms; instead, as it is within the Court’s discretion to
correct typographical errors, it is appropriate in this instance to correct the typographical error.
Thus, this Court concludes that “inner” as it appears in claims 2, 13, and 15 of the ’097 Patent
will be corrected to “outer.”
“said upper bearing rim”
Plaintiffs and DePuy dispute the meaning of the claim term “and said first number of
recesses is positioned adjacent said upper bearing rim” as it appears in dependent claim 7.
Plaintiffs argue that if the disputed language is amenable to construction, it should mean “and
said first number of recesses is positioned close to said upper edge of the bearing opposite its
apex.” (Pls. Op. Br. 25.) Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the claim language be deemed
indefinite. (Id.) DePuy argues that inclusion of the word “bearing” was a typographical error
and should be corrected to “shell.” (DePuy Op. Br. 34-35.)
Plaintiffs point to figures 10 and 11 of the ’097 Patent to illustrate that the “upper bearing
rim” is the “upper edge of the bearing opposite its apex.” (Pls. Op. Br. 25-26.) Specifically, for
instance, Plaintiffs assert that figure 10 displays the apex of the bearing as opposite the opening
of the bearing. (Id. at 25.) Based on these figures, Plaintiffs state that the intrinsic record
supports their proposed construction. (Id. at 26.) Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that there is
no antecedent basis for “said upper bearing rim” because no “upper bearing rim” is mentioned in
claim 7 or any dependent claim stemming from claim 7. (Id. at 24); see Predicate Logic, Inc. v.
Distributive Software, Inc., 544 F.3d 1298, 1305 06 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“claim terms using ‘said’

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are ‘anaphoric phrases, referring to the initial antecedent phrase’”). According to Plaintiffs,
“said upper bearing rim” could either render the claim indefinite or refer to the bearing rim
discussed in the specification. (Pls. Op. Br. 24-25.)
DePuy contends that “bearing” should be corrected to “shell” because it was a
typographical error.

(DePuy Op. Br. 34-35.)

DePuy argues that the patent specification

demonstrates that the anti-rotation recesses are positioned on the shell, and not the bearing.
Specifically, DePuy points to figures 8 and 9 where the anti-rotation recesses are around the
upper rim of the shell. (Id. at 35.)
In considering whether to correct the disputed language or adopt a proposed construction,
this Court must consider (1) whether the alleged correction is not subject to reasonable debate
and (2) whether the prosecution history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims.
See Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d at 1353 (citing Novo Indus., LP, 350 F.3d at 1357).
With respect to the disputed language, Plaintiffs and DePuy appear to focus on different aspects
of the claim. Plaintiffs focus on the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of “upper
bearing rim” as it appears in claim 7 and throughout the patent. DePuy focuses on the placement
of the recesses, which reveals the typographical error of “bearing” intended to be “shell.” When
reviewing this key disputed phrase “upper bearing rim” within the context of the full claim
language, it is clear that the inventor was referring to the recesses located on the upper shell rim.
The intrinsic evidence and Markman hearing discussions support this proposition as the ’097
Patent consistently describes the recesses on the “upper shell rim” and not the “upper bearing
rim.” It is only in this claim, for the first time, that the recesses are described as being positioned
on the “upper bearing rim” rather than the “upper shell rim” appears. Accordingly, this Court
finds that there is no reasonable or logical debate regarding the correction from “bearing” to

51

“shell.” Furthermore, the prosecution history clearly supports that the inventors intended that the
anti-rotation recesses be around the upper rim of the shell and not the bearing. (Pls. Op. Br.,
App. D at 3-6.) As it is within this Court’s power and discretion to correct minor errors, this
Court concludes that the word “bearing” in claim 7 was a typographical error and will be
corrected to read “shell.”
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court orders that the disputed claims in the ’243 Patent
and the ’097 Patent be construed as set forth in this Opinion. A summary of this Court’s
construction of the disputed claims is provided in the corresponding Order.
s/ Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.
cc:

Magistrate Judge Arleo

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