CORBETT v. LAGANA et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh on 7/19/2012. (ld, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRYAN CORBETT,
Plaintiff,

Civil No.

:

11-6560

(DMC)

V.

OPINION
PAUL LAGANA,

e t al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Bryan Corbett,
Se
592940/525665C
Northern State Prison
168 Frontage Street
Newark, NJ 07114

CAVANAUGH, District Judge
Plaintiff,
Prison,

Newark,

a state prisoner confined at the Northern State
New Jersey,

brings this civil action alleging

violations of his constitutional rights.
proceed

forma pauperis

At this time,
U.S.C.

(“IFP”),

He has applied to

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

the Court must review the complaint,

§ 1915(e)

and l9l5A,

pursuant to 28

to determine whether it should be

dismissed as frivolous or malicious,
upon which relief may be granted,

for failure to state a claim

or because it seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
following reasons,

§ 1915.

the complaint must be dismissed.

1

For the

BACKGROUND
According to his Statement of Claims

¶

(Complt.,

6),

Plaintiff states that he was “purposely and vindictively” placed
“in a cell of ill form as a personal punishment,” on March 11,
2011.

He alleges that his placement in the cell caused him

mental and emotional distress,

and that wrote remedy forms which

went unanswered.
Prior to that,

from December 8,

was “forced to live in a{n]
relief

.

.“

2010 to January 6,

2011,

he

inhumane area and manner without

He states that the cell was “a cold room without

the proper linen[s]

,

clothes or cosmetics of any sort,”

and that

his remedies went unanswered.
Plaintiff asks to be moved to a different unit,

and for

monetary relief
DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard
1.

Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

The Prison Litigation Reform Act,
801—810,

110 Stat.

1321—66 to 1321—77

Pub.

L,

No.

(April 26,

104-134,

1996)

,

§

requires

a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner is proceeding j forma pauperis or seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity.
to identify cognizable claims and to
that is frivolous,

malicious,

The Court is required

sponte dismiss any claim

fails to state a claim upon which

2

relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)

.

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e) (2) (B);

This action is subject to

screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C.

sponte

§ 1915(e) (2) (B)

and

1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as an indigent and is a
prisoner.
In determining the sufficiency of a pg

complaint,

the

Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.

Erickson v.

Pardus,

(following Estelle v.

Gamble,

United States v.

969 F.2d 39,

Day,

551 U.S.

429 U.S.
42

97,

89,

106

(3d Cir.

93—94

(2007)

(1976));

see also

1992)

The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v.
556 U.S.

662

(2009).

The Court examined Rule 8(a) (2)

Igbal,

of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a) (2).
550 U.S.
offers

Fed.

that,

Civ,

Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp.
544

(2007)

for the proposition that “[a)

‘labels and conclusions’

or

(quoting Twombly,

550 U.S.

at 555),

to prevent a summary dismissal,

allege “sufficient factual matter”

3

v.

P.
Twombly,

pleading that

‘a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do,’”
1949

R.

Igbal,

129 5.

Ct.

at

the Supreme Court held

a civil complaint must now

to show that the claim is

facially plausible.

This then “allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
(3d Cir.

Fowler v.

2009) (citing Igbal,

UPMC Shadyside,

129 5.

Ct.

578 F.3d 203,

210

at 1948)

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Igbal emphasizes that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint

are plausible.
Twombly,

Igbal,

505 U.S.

643 F.3d 77,

84

at 555,

(3d Cir,

129 S.

Ct.

at 1949-50.

& n.3; Warren Gen.
2011).

Hosp.

211

such an entitlement with its facts.”

(citing Phillips v.

(3d Cir.
2.

2008)

v. Amgen Inc.,

“A complaint must do more than

allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
‘show’

See also

County of Allegheny,

A complaint has to
Fowler,

578 F.3d at

515 F.3d 224,

234—35

)

Section 1983 Actions

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.

Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory
subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress
...

Thus,

to state a claim for relief under § 1983,

allege,

first,

a plaintiff must

the violation of a right secured by the
4

Constitution or laws of the United States and,

second,

that the

alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
(1988) ;

Piecknick v.

1994); Malleus v.
B.

See West

Pennsylvania,

George,

V.

Atkins,

487 U.S.

36 F.3d 1250,

641 F.3d 560,

563

42,

1255—56

(3d Cir.

48

(3d Cir,

2011).

Plaintiff’s Claims
1.

Housing Assignment

Plaintiff’s complaints concerning his temporary housing fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process

Clause may arise from either of two sources:

from the Due Process

Clause itself or from statute or regulation.

Helms,

459 U.S.

Corrections,

460,

466

(1983) ; Asguith v.

186 F.3d 407,

409

(3d Cir.

Hewitt v.
Department of

1999)

With respect to convicted and sentenced prisoners,

“[ajs

long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the
prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and
is not otherwise violative of the Constitution,

the Due Process

Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison

authorities to judicial oversight.”
236,

242

Conner,

(1976),
515 U.S.

quoted in Hewitt,
472,

480,

Montanye v.
459 U.S.

115 S.Ct.

(1995)

5

2293,

Haymes,

427 U.S.

at 468 and Sandin v.
132 L.Ed.2d 418

Governments,

however,

by statute or regulation,

may confer

on prisoners liberty interests that are protected by the Due
Process Clause.

“But these interests will be generally limited

to freedom from restraint which,

while not exceeding the sentence

in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the
Due Process Clause of its own force,

nonetheless imposes atypical

and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Sandin,

515 U.S.

at 484

(finding that disciplinary segregation conditions which
effectively mirrored those of administrative segregation and
protective custody were not “atypical and significant hardships”
in which a state conceivably might create liberty interest)
None of the losses enumerated by Plaintiff rises to the
level of an “atypical and significant hardship
the ordinary incidents of prison life,” and,

in relation to

...

thus,

even if they

violate regulations guiding prison administration,

none gives

rise to procedural due process concerns.
More specifically,

a prisoner does not have a liberty

interest in a particular housing assignment within a prison
system.

See McKune v.

Lile,

536 U.S.

24,

39

(2002)

(“It is well

settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core
of prison administrators’
460

(1983)

expertise.”); Hewitt v.

Helms,

459 U.S.

(no liberty interest in remaining in general

population rather than administrative segregation); Asguith,

6

186

F.3d at 411-12

(return to prison from halfway house did not

impose “atypical and significant hardship” on prisoner and,

thus,

did not deprive him of protected liberty interest); Barr v.
IDiGuglielmo,

2008 WL 2786424

(E.D.

Pa.

2008)

(no liberty interest

in being housed in particular wing of prison).
In this case,

Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed,

as he

has no constitutional right to a particular housing assignment.

2.

Conditions of Confinement

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
punishment’

...

imposes on

[prison officials]

‘humane conditions of confinement.’”
Dev.,

621 F.3d 249,

Brennan,

511 U.S.

256

825,

(3d Cir.

832

‘cruel and unusual

Betts v.

2010)

(1994)).

a duty to provide
New Castle Youth

(quoting Farmer v.

An alleged deprivation,

rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation,

to

must result

in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.

See Farmer,

511 U.S.

at 835.

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment,

an inmate must

allege both an objective and a subjective component.
v.

Seiter,

Corr,

Fac.,

501 U.S.

294,

298

176 Fed. Appx.

(1991);

234,

238

Counterman v.
(3d Cir.

Wilson

Warren Cnty.

2006),

The

objective component mandates that only those deprivations denying
the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment
violation.

See Helling v. McKinney,

7

509 U.S.

25,

32

(1993)

This component requires that the deprivation sustained by a
prisoner be sufficiently serious,

for only “extreme deprivations”

are sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment claim.
V.

McMillian,

503 US.

1,

9

(1992)

See Hudson

The subjective component

.

requires that the state actor have acted with “deliberate
indifference,” a state of mind equivalent to a reckless disregard
of a known risk of harm.

See Farmer,

Wilson,

A plaintiff may satisfy the objective

501 U.S.

at 303.

511 U.S.

at 835

(1994);

component of a conditions of confinement claim by showing that
the conditions alleged,

either alone or in combination,

deprive

him of the minimal civilized measure of life ls necessities,
as adequate food,

clothing,

and personal safety.

shelter,

Rhodes v.

such

sanitation, medical care,
Chapman,

452 U.S.

337,

347-48

(1981)
However,

while the Eighth Amendment directs that convicted

prisoners not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment,
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”
U.S.

at 349.

“the

Rhodes,

452

To the extent that certain conditions are only

“restrictive” or “harsh,” they are merely part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.
See id.

at 347.

The Court finds that the allegations as set forth by
Plaintiff regarding his conditions while placed in the new wing
from December 8,

2010 to January 6,

8

2011 and on March 11,

2011,

do not rise to the level of a serious constitutional deprivation.
Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that he has been deprived
of basic hygiene and shelter needs for an extended period of
time.

Indeed,

his allegations involve only loss of bed linens

and heat for a very short period of time,

His allegations of

deprivation of “clothes and cosmetics” are not sufficient,
pled,

as

to withstand Igbal dismissal.
Therefore,

this claim will be dismissed against all

defendants for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUS I ON

Based on the foregoing,

Plaintiff’s complaint must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted,

without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

1915(e) (2) (B) (ii)

and 1915A(b) (1).

§

An appropriate order

accompanies this opinion.

United States
Dated:

9

Judge