CORBETT v. LAGANA et al
Filing
2
OPINION. Signed by Judge Dennis M. Cavanaugh on 7/19/2012. (ld, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
BRYAN CORBETT,
Plaintiff,
Civil No.
:
11-6560
(DMC)
V.
OPINION
PAUL LAGANA,
e t al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Bryan Corbett,
Se
592940/525665C
Northern State Prison
168 Frontage Street
Newark, NJ 07114
CAVANAUGH, District Judge
Plaintiff,
Prison,
Newark,
a state prisoner confined at the Northern State
New Jersey,
brings this civil action alleging
violations of his constitutional rights.
proceed
forma pauperis
At this time,
U.S.C.
(“IFP”),
He has applied to
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
the Court must review the complaint,
§ 1915(e)
and l9l5A,
pursuant to 28
to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious,
upon which relief may be granted,
for failure to state a claim
or because it seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
following reasons,
§ 1915.
the complaint must be dismissed.
1
For the
BACKGROUND
According to his Statement of Claims
¶
(Complt.,
6),
Plaintiff states that he was “purposely and vindictively” placed
“in a cell of ill form as a personal punishment,” on March 11,
2011.
He alleges that his placement in the cell caused him
mental and emotional distress,
and that wrote remedy forms which
went unanswered.
Prior to that,
from December 8,
was “forced to live in a{n]
relief
.
.“
2010 to January 6,
2011,
he
inhumane area and manner without
He states that the cell was “a cold room without
the proper linen[s]
,
clothes or cosmetics of any sort,”
and that
his remedies went unanswered.
Plaintiff asks to be moved to a different unit,
and for
monetary relief
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
1.
Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act,
801—810,
110 Stat.
1321—66 to 1321—77
Pub.
L,
No.
(April 26,
104-134,
1996)
,
§
requires
a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner is proceeding j forma pauperis or seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity.
to identify cognizable claims and to
that is frivolous,
malicious,
The Court is required
sponte dismiss any claim
fails to state a claim upon which
2
relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)
.
See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) (2) (B);
This action is subject to
screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C.
sponte
§ 1915(e) (2) (B)
and
1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as an indigent and is a
prisoner.
In determining the sufficiency of a pg
complaint,
the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
Erickson v.
Pardus,
(following Estelle v.
Gamble,
United States v.
969 F.2d 39,
Day,
551 U.S.
429 U.S.
42
97,
89,
106
(3d Cir.
93—94
(2007)
(1976));
see also
1992)
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v.
556 U.S.
662
(2009).
The Court examined Rule 8(a) (2)
Igbal,
of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a) (2).
550 U.S.
offers
Fed.
that,
Civ,
Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp.
544
(2007)
for the proposition that “[a)
‘labels and conclusions’
or
(quoting Twombly,
550 U.S.
at 555),
to prevent a summary dismissal,
allege “sufficient factual matter”
3
v.
P.
Twombly,
pleading that
‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do,’”
1949
R.
Igbal,
129 5.
Ct.
at
the Supreme Court held
a civil complaint must now
to show that the claim is
facially plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
(3d Cir.
Fowler v.
2009) (citing Igbal,
UPMC Shadyside,
129 5.
Ct.
578 F.3d 203,
210
at 1948)
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Igbal emphasizes that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint
are plausible.
Twombly,
Igbal,
505 U.S.
643 F.3d 77,
84
at 555,
(3d Cir,
129 S.
Ct.
at 1949-50.
& n.3; Warren Gen.
2011).
Hosp.
211
such an entitlement with its facts.”
(citing Phillips v.
(3d Cir.
2.
2008)
v. Amgen Inc.,
“A complaint must do more than
allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
‘show’
See also
County of Allegheny,
A complaint has to
Fowler,
578 F.3d at
515 F.3d 224,
234—35
)
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory
subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress
...
Thus,
to state a claim for relief under § 1983,
allege,
first,
a plaintiff must
the violation of a right secured by the
4
Constitution or laws of the United States and,
second,
that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
(1988) ;
Piecknick v.
1994); Malleus v.
B.
See West
Pennsylvania,
George,
V.
Atkins,
487 U.S.
36 F.3d 1250,
641 F.3d 560,
563
42,
1255—56
(3d Cir.
48
(3d Cir,
2011).
Plaintiff’s Claims
1.
Housing Assignment
Plaintiff’s complaints concerning his temporary housing fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
A liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause may arise from either of two sources:
from the Due Process
Clause itself or from statute or regulation.
Helms,
459 U.S.
Corrections,
460,
466
(1983) ; Asguith v.
186 F.3d 407,
409
(3d Cir.
Hewitt v.
Department of
1999)
With respect to convicted and sentenced prisoners,
“[ajs
long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the
prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and
is not otherwise violative of the Constitution,
the Due Process
Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison
authorities to judicial oversight.”
236,
242
Conner,
(1976),
515 U.S.
quoted in Hewitt,
472,
480,
Montanye v.
459 U.S.
115 S.Ct.
(1995)
5
2293,
Haymes,
427 U.S.
at 468 and Sandin v.
132 L.Ed.2d 418
Governments,
however,
by statute or regulation,
may confer
on prisoners liberty interests that are protected by the Due
Process Clause.
“But these interests will be generally limited
to freedom from restraint which,
while not exceeding the sentence
in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the
Due Process Clause of its own force,
nonetheless imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.”
Sandin,
515 U.S.
at 484
(finding that disciplinary segregation conditions which
effectively mirrored those of administrative segregation and
protective custody were not “atypical and significant hardships”
in which a state conceivably might create liberty interest)
None of the losses enumerated by Plaintiff rises to the
level of an “atypical and significant hardship
the ordinary incidents of prison life,” and,
in relation to
...
thus,
even if they
violate regulations guiding prison administration,
none gives
rise to procedural due process concerns.
More specifically,
a prisoner does not have a liberty
interest in a particular housing assignment within a prison
system.
See McKune v.
Lile,
536 U.S.
24,
39
(2002)
(“It is well
settled that the decision where to house inmates is at the core
of prison administrators’
460
(1983)
expertise.”); Hewitt v.
Helms,
459 U.S.
(no liberty interest in remaining in general
population rather than administrative segregation); Asguith,
6
186
F.3d at 411-12
(return to prison from halfway house did not
impose “atypical and significant hardship” on prisoner and,
thus,
did not deprive him of protected liberty interest); Barr v.
IDiGuglielmo,
2008 WL 2786424
(E.D.
Pa.
2008)
(no liberty interest
in being housed in particular wing of prison).
In this case,
Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed,
as he
has no constitutional right to a particular housing assignment.
2.
Conditions of Confinement
“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
punishment’
...
imposes on
[prison officials]
‘humane conditions of confinement.’”
Dev.,
621 F.3d 249,
Brennan,
511 U.S.
256
825,
(3d Cir.
832
‘cruel and unusual
Betts v.
2010)
(1994)).
a duty to provide
New Castle Youth
(quoting Farmer v.
An alleged deprivation,
rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation,
to
must result
in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.
See Farmer,
511 U.S.
at 835.
To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment,
an inmate must
allege both an objective and a subjective component.
v.
Seiter,
Corr,
Fac.,
501 U.S.
294,
298
176 Fed. Appx.
(1991);
234,
238
Counterman v.
(3d Cir.
Wilson
Warren Cnty.
2006),
The
objective component mandates that only those deprivations denying
the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are
sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment
violation.
See Helling v. McKinney,
7
509 U.S.
25,
32
(1993)
This component requires that the deprivation sustained by a
prisoner be sufficiently serious,
for only “extreme deprivations”
are sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment claim.
V.
McMillian,
503 US.
1,
9
(1992)
See Hudson
The subjective component
.
requires that the state actor have acted with “deliberate
indifference,” a state of mind equivalent to a reckless disregard
of a known risk of harm.
See Farmer,
Wilson,
A plaintiff may satisfy the objective
501 U.S.
at 303.
511 U.S.
at 835
(1994);
component of a conditions of confinement claim by showing that
the conditions alleged,
either alone or in combination,
deprive
him of the minimal civilized measure of life ls necessities,
as adequate food,
clothing,
and personal safety.
shelter,
Rhodes v.
such
sanitation, medical care,
Chapman,
452 U.S.
337,
347-48
(1981)
However,
while the Eighth Amendment directs that convicted
prisoners not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment,
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.”
U.S.
at 349.
“the
Rhodes,
452
To the extent that certain conditions are only
“restrictive” or “harsh,” they are merely part of the penalty
that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.
See id.
at 347.
The Court finds that the allegations as set forth by
Plaintiff regarding his conditions while placed in the new wing
from December 8,
2010 to January 6,
8
2011 and on March 11,
2011,
do not rise to the level of a serious constitutional deprivation.
Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that he has been deprived
of basic hygiene and shelter needs for an extended period of
time.
Indeed,
his allegations involve only loss of bed linens
and heat for a very short period of time,
His allegations of
deprivation of “clothes and cosmetics” are not sufficient,
pled,
as
to withstand Igbal dismissal.
Therefore,
this claim will be dismissed against all
defendants for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUS I ON
Based on the foregoing,
Plaintiff’s complaint must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted,
without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1915(e) (2) (B) (ii)
and 1915A(b) (1).
§
An appropriate order
accompanies this opinion.
United States
Dated:
9
Judge
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