PAL v. JERSEY CITY MEDICAL CENTER et al

Filing 139

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Stanley R. Chesler on 7/21/14. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NEELU PAL,

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Plaintiff,
v.
JERSEY CITY MEDICAL CENTER, et
al.,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 11-6911 (SRC)
OPINION

CHESLER, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the renewed motion for summary judgment filed
by Defendants University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (“UMDNJ”), Peter Scholz,
M.D. and Dorian Wilson, M.D. (collectively the “UMDNJ Defendants”). 1 Pro se Plaintiff Neelu
Pal opposes the motion for summary judgment. The Court has considered the papers filed by the
parties and proceeds to rule without oral argument, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
78. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion for summary judgment.
The Court also discusses in this Opinion a motion for leave to amend the Complaint, filed
by Pal, and a motion filed by the UMDNJ Defendants for the imposition of sanctions against Pal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. These motions will be denied.

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The Court will refer this group of Defendants by specifying their UMDNJ affiliation to distinguish them from
another group of Defendants affiliated with the Jersey City Medical Center. The other group of Defendants will be
referred to as the “JCMC Defendants.”
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I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Neelu Pal, a female of Indian origin, is a medical doctor and board certified

general surgeon. (The Court will refer to her as “Plaintiff” or “Dr. Pal.”) She had been a
resident in the cardiothoracic surgery program at UMDNJ-Robert Wood Johnson Hospital
(“UMDNJ-RWJ”) but resigned in February 2009 after she was informed that her contract would
not be renewed. Dr. Pal believed that the non-renewal was a retaliatory action in response to her
complaints that the staff had discriminated against her based on her race, gender and national
origin. She initiated suit in New Jersey state court against various doctors from UMDNJ-RWJ,
seeking redress for the allegedly retaliatory non-renewal. The Court will refer to that lawsuit as
the “State Action.”
In or about March 2009, after resigning from the cardiothoracic surgery program, Dr. Pal
applied for privileges to practice as a general surgeon at Jersey City Medical Center (“JCMC”).
JCMC denied her application, and Dr. Pal was unsuccessful in her appeal of that decision.
Accordingly, on October 4, 2011, JCMC filed an Adverse Action Report with the National
Practitioner Data Bank, regarding the denial of privileges. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Pal filed this
separate lawsuit in federal court, claiming that JCMC’s denial of her application for privileges
and related filing of the Adverse Action Report have rendered her unable to obtain privileges at
any medical facility and essentially destroyed her career as a general surgeon. Insofar as the
UMDNJ Defendants named in this lawsuit are concerned, Pal alleges that they gave JCMC
negative references in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination while at UMDNJ-RWJ.
While this lawsuit was pending, Dr. Pal, represented by legal counsel, tried the State
Action before a jury. A judgment in favor of Pal was entered in April 2013 awarding her $1.6

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million in damages on her claim for the retaliatory non-renewal of her contract in UMDNJRWJ’s cardiothoracic surgery program.
After that judgment was entered, the UMDNJ Defendants moved for summary judgment
here on the grounds that Plaintiff’s litigation of the State Action precludes her from pursuing her
claims in this action by operation of the entire controversy doctrine and/or the doctrine of issue
preclusion. The Court denied the motion for lack of sufficient evidence to carry their burden of
establishing either of these two affirmative defenses as a matter of law. The UMDNJ Defendants
had argued that Plaintiff expanded her claims in the State Action to go beyond the non-renewal
of her contract in the cardiothoracic surgery program and encompass her overall unemployability
due to UMDNJ’s negative references and the denial of her application for privileges at JCMC.
In that motion, the UMDNJ Defendants relied heavily on the jury verdict sheet, which posed the
following question:
7.
Did Dr. Pal prove by a preponderance of the evidence that UMDNJ
provided negative references about her to other health care facilities and, if
so, that that conduct was retaliation, causally connected to her
communications regarding discrimination?
(Tipton Cert., Ex. U. at 2.) The jury’s unanimous response to that question was “No.” (Id.) The
Court reasoned that although Defendants had presented portions of the State Action record
indicating that the scope of that action was broadened to litigate the impact of UMDNJ’s alleged
negative references on Dr. Pal’s entire medical career, the evidence offered too truncated a view
of the State Action for the Court to determine exactly which facts and/or issues were addressed
and decided. On the record presented, the Court could not conclude that either of the
preclusionary doctrines applied. The Court’s complete analysis is set forth in its Opinion of
November 19, 2013.

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In this renewed motion, the UMDNJ Defendants once again argue that this lawsuit is
barred by the entire controversy doctrine and/or issue prelusion. They proffer additional portions
of the State Action record, including the full transcript of the State Action court’s jury charge,
the original and amended expert reports served by Dr. Pal’s expert, trial testimony and pertinent
portions of the opening and closing statements made by Dr. Pal’s attorney. The Court’s
discussion below will concentrate on whether the additional evidence suffices to demonstrate
that there is no genuine issue as to the preclusive effect of the State Action on this lawsuit.

II.

DISCUSSION
A. The UMDNJ Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that a “court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (construing the similarly worded Rule 56(c), predecessor
to the current summary judgment standard set forth in Rule 56(a)). A factual dispute is genuine
if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant, and it is material if, under the
substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court “must
view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the opposing party.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.
Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). It may
not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 255.

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The UMDNJ Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment based on
affirmative defenses on which they bear the burden of proof. “When the moving party has the
burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact: it must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the
burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.” In re
Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real
Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991)). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial
burden, the party opposing the motion must establish the existence of a genuine issue as to a
material fact. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir.
1985). “A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has provided
sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial.” Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc.,
243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent.
Pension Fund of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs and Participating Emp’rs, 134 S. Ct. 773
(2014). However, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere
allegations; instead, it must present actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material
fact for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Schoch v. First Fid. Bancorporation, 912 F.2d
654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that “unsupported allegations in [a] memorandum and
pleadings are insufficient to repel summary judgment”).
The UMDNJ Defendants have demonstrated, in accordance with Rule 56(a), that the
claims Dr. Pal asserts against them in this suit are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, is an equitable doctrine that prevents parties
from relitigating issues that have already been “fairly litigated and determined.” First Union Nat.
Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007). Put differently, the Supreme Court

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has held that issue preclusion bars “‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually
litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the
issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)
(quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001)). Because the UMDNJ
Defendants contend that this action is barred by the preclusive effect of the State Action, the
preclusion rules of the State of New Jersey govern the analysis here. Interfaith Comm. Org. Inc.
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 295, 303 (D.N.J. 2010). “[T]he [state court] judgment will
have a preclusive effect in the federal court if the judgment would have had a preclusive effect in
the court that rendered the judgment.” Id. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that the
party asserting that collateral estoppel applies must demonstrate that:
(1 ) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the
prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior
proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final
judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was
essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the
doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the
earlier proceeding.
First Union Nat’l Bank, 190 N.J. at 352.
In this lawsuit, Dr. Pal asserts three claims against the UMDNJ Defendants: a claim
against Dr. Wilson for conspiracy to deprive Pal of her career and livelihood on the basis of her
gender and/or national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; a similar § 1985 claim against
Dr. Scholz; and a post-employment retaliation claim under the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”) against UMDNJ and Dr. Scholz. (See Am. Compl., Counts I, II and
VII.) These claims all depend upon the allegation Dr. Scholz, the director of the cardiothoracic
surgery residency program at UMDNJ-RWJ, and Dr. Wilson, director of the general surgery
residency program at UMDNJ-Newark, provided negative information about Dr. Pal in

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connection with her application for privileges at JCMC “because of Plaintiff’s gender and/or
national origin and/or because she made allegations against UMDNJ for discrimination and
harassment against her.” (Id., ¶¶ 134, 149.) According to the Amended Complaint, Dr. Nathaniel
Holmes, the chair of the JCMC credentials committee, contacted each one of these UMDNJ
references regarding Dr. Pal’s application to JCMC. The Amended Complaint alleges that Dr.
Scholz informed Dr. Holmes that Dr. Pal “had made allegations of discrimination, the hospital
investigated the claims and found no merit to them, UMDNJ-RWJMS demanded that Pal retract
her allegations, Pal refused, and UMDNJ-RWJMS asked Pal to leave.” (Id., ¶ 98). As for Dr.
Wilson, the Amended Complaint alleges that, although he had provided a positive
recommendation for Dr. Pal, in his conversation with Dr. Holmes, he “made negative comments
about Plaintiff and stated, in essence, that she was not to be trusted.” (Id., ¶ 102.)
The identical issue of whether Dr. Scholz and Dr. Wilson gave negative references in
retaliation for Pal’s complaints of discrimination and as a result rendered her unable to practice
as a surgeon was actually litigated and decided in the State Action. The identity of the issues is,
as the Court noted in its Opinion on the first motion for summary judgment, strongly suggested
by the verdict sheet in the State Action, which expressly asked the jury to determine whether
“Dr. Pal prove[d] by a preponderance of the evidence that UMDNJ provided negative references
about her to other health care facilities and, if so, [whether] that conduct was retaliation, causally
connected her communications regarding discrimination[.]” Previously, the Court held that,
without a more complete record of the State Action, it could not conclude that a reasonable juror
would find that this question on the verdict sheet presented the exact issue raised in this federal
action. On this motion, the UMDNJ Defendants have proffered the necessary evidence to
establish that collateral estoppel applies.

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Though the State Action was initiated to address solely the alleged retaliation by various
UMDNJ-RWJ doctors, including Dr. Scholz, by not renewing Dr. Pal’s residency contract, the
evidence demonstrates that Dr. Pal expanded her previous lawsuit to include a second alleged act
of retaliation: the same negative references at issue in this action. The trial of the State Action
covered both the Holmes-Scholz and Holmes-Wilson conversations. Dr. Pal’s attorney, in his
opening statement, told the jury that it would hear evidence concerning Dr. Scholz’s
communication to Dr. Holmes about Dr. Pal’s unsubstantiated complaints of racial
discrimination and that “because of that, [JCMC] denied her application and that triggered
what’s called adverse action report with the National Practitioner Data Bank.” [Tipton Cert., Ex.
Q at 41:24 -42:2.) Counsel went on to add that the evidence would show that “because she was
denied privileges at Jersey City Medical Center, every hospital that she ever applies to again will
see she had a problem and she got denied.” (Id. at 42:6-9.) Regarding Dr. Scholz’s conduct, Dr.
Pal’s attorney argued that “Clearly, this resulted in the destruction of Dr. Pal’s career. At this
point she had been out of the operating room for over four years. Every time she gets denied it
gets added to that data bank and so it perpetuates the situation.” (Id. at 43:4-8.) Although Dr.
Wilson, of UMDNJ-Newark, was not named as a defendant in the State Action, information
about her conversation with Dr. Holmes was presented to the jury. Dr. Pal subpoenaed Dr.
Holmes as a non-party witness in the State Action. Her counsel specifically asked Dr. Holmes
about his conversation with Dr. Wilson in connection with Dr. Pal’s application for privileges.
The testimony on the subject of Dr. Wilson’s changed opinion was as follows:
Q. . . . we were talking about Dr. Wilson’s reference. I’ve showed
it to you today on the board and it’s clear that his written reference said
that it was recommended highly without reservation, correct?
A. The written recommendation, yes.

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Q. Okay. And that he said that all of her skills were good, correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Who is Dr. Wilson?
A. Dr. Wilson is professor, a professor at UMDNJ Newark.
Q. So he’s related to UMDNJ, correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And then for some reason, we don’t know, he changed his
mind, somebody from UMDNJ, correct?
A. When I spoke to him on the phone, yes, he had a different
opinion.
(4/22/14 Tipton Cert., Ex. F at 47:9-48:1.) This evidence undermines Plaintiff’s argument that
the issue in the State Action was distinct because the judge emphasized that UMDNJ-RWJ, and
not UMDNJ-Newark, was the named institutional defendant. It is clear that while the State
Action complaint was never formally amended to add allegations beyond the initial claims of
retaliatory non-renewal of Dr. Pal’s residency at UMDNJ-RWJ, the negative references given
after Dr. Pal resigned from UMDNJ-RWJ became a key aspect of the State Action. In other
words, though the UMDNJ Defendants named in this case were not parties to the State Action at
the time of trial, 2 the conduct of both Dr. Scholz and Dr. Wilson, and in particular the impact of
their conversations with Dr. Holmes on the JCMC privileges application, was at issue in the
State Action.
The court’s jury charge in the State Action further demonstrates that the same issue of the
allegedly retaliatory communications by Dr. Wilson and Dr. Scholz which are critical to
Plaintiff’s claims in this case are identical to the issue decided in the State Action. In the charge,

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It appears that Dr. Scholz was named as a defendant when the State Action was initiated, but Plaintiff later
withdrew her claims against the individual UMDNJ-RWJ doctors to pursue only the institution at trial.
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the court explained to the jury that “there are two parts to a retaliation claim that you can
consider.” (Tipton Cert., Ex. T at 54:19-20.) The court expressly distinguished between the
non-renewal of the cardiothoracic residency and the negative references as acts of retaliation for
her complaints of discrimination to UMDNJ-RWJ, instructing the jury that it could find that both
were retaliatory, neither was, or one was and the other was not. (Id. at 54:1-7.)
The record, moreover, unequivocally shows that Dr. Pal actually litigated the issue of
whether the Scholz-Holmes and Scholz-Wilson communications were retaliatory negative
references. The Court need only look to testimony elicited by Pal’s attorney on the subject, the
jury charge and the verdict sheet, as set forth above. The issue was further highlighted by Dr.
Pal’s counsel in his opening statement at trial and in his summation to the jury, when he referred
to the “domino effect” of the negative references (Tipton Cert., Ex. S at 106-07, 115), the denial
of her application for privileges at JCMC, the Adverse Action Report, and her inability to find
work as a general surgeon.
Dr. Pal attempts to point to a disputed issue of fact as to the extent of the matters
litigated. She argues that the State Action was limited to the impact of UMDNJ’s conduct on her
ability to practice as a cardiothoracic surgeon, whereas in this action, she seeks redress for the
destruction of her entire medical career, allegedly precipitated by the negative references and
ensuing adverse action report filed by JCMC when it denied her application for privileges to
practice as a general surgeon. In addition to the evidence showing that the State Action in fact
decided the issue of whether “UMDNJ provided negative references about [Pal] to other health
care facilities [in] retaliation” for Pal’s complaints of discrimination, Dr. Pal’s argument is
further belied by her own expert report in the State Action. Initially, Dr. Pal’s expert had
calculated her losses based on his assumption that, having been deprived of a career as a

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cardiothoracic surgeon, she could nevertheless work as a general surgeon and accordingly
concluded that her future lost wages claim was worth approximately $1.3 million. Dr. Pal later
served and relied upon an amended expert report, in which he considered the denial of privileges
at JCMC and the adverse action report filed on October 7, 2011 with the NPDB. The amended
expert report stated that “due to interference by UMDNJ [Pal] has been unable to find a position
as a General Surgeon, even though she is board certified in General Surgery” and increased her
lost earnings claim to over $10 million. [Tipton Cert., Ex. P.] Moreover, a motion for summary
judgment filed by Dr. Pal in the State Action recited as material facts the communications with
Holmes, the denial of Pal’s application for privileges at JCMC, the fact that the adverse action
report filed by JCMC was based upon “negative references regarding the physician’s inability to
work with others,” the adverse action report’s impact on her ability to find work as a physician.
The remaining three factors in the collateral estoppel analysis are also satisfied. The
court in the State Action reached a final judgment on the merits. The State Action was tried to
verdict, with the jury unanimously concluding that the negative references provided by UMDNJ
were not retaliatory. The determination of that issue was essential to the State Action judgment.
As reflected by both the amended report prepared by Pal’s expert and her attorney’s arguments,
Pal contended that as a result of the negative references and the adverse action report, she could
not obtain a surgical position, even in her board-certified general surgeon capacity, and lost over
$10 million in front pay. Based on the jury’s verdict, however, the judgment in favor of Dr. Pal
was limited to damages on her claim of retaliatory non-renewal. She was awarded a total of only
$1.6 million dollars, which included a $1 million award for lost future earnings. The jury found
that no causal link existed between Dr. Pal’s complaints of discrimination and UMDNJ’s
negative references. This finding removed her claims of ensuing unemployability as a general

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surgeon from the damages calculation and was thus clearly essential to the judgment. Finally,
Dr. Pal, the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted, was herself a party to the State
Action. She participated in the State Action, which was tried before a jury over the course of
several weeks. Dr. Pal was represented by legal counsel, who engaged in discovery, motion
practice and active examination and cross-examination of witnesses at trial.
Dr. Pal tries to avoid application of collateral estoppel by arguing that it would be unfair
and inequitable to permit the UMDNJ Defendants to avail themselves of this defense because
they refused to consolidate the State Action with this federal lawsuit when Plaintiff broached that
idea. This argument fails for lack of legal and factual support. While Plaintiff indicates that the
attorney who had been representing her raised this topic informally among counsel, there is no
record of her making a formal motion for consolidation, nor, for that matter, any opposition by
the UMDNJ Defendants. She also gives no indication that the “consolidation” of lawsuits
pending before different courts – one federal and one state – would be legally feasible.
In short, the UMDNJ Defendants have carried their burden on this Rule 56(a) motion of
demonstrating that a reasonable juror would find the claims against them barred by collateral
estoppel. Accordingly, their motion for summary judgment will be granted.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave To Amend the Complaint
Plaintiff asks for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint which would, among other
changes, add an NJLAD post-employment retaliation claim against Dr. Wilson, reinstate NJLAD
claims against the JCMC Defendants (which had been withdrawn upon the filing of the First
Amended Complaint) and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the JCMC Defendants.
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a motion to amend the complaint
should be granted freely when the interests of justice require, the instant motion brought by

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Plaintiff must be denied. It is well-established that motions to amend may be denied where there
is undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive by the movant or futility of the amendment. Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
At the very least, the motion is prejudicially untimely, with no apparent justification for
Plaintiff’s dilatory conduct. The Court’s scheduling order set an October 3, 2012 deadline for
motions to add new parties or amend the pleadings. Plaintiff in fact had acted within that time
frame, earlier in the action, when she filed a motion for leave to file the First Amended
Complaint, which has remained the operative pleading since it was filed in accordance with the
Court’s order. This motion, the fifth Rule 15 motion filed by Plaintiff, was filed on April 7,
2014. Long after the scheduling order’s deadline, and two-and-a-half years after initiating this
litigation, she seeks to add numerous factual allegations as well as name additional defendants.
This excessive delay prejudices Defendants, who would be forced to conduct additional
discovery on the new claims. Dr. Pal does not even attempt to explain why she has delayed in
seeking to amend the complaint further, particularly when the factual allegations, legal claims
and parties she wishes to add are based on the same events as the prior pleadings, namely, the
negative references from UMDNJ and the denial of her application for privileges at JCMC.
Moreover, the amendment Plaintiff seeks would unfairly prolong proceedings. The Court
notes both the UMDNJ Defendants and the JCMC Defendants had filed motions for summary
judgment several months after the Court denied a previous, similarly untimely motion brought by
Plaintiff for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (See May 14, 2013 Opinion & Order).
Plaintiff opposed the motions for summary judgment, and they were denied without prejudice by
the Court. Now, when faced with the UMNDJ Defendants’ renewed motion for summary
judgment and the possibility that her action may reach a conclusion, Plaintiff attempts to thwart

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that effort, not by pointing to facts that demonstrate the potential merit of her existing claims, but
by continuing to expand the litigation. This is precisely the situation that lies within the
exception to Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment standard.
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint will be denied.
C. Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions
The UMDNJ Defendants have also filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 11, for an order
imposing sanctions on Plaintiff for conduct they contend constitutes material misrepresentations
to the Court regarding her health condition and efforts to delay proceedings. In particular, they
point out that Plaintiff has sought numerous continuances and extensions in this lawsuit by
representing to the Court that she is dealing with significant health problems and is too ill to
litigate. Yet, Defendants maintain, she has in the meantime been aggressively litigating, pro se,
two other actions: a medical malpractice action she filed in New York and a suit filed against her
in Nevada by her former attorney. According to the papers filed in support of this motion for
sanctions, during the same exact time period in which she asked this Court “to continue all
proceedings in this case for a legitimate medical reason,” that is, the fall of 2013, Dr. Pal was
actively filing numerous motions and other pleadings in the Nevada case. She also filed an order
to show cause and attended a pretrial conference in the New York case. Defendants further note
that Dr. Pal similarly invokes her medical condition in other cases when deadlines are looming.
They argue that Dr. Pal’s conduct reveals the falsity of her representations to the Court, and
moreover, displays a pattern of raising her claimed medical disability for the purpose of delay or
to focus on other legal matters in which she is involved.
Rule 11 imposes an affirmative duty on an attorney and/or a party to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal bases of all claims before filing any document with

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the court. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991);
Bensalem Twp. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1314 (3d Cir. 1994). In relevant
part, Rule 11 provides:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading,
written motion, or other paper-whether by signing, filing, submitting, or
later advocating it-an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the
best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost
of litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1).
In determining whether a party or attorney has violated the duties of Rule 11, the Court
must apply an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. Mary Ann Pensiero,
Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Brubaker Kitchens, Inc. v. Brown, 280 F.
App'x 174, 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is well-settled that the test for determining whether Rule 11
sanctions should be imposed is one of reasonableness under the circumstances, the determination
of which falls within the sound discretion of the District Court.”). Rule 11 authorizes a court “to
impose an appropriate sanction” on an attorney and/or party found to have violated the
obligations of the rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). In this way, the rule seeks “to curb abusive
litigation tactics and misuse of the court's process.” Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482
(3d Cir.1987). The sanction “must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
The Court, in its discretion, finds that Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. While the
movants have cast doubt on Dr. Pal’s motivation for her applications for extensions and
continuances, the record does not sufficiently support their contention that Dr. Pal has

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misrepresented the status of her health and/or requested extensions for patently improper
purposes. Rule 11 applies to attorneys, represented parties and pro se litigants alike, but this
situation does not present the “exceptional circumstances” for which Rule 11 sanctions are
typically reserved. Bensalem Twp., 38 F.3d at 1314.

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against the UMDNJ

Defendants are barred by collateral estoppel. The motion for summary judgment filed by the
UMDNJ Defendants will accordingly be granted. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint and Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions will both be denied. An
appropriate Order will be filed.

s/ Stanley R. Chesler
STANLEY R. CHESLER
United States District Judge
Dated: July 21, 2014

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