LOCAL 966, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS v. JCB, INC.
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 4/29/13. (gh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LOCAL 966, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,
Civ. No. 2:12-cv-00202 (WJM)
OPINION
Petitioner,
v.
JCB, INC., d/b/a RYB INC., d/b/a,
SUPERIOR MAINTENANCE OF
WESTCHESTER, INC., d/b/a/
SUPERIOR MAINTENANCE CO., d/b/a/
TRI-STATE MAINTENANCE CORP.,
Respondents.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Local 966, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“Petitioner”) brings this
contested petition to confirm an arbitration award under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. Respondents Superior Maintenance Co., Superior Maintenance of
Westchester, Inc., JBC, Inc., RYB, Inc., and Tri-State Maintenance Corp. crossmove under Rule 56 for an order denying confirmation. There was no oral
argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s
motion is GRANTED and Respondents’ cross-motion is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was the collective bargaining representative for building service
workers employed by Superior Maintenance of Westchester, Inc. and Superior
Maintenance Co. (together “Superior Maintenance Group”). Petitioner did not
enter into a collective bargaining agreement with Respondents JCB, Inc., Tri-State
Maintenance Corp., and RYB, Inc.1
1
Petitioner alleges that these three Respondents are alter-egos of Superior Maintenance Group. While it appears
that these three Respondents are closely related to Superior Maintenance Group, the sole issue before this Court is
1
On April 13, 2009, Petitioner presented Superior Maintenance Group with a
grievance alleging violation of the relevant collective bargaining agreements. The
dispute proceeded to arbitration.
On May 1, 2009, Petitioner appeared before arbitrator Joseph Harris.
Superior Maintenance Group did not appear. On October 23, 2009, arbitrator
Harris awarded Petitioner $339,820.00 for back pay, unpaid raises, unpaid vacation
time, unpaid sick days, unpaid holidays, and unpaid work hours. ECF No. 15-7.
The award (the “Award”) also provided for interest at “legally accruable rates.”
Petitioner suggests 8% compounded annually as a legally accruable rate.
Respondents do not contest this figure.
On October 27, 2009, a copy of the Award was sent to Superior
Maintenance Group. ECF No. 15-6. On January 1, 2012, Petitioner brought the
instant action to confirm the Award.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery
[including, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file] and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23
(1986); Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A
factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party,
and is material if it will affect the outcome of the trial under governing substantive
law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court
considers all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.2d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007). 2
III.
DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that the matter should be dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The Court finds that Respondents have waived their personal
jurisdiction defense. The Court also finds that Respondents have waived their
objections to confirmation. Accordingly, the Court will CONFIRM the Award.
whether to confirm the arbitration award in favor of Superior Maintenance Group, the prevailing party in the
arbitration.
2
Respondents ask the Court to “dismiss” Petitioner’s summary judgment motion based on a failure to comply with
Local Rule 56.1. Local Rule 56.1 requires that movants accompany summary judgment motions with statements of
material facts not in dispute. Though Petitioner called their statement of material facts a “Declaration,” they have
otherwise complied with Local Rule 56.1. The Court will not deny Petitioner’s motion on this basis.
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A.
Respondents Waived Their Personal Jurisdiction Defense
In their cross-motion for summary judgment, Respondents argue that the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction in this matter. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(1) provides that a party waives its personal jurisdiction defense if it does not
include the defense in a motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading. Defendants
did not file a motion to dismiss or raise personal jurisdiction as a defense in their
answer. Accordingly, Defendants have waived their ability to contest personal
jurisdiction. The Court will DENY the motion to dismiss on the basis of personal
jurisdiction.
B.
The Court Will Confirm The Award
The Court has jurisdiction over this confirmation proceeding pursuant to
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“Section
301”). “Because section 301 contains no limitations period, the most analogous
state statute of limitations [is] adopted as federal law.” Office & Prof’l Emp. Int’l
Union, Local No. 471 v. Brownsville Gen. Hosp., 186 F.3d 326, 336 (3d Cir.
1999). In “plenary actions” like this one, New Jersey law provides parties with six
years in which to confirm an arbitration award but only three months in which to
vacate an arbitration award. Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 703 F.2d 738, 745 (3d Cir.
1983) (confirmation); Hotel & Rest. Emp. & Bartenders Intern. Union, Local 54 v.
Ramada, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 1121, 1124 (D.N.J. 1986) (confirmation); Policeman’s
Benevolent Assoc., Local 292 v. Bor. of North Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 401 (1999)
(vacatur).3
In Serv. Emp. Int’l Union, Local No. 36 AFL-CIO v. Office Center Serv.,
Inc., 670 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1982), a union obtained an arbitration award against a
union employer. The union moved to confirm the award roughly one year later. In
the confirmation proceeding, the employer argued that the arbitrator’s conclusions
were “clearly erroneous, outside [of its] jurisdiction . . . and [did] not draw their
essence from the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 406 n.5. The district
court held that these objections were untimely because a motion to vacate the
award based on the same objections would have been untimely. The district court
confirmed the award, and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Third Circuit explained:
“if a defendant has important defenses to an arbitration award he should raise them
within the period prescribed for actions to vacate rather than wait to raise them as
defenses in a confirmation proceeding.” Id. at 412.
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Plenary actions are distinguished from summary actions, which are governed by N.J.R. 4:67-2(b). A summary
action for confirmation or vacatur must be commenced within three months. Policeman’s Benevolent Assoc, 158
N.J. at 396 (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7).
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Here, Respondents object to confirmation, arguing that the Award provides
classwide relief, in violation of the terms of the relevant CBAs. Respondents first
made this argument in 2012, more than two years after the Award was issued and
delivered to them. The argument is an “important defense” to an arbitration
award,” and it should have been “raise[d] . . . within the period prescribed for
actions to vacate.” 4 Id. Respondents are barred from raising the argument in this
confirmation proceeding. See id. Accordingly, the Court will DENY summary
judgment on behalf of Respondents.
While Respondents’ objections are untimely, Petitioner’s motion to confirm
the Award is timely because it was brought within New Jersey’s six year
limitations period for confirming arbitral awards. See Taylor, 703 F.2d at 745. In
the absence of any timely challenges to confirmation, the Court must confirm the
Award. See Serv. Emp., 670 F.2d at 412; see also Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Int’l
Chem. Workers Union, 853 F.2d 1310, 1317 (6th Cir. 1988) (proper to “rubber
stamp” labor arbitration award that does not violate public policy where objections
to confirmation are time-barred). Respondents do not challenge this conclusion or
attempt to distinguish the applicable caselaw. Accordingly, the Court will
GRANT summary judgment on behalf of Petitioner.
The Court will enter judgment in favor of Petitioner for $445,963.06. This
reflects the arbitrator’s award of $339,820 compounded annually at 8% from
October 23, 2009 until the date of this Opinion, in addition to $484.00 in costs.
Post-judgment interest will accrue in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED and Respondents’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. An
appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: April 29, 2013
4
In New Jersey state court, “[a]lthough the losing party may not institute an action to vacate an award after
the expiration of three months, it may file an answer asserting affirmative defenses.” Haledon, 158 N.J. at 403. At
least one court in this District has held that this rule does not apply in confirmation actions brought under Section
301. Local 863, Intern. Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousers, and Helpers of America, No. 6-3827, 2008
WL 877855, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008). As Respondents do not argue that Local 863 was incorrectly decided, the
Court will not address the issue.
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