MUHAMMAD v. CITY OF NEWARK et al

Filing 4

OPINION. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi on 1/18/13. (jd, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KWASI SEKOU MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff,

Civil No.

:

12-0325

(CCC)

V.

CITY OF NEWARK,

et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

Kwasi Sekou Muhammad, Pro Se
#422750/139888
Southern State Correctional Facility
4295 Route 47
Delmont, NJ 08314
CECCHI,

District Judge

Plaintiff, Kwasi Sekou Muhammad, incarcerated at Southern State
Correctional Facility (“SSCF”) in Delmont, New Jersey seeks to bring
this action in forma pauperis
indigence,

(“IFP”), Based on his affidavit of

the Court will grant Plaintiffs application to proceed

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (a) and order the Clerk of the Court
to file the Complaint.
The Court must now review the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e) (2) (B)

and § l9l5A(b),

to determine whether it should be

dismissed as frivolous or malicious,

for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set
the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Complaint should

forth below,
be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff seeks to sue the Newark Police Department and various
police detectives, prosecutors,
under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

a hospital,

(Compl., p.

and a private citizen

2).

Plaintiff asserts that in May of 1993,

he was “hanging” at a

friend’s house, when two cars, apparently stolen, drove by and shot
him,

As a result of the shooting,

amputated.

(Compl.,

¶[ 8-18).

Plaintiff’s left leg was

Plaintiff argues that:

During and before the shooting the Newark Police did not patrol
the area, nor did any special task force to prevent stolen
vehicles patrol the area, nor was there any special gang task
force in place to prevent gang violence and stolen vehicles,
although the neighborhood was known for having stolen vehicles
speed through the area.
(Compl., ¶ 14).

With regard to the private citizen he sues, Margaret

Lucas, Plaintiff states: “Plaintiff’s mother [presumably, Ms. Lucas]
did not ask plaintiff’s consent nor discuss anything with him prior
to doctors and/or surgeons amputating his limb.”
He notes that

“there were no alternative moods

(Compl.,

[sic]

¶ 18).

of treatment

expressed to his mother or to him as to a result of the shooting.”

(Compl.,

¶ 17).

Plaintiff asserts that the foregoing violated his right to equal
He

protection of the law, as well as various New Jersey state laws.
argues that defendant Lucas breached a fiduciary trust.
filed these claims in state court.’
relief,
Relief”,

Plaintiff

He asks for monetary and other

and for appointment of counsel.

(Compl.,

“Request for

“Request for Appointment of Counsel”).
DISCUSSION

1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal

The Prison Litigation Reform Act,
801-810,

110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321—77

Pub.

L. No.

(April 26,

104-134,

1996),

§

requires a

district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against
a governmental employee or entity.

The Court is required to identify

cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief,

See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e) (2) (3), This action is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
1915(e) (2) (B)

§

and § 1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as an

indigent and is a prisoner.
‘This Court notes that Plaintiff’s admission that he has filed
his claims in state court may bar his claims from being presented
See, e.g.,
here, under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)
3

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court
must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
See Erickson v, Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

969 F.2d 39,

42

(following Estelle

106 (1976)); see also United States v. Day,

(3d Cir.

1992)

The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S.

662,

129 5. Ct.

1937,

173 L. Ed.2d 868

(2009)

.

The Court

examined Rule 8(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
R. Civ.

P.

8(a)(2).

Fed.

Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp.

v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the proposition that “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions or ‘a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do,

‘“

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that,
to prevent a summary dismissal,

a civil complaint must allege

“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible.

This then “allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fowler v.
Iqbal,

UPMC Shadyside,

578 F,3d 203,

210

(3d Cir.

2009) (citing

supra).

The Supreme Court s ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff
4

must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are plausible.
See Iqbal,

556 U.S. 677-679.

See also Twombly,

505 U.S. at 555, &

n.3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Arngen Inc., 643 F.3d77, 84 (3dCir. 2011);
Bistrian v.

Levi,

696 F.3d 352

(3d Cir.

2012),

A complaint must

do more than allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief.

A

complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”

Fowler,

County of Allegheny,

515 F.3d

578 F.3d at 211
224,
2.

234-35

(citing Phillips v.

(3d Cir.

2008))

Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

for certain violations of his constitutional rights.

§ 1983

Section 1983

provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress
Thus,

to state a claim for relief under § 1983,

a plaintiff must

allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Piecknickv. Pennsylvania,

36 F.3d 1250,

1255-56

(3d Cir.

1994); Malleus v.

5

George,

641 F.3d

(3d Cir. 2011)

560,

563

3.

Limitations Period

Federal courts look to state law to determine the limitations
period for § 1983 actions. See Wallace v, Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387*
88

(2007).

Civil

rights

or constitutional

tort

claims

are best

characterized as personal injury actions and are governed by the
applicable
actions.

(1985).

states

statute

See Wallace,

Accordingly,

personal

injury

Plaintiff

T

supra;

of

limitations

Wilson v.

New Jersey s
T

actions,

N.J.

for

Garcia,

personal
471 U.S.

261,

25

Stat.

Ann.,

§

2A:l4—2,

governs

claim. See Montgomery v. DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120,

(3d Cir.

1989)

.

Under N.J.

280

two-year limitations period on

n.4 (3d Cir. 1998); Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t,

23,

injury

Stat. Ann.

§ 2A:14—2,

126 &

892 F.2d
an action

for an injury to the person caused by a wrongful act, neglect,

or

default must be commenced within two years of accrual of the cause
of action. See Cito, 892 F.2d at 25; accord Bro v. Foley, 810 F.2d

55,

56

(3d Cir.l987)

*

The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that the
defendants generally must plead and prove,
Constr.

Corp.,

570

F,2d

1168,

1174

See Bethel v.

(3d Cir.

1978)

Jendoco

(statute

of

limitations on civil rights claim is an affirmative defense). While

a plaintiff is not required to plead that the claim has been brought
within the statute of limitations, Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297
6

(3d Cir, 2002>, the Supreme Court observed in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 215 (2007), that if the allegations of a complaint,
relief

is

barred by

the

applicable

statute

of

“show that

limitations,

the

complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.”
In

this

case,

Plaintiff

plainly alleges

occurred on Nay of 1993, when he was shot,

that

his

injuries

He would have two years

from that date to timely file his claim. Plaintiff’s complaint was
filed on January 10, 2012, the date he signed it, which was well beyond
2
the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above,
dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
l9l5A(b) (1),
granted.

Plaintiff’s Complaint must be

§ 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii)

and §

for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

The dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff filing a

motion to reopen and an Amended Complaint to address the
deficiencies, as set forth in this Opinion.

Plaintiff’s Request for

This
2 Court notes that New Jersey statutes set forth certain
bases for “statutory tolling.” See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:l4New Jersey
21 (detailing tolling because of minority or insanity).
also allows equitable tolling, where “the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the
filing deadline to pass,” and where “a plaintiff has timely asserted
his rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the wrong
Freeman v. New Jersey, 347 N.J. Super. 11, 31, 788 A. 2d 867,
forum.”
As pled, the
879-80 (N.J. App. Div. 2002) (citations omitted).
Complaint does not allege any basis for statutory or equitable
Plaintiff may move to reopen this matter, attaching to any
tolling.
such motion to reopen an Amended Complaint detailing any basis for
tolling.
7

Counsel is dismissed as moot.
An appropriate Order follows.

(7

CLAIRE C. CEHI
United States District Judge
Dated: January 18,

2013

8