RITCHIE v. HUDSON COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, MEDICAL DEPT. et al
Filing
2
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 8/24/12. (dc, )
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
MARK RITCHIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUDSON COUNTY CORR. CENTER,
et al.,
Civil No. 12-683 (JLL)
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
:
APPEARANCES:
MARK RITCHIE, Plaintiff pro se
254320
Hudson County Correctional Center
35 Hackensack Avenue
S. Kearny, N.J. 07032
LINARES, District Judge
Plaintiff Mark Ritchie (“Plaintiff”) seeks to bring this
action in forma pauperis.
Based on his affidavit of indigence,
the Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of
the Court to file the complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, to determine whether it
should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes
that the complaint should be dismissed.
Plaintiff’s request for
pro bono counsel will be dismissed as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, incarcerated at Hudson County Correctional Center
in South Kearny, New Jersey at the time of filing, brings this
civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against
Defendants Hudson County Correctional Center and Dr. Parks.
The
following factual allegations are taken from the complaint, and
are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has
made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s allegations.
On or about December 21, 2011, Plaintiff was seen by the
medical department at the Hudson County Correctional Center and
they ordered that Plaintiff be given a bottom bunk because he was
having back problems.
About a week later, Plaintiff fell from
the top bunk and re-injured his back.
in the medical ward.
As a result, he was placed
While in the medical ward, Plaintiff fell
in the shower, further injuring his back and head.
Plaintiff
alleges that he fell due to the fact that there were no railings
in the shower.
Plaintiff further alleges that he asked Dr. Parks
for tramadol to treat his back injury, a medication he had been
receiving before his incarceration, but Dr. Parks refused to
prescribe it for him.
Plaintiff requests that the Court reward him “with some sort
2
of relief for his injuries.”
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires
a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity.
The Court is required
to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A because Plaintiff is
proceeding as an indigent and is a prisoner.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
3
The Court
examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.”
FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2).
Citing its opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the
proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to
prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege
“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009)(citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948).
The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint
are plausible.
See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50.
See also
Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen
Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).
“A complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint
has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”
Fowler, 578
F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)).
4
2.
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section
1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48,
108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania,
36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d
560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
1.
Correctional Facility
Plaintiff has named Hudson County Correctional Center as a
defendant in this action.
A jail is not a “person” amenable to
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Marsden v. Federal BOP, 856
F.Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (county jail not an entity
amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Powell v. Cook County
5
Jail, 814 F.Supp. 757, 758 (N.D.Ill. 1993) (Cook County Jail not
a “person” under § 1983); McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional
Center, 788 F.Supp. 890, 893–94 (E.D.Va. 1992) (local jail not a
“person” under § 1983); Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928
F.Supp. 993, 995 (N.D.Cal. 1996) (county department of
corrections is an agency of the county and cannot be sued
separately from the county under § 1983); Mayes v. Elrod, 470
F.Supp. 1188, 1192 (N.D.Ill. 1979) (county department of
corrections not a suable entity separate from the county).
Accordingly, all claims against Hudson County Correctional Center
will be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Dr. Parks
Pre-trial detainees and convicted but unsentenced prisoners
retain liberty interests firmly grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399
F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 (3d
Cir. 2000).
Analysis of whether such a detainee or unsentenced
prisoner has been deprived of liberty without due process is
governed by the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 157–60, 164–67; Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 341–42.
In
evaluating
the
constitutionality
of
conditions
or
restrictions
of
pretrial
detention that implicate only the protection
against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, we think that the proper
inquiry is whether those conditions amount to
6
punishment of the detainee. For under the Due
Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished
prior
to
an
adjudication
of
guilt in
accordance with due process of law....
Not every disability imposed during pretrial
detention amounts to “punishment” in the
constitutional
sense,
however.
Once the
government
has
exercised
its
conceded
authority to detain a person pending trial, it
obviously is entitled to employ devices that
are
calculated
to
effectuate
this
detention....
A court must decide whether the disability is
imposed for the purpose of punishment or
whether it is but an incident of some other
legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a
showing of an expressed intent to punish on
the part of detention facility officials, that
determination generally will turn on “whether
an
alternative
purpose
to
which
[the
restriction] may rationally be connected is
assignable for it, and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned [to it].” Thus, if a
particular
condition
or
restriction
of
pretrial detention is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective, it does
not, without more, amount to “punishment.”
Conversely, if a restriction or condition is
not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if
it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees
qua detainees....
441 U.S. at 535–39 (citations omitted).
The Court further
explained that the government has legitimate interests that stem
from its need to maintain security and order at the detention
facility. “Restraints that are reasonably related to the
institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not,
7
without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if
they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee
would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting
trial.”
441 U.S. at 540.
With respect to medical care and
prison conditions, however, pretrial detainees retain at least
those constitutional rights enjoyed by convicted prisoners.
Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545; Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 165–66; Natale,
318 F.3d at 581–82; Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 187–88 (3d
Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts suggesting
intent to punish in connection with either the top bunk or the
decision by Dr. Parks not to provide Plaintiff with the
prescription medicine he wanted.
Nor do the facts alleged
reflect that the incidents complained of arose out of any
arbitrary or purposeless policies or practices. The Complaint
fails to state a claim for deprivation of Plaintiff's due process
rights.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint will be
dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
However, because it is conceivable
that Plaintiff may be able to supplement his pleading with facts
sufficient to overcome the deficiencies noted herein, the Court
8
will grant Plaintiff leave to move to re-open this case and to
file an amended complaint.1
Plaintiff’s request for pro bono
counsel is dismissed as moot.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: August 24, 2012
S/ Jose L. Linares
JOSE L. LINARES
United States District Judge
1
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the
original complaint no longer performs any function in the case and “cannot be
utilized to cure defects in the amended [complaint], unless the relevant
portion is specifically incorporated in the new [complaint].” 6 Wright,
Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (2d ed.1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in
the original complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations
to be adopted must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer
course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
9
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?