THOMAS v. GERBER PRODUCTS COMPANY et al
Filing
102
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jose L. Linares on 10/6/14. (jd, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
IN RE GERBER PROBIOTIC
PRACTICES LITIGATION
SALES
Civil Action No.: 12-835 (JLL)
OPINION
LINARES, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court by way of a motion to dismiss (CM/ECF No. 93) the
Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (CM/ECF No. 92) pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Gerber Products Company (hereafter “Defendant” or “Gerber”). No
oral argument was heard pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After
considering the submissions of the parties in support of and in opposition to the instant motion,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The instant putative consumer-protection class action arises out of the alleged deceptive,
false, and misleading marketing of three Gerber products (collectively the “Products”): Good Start
Protect Infant Formula and Good Start 2 Protect Formula for 9 through 24 months (“Good Start”),
and DHA & Probiotic Cereal
—
Single Grain Oatmeal and Rice varieties. (FAC
¶ 2).
Plaintiffs’
allege that the marketing and labeling of those products are deceptive in two primary ways: despite
1
The following plaintiffs assert claims in the FAC Irene Dourdoulakis, Shavonda Hawkins, and Saba Siddiqi.
(FAC ¶{ 24-26) (collectively “Plaintiffs”).
representations to the contrary, the Products (1) do not provide immune system
benefits; and (2)
are not near equal to breast milk.
First, Plaintiffs assert that the Products’ marketing and labeling contain
false and
misleading misrepresentations based on the immune system effect of a probio
tic bacteria, “Bifidus
BL.” (FAC ¶ 4). Plaintiffs allege that despite Defendant’s representations regard
ing the Produc
ts’
immune system benefits, “numerous studies show that the Products do not and
cannot provide the
immune-related health benefits Defendant claims.” (FAC 4). Specifically,
Plaintiffs allege:
¶
Gerber’s representations are designed to induce consumers, unaware that healthy
babies’ bodies already maintain the proper balance of intestinal bacteria, to
buy the
Products. Gerber advertises the Products as the only formulas and cereals
that
include probiotics that will strengthen and support the immune systems of
young
children. However, Defendant’s marketing message is false and decept
ive, as the
“probiotic” bacteria in the Products do not perform as advertised, and scienti
fic
studies
demonstrate that probiotic supplementation in infant formula does not
support infant immunity or provide the advertised health benefits including
because
such supplementation does not (a) decrease the levels of harmful pathog
ens in
babies’ intestinal microflora, (b) increase the levels of good bacteria in
babies’
intestinal micro-flora, or (c) reduce infections.
.
(FAC
.
¶ 8, see also ¶J
16, 17).
With regard to the Good Start products, Plaintiffs maintain that the Gerber
marketing
strategy deliberately includes “IMMUNIPROTECTr which contains
,”
TM
the trademarked Bifidus
BL probiotic bacteria, as a “deceptive marketing hook.” (FAC
¶ 6).
With regard to its cereal
products, which also contain Bifidus BL, Plaintiffs allege that Gerber represe
nts they will “help
support a healthy immune system.” Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Gerber
, to further reinforce the
allegedly deceptive message, represents that the Products’ “advanced”
immune system benefits
result from the use of Bifidus BL, which is found in breast milk. (FAC
¶ 7). Plaintiffs assert that
“Gerber’s representations are designed to induce customers, unaware
that healthy babies’ bodies
already maintain the proper balance of intestinal bacteria, to buy the produc
ts.” (FAC ¶ 8).
Second, Plaintiffs allege that despite the fact that “experts unanimously
agree that breast
milk is best for infants,” Gerber also adds ingredients to the Products in
order to “claim on its
packaging and labeling, and throughout its marketing and advertising campa
ign that the Products
possess nutritional qualities that are nearly equivalent to those of breast
milk.” (FAC
also
¶ 12, see
¶J 13, 14). However, scientific evidence allegedly demonstrates that “breast milk provides
unique nutritional benefits that Defendant’s Products do not provide.”
(FAC
¶ 15).
Plaintiffs allege that even though the Products’ marketing implies that
there is a proven
scientific basis for the immune system benefits, by representing that the
health-related claims are
based on “studies” and “research,” “the body of scientific evidence on
probiotic supplementation
in infant formula shows that the probiotic ingredient in the Products
does not support the infant
immune system and does not otherwise provide the advertised health
benefits.” (FAC
e.g.
¶ 19, see
¶ 36, 38) (emphasis in original). Similarly, “scientific evidence proves that, contrary to
Defendant’s advertising, formula supplemented with probiotics does
not provide breast milkquality nutrition.” (FAC ¶ 20).
In support of the allegation that the findings of numerous studies
contradict Defendant’s
representations regarding the Products, Plaintiffs point to a numbe
r of scientific studies and
reports.
(FAC
¶J 70-82). In addition, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant cites no studies that
effectively support certain of its claims. In fact, Plaintiffs claim that
the studies cited by Defendant
actually demonstrates the falsity of Defendant’s advertising and
otherwise do not support its
immunity strengthening claims. (FAC 83-87). Therefore, Plainti
¶J
ffs allege that “[njone of these
studies, even if they could be characterized as clinical
—
which they cannot
—
supports the
conclusion that Gerber Products in fact strengthen and suppor
t a baby and toddler’s immune
system as labeled and advertised.” (FAC
¶ 88).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege that the “labeling and advertisin
g claims are false and
deceptive because they imply that the Products provide more healt
h benefits that other, less costly
predecessor and regular formulas that do not contain
probiotics, Bifidus
“IMMUNIPROTECTTM.”
(FAC
¶ 61).
BLTM,
or
Therefore, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s
representations regarding the Products are likely to misl
ead consumers acting reasonably under
the circumstances into believing that the Products are supe
rior to other products because they are
the near-equivalent of breast milk and that they provide imm
une system benefits. (FAC
¶ 62).
Further, they allege that a reasonable consumer would not have
purchased the Products but for the
alleged misrepresentations and that Plaintiffs have paid a prem
ium for doing so. (FAC
¶ 100).
Gerber allegedly sells the Products at a premium over pred
ecessor and regular formula products
without probiotics. (FAC
¶
22).
Plaintiffs assert that despite rebranding the Products in Febr
uary 2010 and re-naming them
in early 2011, Defendant has manufactured, marketed,
and sold the Products since at least
September 27, 2009 with false and misleading representa
tions on the packaging, labeling, and
online advertising. (FAC ¶ 3). Defendant allegedly
advertises and promotes the Products
primarily through “the front-of-pack and back-of-pack” label
ing claims. (FAC ¶ 42). In addition,
Defendant allegedly uses online advertising, including at
its website, and other media, including
television commercials. (FAC ¶j 43, 59, 60).
Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action in the FAC:
(1) violation of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 56:8-2
et seq. (“NJCFA”) on behalf of Plaintiff
Dourdoulakis and the putative Class or New Jersey Subc
lass; (2) violation of the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act, California Civil Code
§ 1750,
et seq., on behalf of Plaintiffs Hawkins and the
putative California Subclass; (3) unlawful business
acts and practices in violation of California
Business & Professions Code Section 17200, et seq., on behalf of Plainti
ffs Hawkins and the
putative California Subclass; (4) violation of the New York Consumer Protec
tion Act, N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law
§ 349, et seq., on behalf of Plaintiff Siddiqi and the putative New York Subclass; (5)
violation of the Washington Deceptive Trade Practices Law, Wash. Rev.
Code.
§ 19.86.020, et
seq. on behalf of Plaintiffs the putative Washington Subclass. In additio
n, the FAC also contains
a number of New Jersey state law claims on behalf of all Plaintiffs and
the putative class, or in the
alternative on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons from each
Plaintiff’s respective state
of residence pursuant to the applicable provision of law from his or her
state: (I) breach of implied
warranty of merchantability (Count VI); and (3) unjust enrichment
(Count VII).
II. JURISDICTION and LEGAL STANDARD
Jurisdiction is premised upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2), as Plaintiffs allege that the matter in
controversy, exclusive of interest and cost, exceeds the value of $5 million
and is a class action in
which at least one class member is a citizen of a different state from
Defendant.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint
set forth “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” For a complaint to
survive dismissal, it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accept
ed as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Jqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Ati.
Corp.
V.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007)). The plaintiff’s
short and plain statement of the claim must “give the defendants
fair notice of what the.
.
.
claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must accept
all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of the non-moving party. See Phillips
v. County ofAllegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008). “Factual allegat
ions must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twom
bly, 550 U.S. at 555
(2007). Further, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formul
aic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (2007)). However, this “does
not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough
facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary elemen
t.” st Penn Allegheny
Health Sys. Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Phillip
s v. County ofAllegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.2008)),
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motions Before the Court
1. Defendant’s argument
Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted on two grounds: (1) Plainti
ffs lack Article
III standing to assert claims for Gerber’s infant formula products becaus
e no remaining named
plaintiff is alleged to have purchased the specific product; and (2) The
New Jersey Plaintiff fails
to allege an “ascertainable loss”.
2. Plaintiff’s Opposition
In opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiff argues: (1) Plaintiffs
have standing to assert
claims relating to products they did not purchase; and (2) Plainti
ffs have plead an ascertainable
loss under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.
B. Standing
The requirements of Article III constitutional standing are as follow
s:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”-an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or immin
ent, not
conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection betwee
n the injury
and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challen
ged
action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third
party
not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative,
that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlfe, 504 U.S. 555, 560—61, (1992); Darners
Motor Co., Inc. v, Ford
Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290—91 (3d Cir. 2005); Society Hill Towers Owner
s’Ass’ n v. Rendell,
210 F.3d 168, 175—76 (3d Cir. 2000).
‘ln the class action context, however, traditional notions of standing are not
completely
informative of what claims may be asserted.” In re Franklin Mut Funds Litig.,
F.Supp.2d at 461.
none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes
the requisite case or
controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himsel
f or any other member
of the class.” Hayes v. Wal—Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-2522, 2013 WL 39577
57, at *9 (3d Cir.
2013) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, (1974)). At the pleadin
g stage,
“{a]lthough general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defend
ants conduct may
suffice, the complaint must still ‘clearly and specifically set forth facts suffici
ent to satisfy’
Article III.” Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38,41 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotin
g Lujan, 504 U.S. at
561; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
In Haas v. Pittsburgh National Bank, the Third Circuit held that notwithstand
ing the fact
that a plaintiff lacked standing to pursue a particular claim, she could assert
that claim in a
putative class action where she did have standing to pursue two closely
related claims against the
same defendant. 526 F.2d 1083, 1088—89 (3d Cir. 1975). The Third Circuit
explained in that
case:
Haas’ two claims against Mellon Bank, moreover, are close relat
ly
ed to the commercial
transactions claim on which she lacks standing. Not only do
all three claims involve
identical revolving accounts under the same Mellon Bank card
holder agreements, but the
statutory damages sought to be recovered for each asserted viola
tion are in large part the
same.
Id.
Following that rationale, this Court, in Stewart v. Smart Bala
nce, denied Defendant’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for products they did not
personally purchase. No. 11 -6174,
2012 WL 4168584, at 14. (D.N.J. June 26, 2012) Smart Bala
nce asserted, inter alia, that the
Stewarts lacked standing to pursue claims for two out of the
three Fat Free Enhanced Milk
products at issue, stating “the injury in fact requirement does
not, as Plaintiffs urge, disappear in
the class action context.” Id. This Court found dismissal inap
propriate at that particular stage of
the litigation because the basis for the Plaintiffs’ claims were the
same, the products were closely
related, and the defendants were the same. Id. at 16. Thes facto
e
rs, coupled with the fact that the
issue of standing was not before the Court, led to denial of
Smart Balance’s motion to dismiss.
Id.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs lack Article Ill standing
to assert claims for Gerber’s
infant formula products because no remaining named plain
tiff is alleged to have purchased the
specific product. Specifically, Defendant state that in orde
r to allege a concrete “injury in-fact,” a
plaintiff must have suffered an injury as a result of actua
lly purchasing the product in question
himself. However, because Plaintiffs removed Jose Joven
as a plaintiff within the FAC, the
Complaint now fails to include a named plaintiff who purc
hased the infant formula products
personally. Defendant further argues that even if Plain
tiffs are entitled to assert claims for
products they did not personally purchase, the products
are not sufficiently related for Plaintiffs’
claims to meet the standard imposed by the Court.
Plaintiffs argue that contrary to Defendant’s assertions, Plaintiffs do have
Article III
standing. Plaintiffs state that if a standing issue would arise solely becaus
e of class certification,
then the class certification issue should be decided before the standin
g issues are addressed.
Therefore, Plaintiffs contend, because Plaintiffs’ class has yet to
be certified, a dismissal based
upon Plaintiffs lack of standing would be premature. What is more,
Plaintiffs argue that if a class
includes purchasers of a variety of products, a named plaintiff that
purchases only one type of
product may assert a claim for a product he did not purchase, as
long as the misrepresentations
and omissions were common to all purchasers. Further, Plaintiff conten
ds that a class-action
plaintiff may assert claims for a product he did not purchase so long
as the basis for the claims is
the same, the products are closely related, and the defendants are the
same.
While Defendant is correct in asserting that Plaintiffs have failed to
name a Plaintiff who
has personally purchased Gerber’s infant formula product, the Court
declines to dismiss
Defendant’s motion on these grounds. Following the approach taken
by Haas and Stewart, the
Court finds that dismissal is inappropriate at this stage of the litigati
on.
First, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the basis for the claims is the
same. Plaintiffs argue
that Gerber falsely promoted both products as having the same probio
tic bacteria, Bifidus BL,
which, Defendant claims, promotes the development of Children’s
immune systems. (emphasis
added). Plaintiff furthers their argument by noting that both the formul
a and cereal products are
part of the same “Start Healthy, Stay Healthy” product line. Plainti
ffs maintain that Gerber
promotes this product line as one that is “backed by rigorous science
and research,”
“scientifically advanced,” and both products bear the “ImmuniProte
ct” trademark, allegedly
designed to “help [consumers) recognize Gerber foods with
important vitamins and minerals that
support healthy growth as well as nutrients and ingredients that
support a healthy immune
system.” Second, the Court finds that the products are closely related.
Not only are the products
part of the same “Start Healthy, Stay Healthy” line, as Plaintiff notes,
they both contain the same
probiotic bacteria, Bifidus BL. Finally, the Defendants are the same
due to both products being
manufactured by Gerber. Therefore, by following the same approa
ch this Court took in Stewart,
which was based on the Third Circuit’s ruling in Haas, the Court finds
dismissal of Plaintiffs
claim, based upon a failure to name a Plaintiff who personally bough
t one of the products at
issue, inappropriate at this stage of the litigation.
C. Ascertainable Loss
“To state a cause of action under the [New Jersey] Consumer Fraud
Act, a plaintiff must
allege: (1) an unlawful practice by the defendant; (2) ascertainable
loss by plaintiff and (3) a
causal nexus between the first two elements—defendant’s allegedly
unlawful behavior and the
plaintiffs ascertainable loss.” New Jersey Citizen Action v. Scheri
ng-Plough Corp., 367 N.J.
Super. 8, 11-12 (App. Div. 2003) (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
138 N.J. 2, 24 (1994)).
Under the NJCFA, Plaintiffs are “required to plead specific facts setting
forth and defining the
ascertainable loss suffered.” Solo v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No.
06-1908, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31088, at *9 (D.N.J. April 26, 2007). To establish ascertainable
loss, a plaintiff “must
suffer a definite, certain and measurable loss, rather than one that
is merely theoretical.” Bosland
v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 557 (2009); see also Thiede
mann v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 248 (2005) (evidence of ascertainable loss “must
be presented with some
certainty demonstrating that it is capable of calculation.
. .“).
In interpreting the NJCFA, courts
have been instructed to “be faithful to the Act’s broad remedial purpos
es..
[Act] broadly, not in a crabbed fashion.” Id. at 556 (citations omitte
d).
.
.
[and] construe the
In cases involving misrepresentation, “either out-of-pocket loss or a demon
stration of loss
in value will suffice to meet the ascertainable loss hurdle.” Thiedemann,
872 A.2d at 792. In
addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court has found ascertainable loss premis
ed on a benefit-ofthe-bargain theory sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 795
n.8; Smajlaj, 782 F. Supp.
2d at 99. “A plaintiff alleging a benefit-of-the-bargain states a claim if
he or she alleges (1) a
reasonable belief about the product induced by a misrepresentation; and
(2) that the difference in
value between the product promised and the one received can be reason
ably quantified.” Id.
importantly, “[tjhe certainty implicit in the concept of an ‘ascertainable
’ loss is that it is
quantifiable or measurable.” Thiedemann, 872 A.2d at 792.
Defendant argues that because the sole remaining New Jersey Plaintiff,
Dourdoulakis,
(“NJ Plaintiff”) has not alleged the purchase or use of Gerber infant formul
a products, as a
matter of law she cannot establish ascertainable loss with respect to the
formula. Defendant
maintains that under the benefit of the bargain theory, NJ Plaintiff has
not alleged that she either
was promised or received allegedly inferior products. Therefore, Defend
ant argues, NJ Plaintiff
cannot “quantify the difference in value between the promised produc
ts and the actual product
received.” Smajiaf, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 99. Further, Defendant conten
ds that the remaining
allegations NJ Plaintiff offers in support of ascertainable loss on cereal
are inadequate as a matter
of law. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to
identify a comparable product
and its price to the product in question.
Plaintiffs state that by asserting that NJ Plaintiff failed to buy the Good
Start Formula and
therefore cannot allege ascertainable loss, Defendant is merely “re-run
[ningj” its argument
regarding NJ Plaintiff and the incapacity to sue for loss agains produc
t
ts she did not buy. Further,
Plaintiff states that they have validly alleged a benefit of the bargain
theory in the FAC.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that they have alleged that Gerber charges
a premium for its
probiotic products, based upon the benefits to the immune system that the
products supposedly
provide. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that they have also alleged that becaus
e the products do
not actually offer these benefits, Plaintiffs have suffered a loss becaus
e they purchased a product
and received less than what they paid for. Finally, Plaintiffs maintains
that they do not need to
specifically identify a comparable product by name. Rather, Plaintiffs
claims that they need only
to generally identify the type of products used for comparison and the
results of that comparison.
While Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that a reasonable belief about
the product was
induced by a misrepresentation, Plaintiff has failed to identify a compa
rable product and its cost,
which would allow the Court to find the difference in value between
the product as promised and
the product as allegedly received. In Lieberson v. Johnson and Johnso
n, this Court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice, for failure to allege the identity
and cost of comparable
products. 865 F. Supp. 2d at 541. The court stated:
“[Ajithough Plaintiff alleges that comparable products cost twenty
five percent less than
the J & J products, Plaintiff has not alleged the identity or the cost of
any allegedly
comparable products. Thus, the Court is unable “to quantify the differe
nce in value
between the promised product and the actual product received.” Smajla
j, 782 F.Supp.2d
at 99. As a result, the Court finds that absent any specific information
concerning the
price of the Products or the price of any comparable products, Plainti
ffs allegations
concerning the ascertainable loss are nothing more than unsupported
conclusory
statements that are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.
For these reasons,
Plaintiffs claims under the NJCFA are dismissed without prejudice
because it is
conceivable that Plaintiff could plead ascertainable loss with suffici
ent specificity.
Id.
Following the Court’s reasoning in Lieberson, this Court finds that
because Plaintiffs
have failed to allege the identity and cost of comparable products
to the products at issue, the
Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs allege
that Gerber charged more for
the products at issue than for its ordinary formula and infant cereal
products, and competitor
formula and infant cereal products (including both branded and private label produc
ts); that there
is a difference of 10 cents per ounce for branded formulas and 45 cents per ounce
for private
label formulas; and Gerber is able to charge approximately $0.05 more per ounce
for its DHA &
Probiotic Cereal over its own oatmeal & banana, rice & banana apple, and oatmea
l & apple
peach infant cereals.
While Plaintiffs have named some of the comparable products (ie. Gerber’s own
infant
cereals and formulas), they fail to name the identity of the alleged branded and private
labeled
products. Moreover, while Plaintiffs allege the difference in price between produc
ts, Plaintiffs
fails to allege a price paid for the products, as well as the price for any compa
rable products.
Plaintiff’s allegations under the benefit of the bargain are sufficient, but for
the lack of identity of
some of the comparable products or the cost of any allegedly comparable produc
t. In order for
the Court to quantify the difference in value between the promised product
and the actual
product received, the Court must know the identity and price of the compared
product beyond
the conclusory tags of “private label formulas” and “competitor formula and
infant cereal
products.” Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs could plead ascertainable
loss with specificity,
the Court will grant afinal opportunity to amend this claim insofar as they can
insert the
identities and prices of comparable products sufficient to allege ascertainable
loss under the
benefit of the bargain theory. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Complaint is dismissed
without prejudice.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein expressed, the New Jersey Plaintiffs’ NJCFA claim is
dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs may amend within 30 days.
Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs claim for lack of Article III standing is denied.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
DATE: October 6, 2014
Is/Jose L. Linares
Jose L. Linares
United States District Judge
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