GROHS et al v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al
Filing
28
OPINION. Signed by Judge Kevin McNulty on 11/20/13. (jd, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
STEVEN GROHS,
Civ. No. 2:12-00905
(KM)(MCA)
Plaintiff,
V•
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MEG YATAURO et al.,
Defendants.
KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.:
This matter comes before the court on the motion of the Defendants, Meg
Yatauro and Gary M. Lanigan, to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and on grounds of sovereign and
qualified immunity. Also before the Court is a motion for a preliminary
injunction filed by the Plaintiff, Steven Grohs. For the reasons discussed below,
the motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion for
a preliminary injunction is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, Steven Grohs, is a civilly committed resident at the Special
Treatment Unit (“STU”) in Avenel, Middlesex County, New Jersey. Compi.,
(Docket No. 10),
¶ 2.1. Grohs and four other named plaintiffs filed this civil
rights action, styled as a class action, against Meg Yatauro and Gary Lanigan,
officials of the New Jersey Department of Corrections
(“NJDOC”). The
Complaint raises a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 relating to the health and safety conditions of the
STU where Grohs is confined. Id. ¶J 4.20, 6.7. Specifically, Grohs alleges that
the STU provides residents with inadequate hot water for showering and that,
1
as a result, Grohs’ medical conditions, including MRSA and a respiratory
allergy, have worsened. Compi.
¶J 4.4
—
4.15. Grohs seeks declaratory relief
regarding the Defendants’ conduct; injunctive relief ordering the Defendants to
repair the hot water system, appointing a Special Master, and appointing pro
bono counsel; and damages. Id.
¶ 7.
Yatauro is the Administrator and head of the STU. Id.
¶ 3.2. Lanigan is
the Commissioner and head of the NJDOC. Id.
¶ 3.3. Both Defendants are sued
in their individual and official capacities. Compi. ¶J 3.2
3.3. The complaint
—
alleges that these two Defendants are liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for the conduct of their subordinates, and that they knew or should
have known about the wrongful conduct that is alleged. Id.
Because Grohs alleges a civil rights claim for damages under 42 U.S.C.
§
1983, the Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and 1343(a). Diversity of citizenship is not alleged, and does
not appear to be present. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The Complaint alleges the following facts, which are assumed to be true
for the purposes of this motion to dismiss. The STU consists of two buildings in
Avenel, New Jersey: the Main Unit, containing individual cells, and the Annex,
containing open-bay dormitories. Compi.
¶ 4.2, The NJDOC is charged with
responsibility for the STU, including the maintenance and upkeep of the
facility, pursuant to state law. Id. Grohs is housed in the Annex. Id.
The steam system that provides heat and hot water to the STU is in
disrepair. IcL
¶ 4.4. The hot water provided is inadequate for the number of
residents housed in the Annex. Id. The temperature rarely exceeds 73 degrees
and is often colder. Id. Even when the water does exceed 73 degrees, it
fluctuates to “cold and freezing cold.” Id. The lack of hot water is worsened by
other conditions at the Annex. The shower area is large and unheated. Id.
¶
4.5. The steam pipes leak onto the floor of the dining area, and some parts of
the pipes are not insulated. Id. The hot water used by the showers is
2
continuously shared with washing machines from 6:15 am to 9:15 pm, seven
days a week. Id. The residents are not permitted to shower outside of that time
range, when more hot water is available. Id.
On or about January 5, 2012, Grohs asked STU Assistant Administrator
Steve Johnson why there was inadequate water. Id.
¶
4.6. Johnson responded
that he had requested that the State repair defective piping valves over the last
three years, but was told that it was too expensive to repair. Id. The STU has
also received “numerous” written complaints about the hot water. Id.
Residents
making
complaints,
including
Grohs,
were
never
¶
4.13.
given
any
reasonable explanation why the necessary repairs were not made to the steam
system. Id.
¶11
4.6, 4.13
Defendants Yatauro and Lanigan have personally toured the STU and
have been informed about the residents’ complaints. Id.
¶
4.12. Defendants
knew or should have known that residents were using alternative means of
heating water, including coffee urns and microwaves. Id.
¶J
4.8, 4.9. The
Defendants also knew or should have known that the building was incurring
water damage from leaky steam pipes and that residents were suffering adverse
health effects from this “unhealthy environment.” Id.
¶J
4.7, 4.11.
Those adverse health effects include respiratory allergies and asthma.
Id. Grohs suffers from MRSA,’ lower back injuries, and a respiratory allergy. Id.
¶
4.15. Because of MRSA, Grohs must shower at least once a day. The cold
showers
cause
him
ongoing,
intermittent
“non—life
threatening
and
unnecessary respiratory difficulties.” Id.
Grohs filed his Complaint on February 14, 2012, and applied to proceed
in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (Docket Nos.
1, 2). The Court granted Grohs’
The Court takes judicial notice that MRSA is an abbreviation for Methicihin
resistant Staphylococcus aureus, an infection caused by a strain of staph bacteria
that has become resistant to the antibiotics commonly used to treat ordinary staph
infections. In its variant forms, it seemingly tends to occur in hospitals or crowded
institutional settings. See www.mayoclinic.org/mrsa/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
3
application to proceed IFP on December 12, 2012, but denied the applications
of the other four named plaintiffs. (Docket No. 9 at 3-4). In the same Order, the
Court dismissed the State of New Jersey, the NJDOC, and the STU as improper
defendants under Section 1983. Id. at 2. Although the complaint was filed as a
class action, the Court deferred a ruling on class certification. Id. The
remaining defendants, Yatauro and Lanigan, filed this motion to dismiss on
May 13, 2013. (Docket No. 21).
On June 7, 2013, Grohs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.
(Docket No. 24). In the motion, Grohs alleges that his legal papers related to
this case were wrongfully taken from his cell and read, and that he has been
threatened and harassed by STU corrections officers. Plaintiff P.1. Br., (Docket
No. 24-1), p. 7-8, (Grohs Affs. attached as Exhibits A
—
B). (He acknowledges
that the papers were returned to him.) Id. at 4. Grohs asks the Court to enjoin
any further retaliation, and urges that the Court exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a common law retaliation claim. Id. at 10-11. Grohs has not
sought leave to amend his complaint to include a retaliation claim, and at least
some of the alleged targets of the claim seem to be non-parties.
The Defendants filed their opposition to the preliminary injunction
motion non June 17, 2013 (Docket No. 25). Grohs filed a reply on June 25,
2013. (Docket No. 26). On August 30, 2013, he filed a supplemental pleading in
further support of his motion for a preliminary injunction. (Docket 27).
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment/”Persons” Liable Under Section 1983
The Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed because
Grohs’ claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and, relatedly, that state
employees in their official capacities are not “persons” amenable to suit under
42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Def. Br. at 6. Defendants raise their immunity arguments
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but they are more properly considered as
challenges to the court’s jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). Rule
4
12(b)(1) challenges may be either facial or factual attacks. See 2 MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[4j (3d ed. 2007); Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial challenge asserts that
the complaint does not allege sufficient grounds to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (D.N.J. 1999).
A court considering such a facial challenge assumes that the allegations in the
complaint are true, and may dismiss the complaint only if it nevertheless
appears that the plaintiff will not be able to assert a colorable claim of subject
matter jurisdiction. Cardio—Med. Assoc., Ltd. v. Crozer—Chester Med. Ctr., 721
F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983); Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438. For the purposes
of this motion to dismiss, the Defendants’ immunity defenses will be
considered as facial attacks.
The Eleventh Amendment “is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal
courts of subject matter jurisdiction” over actions against a State. Blanciak v.
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79
L.Ed.2d 67 (1984)). The state’s immunity from suit also extends to “arms” of
the state, such as agencies or departments. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99; Carter
v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotations and
emphasis omitted); see also Chisoim v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 322-23 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity may be available to a state partyin-interest notwithstanding a claimant’s failure to formally name the state as a
defendant.”). The state’s sovereign immunity, moreover, is preserved under
Section 1983; a state is therefore not a “person” who may be sued under
Section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989).
The immunity of state officers under Section 1983 is more nuanced.
Under Will, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the officials office.” Id. at 71
(citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878
(1985)). Such a suit is thus no different from a suit against the State itself. Id.
5
(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165-166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87
L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.s.
658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Under Will and Hafer, Grohs’ claims for
damages against the Defendants in their official capacities are barred by
sovereign immunity.
A claim for damages against a state official in his or her individual
capacity is a different matter. In that individual capacity, he or she does not
partake of the state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and is a
suable “person” within the meaning of Section 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 30-3 1, 112 S. Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991) (“the Eleventh Amendment
does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and personal liability
on state officials under § 1983”) (internal quotations omitted); Smith v. New
Jersey, 908 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563 (D.N.J. 2012). An award of damages from an
individual defendant, as opposed to the public treasury, is a “permissible
remedy in some circumstances.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238, 94 5.
Ct.
1683
(1974).
Accordingly,
Grohs’
claims
for
damages
against the
Defendants in their individual capacities are not barred. See Compi.
3.3.
¶J 3.2
-
That leaves Grohs’ Section 1983 claim for injunctive relief. “[Ojfficial
capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the
state.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10 (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14); see
also Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
A state official against whom prospective injunctive relief is sought, then, does
not partake of the State’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,
and is considered a “person” for purposes of Section 1983. The claim for
injunctive relief is not barred.
Accordingly, I decide the Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional motions to
dismiss as follows. The motion to dismiss is granted as to the Section 1983
damages claims against Yatauro and Lanigan in their official capacities. The
6
motion to dismiss is denied as to the damages claims asserted against them in
their individual capacities. And the motion to dismiss is denied as to claims for
injunctive or prospective relief against Defendants in their official capacities.
B. Failure to State a Claim
The Defendants also argue that Grohs has failed to allege facts sufficient
to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation under Section 1983. These
arguments will be considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which provides for
the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
1. The Rule 12(b)(6) standard
To state a valid claim for relief, the Complaint must contain: (1) a short
and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction; (2) a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought. Fed R. Civ. P. 8(a).
The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.
2005). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must take the allegations of
the complaint as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff.
Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). Although a
complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels
and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, the
factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a
speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570; see also
Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008).
7
In a case brought pro Se, such as this one, the Court must construe the
complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 9394 (2007); Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Liberal construction
does not, however, require the Court to credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald
assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d
902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Even a pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure
to state a claim if the allegations set forth by the plaintiff cannot be construed
as supplying facts to support a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. See
Millhouse v. Carison, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981).
2. Personal Involvement
The Defendants first argue that the Complaint relies solely on respondeat
superior, and fails to allege that they were personally involved in the alleged
wrongdoing. Def. Br. at 10
—
11. The liability of a defendant in a Section 1983
civil rights action cannot be predicated solely on respondeat superior, there
must be personal involvement. See Shaw by Strain v. Stackhouse, 920 F.2d
1135, 1147 (3d Cir. 1990); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195,
1207 (3d. Cir. 1988) (citing Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n. 3, 101 S.Ct.
1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d
1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976)).
Defendants correctly note that one of the theories of liability alleged in
the Complaint is respondeat superior, which is insufficient as a matter of law.
See Compl.
¶J
3.2
—
3.3. If that were the only theory of liability alleged, the
Complaint might have to be dismissed. The Complaint, however, also alleges
that the Defendants were personally involved in the failure to provide hot water
to the STU residents. See id. Specifically, the Complaint alleges the following
facts: There are visibly leaking steam pipes in the STU for which trash cans are
used to collect the water (Compi.
toured the STU (Id.
¶
¶
4.11); both Yatauro and Lanigan personally
4.12); the STU has received numerous written complaints
8
from residents about inadequate hot water (Id.
¶
4.13); Grohs asked STU
Assistant Administrator Steve Johnson about the hot water in the Annex and
he responded that the defective piping valves were too expensive to repair (Id.
¶
4.6). Allegedly, then, both Yatauro and Lanigan had personal knowledge of the
problems with hot water in the Annex, they saw the potentially unhealthy
environment caused by the leaky pipes, they received complaints from
residents, and, despite their official duties, took no action to repair the water
system.
Construing the complaint liberally under Haines, I find that Grohs has
alleged
sufficient
facts
at
this
preliminary
pleading
stage
to
support
Defendants’ potential personal liability. See Millhouse, 652 F.2d at 373. The
motion to dismiss on this ground will be denied.
3. Liability for conditions of civil commitment
The Defendants also argue that Grohs has failed to establish a
substantive due process claim because he has not satisfied both subjective and
objective components for the violation. See Def. Br. at 14-15. This amounts to a
dispute over whether the Complaint adequately alleges that Defendants acted
with “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s welfare. Id. at 15.
Grohs is not a prison inmate; he is confined pursuant to a civil order of
commitment. The Complaint nevertheless alleges that Defendants have acted
with “deliberate indifference” to the well-being of Plaintiff, a standard adopted
from Eighth Amendment cases challenging prison conditions. See, e.g., Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F’.3d 120, 125
(3d. Cir. 2001) (stating elements of Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment claim). In such prison cases, “a prison official cannot be found
liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions
of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
9
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.s. at 837. Thus the mental
element is a subjective one: deliberate indifference. And a deprivation that is
sufficiently “serious” is a denial of a “minimal civilized measure of lifes
necessities.” Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.s. 337, 347 (1981)).
That generally implies that prison officials must provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must institute reasonable safety
measures. See id., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526—527 (1984). To fall
short of that standard is to exceed the proper bounds of punishment.
I consider, but need not definitively decide for purposes of this motion,
that the governing standard may be different for this particular kind of claim,
in the particular setting of civil commitment. Certainly, it is true as a general
matter that persons involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate
treatment and better conditions of confinement than are persons who are being
criminally punished. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321, 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982). Compare Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69
L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (prisoners) with Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.s. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861,
60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (pretrial detainees) and Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 595 F.Supp. 1417, 1428 (D.N.J. 1984) (pretrial detainees).
Certainly the state has no less of a duty to provide civilly committed persons
with adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and safety measures.
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. And because civil commitment is not punishment,
the hardships of civil confinement cannot be punitive; they must “bear some
reasonable relation to the
[nonpunitive] purpose for which persons are
committed.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265, 121 5. Ct. 727 (2001); see also
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 (citing Jackson u. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92
S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972)).
In certain contexts, then, the case law has analyzed conditions of
confinement, not under Eighth Amendment standards, but under the Due
10
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That analysis requires a court to
weigh an individual’s liberty interests against the relevant interests of the state.
Id. Thus Youngberg analyzed a claim for safe conditions of confinement,
freedom from bodily restraints, and training/habilitation not in terms of
deliberate
indifference,
but
rather
against
a
standard
of
reasonable
“professional judgment.” Id. That “professional judgment” standard applies to
“professional decisionmakers,” defined as “person[s] competent, whether by
education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue.”
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323
n.30 (applied to doctors and nurses in context of
medical treatment within the institution). A professional decisionmaker may be
held
liable,
not
for
mere
negligence,
but
when
his
or
her
conduct
“substantial[ly] depart[s] from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards.”
Youngberg,
457
U.S.
at
314
(quoting
Chief Judge
Seitz’s
concurrence in the decision below, 647 F.2d 147, 178 (1980)).
In Shaw by Strain v. Stackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1990), the Third
Circuit dealt with a claim that the personnel of a state mental institution had,
inter alia, failed to protect a patient from assault. That Court applied the
Youngberg
“professional
standards”
analysis
to
the
institution’s
superintendent, assistant superintendent, program coordinator, unit manager,
senior resident supervisor, residential services supervisor, and recreation
director, among others. Id. at 1147. It applied the deliberate indifference
standard, however, to residential service aides, nonprofessionals who lacked
decision-making authority.
When analyzing conditions of civil commitment, some judges in this
District have continued to rely on Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference”
standards, either alone, by analogy, or in combination with other factors. For
2
See Aruanno tj’. Green, No. 09-1542 (JLL), 2011 WL 2490988, *8 (D.N.J. June
22, 2011) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993); Ford v. Mercer County
Corr. Center, 171 F. App’x 416, 419 (3d Cir. 2006); Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257,
262 (3d Cir. 2003)); Aruanno v. Green, No. 09-1542 (JJL), 2012 WL 3779390, *5
2
11
purposes of this motion, however, it is not necessary to precisely limn the
contours and limits of the Youngberg analysis. Indeed, the precise legal test
that applies may itself depend on further development of the record.
As it happens, this Complaint does not rest solely on the Youngberg
standard; it does allege “deliberate indifference.” Compi.
6.4
6.5. At this
¶J
early
stage,
the
allegations
are
sufficient
under
either
—
3
standard.
The
Defendants, no mere bystanders, were the Administrator of the STU (Yatauro)
and the Commissioner of the NJDOC (Lanigan); as such, they were allegedly
responsible for conditions in the facility. The Complaint alleges that both
Yatauro and Lanigan personally toured the facility, saw the conditions “with
their own eyes” and were informed about the complaints, but did nothing. Id.
¶
4.12. Allegedly, then, they were subjectively aware that the STU residents were
“exposed to unreasonable risks of injury to their health and well-being.” Id.
¶
6.5 By failing to take reasonable measures to correct those unhealthy
conditions, Grohs alleges, Yatauro and Lanigan were “deliberately indifferent”
to his safety and well-being. Id.
¶
6.4
—
6.5. The complaint will bear the
interpretation that those defects were ignored for a period of years. That
circumstance, too, would support an allegation that Defendants’ acts, and their
(D.N.J. Aug. 29 2012), affd, 2013 WL 2350169 (dismissing amended complaint in
same action); see also Cherry Whitehead, No. 09-4161 (SDW), 2012 WL 253138, *6.7
(D.N.J. Jan. 25, 2012) (applying both standards); Stahl v. Main, No. 07-4 123 (SRC),
2008 WL 2446816, *3_4 (D.N.J. 2008) (applying deliberate indifference). But see Wood
u. Main, No. 05-1448 (RMB), 2008 WL 3833584, *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2008) (applying
professional judgment standard in failure-to-protect case brought by institutionalized
plaintiff).
I do not here repeat the allegations about conditions in the facility, but focus on
the facts relating to the Defendants. In brief, however, the Complaint alleges that the
STU receives inadequate hot water for showering, that the water rarely exceeds 73
degrees and is often colder, and that the water temperature fluctuates to cold and/or
freezing temperatures. Compl. ¶ 4.4 Grohs also alleges that the shower area is
unheated, that pipes in the area are not insulated and leak onto the floor, that the hot
water is inadequate for the number of residents, and that residents are not permitted
to shower when the water is sufficiently hot between 9:45 pm and 6:15 am. Id. 4.5.
¶
As to Grohs personally, the impact of these conditions is magnified by MRSA and a
respiratory problem. Id. ¶ 4.15.
12
inaction,
constituted
deliberate
indifference,
fell
short
of
professional
standards, or both. Either way, dismissal of the Complaint would not be
appropriate.
Whether under an Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” test, a
due process “professional standards” test, or some more specifically tailored
analysis, these factual allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss. Whether they can be proven is, of course, a separate matter.
The question remains whether denial of hot water is the sort of
deprivation that will give rise to a constitutional claim. To some extent, that
issue is settled by the Youngberg “professional standards” analysis. If a
professional prison administrator would attend to such matters, and the failure
to do so is a substantial deviation from that standard, then a constitutional
issue is posed. Where the commitment is explicitly non-punitive, the denial of
adequate hot water would have to be found to bear a “reasonable relation” to
the nonpunitive purposes of commitment. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. at 265.
More generally, even in the Eighth Amendment context, and a fortiori in the
civil context, the state has an affirmative duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing, medical care, and safety measures to those in its care. See
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
There is some surface plausibility to the notion that denial of adequate
hot water bears no relation to the legitimate purposes of confining the residents
at Avenel. The New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator’s Act, under which the
residents are detained, has two fundamental purposes: to protect the public
from dangerous predators and to treat sex offenders who are, by definition,
suffering from a mental abnormality. In re Civil Commitment of W.X.C., 204 N.J.
179, 188, 8 A. 3d. 174, 179 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S .Ct. 1702, 179 L.Ed.2d
635.
There is also some authority for considering adequate hot water as a
reasonable condition of confinement. That is particularly true when inadequate
13
hot water is combined with other factors affecting health and safety. As I have
said, Eighth Amendment criminal cases must be applied with care in this
context, but they do offer some guidance. In a prisoner case, non-functioning
water heaters for inmate showers were found to be one of various conditions at
the prison that failed to meet constitutional standards. Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.
Supp. 727, 736 (D.V.I. 1997); see also Monmouth Cnty Con-. Inst. Inmates v.
Lanzaro, 595 F. Supp. 1417, 1432 (D.N.J. 1984) (finding inadequate hot water
as one of numerous factors contributing to unconstitutional conditions of
confinement for both
inmates
and pre-trial detainees).
In
that Eighth
Amendment context, though, inadequate hot water has played a highly factdependent role as one of a number of factors. “Some conditions of confinement
may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each
would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect
that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as
food, warmth or exercise-for example, a low cell temperature at night combined
with a failure to issue blankets.” Blackiston v. Vaughn, No. A. 95-3740, 1998
WL 665477, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 1998) (non-precedential) (motion to
dismiss denied where prisoner alleged there was no heat or hot water, that he
was denied a hat and gloves, and that he suffered from the cold as a
consequence). And other Eighth Amendment cases have denied claims based
on inadequate hot water because that condition was not combined with
additional, significant conditions. See Allen u. Passaic Cnty. Jail, No. 09-0408,
2009 WL 4591206, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Blackinston) (not
precedential); Watkins v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 1005, 1011 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(conditions of segregated confinement, including a cell with no hot water, did
not violate the Eighth Amendment).
As to civil commitment itself, there is little or no case law on claims of
inadequate hot water, whether alone or in combination with medical factors.
An example of an analogous claim is Cruz v. Main, No. 10-5605, 2011 WL
3625068, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2011). There, Judge Wigenton of this Court
14
addressed a claim (one among many) by a person at the Avenel STU that the
air circulation was limited, the roof leaked, and that the water quality was
poor. Judge Wigenton allowed that these defects, if not addressed by
renovations,
might give
circumstances
analysis
rise
and
to
a claim,
denied
but applied
all
a totality-of-the-
conditions-of-confinement
“without prejudice, for failure to state a claim at this time.” Id. at *5
claims
I find that the principles of the above-cited cases strongly suggest that
the allegations, if proven, could make out a plausible constitutional claim. The
motion to dismiss the complaint is therefore denied.
C. Qualified Immunity
The Defendants also claim that dismissal is appropriate because they
enjoy qualified immunity from the Section 1983 claims. Def. Br. (Docket No.
21-1) at 16.
1. The qualified immunity analysis
Qualified immunity protects government officials such as Defendants
Yataouro and Lanigan from liability for damages as long as their conduct does
not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). It does not matter
whether the error relates to the law, the facts, or some mixture of the two. Id.
(citing Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068
(2004) (Kennedy, dissenting); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507, 98 S.Ct.
2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), (qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in
judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law”)). As long as an
official reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law,
qualified immunity will shield the official from liability. Sharp v. Johnson, 669
F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012).
15
Immunity does not extend to all officers who engage in necessary official
acts. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 29. Rather, officers’ individual immunity from suit
under Section 1983 is predicated on “a considered inquiry into the immunity
historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests
behind it.” Id. (quoting Imbler u. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47
L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). “Officials who seek exemption from personal liability have
the burden of showing that such an exemption is justified by overriding
considerations of public policy, and the Court has recognized a category of
‘qualified’ immunity that avoids unnecessarily extending the scope of the
traditional concept of absolute immunity.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
224, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1988); see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
Courts regularly employ a two-step test, originally adopted in Saucier v.
Katz: (1) whether the official’s conduct violated a constitutional or federal right;
and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established.” 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001). Pearson later overruled the requirement of Saucier that the two prongs
be analyzed in the prescribed order. 555 U.s. at 244; see also Sharp, 669 F.3d
at 159.
Whether conduct violates a constitutional right is straightforward, at
least conceptually. It is a matter of applying case law to the facts alleged. The
substantive content of the constitutional claims was discussed above.
Whether such a constitutional violation is “clearly established” requires
more explanation. The Third Circuit has found that “a right is clearly
established for qualified immunity purposes where its contours are ‘sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right.” Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202); see also
Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2006). That is to say, the right
the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly established” in a
16
particularized way and the court must define the right with the appropriate
level of specificity. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034
(1987); Wilson u. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692 (1999); Williams v.
Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2006); Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159. Even if there
is no precedent directly on point, however, an action may still violate a clearly
established right where a general constitutional rule already identified in the
decisional law applies with “obvious clarity” to the specific conduct in question.
Id.; Hope v. Peizer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002); Anderson, 483
U.S. at 641.
2. Whether the Complaint alleges a constitutional violation that is
clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity
Grohs’ claim that inadequate hot water at the STU impaired the safety
and well-being of its residents implicates his constitutional right to reasonable
conditions of confinement, as established above. The question remains whether
existing law on reasonable conditions of health and safety applies to Groh’s
claim with the requisite “obvious clarity.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 741;
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; Sharp, 669 F.3d at 159. To be sure, it is desirable
to resolve the question of qualified immunity as early as possible, ideally at the
motion to dismiss stage. Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit,
and not just a defense to liability, it is effectively lost if a case erroneously
proceeds to trial. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (1985)). I find, however, that I cannot dismiss the
complaint on qualified immunity grounds at this early stage.
The adequacy, or not, of hot water has not given rise to a specialized
jurisprudence with respect to civilly committed persons. It is clear, however,
that
such
persons,
who
are
not being punished
criminally but have
involuntarily been placed under Defendants’ care and supervision, have a right
to humane conditions and some reasonable level of concern for their health
and safety.
17
Particularly under the due process standard, the law is clear enough that
I cannot now grant a motion to dismiss or find qualified immunity. Under
Youngberg, supra, and Shaw, supra, a developed factual record might well
establish a substantial divergence from the professional standards that apply
to Defendants’ positions. Certainly a complete failure to take steps to prevent a
plaintiff with a medical condition from being daily doused with cold water
would plausibly give rise to such a claim. In the present posture, I will not
dismiss a claim that, by allegedly failing to repair the water system, Yatauro
and Lanigan substantially departed from acceptable professional judgment, in
violation of Grohs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. See Shaw, 920
F.2d at 1143, 1145.
The motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds is denied.
D. Preliminary Injunction Related to Alleged Retaliation
Grohs has also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against various
corrections officers “in the control of Defendant Lanigan” for alleged retaliation
related to the filing of this action. P.1. Motion, (Docket No. 24 at 1). The motion
seems to be based on a retaliation claim that has not been pleaded.
I note that there have been (unreported) cases in this district finding no
cognizable conditions of confmement claim because the STU plaintiff failed to allege
that the treatment constituted “punishment” or that he was adversely affected. See
e.g. Anderson v. DaCosta, No. 10-5835 (FSH), 2011 WL 2223713, at *15 (D.N.J. June
1, 1011); Vanderpool v. Sharp, No. 10-5082 (WJM), 2011 WL 941343, at *7 (D.N.J.
Mar. 15, 2011); Graham v. Main, No. 10-5027 (SRC), 2011 WL 2412998, at *10 (D.N.J.
June 9, 2011); Cooper v. Sharp, No. 10-5245 (FSH), 2011 WL 1045234, at *11 (D.N.J.
Mar. 23, 2011); Badu-Shabazz v. Sharp, No. 10-5637 (WJM), 2011 WL 1080521, at
*11 (D.N.J. March 21, 2011); Barber v. Sharp, No. 10-528 (PQS),
6
2011 WL 2223651
at *7 (D.N.J. June 2, 2011). Grohs’ complaint, however, does allege with specificity
that he was adversely affected by the Defendants’ failure to provide reasonable
conditions in the STU. And the factual record, if developed, may well establish that the
Youngberg/Shaw analysis is most appropriate to this situation.
18
In his motion, Grohs requests that the Court enter an order directing
STU officers Lt. M. Rock-Asencio, Sgt. Fratalone, and SCO Datz to “cease
all
retaliation” against him, restrict their contact with him to areas of the
STU
under video surveillance, allow Grohs to confer with his attorney at any
time
prior to his being questioned, and for the Court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his (hypothetical) state-law retaliation claim. Plaintiff P.1.
Br.,
(Docket No. 24-1), at 10—il. Rock-Asencio, Fratalone, and Datz are not parties
to this action.
Grohs has not shown he is entitled to the relief he requests in his
motion. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy” that should
be
granted only in limited circumstances. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Winback and
Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1426—27 (3d Cir. 1994). In ruling on
a
motion for a preliminary injunction, the court must consider: (1) the likelihood
that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at a final hearing; (2) the extent
to
which the plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained
of;
(3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if
the
preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest. Id. (citing Optici
ans
Ass’n v. Indep. Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 191—92 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Court
should issue the injunction only if the plaintiff has produced evidence
sufficient to convince the court that all four factors favor the relief.
Here, Grohs is not seeking relief based on claims pleaded in the
Complaint. Rather, he is attempting to obtain preliminary relief based on
an
unpleaded retaliation claim that “may” exist. See P.1. Plaintiff Br. at 6 (“Plaintiff
may be able to support a claim for retaliation.”)
Grohs alleges that the retaliation began in May 2013, over a year after
the Complaint in this case was filed. Id. at 3. Only one concrete act of
retaliation is alleged: Corrections officers at the STU, who are not parties
to
this action, allegedly confiscated Grohs’ legal documents and searched him for
“no reason.” Id. at 3—4. Grohs does not make any credible factual allegat
ion
19
that the named Defendants knew of these actions. Grohs only
alleges that he
submitted written requests and remedy forms to “facility officia
ls.” Id.; P.1.
Plaintiff Supp. Br. (Docket No. 27), at 4. Further, Grohs acknowledges
that the
allegedly confiscated papers were returned to him. Id. at 5.
In short, neither likelihood of success nor any irreparable, ongoin
g harm
is present. And the absence of either would be sufficient
to defeat an
application for a preliminary injunction. See American Express Travel
Related
Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012);
Adams v.
Freedom Forge, 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000). Indeed,
even if these
allegations were taken as true, and even if they related to an
existing claim
against an existing party, they probably would not support an
application for
extraordinary injunctive relief.
A motion for preliminary relief is not an appropriate means of asserti
ng
new claims. The motion for a preliminary injunction is in any event
denied.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss the Complaint
against
Defendants Yatauro and Lanigan (Docket No. 21) is:
1. GRANTED as to claims for damages against the Defendants
in their
official capacities;
2. DENIED as to claims for damages against the Defendants in
their
individual capacities; and
3. DENIED as to claims for prospective equitable relief.
In addition, the motion for a preliminary injunction (Docket No.
24) is
DENIED. An Order will be entered in accordance with this Opinio
n.
Dated: November 20, 2013
MC
K VIN MCNULTY, U.S.D
20
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?