BUCK v. THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY et al

Filing 29

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Esther Salas on 6/30/14. (sr, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RUTH E. BUCK,

Civil Action No. 12 – 1611 (ES)
Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.
THE CITY OF JERSEY CITY, ET AL.,
Defendants.
SALAS, DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Ruth E. Buck’s
Complaint. (D.E. No. 18). The motion, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is brought by the
City of Jersey City, Nesle Rodriguez, Jay Yaker, Linda Aristando, Edward Coleman, Jane Doe,
and John Doe (“Defendants”). Defendants contend that the Complaint should be dismissed
because “Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is a series of baseless allegations . . . and a series of legal
conclusions pertaining to a § 1983 claim without any reference to the elements that would lead to
that conclusion.” (D.E. No. 27, Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Br.”)
at 19). Moreover, Defendants contend, “all [Defendants] enjoy some form of immunity from civil
suit, either absolute immunity . . . or qualified immunity.” (D.E. No. 28, Defendants’ Brief in
Response to Plaintiff’s Opposition (“Def. Rep.”) at 1).
The Court has considered the parties’ submissions in support of, in opposition to, and in
reply of the opposition to the instant motion. The Court rules on this motion without oral argument,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). Counts II, IV, and V, against Judges Nesle Rodriguez and John
Doe, and Prosecutors Linda Aristando and Jay Yaker, are dismissed with prejudice. All other
Counts are dismissed without prejudice.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an owner and landlord of two houses—one three family house, one six family
house—in Jersey City, New Jersey, though Plaintiff resides in Red Bank. (Compl. ¶ 8). The
Director of Housing Code Enforcement for Jersey City, Defendant Edward Coleman, cited
Plaintiff in 2009 for violation of a local ordinance that mandated that she provide heat to tenants.
(Compl. ¶ 28). Pursuant to the citation, Municipal Prosecutors Linda Aristando and Jay Yaker,
prosecuted Plaintiff in Jersey City Municipal Court. (Compl. ¶ 37). Municipal Judge Nesle
Rodriguez presided over the proceeding. (Compl. ¶ 31). Judge Rodriguez found Plaintiff guilty
and imposed a fine. (Id.). After Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to vacate Judge Rodriguez’s
judgment, Plaintiff appealed to the Law Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. (Compl. ¶
52). Plaintiff’s appeal was denied, (Def. Br., Ex. A), and the New Jersey Appellate Division
affirmed the dismissal, (Def. Br., Ex. B).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff advance a Complaint containing a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” But in order to survive
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12 (b)(6), the plaintiff’s
pleading must “nudge [the plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plaintiff’s use of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do[es] not suffice” to
nudge a claim across this line. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, a “complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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In evaluating whether a complaint has stated a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,
the Court must accept all well pled factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
233 (3d Cir. 2008). It is the moving party’s burden to show that “the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of h[er] claim which would entitle h[er] to relief.” Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d
29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980). Further, complaints drafted by pro se plaintiffs should be construed more
liberally than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
B. Analysis
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint is very unclear. Plaintiff lists
fourteen sources of law under which she alleges her claims arise, some of which are inapposite.
(See Def. Br. at 17–18). But because Plaintiff seeks “compensatory, monetary, special, exemplary
and punitive damages,” (Compl. at 17), having alleged what appear to be violations of
constitutional rights, the Court, like Defendants, interprets Plaintiff’s claims as arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
1. Count I
Plaintiff alleges that a municipal court mediator named Jane Doe has perpetrated a “pattern
of unlawful discrimination” against Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 16). However, Plaintiff offers no
evidence of discrimination by Jane Doe, let alone a pattern of such discrimination. Plaintiff states
only that Mediator Jane Doe “refused to allow a proper case to be instituted by the White Plaintiff
against one, Spanish speaking William Rivera.” (Id.).
Plaintiff’s Complaint describes Jane Doe’s behavior, but fails to show how the behavior
violates any law. (See Compl. ¶ 18). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standard set

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forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Therefore, the claim against Defendant Jane Doe is dismissed without
prejudice.
2. Count II
a. Prosecutor Linda Aristando
Plaintiff alleges that she “was deprived of her day in court by [a] purposely malicious
prosecutor,” Linda Aristando. (Compl. ¶ 20). Regardless of the veracity of this allegation,
however, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity to suit under § 1983 when acting within the scope
of prosecutorial duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). The Supreme Court noted
that “this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress against
[even] a prosecutor whose malicious . . . action deprives him of liberty.” Id. at 427 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court also has emphasized the importance of terminating attempted civil
claims against prosecutors at the pleading stage, before discovery. See, e.g., id. at 425 (“[S]uits
that survived the pleadings would pose substantial danger of liability even to the honest
prosecutor[,]” and “if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person
charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the pressing duty
of enforcing the criminal law.”). Therefore, the claim against Defendant Linda Aristando is
dismissed with prejudice.
b. Municipal Court Conviction
It is unclear whether this Count also contains a claim that Plaintiff was deprived of due
process of law, and thus that her conviction in municipal court was unconstitutional. (Compl. ¶
20) (Plaintiff alleges that she “was deprived of her day in court by [a] purposely malicious
prosecutor.”).

Regardless, this Court cannot award damages, pursuant to § 1983, for an

unconstitutional conviction unless Plaintiff “prove[s] that the conviction or sentence has been

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reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). Plaintiff has offered
no evidence of any such conditions and, accordingly, has failed to meet the pleading standard set
forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Therefore, any claim for damages for an unconstitutional conviction
is dismissed without prejudice.
3. Count III
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Edward Coleman “initiated an unworthy criminal lawsuit”
against Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶ 28). Plaintiff claims Coleman “seized upon the opportunity to
condemn, get even with, and punish her for speaking out and criticizing, especially as female
against him and male inspectors.” (Compl. ¶ 40). To the extent that this part of the Count amounts
to a claim that Plaintiff is entitled to damages for an unconstitutional conviction, Heck, cited supra,
disposes of the claim. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this claim without prejudice.
With respect to what seems like an alleged violation of equal protection, Plaintiff states
that Coleman “heads a staff of inspectors believed to be all male.” (Compl. ¶ 13). Plaintiff alleges
that “[a]t one point [P]laintiff complained about sex discrimination” but Coleman “would answer
no question as to the sex of his inspectors” and was “overly protective of the work of his male
inspectors.” (Compl. ¶¶ 26–27).
But merely leading a staff of predominantly male inspectors and refusing to answer
questions about the sex of those inspectors cannot plausibly support a claim of sex discrimination.
Further, it is not at all clear what it means to be “overly protective of the work of his male
inspectors” or according to what standard Plaintiff finds that Coleman was overprotective. Though
Plaintiff does claim she complained to Coleman about sex discrimination, that fact alone cannot

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support a claim of sex discrimination. Plaintiff, accordingly, has failed to meet the pleading
standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Therefore, the claim against Defendant Edward Coleman
is dismissed without prejudice. 1
4. Count IV
Plaintiff alleges that the “bias of defendant [Judge] Nesle Rodriguez is highlighted by her
abuse of discretion and purposeful and wrongful finding of guilt on February 23, 2009
accompanied by excessive fines and other punishment.” (Compl. ¶ 31). Regardless of the veracity
of this allegation, judges are absolutely immune to suit under § 1983. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S.
9, 11 (1991). “[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and
corruptly.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (emphasis added). Judicial immunity is lost
only when the Judge is acting outside judicial capacity or without proper jurisdiction. Mireles,
502 U.S. at 11–12. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Judge Rodriguez (or Defendant Judge
John Doe) has acted outside her judicial capacity or presided over the municipal trial without
jurisdiction.

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The claim will not be dismissed with prejudice, despite Defendants’ qualified immunity argument. (See
Def. Br. at 12–14). The defense of qualified immunity extends to the actions of a state official only if his “conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Plaintiff stated that her “Civil Action aris[es] out of . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment.” (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiff also stated that “[b]eing female [Plaintiff] is . . . discriminated against by the
defendant Director of Housing Code Enforcement [Coleman].” (Compl. ¶ 8). The Fourteenth Amendment establishes
a right against invidious discrimination on the basis of gender by an agent of the state. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). Defendant Coleman, therefore, is not clearly entitled to the qualified immunity defense.
Defendant Jersey City, on the other hand, could be liable for the allegedly discriminatory conduct of Coleman
(or Jane Doe) if in acting discriminatorily, the Defendant was executing Jersey City “policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” See Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to plausibly suggest
that this is the case in this action. But because Monell leaves this possibility open, the Court does not dismiss, with
prejudice, all claims advanced against the City of Jersey City.

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To be clear, the doctrine of judicial immunity protects judges from charges of even
malicious conduct because the existence of malice “ordinarily cannot be resolved without
engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. Judicial immunity “is not for
the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose
interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and
without fear of consequences.” Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
Thus, the claims against Defendants Nesle Rodriguez and John Doe are dismissed with
prejudice.
5. Count V
Plaintiff alleges that Prosecutor Jay Yaker “knowingly and unjustly and without basis in
fact, recommended that the judge find plaintiff guilty and fine her the maximum fine of $1,250.00
per day.” (Compl. ¶ 34). However, as previously discussed, prosecutors are absolutely immune
to suit pursuant to § 1983, and the Supreme Court has expressed the need to protect prosecutorial
efficiency by dismissing such suits at the pleading stage. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425 (“[S]uits that
survived the pleadings would pose substantial danger of liability even to the honest prosecutor.”).
Therefore, the claim against Defendant Jay Yaker is dismissed with prejudice.
6. Count VI
Plaintiff alleges that “[D]efendants Coleman, Rodriguez and Yaker conspired together to
prosecute the plaintiff and find her guilty and levy heavy fines and other punishment because of
their racial-religious and sex bias and for retaliation against her because she spoke out and
criticized according to her constitutionally guaranteed right to do so.” (Compl. ¶ 37). However,

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as previously discussed, the claims against Judge Rodriguez and Prosecutor Yaker are dismissed
with prejudice. 2
Count VI also alleges that
Defendant Yaker offered to settle [the prosecution of the municipal ordinance violation]
by having plaintiff pay half of the fine, giving no justification for the reduction[.] But after
plaintiff chose to follow a certain appeal route and the matter was remanded, Mr. Yaker
insisted on the higher amount of over $5,000.00. It is submitted that the increased amount
was in retaliation.
(Compl. ¶ 54).
The Complaint further states that “when plaintiff sought to subpoena a key witness, tenant
Filene Best, Judge Rodriguez quashed the subpoena.” (Compl. ¶ 49). The Due Process Clause
prohibits vindictive, retaliatory prosecution. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978).
And The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in h[er]
favor.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
Again, this part of Plaintiff’s Complaint seems to allege the unconstitutionality of her
conviction in municipal court. The Court has already decided that it will dismiss this part of the
Complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to Heck:
[The Supreme Court] hold[s] that, in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction . . . , a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .
512 U.S. at 486–87 (citation omitted).

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As against Defendant Coleman, this portion of the Complaint appears to add an alleged violation of First
Amendment Rights (“retaliation against [Plaintiff] because she spoke out”) and an alleged violation of equal protection
(“punishment because of [Defendants’] racial-religious . . . bias”), distinct from the alleged sex discrimination outlined
in Count III. Though, as previously discussed, these claims plainly do not meet the pleading standard set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal. Thus, as with Count III, the Court will dismiss aspects of Count VI that speak to equal protection
and First Amendment violations against Defendant Coleman, without prejudice.

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Plaintiff has not provided evidence supporting the existence of any such conditions in the
instant action. To the contrary, when Plaintiff appealed her municipal court conviction, the
Superior Court of New Jersey dismissed her appeal, (Def. Br., Ex. A), and the New Jersey
Appellate Division subsequently affirmed the dismissal, (Def. Br., Ex. B).
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint is GRANTED. Counts
II, IV, and V—as against Judges Nesle Rodriguez and John Doe, and Prosecutors Linda Aristando
and Jay Yaker—are dismissed with prejudice. All other Counts—as against Director of Housing
Code Enforcement Edward Coleman, Mediator Jane Doe, and Jersey City, but only to the extent
that it could be liable for the conduct of Coleman or Doe—are dismissed without prejudice. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/Esther Salas
x
Esther Salas, U.S.D.J.

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