BROWN v. PARSONS INSPECTION
Filing
12
OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 10/16/12. (dc, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
Civ. No. 2:12-01652 (WJM)
SHAROD BROWN,
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
PARSONS INSPECTION,
Defendant.
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Pro se Plaintiff Sharod Brown brought suit against his former employer
alleging breach of contract, wrongful termination, and discrimination. Plaintiff’s
former employer, Defendant Parsons Inspection and Maintenance Corp.
(“Parsons”), improperly pled as “Parsons Inspection,” moves to dismiss the
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will sua sponte DISMISS this action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. It will DENY as moot Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.
On January 18, 2012, Plaintiff brought suit in Superior Court. Defendant
subsequently removed the action to this Court based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367,
1441 and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“Section 301”), 29
U.S.C. § 185. On April 5, 2012, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s one
paragraph Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
“Unclear that [it even had] subject matter jurisdiction to entertain [the] motion,”
the Court recognized that Plaintiff’s Complaint was too vague and conclusory to
satisfy federal pleading standards. ECF No. 6. But rather than dismiss the
Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), the Court sua sponte ordered Plaintiff
to submit a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(e). The Court asked Plaintiff to provide information about his work history, his
union, and his termination. It asked Plaintiff to explain why he believes Parsons
violated the law when it fired him. And it asked Plaintiff whether he was covered
1
by a collective-bargaining agreement at the time of termination. Plaintiff
responded to these questions in a four-page statement that asserts claims for breach
of contract, wrongful termination, and discrimination. Defendant again moved to
dismiss.
Before the Court can attend to the merits, it must first assure itself of subject
matter jurisdiction. As noted earlier, Defendant asks the Court to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441 and Section 301. In
evaluating its subject matter jurisdiction—or lack thereof—the Court is cognizant
that “[r]emoval statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts to be resolved
in favor of remand.” Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009). As the
removing party, it is Parsons’s burden to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004). At any
time before final judgment, the Court has the power to remand this action to state
court if it concludes that Parsons has failed to meet its burden. See 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).
Plaintiff’s first claim is for breach of contract. In bringing the claim,
Plaintiff does not identify the contract provisions that Parsons allegedly violated.
Nor does he state whether those contract provisions implicate a collectivebargaining agreement. Indeed, the closest Plaintiff comes to alleging the existence
of a collective-bargaining agreement is to claim that “[the Local 518] did not
uphold our contract” and to claim that “they”—presumably the Defendant—“have
a step program before they can fire you, and I was not at the last step.” Pls.’ Rule
12(e) Statement 4-5, ECF No. 8. Yet, Defendant’s jurisdictional argument relies
entirely on the assumption that Plaintiff’s claims are grounded in his collectivebargaining rights. Notice of Removal ¶ 12, ECF No. 1. Ultimately, as explained
infra, Defendant’s subject matter jurisdiction argument fails because it is grounded
in speculation. Cf. Brown, 575 F.3d at 326 (doubts to be resolved in favor of
remand).
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over contract claims that arise
under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and contract claims arise under federal law if
they are preempted by Section 301. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“[I]f a federal cause of action
completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the
scope of the federal cause of action necessarily ‘arises under’ federal law.”).
Plaintiff’s contract claim is preempted by Section 301 only if it requires the Court
to interpret a collective-bargaining agreement. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 n.8 (1988). While Plaintiff’s allegations reference a
contract—presumably an employment contract with Parsons—they do not mention
2
a collective-bargaining agreement, or even Section 301, for that matter. Therefore,
Defendant cannot argue that a Section 301 claim appears on the face of the
Complaint. Instead, it argues that Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by Section 301
because those claims will necessarily require the Court to interpret a collective
bargaining agreement. See Notice of Removal ¶ 13. But that assumption is
mistaken, as demonstrated by Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), a
case cited in Defendant’s Notice of Removal. See Notice of Removal ¶ 13.
In Caterpillar, the Supreme Court held that breach of contract claims
brought by union employees against their employer were not preempted by Section
301. The claims escaped preemption because they were neither “founded directly
on rights created by collective-bargaining agreements” nor “substantially
dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. at 394 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). While the plaintiffs in Caterpillar could have
brought claims under Section 301 alleging a violation of their collective-bargaining
rights, they were not required to do so. The plaintiffs were free to bring
exclusively state law claims under their employment contract so long as the claims
did not implicate the collective-bargaining agreement. Id. The Court held that “a
plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal
rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contract rights, so long as
the contract relied upon is not a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
Because it cannot determine whether Plaintiff’s contract claim asserts rights
independent of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Court cannot determine
whether the contract claim is preempted by Section 301. That uncertainty weighs
in favor of remand. See Brown, 575 F.3d at 326. Similarly, the Court cannot
determine whether Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful termination and discrimination
implicate a collective-bargaining agreement. Most likely, they do not. Cf. Snyder
v. Dietz & Watson, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 428, 454 (D.N.J. 2011) (wrongful
termination claim under New Jersey law not preempted by Section 301); Scott v.
Sysco Food Serv. of Metro N.Y., L.L.C., No. 7-3656, 2007 WL 3170121, at **6-7
(D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2007) (discrimination claim under New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination not preempted by Section 301). While these claims could possibly
require the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement, the Court cannot
exercise jurisdiction by assumption.
Unable to ground subject matter jurisdiction in Section 301, Defendant
might attempt two additional arguments. Both attempts would fail. First,
Defendant might argue that claims for breach of contract, wrongful termination,
and discrimination are state law claims over which this Court has subject matter
3
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. But that argument is a non-starter since
Plaintiff has failed to allege diversity of citizenship. Second, Defendant might
attempt to cast Plaintiff’s claim for discrimination as a claim arising under federal
anti-discrimination law rather than state anti-discrimination law. But Plaintiff is
the “master of the complaint,” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392, and he has given no
indication that he wishes to pursue a federal discrimination claim. Since all
jurisdictional doubts must be resolved in favor of remand, see Brown, 575 F.3d at
326, the Court will not create a federal cause of action where Plaintiff has not
alleged one.
Plaintiff brought this action in state court, and that is where he will get to
litigate it. The Court will DISMISS the Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and remand this matter to Superior Court. It will DENY as moot the
motion to dismiss. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: October 16, 2012
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?