STEPHANATOS v. WAYNE TOWNSHIP et al

Filing 120

OPINION & ORDER denying 113 Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Case. Signed by Judge John Michael Vazquez on 8/30/2023. (Notice of Mail) (dam)

Case 2:12-cv-01793-JMV-JBC Document 120 Filed 08/30/23 Page 1 of 4 PageID: 4874

Not for Publication
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BASILIS N. STEPHANATOS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 12-1793

v.
WAYNE TOWNSHIP, et al.,

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Basilis N. Stephanatos’s Motion to Reopen
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). D.E. 113. Defendants American Tax Funding,
LLC; and Officers Ronald Lucas and Victor D’Agostino and the County of Passaic filed briefs in
opposition to Plaintiff’s motion, D.E. 115, 117. Plaintiff filed a brief in reply. D.E. 119. The
Court reviewed the documents in support and opposition of Plaintiff’s motion, and decided the
motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
For purposes of the instant motion, the Court does not retrace this case’s full factual and
procedural history. The prior April 15, 2013 Opinion granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
Complaint (the “MTD Opinion”) includes a detailed recounting of the factual background of this
matter. To the extent relevant to the instant motion, the Court incorporates the factual and
procedural history from the MTD Opinion.

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Briefly, Plaintiff filed suit in 2012, asserting multiple constitutional claims that challenge
various local taxation practices and the foreclosure of his home. In the MTD Opinion, Judge
Hochberg dismissed all but three of Plaintiff’s claims on res judicata grounds because Plaintiff
already litigated his tax related claims in New Jersey state court. Opinion at 6-8. Judge Hochberg
dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining Fourth Amendment and conversion claims, which related to the
foreclosure, because Plaintiff failed to state claims. Id. at 8-9. Since Plaintiff’s Complaint was
dismissed in 2013, Plaintiff has made numerous attempts to relitigate and appeal, all of which have
been rejected. D.E. 85, 88, 111. Plaintiff seeks to reopen this matter now because of the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023). See Plf. Br. at 3.
Plaintiff contends that his case should be reopened pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(4), (b)(5), and (b)(6). Plf. Br. at 3. Through Rule 60(b), “the court may relieve a
party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The rule “allows a
party to seek relief from a final judgment and request the reopening of his case, under a limited set
of circumstances including fraud, mistake, newly discovered evidence, or any reason justifying
relief.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005). But “Rule 60(b) motions are viewed as
‘extraordinary relief which should be granted only where extraordinary justifying circumstances
are present.’” Kiburz v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 446 F. App’x 434, 436 (3d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 929 (3d Cir. 1991)). A change in the controlling law might
justify Rule 60(b)6) relief. But “‘intervening changes in the law rarely justify [such] relief’
without more.” Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 295 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting
Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 121, 124 (3d Cir. 2014)) (emphasis in original). “The ultimate question
is whether the petitioner has shown ‘extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an
extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.’” Id. (quoting Cox, 757 F.3d at 115)).

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Again, Plaintiff argues that Tyler justifies reopen this matter. Tyler asserted a Takings
Clause claim related to Hennepin County’s allegedly unconstitutional retention of money in excess
of her tax debt, which that County obtained after it seized and sold her property. The Supreme
Court addressed whether Tyler had standing to assert a claim under the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Tyler, 598 U.S. at 635-37. The Supreme Court determined that Tyler had standing
to assert a claim to recover the excess amount. Id. at 647.
Plaintiff argues that this Court should reopen the matter and use its equitable powers to
apply Tyler retroactively. But Plaintiff intends to assert claims far beyond the limited scope of
Tyler. Plaintiff seeks to assert claims related to the confiscation of his real estate property, his
eviction, and the seizure of Plaintiff’s firearms and property. Plaintiff also seeks to assert claims
related to a state criminal case, including malicious prosecution, speedy trial rights, and double
jeopardy. Plf. Reply at 11-12. The Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler does not appear to be
relevant to any of these claims. Rather, Plaintiff seeks to reopen this matter to bring new claims
related to events that largely occurred after this matter was dismissed in 2013.
Plaintiff also seeks to assert a takings clause claim pursuant to Tyler. But Plaintiff does
not assert a claim related to any excess proceeds from the tax sale of his property. Instead, Plaintiff
emphasizes that he seeks the current market value for the seized property. Plf. Reply at 1.
Consequently, Tyler is distinguishable. Moreover, a new or changed interpretation of federal law
in civil cases is generally “given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review.”
Riccio v. Sentry Credit, Inc., 954 F.3d 582, 593 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Tax’n, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993)). This matter, however, has been closed for almost a decade. As
discussed, Judge Hochberg dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint in 2013, largely on res judicata

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grounds. Plaintiff provides no legal explanation as to why the general rule of retroactivity should
not apply to this matter.
In short, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that any extraordinary circumstances justify
reopening this matter. As a result, for the reasons set forth above, and for good cause shown,
IT IS on this 30th day of August, 2023,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to reopen (D.E. 113) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk’s Office is directed to mail a copy of this Opinion & Order to
Plaintiff.

___________________________________
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

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