CAMPBELL v. UNION COUNTY CHIEF OF MEDICAL STAFF DR. JOHN DOE/DR. JANE DOR, UNION COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY INDIVIDUALLY AND OFFICIALLY

Filing 131

OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 9/26/2018. (gl, )

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

HYDEACARR CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. JOHN DOE/DR. JANE DOE NEW
JERSEY STATE PRISON CHIEF OF
MEDICAL STAFF, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 12-2750 (SDW)

OPINION

WIGENTON, District Judge:
Presently before the Court is Defendant Ralph Woodward’s motion for summary judgment
brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF No. 114). Plaintiff has filed
opposition to the motion, (ECF No. 126), to which Defendant replied. (ECF No. 130). For the
following reasons, this Court will grant the motion and will dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining § 1983
claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

I. BACKGROUND
This Court previously summarized the basic factual background and procedural history of
this matter as follows:
On or about May 7, 2012, Plaintiff, Hydeacarr Campbell, filed a

complaint asserting that various officials at New Jersey State Prison
and several related facilities had violated his constitutional rights by
failing to properly treat him following a pair of surgeries to remove
a cyst under his right armpit and to combat an inflammatory
infection in his right buttock area. (ECF No. 1). On January 22,
2013, this Court entered an order and opinion screening the
complaint and permitting Plaintiff’s claim that the New Jersey State
Prison medical staff had failed to treat him following his surgeries
to proceed as a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(ECF No. 2-3). Plaintiff made several attempts to serve the chief
of medical staff of the prison, but was unsuccessful until after the
appointment of counsel on June 20, 2014. (ECF No. 16).
....
On August 19, 2015, new counsel was assigned to Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 32). Following several extensions, new counsel filed an
amended complaint on October 8, 2015. (ECF No. 38). Although
the amended complaint was based on the same facts as the original
– i.e. the failure to provide Plaintiff with prescribed medical
treatment after his surgeries – the amended complaint specifically
named [several new] Defendants . . . [including] Dr. Ralph
Woodward.
(ECF No. 53 at 2-3). Litigation in this matter thereafter continued, some Defendants were
dismissed from this matter, and discovery commenced. (ECF Docket Sheet).
During discovery, Defendant conducted a deposition of Plaintiff. During his deposition,
Plaintiff testified that, after having surgery, his surgeon told doctors at New Jersey State Prison
that Plaintiff required physical therapy. (Document 7 attached to ECF No. 114 at 8). When no
therapy was provided, Plaintiff “complain[ed] to the guards” but was provided only one brief
session to help him learn how to walk again. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff thereafter continued to complain
to the guards, and was moved to a different cell. (Id.). Although Plaintiff continued to complain
to the guards, Plaintiff did not file a grievance or inmate remedy form, nor did he speak with
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anyone in the prison ombudsman’s office regarding the issue. (Id.). Plaintiff explained this
failing by stating that he wasn’t aware he had to file remedy forms, but would have filed them had
he been aware of them. (Id. at 10). Because his complaints to the guards, and later complaints
to some nurses who came to change his bandages, did not produce results, Plaintiff began
requesting a transfer. (Id.).
Approximately four months after his original surgery in August 2008, Plaintiff was
transferred to Northern State Prison in December 2008. (Id. at 11). Following this transfer,
Plaintiff did not complain about the lack of therapy, nor did he file any inmate remedy forms or
grievances regarding the lack of therapy. (Id.). Plaintiff’s silence about the alleged lack of
treatment continued for four years until he was transferred to East Jersey State prison in 2012.
(Id.). While in East Jersey, Plaintiff likewise failed to complain or file any grievances regarding
the treatment issue because he didn’t believe that further complaints would make any sense. (Id.).
Petitioner likewise did not submit complaints or remedy forms after his transfer to a halfway house.
(Id.). Plaintiff also testified at his deposition that he never specifically spoke to or submitted his
complaints to Defendant Dr. Woodward. (Id. at 12). Ultimately, Plaintiff testified that he never
submitted any kind of written complaint or grievance form regarding the alleged failure of the
prison to provide him with therapy for the six years he was incarcerated following his surgery, and
instead only made verbal complaints to individual nurses or prison guards in the immediate
aftermath of his surgery prior to his first transfer in December 2008. (Id. at 16).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
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Pursuant to Rule 56, a court should grant a motion for summary judgment where the record
“shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden
of “identifying those portions of the pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A
factual dispute is material “if it bears on an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim,” and is
genuine if “a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party.” Blunt v. Lower Merion
School Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). In deciding a motion for summary judgment a
district court must “view the underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion,” Id., but must not make credibility determinations
or engage in any weighing of the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the non-moving party, [however,] there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Once the moving party has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party who must provide evidence sufficient to establish that a reasonable jury could find in the
non-moving party’s favor to warrant the denial of a summary judgment motion. Lawrence v.
Nat’l Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996); Serodio v. Rutgers, 27 F. Supp.
3d 546, 550 (D.N.J. 2014). “A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it
has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial. However, the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment cannot rest on mere allegations, instead it must present
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actual evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact for trial.” Serodio, 27 F. Supp.
3d at 550.

B. Analysis
In his summary judgment motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s § 1983 medical claims
should be dismissed because Plaintiff, who was incarcerated at the time he filed his initial
complaint in this matter, failed to administratively exhaust his claims. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e, a plaintiff who is an incarcerated prisoner at the time he files his complaint is required to
exhaust all available administrative remedies before he may file a federal civil rights suit
challenging “prison conditions.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84-85 (2006). A prisoner is
required to meet this exhaustion requirement before filing suit “even where the relief sought –
[such as] monetary damages – cannot be granted by the administrative process.” Id.; see also
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 (2001). Where an administrative procedure is available and
capable of being used, a plaintiff seeking to challenge prison conditions via a federal civil rights
action must fully and properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, and
exceptional circumstances will not excuse a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. Ross v. Blake, --- U.S.
---, ---, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856-57 (2016).
Because Plaintiff’s medical claims concern matters of prison life, see Booth v. Churner,
206 F.3d 289, 298 (3d Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S.
516, 532 (2002) (the “exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether
they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force
or some other wrong”), and because Plaintiff was a prisoner at the time he filed his initial
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complaint, this matter is subject to § 1997e’s exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Ahmed v.
Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir 2001). That Plaintiff filed an amended complaint – rather
than a new action – after his release does not change the fact that he is subject to this requirement.
Id. (finding that any post-release amended complaint asserting that Plaintiff was no longer
incarcerated was futile because it would not change the fact that the plaintiff was required to
exhaust when he filed his initial complaint and his later release did not obviate the need for
exhaustion).

Any failure to exhaust by Plaintiff prior to filing his initial complaint would thus

render this matter subject to dismissal unless Plaintiff can show that he falls into the statutory
exception discussed in Ross. This exception to the exhaustion requirement will only apply where
there no administrative remedy is available either because the state has provided no remedy to
prisoners, the administrative remedy provided is incapable of being used because it acts as a
“simple dead end,” or the procedure is so confusing or draconian that “all but the most skillful”
prisoners are prevented from properly exhausting their claims. Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-61. A
prisoner’s transfer from one prison to another within the same state prison system, neither relieves
him of the obligation to exhaust his claims nor renders his administrative remedies unavailable.
See Jackson v. Grundy, 877 F. Supp. 2d 159, 176-77 (D.N.J. 2012); see also Williamson v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 131 F. App’x 888, 890 (3d Cir. 2005); Napier v. Laurel Cnty., Ky, 636 F.3d
218, 223 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[g]enerally, the transfer of a prisoner from one facility to another does
not render the grievance procedures at the transferor facility ‘unavailable’ for the purposes of
exhaustion”).
“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical
procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some
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orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91. A prisoner
therefore properly exhausts his administrative remedies only by seeking all available
administrative remedies while at least substantially complying with the rules and regulations of
the applicable administrative body, in this case the state prison system. Id. at 90-103; Small, 728
F.3d at 272 (completion of the administrative review process “means ‘substantial’ compliance with
the prison’s grievance procedures”).

In determining whether a prisoner has successfully

exhausted, a court must look to the grievance regime of the prison facility to determine what steps
are required to fully exhaust, and compliance with those procedures is all that is required to
properly exhaust a claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Because exhaustion is
a threshold issue affecting a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, it is the Court, and not a jury, that
determines whether a given plaintiff has properly exhausted his claims, even to the extent of
resolving any factual disputes related to the exhaustion issue. Small, 728 F.3d at 269-71.
New Jersey’s “Inmate Remedy System is a comprehensive system that includes the
opportunity for an inmate to submit an ‘Inmate Inquiry Form’ or ‘Inmate Grievance Form’ and, in
response to the resulting decision or finding, to submit an ‘Administrative Appeal.’” N.J. Admin
Code § 10A:1-4.4(c) (2018). Exhaustion of administrative remedies therefore requires that a
prisoner both submit an inquiry or grievance form, and an administrative appeal of any adverse
decision on the inquiry or grievance form. § 10A:1-4.4(d). These remedy forms “must be
complete, legible, and include a clear and concise statement” of the prisoner’s claim, and “shall
contain the full name, [inmate] number and, when required, signature of the inmate submitting the
form.” § 10A:1-4.4(e). Upon the filing of an inquiry or grievance form, a prisoner will receive
a response within fifteen or thirty days respectively as to the two types of forms, unless the
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coordinator of the prison’s grievance system determines more time is needed, in which case the
prisoner shall be informed of the need for more time. § 10A:1-4.4(i), 4.5(d). Upon receiving a
final response to the form, Petitioner may file his administrative appeal, within ten calendar days,
at which point he will receive a final decision on his appeal within ten further calendar days. §
10A:1-4.6.
According to Plaintiff at his deposition, he never filed a formal grievance or complaint, nor
submitted any form of written complaint with the various prisons or the New Jersey Department
of Corrections. Instead, he made complaints to individual guards and nurses. Clearly, such
verbal complaints do not comply with the grievance procedures put into place by the New Jersey
Department of Corrections. Thus, by his own admission, Plaintiff has failed to properly and fully
exhaust his current § 1983 claims. That Plaintiff was apparently ignorant of the procedures for
exhaustion is insufficient to excuse this failing. See, e.g., Tirado v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 13-1709,
2014 WL 5860598, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2014) (citing Davis v. Warman, 49 F. App’x 365,
368 (3d Cir. 2003), for the proposition that “ignorance or confusion regarding . . . [prison
grievance] policies does not excuse failure to adhere” to proper exhaustion requirements); see also
Stokes v. Wenerowicz, No. 13-7093, 2017 WL 3226863, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2017); Miller v.
Schuylkill Cty. Prison, No. 07-0331, 2007 WL 3342766, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2007) (“an
inmate’s subjective lack of awareness regarding administrative remedies will not excuse” his
failure to exhaust). Instead, his failure to exhaust could only be excused if he could meet the
statutory exceptions to exhaustion.
In that regard, Plaintiff provides only one argument – that Plaintiff was not required to
exhaust because he believed any administrative remedy was a “dead end” because his repeated
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complaints to guards that he was entitled to physical therapy went unanswered.

Plaintiff’s

deposition testimony, however – the only evidence in the record on this issue – makes out no such
claim. Although Plaintiff did testify that the guards and at least one nurse ignored his verbal
complaints, Plaintiff also testified that he never complained to the prison ombudsman, never filed
any form of grievance, and never sent any written complaint to the prison or Department of
Corrections. Indeed, after his transfer to a different prison in December 2008, Plaintiff made no
further attempts to complain – verbally or in writing. This silence then continued for several years
and through transfers to another prison and ultimately a halfway house. Thus, Plaintiff had ample
time and opportunity to make a written complaint – before or after his transfer – and did not do so.
Plaintiff never attempted to comply with the prison’s grievance system, and Plaintiff therefore
cannot show that the system was a “dead end” merely because his complaints to individual guards
or nurses fell on deaf ears. Although the behavior Plaintiff describes on behalf of the guards may
have been reprehensible, that alone does not suffice to show that no administrative remedy was
available or that the available remedy was a dead end. Plaintiff had nearly six years during which
he could have filed an administrative grievance, and he never did so. Plaintiff’s failure cannot be
excused simply because Plaintiff believed any further complaints would be futile. As there is no
evidence to suggest Plaintiff ever attempted to properly exhaust his claim – indeed, his testimony
is quite to the contrary – and as there is no evidence that any prison officials actually stood in the
way of an attempt by Plaintiff to properly exhaust his claim in accordance with prison procedures,
Plaintiff has not provided facts sufficient to support a finding that his administrative remedies were
unavailable. See, e.g., Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859-61. Plaintiff has thus not shown any valid basis
on which this Court can excuse his failure to exhaust his claims, and Plaintiff’s remaining claims
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– all of which are subject to the exhaustion requirement – must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to exhaust. Defendant’s motion shall therefore be granted.1

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court will grant Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 114) and
will dismiss this matter without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. An
appropriate order follows.

Dated: September 26, 2018

s/ Susan D. Wigenton
Hon. Susan D. Wigenton,
United States District Judge

Because this Court will grant Defendant’s motion based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his
claims, this Court need not and does not address Defendant’s timeliness or merits arguments.
Likewise, while Plaintiff, who is no longer incarcerated, is free to file a new action based on his
allegations in this matter insomuch as a dismissal for lack of exhaustion is without prejudice and
Plaintiff would no longer be subject to the exhaustion requirements, any new complaint would still
be subject to § 1983’s statute of limitations. See, e.g, Ahmed, 297 F.3d at 210 (plaintiffs who have
been released may file suits addressing prison conditions to which they were subject prior to their
release without having to exhaust claims); Patyrak v. Apgar, 511 F. App’x 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2013)
(§ 1983 claims in New Jersey subject to two-year statute of limitations). Because this Court will
dismiss this matter for lack of exhaustion and because that dismissal is not conditional, however,
Plaintiff’s claims would most likely be time barred given the fact that Plaintiff has been out of
prison for approximately four years. See, e.g., Brennan v. Kulick, 407 F.3d 603, 606 (3d Cir.
2005) (unconditional dismissal of an action without prejudice does not toll running of statute of
limitations as original complaint “is treated as if it never existed”).
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