CEVDET AKSUT VE OGULLARI KOLL. STI v. CAVUSOGLU

Filing 77

OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 7/14/15. (gh, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CEVDET AKSÜT VE OĞULLARI
KOLL. STI,

Civ. No. 12-2899 (WJM)

Plaintiff,
v.

OPINION

HUSEYIN T. CAVUSOGLU,
Defendant.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
This matter comes before the Court on Huseyin Cavusoglu’s Motion to
Consolidate this case (“Cevdet Aksüt II”) with Civ. No. 14-3362 (“Cevdet Aksüt
III”). Plaintiff and several co-Defendants from Cevdet Aksüt III opposed. For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion is denied.
The Court has already issued an Opinion on a motion for summary judgment
in Cevdet Aksüt II (the Sunrise II Opinion) (ECF No. 74) and Opinions on 4 motions
to dismiss filed in Cevdet Aksüt III (the “Cevdet Aksüt III Opinions”). The Court
writes for readers who are familiar with the facts and defined terms used in all five
of these Opinions.
On February 20, 2015, the Court issued a scheduling order permitting the
Plaintiff to file a Motion to Consolidate by March 13, 2015. (ECF No. 53). The
deadline was extended until April 6, 2015 via a stipulation. (ECF No. 55).
Cavusoglu never filed a Motion to Consolidate. Rather, it slipped a request to
consolidate into its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. This made the request
technically untimely, and Plaintiff objected to the untimeliness. Nevertheless, the
Court gave all objecting parties additional time to brief their objections, and they all
did so.

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, “If actions before the court
involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial
any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any
other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.” The purpose of consolidation is
“to streamline and economize pretrial proceedings so as to avoid duplication of
effort, and to prevent conflicting outcomes in cases involving similar legal and
factual issues. In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 724 (3d Cir. 1999). A district
court has broad discretion to determine to consolidate cases. In re Mock, 398 Fed.
App’x. 716, 718 (3d Cir. 2010); Ellerman Lines, Ltd. v. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.,
339 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1964). The mere existence of common issues does not
require consolidation. Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Marketing Corp., 149
F.R.D. 65, 81 (D.N.J. 1993). In exercising its discretion to consolidate cases, the
court should weigh the benefits of judicial economy against the potential for new
delays, expense, confusion, and prejudice. Margolis v. Hydraxatone, LLC, 2013 WL
875987, at *3 (D.N.J. March 6, 2013); Liberty Lincoln Mercury, 149 F.R.D. at 80.
Cevdet Aksüt II and Cevdet Aksüt III have very similar factual and legal issues.
Cevdet Aksüt III emerged from discovery that occurred during Cevdet Aksüt II.
Consolidation would conserve judicial resources and reduce the litigation expenses
of the parties.
Defendant notes that it would have made more sense for Plaintiff to amend
the Cevdet Aksüt II Complaint than it did to file a third iteration of a debt-collection
case. However, Plaintiff’s choice to file a third Complaint makes sense in light of
Plaintiff’s goal of obtaining a personal judgment against Cavusoglu as soon as
possible. Amending the Cevdet Aksüt II Complaint, like consolidation, would have
meant more long delays.
Cevdet Aksüt II will be ready for trial as soon as the Pre-Trial Order is filed,
but discovery in Cevdet Aksüt III has not yet begun and will likely take at least two
years to complete given the number of additional parties and additional factual
theories in the Cevdet Aksüt III Complaint.
The delays inherent in consolidation would be so much of an injustice to
Plaintiff as to outweigh the economic benefits of consolidation. First, there is the
amount of time Plaintiff has been waiting to be paid. Plaintiff has been waiting since
late 2009 or early 2010 for approximately $1.1 million to which it was legally
entitled at the time that debt came due. To date, it has only collected $30,000.

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Second, Plaintiff seems likely to pierce the corporate veil case in Cevdet Aksüt
II. The record is replete with instances of dubiousness and dishonesty on the part of
Cavusoglu. Therefore, it seems likely that the jury will not find Cavusoglu credible
and will find against him.
Third, Plaintiff has a credible concern that Cavusoglu has or will attempt to
hide his assets from a personal judgment against him. He has the tools to do so at
his disposal in the form of a rabbit warren of bank accounts and shell entities, some
of them located overseas. It seems likely that he has shuffled his assets before in
order to avoid creditors.
In sum, a speedy resolution of the discrete issues in Cevdet Aksüt II weighs
on the scales of justice more heavily than the economic benefits of consolidation.
The Court so finds for three reasons: 1.) the length of time Plaintiff has been trying
to collect money it is rightfully owed; 2.) the likelihood of Plaintiff’s ultimate
success on the merits, and 3.) Cavusoglu’s probable history of asset-shuffling. So
finding, the Court denies Cavusoglu’s Motion to Consolidate. An appropriate order
follows.

/s/ William J. Martini
________________________________
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

Date: July 14, 2015

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