DINOIA v. CUMBO et al

Filing 30

OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 2/19/13. (gh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 2:12-cv-03175 (WJM)

JOHN P. DINOIA,
Plaintiff,

OPINION
v.
TARA J. CUMBO, et al.,
Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Pro se Plaintiff John DiNoia filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) action
against Wantage Municipal Prosecutor William Haggerty (“Defendant”), eight New
Jersey State Troopers, and the New Jersey State Police Department. This matter comes
before the Court on Defendant Haggerty’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion is unopposed. There was no oral argument. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was arrested without probable cause
while walking lawfully on a public road in Wantage, New Jersey. Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant, the Wantage Municipal Prosecutor, charged him with disorderly conduct in
order to retaliate against him. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “actually
endeavored to convict the plaintiff and to advocate for the State despite his knowledge of
plaintiff’s innocence.” Am. Compl. ¶ 71. Plaintiff sets forth a litany of actions that he
argues constitute prosecutorial misconduct. See Am. Compl. ¶ 72. The only action
described in detail is Defendant’s alleged failure to meet a discovery deadline. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 73-81.
Defendant filed this motion to dismiss, which was returnable on December 17,
2012. See ECF No. 20. More than two months have elapsed since the return date, and
Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to the motion.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint,
in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v.
United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975);
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir.
1998). Moreover, where the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint is “to be
liberally construed,” and, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93-94 (2007). Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim has
“facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that he is entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
The Court agrees. The Supreme Court has long held that a prosecutor acting in his role
as an advocate for the State is entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983. Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting
the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under s 1983”);
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993) (“[A] state prosecutor ha[s] absolute
immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution”). In this case,
Plaintiff’s only allegations about Defendant relate to Defendant’s role in initiating and
pursuing a criminal prosecution against him. Because Defendant took these actions in his
role as an advocate for the State, he is entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant Haggerty’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.
Date: February 19, 2013
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