ARCHIE v. THE CITY OF NEWARK et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Faith S. Hochberg on 6/27/12. (jd, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHAQUAN ARCHIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF NEWARK, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 12-3657 (FSH)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HOCHBERG, District Judge:
1. Presently before this Court is a Complaint and application to proceed in forma
pauperis submitted by Shaquan Archie, an inmate incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison.
2. Based on his affidavit of poverty, prison account statement and the apparent absence
of three qualifying dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), this Court will grant Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis and direct the Clerk to file the Complaint. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a).
3. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110
Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires the Court to review a complaint in a civil
action in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity or is
proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(a). The PLRA requires
the Court to sua sponte dismiss at any time a claim if the Court determines that it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this
pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89 (2007). Moreover, the Third Circuit instructs that a court should not dismiss a complaint
with prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to amend, unless it finds bad
faith, undue delay, prejudice or futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F. 3d 103,
110-111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F. 3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000). With these precepts
in mind, the Court will determine whether any of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.
4. In the Complaint, Plaintiff sues the City of Newark, the Newark Police Department,
and a group of unnamed Newark Police Officers for violation of his constitutional rights. In his
statement of facts, Plaintiff asserts:
. . . On the date of March 17, 2009, I was physically assaulted and mentally
abused . . . . I was berated by people who violated my constitutional rights. They
used racially motivated language. There were also other human rights violations
like; I was stood over and kicked, then an officer put his foot on me as if he was
posing over wild game, he had captured. In the establishment, I was assaulted and
repeatedly called a “monkey and ni—er.” After, the first assault, police arrived on
the scene and began the[ir] assault and name calling. The ordeal lasted over (2)
two hours and I was refused bathroom privileges. My personal property was
taken and never returned. A cell phone, gold chain, jacket, shirt, sunglasses, and
fitted baseball cap were all stolen. My permanent record still reflects a “no bills”
charge because, the bar manager never appeared to court because of selfconviction and guilt.
(Dkt. 1 at 6.)
5. This Court may exercise jurisdiction over “Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority.” Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code authorizes a person such as
Plaintiff to seek redress for a violation of his federal civil rights by a person who was acting
under color of state law. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
6. To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (a) a person
caused him to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
(b) the deprivation was done under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
7. The problem with Plaintiff’s Complaint is that the face of the Complaint shows that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations on civil rights
claims is governed by New Jersey’s two-year limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F. 3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010); O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 126-27 (3d Cir. 2006); Montgomery v. De
Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998); Cito v. Bridgewater Township Police Dept., 892 F.2d
23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989). This statute requires that “an action for an injury to the person caused by a
wrongful act, neglect, or default, must be convened within two years of accrual of the cause of
action.” Cito, 892 F.2d at 25 (quoting Brown v. Foley, 810 F.2d 55, 56 (3d Cir. 1987)).
“Accrual is the occurrence of damages caused by a wrongful act . . . . [T]he tort cause of action
accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the wrongful act or omission
results in damages.” Dique, 603 F. 3d at 185-86 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Montgomery, 159 F.3d at 126 (“the limitations period begins to run from the time when
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the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the section 1983
action”) (quoting Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991)); Sameric
Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998) (“A [§] 1983 cause
of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his]
action is based”).
8. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must generally be pleaded and
proved by the defendants. See Bethel v. Jendoco Const. Corp., 570 F.2d 1168, 1174 (3d Cir.
1978) (statute of limitations on civil rights claim is an affirmative defense). While a plaintiff is
not required to plead that the claim has been brought within the statute of limitations, Ray v.
Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297 (3d Cir. 2002), the Supreme Court observed in Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 215 (2007), that if the allegations of a complaint, "show that relief is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.”
9. In this case, Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights were violated when certain
unnamed Newark police officers beat him on March 17, 2009. However, Plaintiff did not
execute the Complaint until May 5, 2012, well beyond the two year statute of limitations, which
expired on March 17, 2011. Although the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, tolling is
extraordinary relief that is appropriate only “in three general scenarios: (1) where a defendant
actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been
prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where
the plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum.” Lake v.
Arnold, 232 F. 3d 360, 370, n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff does not explain why he
waited until almost three years to bring this action and none of the circumstances warranting
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equitable tolling appear to apply, it is apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff’s §
1983 claims are time barred. This Court will dismiss the Complaint as untimely. See Paluch v.
Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 442 Fed. App’x 690, 694 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011)
(“Although the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is an affirmative defense, which
may be waived by the defendant, it is appropriate to dismiss sua sponte under § 1915(e)(2) a
complaint whose untimeliness is apparent from the face of the record”); McPherson v. United
States, 2010 WL 3446879 at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 2, 2010) (“[W]hen a statute-of-limitations defense
is apparent from the face of the complaint, a court may sua sponte dismiss the complaint pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A”); Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F. 3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir.
2006); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc);
Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51 (2nd Cir. 1995); Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993);
Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992); Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991).
10. Because amendment of the Complaint would be futile, this Court will dismiss the
Complaint without granting leave to amend. However, if Plaintiff believes that he can assert
facts showing that equitable tolling is warranted, he may set forth those facts in a motion asking
this Court to reconsider dismissal of the Complaint as time barred. If Plaintiff does so, then
Plaintiff is advised to provide the names of the police officers who allegedly beat him.
11. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
s/ Faith S. Hochberg
FAITH S. HOCHBERG, U.S.D.J.
Dated: June 27, 2012
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