GUERRERO v. PASSAIC COUNTY SHERRIF'S DEPT. et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 12/17/12. (jd, )
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HECTOR GUERRERO,
Plaintiff,
v.
PASSAIC COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPT., et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 12-3715 (SDW)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
HECTOR GUERRERO, Plaintiff pro se
270299
Passaic County Jail
11 Marshal Street
Paterson, N.J. 07505
WIGENTON, District Judge
Plaintiff Hector Guerrero (“Plaintiff”) seeks to bring this
action in forma pauperis.
Based on his affidavit of indigence, the
Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to
file the complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, to determine whether it should
be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons
set forth below, the Court concludes that the complaint should be
dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, incarcerated at the Passaic County Justice Facility
in Paterson, New Jersey at the time of filing, brings this civil
rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants
Passaic County Jail, Sheriff’s Department and Corizon Medical
Services.
The following factual allegations are taken from the
complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The
Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff’s
allegations.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Corizon Medical Services did
not properly treat his injury and due to their neglect, he now walks
with a limp.
Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff’s Department
violated his rights by failing to respond to his grievances
requesting medical attention.
Plaintiff requests that this Court
“make both Defendants pay for [his] pain and suffering.”
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a
district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
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prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against
a governmental employee or entity.
The Court is required to identify
cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This action is
subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A because Plaintiff is proceeding as an
indigent and is a prisoner.
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
The Court examined
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).
FED.R.CIV.P.
Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) for the proposition that “[a] pleading that offers
‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent
a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must allege “sufficient
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible.
This
then “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)(citing Iqbal).
The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint are plausible.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 677-679.
See also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, &
n. 3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011);
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012).
“A complaint must
do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
complaint has to ‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”
A
Fowler,
578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)).
2.
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and, second, that the alleged deprivation
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was committed or caused by a person acting under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff does not indicate whether he was a pre-trial detainee
or a convicted prisoner at the time the incidents occurred.
To the extent he was a pre-trial detainee or a convicted but
unsentenced prisoner at the time of the incidents, Plaintiff retains
liberty interests firmly grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir.
2005); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 2000).
Analysis
of whether such a detainee or unsentenced prisoner has been deprived
of liberty without due process is governed by the standards set out
by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861,
60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 157–60, 164–67; Fuentes,
206 F.3d at 341–42.
In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or
restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only
the protection against deprivation of liberty without
due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is
whether those conditions amount to punishment of the
detainee....
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed
for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an
incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.
Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the
part
of
detention
facility
officials,
that
determination generally will turn on “whether an
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alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it].” Thus, if a
particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more,
amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or
condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal-if it is arbitrary or purposeless-a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees....
441 U.S. at 535–39 (citations omitted).
The Court further explained
that the government has legitimate interests that stem from its need
to maintain security and order at the detention facility. “Restraints
that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute
unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are
restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been
released while awaiting trial.”
441 U.S. at 540.
With respect to
medical care and prison conditions, however, pretrial detainees
retain at least those constitutional rights enjoyed by convicted
prisoners.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 545; Hubbard, 399 F.3d at
165–66; Natale, 318 F.3d at 581–82; Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,
187–88 (3d Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts suggesting intent
to punish.
In fact, Plaintiff provides barely any facts regarding
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his treatment.
He does not even allege what medical issue he
suffered from.
Nor do the facts alleged reflect that the incidents
complained of arose out of any arbitrary or purposeless policies or
practices.
The Complaint fails to state a claim for deprivation of
Plaintiff's due process rights.
To the extent Plaintiff was a convicted and sentenced prisoner
at the time of the acts complained of, he is protected by the Eighth
Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment requires that prison officials provide inmates
with adequate medical care.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04
(1976); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999); Afdahl v.
Cancellieri, 2012 WL 593275 (3d Cir. February 24, 2012).
In order
to set forth a cognizable claim for a violation of his right to
adequate medical care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical
need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that
constitutes deliberate indifference to that need.
Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 106.
To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, the inmate
must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
Hudson v.
The Third Circuit has defined a
serious medical need as: (1) “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment;” (2) “one that is so obvious that
a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention;”
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or (3) one for which “the denial of treatment would result in the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or “a life-long handicap
or permanent loss.”
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d
Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The second element of the Estelle test requires an inmate to
show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical need.
See Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (finding
deliberate indifference requires proof that the official knew of and
disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety).
“Deliberate indifference” is more than mere malpractice or
negligence; it is a state of mind equivalent to reckless disregard
of a known risk of harm.
(1994).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38
Furthermore, a prisoner's subjective dissatisfaction with
his medical care does not in itself indicate deliberate indifference.
Andrews v. Camden County, 95 F.Supp.2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000).
Even
if a doctor's judgment concerning the proper course of a prisoner's
treatment ultimately is shown to be mistaken, at most what would be
proved is medical malpractice and not an Eighth Amendment violation.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; White, 897 F.3d at 110.
Here, Plaintiff does not provide any facts regarding a serious
medical need.
He also does not provide any facts to support a finding
of deliberate indifference.
As such, any Eighth Amendment claim
must be dismissed.
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III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint will be dismissed
in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1).
However, because it is conceivable that Plaintiff
may be able to supplement his pleading with facts sufficient to
overcome the deficiencies noted herein, the Court will grant
Plaintiff leave to move to re-open this case and to file an amended
complaint. 1
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: December 17, 2012
s/Susan D. Wigenton
SUSAN D. WIGENTON
United States District Judge
1
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed, the original
complaint no longer performs any function in the case and “cannot be utilized to
cure defects in the amended [complaint], unless the relevant portion is
specifically incorporated in the new [complaint].” 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (2d ed.1990) (footnotes omitted). An
amended complaint may adopt some or all of the allegations in the original
complaint, but the identification of the particular allegations to be adopted must
be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
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