LUCIA v. CARROL et al

Filing 43

OPINION fld. Signed by Judge Susan D. Wigenton on 5/2/14. (sr, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
LISA LUCIA,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
MICHAEL
CARROLL;
CITY
OF :
WOODBRIDGE, THROUGH ITS POLICE :
DEPARTMENT; JOSEPH STRAILE,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:

Civil Action No. 12-3787 (SDW)(MCA)

OPINION
May 2, 2014

WIGENTON, District Judge.
Before the Court is Michael Carroll (“Officer Carroll”) and the City of Woodbridge’s
(“Woodbridge”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper
in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). This Motion is decided without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78. For the reasons stated below, this Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion with respect to Counts I, II, and III.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff resides in Colonia, New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff and Joseph Straile
(“Straile”) have known each other for approximately fourteen years and have a five-year-old son
together. (Defs’ Statement of Material Facts (“Defs’ SOF”) ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff maintains sole
custody of the child and Straile is allowed supervised visitations. (Id. ¶ 8; Compl. ¶ 8.) Between

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April 2001 through April 2012, Plaintiff reported thirty-six incidents to the police, of which several
reports related to domestic violence. (Defs’ SOF ¶¶ 6-7; Defs’ Br. Ex. E.)
On January 1, 2011, at approximately 5:30 p.m., after a supervised visitation, Straile
dropped off his son at Plaintiff’s home. (Defs’ SOF ¶ 9; Defs’ Br. Ex. F.) Plaintiff and Straile
engaged in a heated argument regarding visitation. (Defs’ SOF ¶ 9.) Straile was enraged, punched
the refrigerator, and left Plaintiff’s home. (Pl.’s Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s SOF”) ¶ 10;
Pl.’s Ex. 1.)

At approximately 6:38 p.m., Straile went to the City of Woodbridge Police

Department and reported a domestic violence incident. (Defs’ SOF ¶ 11.) Officer Carroll—a
police officer for the City of Woodbridge since 2008—was dispatched to respond to the report.
(Id. ¶¶ 11, 27.) Straile alleged that Plaintiff attacked him with a knife causing abrasions to his
right hand and right abdomen. (Id. ¶ 12.) Officer Carroll signed Straile’s complaint for Plaintiff’s
aggravated assault based upon Straile’s statements, Officer Carroll’s investigation, and the visible
injuries. (Id. ¶ 14; Defs’ Br. Ex. I.) Officer Carroll took photographs of Straile’s injuries and
placed them into evidence. (Defs’ Br. ¶ 15; Defs’ Br. Exs. F, J.) After the complaint was filed,
Officer Carroll sought an arrest warrant from Judge Morse of the Woodbridge Municipal Court.
(Defs’ Br. ¶ 16.) Judge Morse found probable cause and set bail at $20,000.00 with no 10% option.
(Id.)
At approximately 10:30 p.m., Officer Carroll and another officer arrived at Plaintiff’s home
to arrest her and charged her with aggravated assault. (Id. ¶ 17; Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff was taken
into custody and then transferred to the Middlesex County Jail workhouse. (Pl.’s SOF ¶ 37.) On
January 2, 2011, after spending fifteen hours in jail, Plaintiff posted bail. (Id. ¶ 38; Defs’ SOF ¶
22.)

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After being released from jail, Plaintiff filed a restraining order against Straile along with
a complaint for filing a false report with law enforcement. (Defs’ SOF ¶¶ 23-24.) On or about
May 4, 2011, Plaintiff’s aggravated assault charge was presented before the Middlesex County
Grand Jury and she was not indicted. (Id. ¶ 25; Pl.’s SOF ¶ 46.)
On January 26, 2012, Straile was found guilty of filing a false report. (Defs’ SOF ¶ 26.)
Plaintiff commenced the instant action on June 20, 2012 against Officer Carroll, the City of
Woodbridge through its police department, and Straile alleging the following Counts: (1)
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to Officer Carroll; (II) violations of the New Jersey Constitution
and New Jersey Civil Rights Act as to Officer Carroll; (III) failure of the City of Woodbridge to
train, supervise and/or discipline Officer Carroll; (IV) false arrest/false imprisonment as to Straile;
(V) malicious prosecution as to Straile; and (VI) intentional infliction of emotional distress as to
Straile. The City of Woodbridge and Officer Carroll brought the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment with respect to Counts I, II, and III.
LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The “mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A
fact is only “material” for purposes of a summary judgment motion if a dispute over that fact
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248. A dispute about a
material fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id. The dispute is not genuine if it merely involves “some metaphysical

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doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586 (1986).
The moving party must show that if the evidentiary material of record were reduced to
admissible evidence in court, it would be insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to carry its
burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Once the moving party
meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant who must set forth specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere allegations, speculations,
unsupported assertions or denials of its pleadings. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir.
2001). “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party’s
evidence ‘is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Marino v.
Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
The nonmoving party “must present more than just ‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations
or suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine issue.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Serv., 409 F.3d
584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325). Further, the nonmoving party
is required to “point to concrete evidence in the record which supports each essential element of
its case.” Black Car Assistance Corp. v. New Jersey, 351 F. Supp. 2d 284, 286 (D.N.J. 2004). If
the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case, and on which . . . [it has] the burden of proof,” then the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23.
DISCUSSION
I.

Count I: Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to Officer Carroll
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

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[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except
that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of
federal law committed by state individuals.” Woodyard v. Cnty. of Essex, 514 F. App’x 177, 180
(3d Cir. 2013). To assert a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff ‘must establish that [ ]he was deprived of a
federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.’” Id. (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d
626, 646 (3rd Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff alleges § 1983 violations against Officer Carroll based on false
arrest and malicious prosecution.
A. False Arrest
The Fourth Amendment of the United States guarantees:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits arrests without probable cause.” Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny,
219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). The proper inquiry in analyzing a § 1983 claim based on false
arrest “is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the arresting
officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.” Dowling
v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). Generally, the question of probable cause in a
§ 1983 suit is one for the jury. Campbell v. Moore, 92 F. App’x 29, 33 (3d Cir. 2004). “However,

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a district court may conclude ‘that probable cause did exist as a matter of law if the evidence,
viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding.’”
Merkle v. Upper Dublin School Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 789 (3d Cir. 2000). In that case, the court
may enter summary judgment accordingly. Id.
In determining whether probable cause existed for an arrest, courts apply an objective
standard based on “the facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest.” Beck v. State
of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).

“[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and

circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United States
v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990)). Nevertheless it does not “require the same type of
specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.”
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972).
Additionally, under the New Jersey Domestic Violence Act, “[a] law enforcement officer
may arrest a person; or may sign a criminal complaint against that person, or may do both, where
there is probable cause to believe that an act of domestic violence has been committed.” N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:25-21(b). However, “if . . . [t]he victim exhibits signs of injury caused by an act of
domestic violence” a law enforcement officer “shall arrest the person who is alleged to be the
person who subjected the victim to domestic violence and shall sign a criminal complaint.” N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-21(a)-(1) (emphasis added).
Moreover, “[u]nder Section 1983, even if probable cause does not exist in fact, defendants
may be entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity if they reasonably believed that probable
cause existed.” Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 385 (2000). The United States

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Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Additionally, the Supreme Court has stated “that
it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly
conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials—
like other officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held
personally liable.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Officer Carroll’s conduct “resulted in Plaintiff being falsely, and
unlawfully arrested and detained, thereby depriving Plaintiff of her right to be free from an
unreasonable and unlawful seizure of her person in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” (Compl. ¶ 29.) Based on the record, the undisputed facts establish
that Officer Carroll responded to Straile’s domestic violence incident report in which he took a full
body image of Straile and photographed his injuries in line with the department’s policy of taking
photographs in the event of a domestic violence incident involving injuries. (Carroll Dep. 25:518, Mar. 28, 2013; Defs’ Br. Ex. J.) After taking the photographs of Straile’s injuries and writing
the report, Officer Carroll determined—based upon his investigation and the visible injuries—that
there was sufficient probable cause to seek an arrest warrant from Judge Morse. (Defs’ Br. 16.)
Following an independent probable cause determination, Judge Morse found that there was
probable cause to issue an arrest warrant. (Defs’ Br. Ex. I.)
Based on the undisputed facts, probable cause did exist as a matter of law at the time of
arrest and the evidence could not reasonably support a contrary factual finding. Additionally, in
accordance with the New Jersey Domestic Violence Act, Officer Carroll acted reasonably in

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seeking out an arrest warrant for the Plaintiff based on Straile’s visible injuries. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:25-21(a)-(1). Furthermore, Officer Carroll would also be protected by qualified
immunity as he reasonably believed probable cause existed. Therefore, Plaintiff’s false arrest
claim fails as to Officer Carroll.
B. Malicious Prosecution
To establish a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was
initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to
justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent
with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.
Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 362-363 (3d Cir. 2003). To prevail on a
malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show that the officer lacked probable cause to
arrest. Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 603-604 (3d Cir. 2005). “Actual malice in the
context of malicious prosecution is defined as either ill will in the sense of spite, lack of belief by
the actor himself in the propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an extraneous improper purpose.”
Morales v. Busbee, 972 F. Supp. 254, 261 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66,
70 (3d Cir. 1988)). Malice “may be inferred from lack of probable cause.” Morales, 972 F. Supp.
at 261.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff contends Officer Carroll’s actions “amounted to malicious
prosecution because there was no probable cause for the arrest.” (Compl. ¶ 28.) However, as this
Court has already concluded, there was probable cause for the arrest. Officer Carroll sought an
arrest warrant after conducting an investigation which included documenting Straile’s statement
and taking photographs of Straile’s injuries. An arrest warrant was then issued after a second
probable cause determination by Judge Morse. Further, Officer Straile’s actions were consistent
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with the New Jersey Domestic Violence Act. Plaintiff makes reference to comments made by the
municipal court judge during Straile’s trial for filing a false report. While these comments are
helpful in understanding the context of the municipal proceedings, they are neither dispositive nor
binding in the instant matter. Based on the undisputed facts, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution
claim fails. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count I is granted.
II.

Count II: Violation of the New Jersey Constitution and New Jersey Civil Rights
Act
In Count II, Plaintiff that Officer Carroll “violated the rights of Plaintiff under Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.” (Compl. ¶ 31.)
Neither party specifically addresses Count II beyond what is discussed with respect to Count I.
Because the analysis for Plaintiff’s New Jersey claims are the same as that of Count I, for the
reasons stated above, this Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to
Count II.
III.

Count III: Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as to the City of Woodbridge
In the instant matter, Plaintiff alleges Woodbridge “failed to train, supervise and/or

discipline Defendant Carroll so as to prevent him from unlawfully depriving citizens of their
constitutional rights, and particularly Plaintiff.” (Compl. ¶ 33.) Under § 1983, a city can be liable
for failure to train where the failure to train reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” policy by a
municipality that causes a constitutional deprivation. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 389 (1989). Liability will not be established “by merely alleging that the existing training
program for a class of employees, such as police officers, represents a policy for which the city is
responsible.” Id. “Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect
evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be
properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” Id.
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Courts have identified two situations in which deliberate indifference is established. See
Brown v. Shaner, 172 F.3d 927, 931 (6th Cir. 1999). “One is failure to provide adequate training
in light of foreseeable consequences that could result from the lack of instruction. A second type
of situation justifying a conclusion of deliberate indifference is where the city fails to act in
response to repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its officers.” Brown, 172 F.3d at
931. In addition to establishing deliberate indifference, “there must be a ‘direct causal link
between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation’ to ground
municipal liability.” Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007)
(quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385).
Under New Jersey state law, all law enforcement officers attend an initial training, within
ninety days of appointment or transfer, on “the handling, investigation and response procedures
concerning reports of domestic violence” and attend “annual inservice training of at least four
hours.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-20(a)(1)-(2). Officer Carroll testified that prior to graduating from
the Police Academy in Monmouth County, he received domestic violence training. (Carroll Dep.
17:3-11.) Officer Carroll’s training records indicate that he received domestic violence in-service
training on December 8, 2008, June 2, 2009, November 19, 2009, November 7, 2010, November
28, 2011 and November 29, 2012. (Defs’ Br. Ex. O.) Further, Officer Carroll testified the
domestic violence trainings were four hours long. (Carroll Dep. 17: 19-24.) As illustrated by
Officer Carroll’s training records and testimony, he has received the proper domestic violence
training consistent with New Jersey state law. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to show that
Woodbridge’s failure to train, supervise and/or discipline its employees evidences a deliberate
indifference to the rights of its inhabitants. Accordingly, as there is no genuine issue of material

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fact regarding Woodbridge’s failure to train/supervise, this Court grants Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to Count III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
with respects to Counts I, II, and III.
s/ Susan D. Wigenton, U.S.D.J.
cc:

Magistrate Judge Madeline C. Arleo

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