PODEIA et al v. CBSK FINANCIAL GROUP et al

Filing 10

OPINION. Signed by Judge William J. Martini on 2/19/13. (gh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Civ. No. 2:12-cv-03855 (WJM)

MARIO PODEIA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

OPINION
v.
CBSK FINANCIAL GROUP, et al.,
Defendants.

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.:
Plaintiffs Mario Podeia, Grace Podeia, Tania Podeia, and Michael Podeia bring this
action against various financial institutions to challenge the foreclosure of their New Jersey
home. This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by three defendants: (1) Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., (2) BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., and (3) Impac Funding Corporation
(collectively, “Defendants”). There was no oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2001, Plaintiffs Mario and Grace Podeia executed a 30-year
mortgage for a property in Wallington, New Jersey. Compl. ¶ 9. On February 7, 2008, a
foreclosure complaint was filed for the property in Bergen County Superior Court. See
Bankers Trust Company of California, N.A., et al. v. Mario Podeia, No. F-5045-08, N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. (filed Feb. 7, 2008). On May 5, 2008, after Plaintiffs failed to plead or
otherwise defend the foreclosure action, a request to enter default was filed. Cert. of
Donna Bates (“Bates Cert.”) Ex. B, ECF No. 5-1. On November 10, 2008, the Honorable
Maria Sypek entered a final judgment against Mario and Grace Podeia. Compl. ¶ 17; Bates
Cert. Ex. C. The same day, a writ of execution was issued, directing the sale of the
property. Bates Cert. Ex. D. On June 9, 2011, following a sheriff’s sale of the property,
Plaintiffs were evicted. Compl. ¶ 18.
Plaintiffs filed the Complaint in this case on June 22, 2012, alleging that Defendants
violated the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(“RESPA”), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) in executing the
mortgage and pursuing the foreclosure. Defendants now move to dismiss.
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II.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court agrees.
Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court determinations or to evaluate
[federal] claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s [decision] in a
judicial proceeding.” Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 885 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “A federal claim is inextricably intertwined
with an issue adjudicated by a state court when . . . the federal court must take an action
that would negate the state court’s judgment.” In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 581 (3d Cir.
2005). Time and again, the Third Circuit has held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars
federal courts from providing relief that would invalidate a state court foreclosure decision.
See, e.g., Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 152 (3d Cir.
2008) (district court correctly relied on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss plaintiff’s
claims for redress from a state court foreclosure decision); Ayres-Fountain v. E. Sav. Bank,
153 F. App’x 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2005) (district court lacked jurisdiction under the RookerFeldman doctrine to hear claims related to state foreclosure action).
In this case, adjudicating Plaintiff’s claims would require this Court to engage in
appellate review of the state court foreclosure action. Plaintiffs argue that the “issues
raised for review in this Court are not issues that were reviewed by the State Court.” Opp.
Br. at 4, ECF No. 8. However, the federal claims raised in this action are inextricably
intertwined with the issues adjudicated in state court. Plaintiffs are challenging the right of
the lender to have foreclosed on the property, and are seeking to litigate the validity of the
underlying mortgage. This is exactly what Rooker-Feldman is meant to prevent: an
attempt to invalidate a final judgment of foreclosure in a separate federal court action. See
Ayres-Fountain, 153 F. App’x at 92 (Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived district court of
jurisdiction to review federal claims that were “inextricably intertwined” with a state court
foreclosure action); El Ali v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 217 F. App’x 115, 116 n.1 (3d Cir.
2007) (district court dismissed plaintiff’s TILA and FDCPA claims under the RookerFeldman doctrine).
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the
Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. An appropriate order follows.
/s/ William J. Martini
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

Date: February 19, 2013
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